In Re Inslaw, Inc.

55 B.R. 502, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1131, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4972
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided November 14, 1985·No. Bankruptcy 85-00070·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE FRANCIS BASON, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Upon consideration of the application for interim compensation of counsel to Inslaw, Inc., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (“Milbank”) and the objections, responses and memoranda relating thereto filed by the United States Trustee, AT & T Information Systems, Inc., Boston Financial & Equity Corp., the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, Milbank, the Bank of Bethesda and the National Bank of Washington, and after two hearings on notice, this Court finds and concludes as follows:

Under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), Milbank is disqualified from representing the Debtor (“Inslaw”) as Inslaw’s counsel in this case because Milbank is not a “disinterested person” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). To be “disinterested,” a person must be “not a creditor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A).» Here, there is an executory contract dated June 10, 1983, between Milbank and Inslaw, whereby Inslaw was to supply computer software to Milbank. Inslaw has partially performed under that contract, and Mil-bank has paid Inslaw for the work performed and has made an advance to Inslaw against future performance. That advance is evidenced by a promissory note having a $50,000 balance. Thus, Milbank is at least a contingent creditor of Inslaw, as a result of this commercial transaction between them. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365 and 502(g), relating to a debtor’s assumption or rejec *504 tion of executory contracts, and claims arising from rejection. Since this commercial transaction is wholly apart from and unrelated to any fees generated by Milbank’s employment as Inslaw’s counsel before In-slaw commenced this case, the exception contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) 2 to disqualification under § 327(a) does not apply. In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Wells Benrus Corp., 48 B.R. 196 (Bankr.D.Conn.1985); In re Anver Corp., 44 B.R. 615 (Bankr.D.Mass.1984); In re Leisure Dynamics, 32 B.R. 753 (Bankr.D.Minn.), affirmed, 33 B.R. 121, 11 BCD 1116 (D.C.D.Minn.1983).

Moreover, this Court cannot ignore that, “even when business transactions are ‘mutually beneficial’ to both sides, such transactions involve adverse interests” because the buyer wants to purchase “at the lowest price” and the seller “wishes to realize as much profit as it can reasonably make ...” In re The Cropper Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 625, 631, 11 BCD 637, (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1983).

However, Milbank’s disqualification under § 327(a) because it is not “disinterested” does not prevent its employment under § 327(e) “for a specified special purpose” if such employment is “in the best interest of the estate” and if Milbank “does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which” Milbank “is to be employed.” 3 In re AM International, Inc., Case No. 82B04922, Bankr.M.D.Tenn., as cited in In re Leisure Dynamics, 32 B.R. at 757.

Here, Milbank’s employment has been and will be by this Court limited to (1) assisting Inslaw’s bankruptcy counsel “in the initial phases of the Chapter 11 case,” restricted to the “development and presentation of initial urgent matters to the Court,” 4 (2) holding “discussions with potential providers of capital to allow the Debtor to reorganize,” 5 and (3) conducting “negotiations at the highest levels of the Department of Justice in an attempt to settle the contract dispute between the Debtor and the Department of Justice.” 6 In addition, Milbank has disqualified itself from any participation in Inslaw’s decisions concerning the June 10, 1983 contract between Milbank and Inslaw. “All matters concerning Milbank as a customer or a creditor of Inslaw will be handled by In-slaw’s bankruptcy counsel ...” 7

The testimony of Inslaw’s president is relevant to the question whether Milbank’s employment, so limited, is “in the best interest of the estate” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 327(e). He testified without contradiction that Milbank’s disqualification would be “devastating” because Mil-bank’s efforts to arrange financing and to settle the $1 million contract dispute with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) are “most critical” to the success of Inslaw’s reorganization effort. (However, so far as the record reveals, neither of these efforts has yet achieved a successful conclusion.)

*505 The remaining question under § 327(e) is whether Milbank “represents] or hold[s] any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter[s] on which” it “is to be employed.” The answer at this time is no. To the contrary, Mil-bank has a great interest in keeping Inslaw alive so that Inslaw can successfully complete its contractual commitment to supply additional computer software to Milbank and thereafter to provide continuing backup services to Milbank. As Inslaw’s president testified, without Inslaw, Milbank will have no one to service the unique products which Milbank has bought and hopes to buy from Inslaw. In addition, Milbank may be uniquely placed to persuade a rather small number of major law firms to join with it (and with Sullivan & Cromwell) in advancing to Inslaw the funds that Inslaw needs in order to develop the computer software which Inslaw will then sell to those firms and on which Milbank has already paid a large advance. Milbank may also be an especially good choice for conducting “negotiations at the highest levels” of the Justice Department.

For all these reasons this Court concludes that Milbank’s employment for the three enumerated “special purpose[s]” is fully justified under 11 U.S.C. § 327(e), at least for so long as the interests of Mil-bank, the Debtor and the estate, with respect to arranging financing and negotiating the contract dispute with DOJ, remain congruent.

However, Milbank’s top rate and its weighted average rate are significantly higher than those of any of the other firms involved in this case. 8

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In Re Inslaw, Inc., 55 B.R. 502, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1131, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4972 (D.D.C. 1985).

55 B.R. 502 (In Re Inslaw, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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