In re: In the matter of N.R.S.W.

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: July 17, 2026
• Docket: CL-2025-0901
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: July 17, ,2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________

CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, and CL-2025-0706 _________________________

K.W.

v.

B.P., T.S.P., and B.M.P.

Appeals from Lee Juvenile Court (JU-17-515.02, JU-17-515.03, JU-17-515.04, JU-17-515.05, and JU-17-515.06) _________________________

CL-2025-0901 _________________________

Ex parte K.W.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Matter of N.R.S.W.)

(Lee Juvenile Court: JU-17-515.07) CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

FRIDY, Judge.

These appeals and this petition for a writ of mandamus arise from

a dependency and custody dispute between K.W. ("the mother") and

T.S.P. and B.M.P. ("the custodians") regarding N.R.S.W. ("the child").

The child has lived with the custodians since 2019, and they are

attempting to adopt her. Appellee B.P. is the child's paternal

grandmother ("the grandmother"), who had legal custody of the child

before she went to live with the custodians.

The Lee Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") entered an order of

dependency and custody on August 11, 2025, finding that the child

remained dependent and vesting sole legal and physical custody of the

child in the custodians. Several appeals have been taken as to that order.

Because we conclude that the order was not final, we dismiss each of the

appeals as being from a nonfinal judgment.

The mother's petition for a writ of mandamus involves a separate

action that the custodians initiated in the Lee Probate Court ("the

probate court") to adopt the child; that action was transferred to the

2 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

juvenile court. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the mother's

petition.

Background This matter began in December 2017, when the grandmother filed

a dependency petition in the juvenile court. That action was designated

as case no. JU-17-515.01 ("the .01 action"). In her petition, the

grandmother asserted that the child, who was then three years old, and

her older sibling, A.F.W. ("the sibling"), were dependent. On February

12, 2018, after an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court entered an

order in which it found that the child and the sibling had been exposed

to domestic violence and that the mother and H.W. ("the father") had

failed to provide for their material needs and education, among other

things. Based on its findings, the juvenile court determined that the

child and the sibling were dependent, vested legal and physical custody

in the grandmother, and permitted the mother to have supervised

visitation. The grandmother encountered some difficulties caring for the

child and permitted the child to live in Georgia with the custodians

without notifying the juvenile court. The child had remained with the

custodians since going to live with them.

3 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

After the juvenile court entered the judgment in the .01 action,

several individuals initiated actions in the juvenile court, including case

no. JU-17-515.02 ("the .02 action"), in which the custodians asserted that

the child was dependent; case no. JU-17-515.03 ("the .03 action"), which

appears to have involved the Lee County Department of Human

Resources in its supervisory capacity; case no. JU-17-515.04 ("the .04

action"), in which a different member of the child's extended family

asserted the child's dependency; case no. JU-17-515.05 ("the.05 action"),

in which the mother petitioned to modify custody of the child; and case

no. JU-17-515.06 ("the .06 action"), in which the grandmother petitioned

to modify custody of the child. The juvenile court consolidated those

actions and purported to resolve all of them in a single order that it

entered in the .02 action on July 17, 2025. The juvenile court amended

that order on August 11, 2025, to address the issue of child support.1

The petition for a writ of mandamus involves case no. JU-17-515.07,

which is an adoption proceeding that the custodians filed in the probate

court and that that court subsequently transferred to the juvenile court

1For ease of reference, we will refer only to the August 11, 2025,

order throughout this opinion. 4 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

in June 2022 ("the adoption action"). The juvenile court did not

consolidate the adoption action with the dependency and custody

matters, and it has not entered a final judgment in that action although,

in the August 11, 2025, order, it determined "that [the mother's] parental

status should not be completely extinguished."

On May 11, 2026, this court consolidated the appeals and the

mandamus petition ex mero motu.

Analysis

The Appeals

Before this court can address the merits of the mother's appeals, we

must first determine whether the August 11, 2025, order is a final

judgment. "The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional

question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment

is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case …." Horton v. Horton, 822 So.

2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). "[J]urisdictional matters are of such

magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex

mero motu." Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987).

In the August 11, 2025, order, the juvenile court identified the

various actions that it said had been "consolidated into" the .02 action,

5 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

and it purported to reach resolutions of the claims presented in those

consolidated actions, including purporting to dismiss the .03 and .06

actions. However, the .02 action was the only action identified by case

number in the caption of the order, and it appears from the record on

appeal that the juvenile court entered the order only in that action. In

other words, while the order purported to resolve all the claims asserted

in the .02 through the .06 actions, the juvenile court entered the order

only in the .02 action.

It is well established that, when a trial court consolidates two or

more actions, those actions do not lose their separate identities, and each

action requires the entry of a separate judgment. Lindsey v. Pollard, 376

So. 3d 496, 502 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (citing League v. McDonald, 355 So.

2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1978)). See also Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Ex parte

Glassmeyer, 204 So. 3d 906, 908-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (recognizing

that, in consolidated cases, although a trial court may specify that all

filings be made in only one case, a final judgment must be entered in each

separate case). Because the juvenile court did not enter the August 11,

2025, order in the .03 through .06 actions, that order, even though it

referenced those actions, cannot constitute a final judgment as to those

6 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

actions, and this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the mother's

appeals from those actions.

We turn now to the question whether the August 11, 2025, order,

entered in the .02 action, was a final judgment sufficient to support an

appeal in that action. In the order, the juvenile court explained that it

had considered a significant amount of evidence in connection with the

actions, and, regarding the mother, it ultimately found that she had made

significant progress during the course of the litigation; that she had

presented "today as a markedly improved individual compared to the

person who first came before this Court"; and that, "[i]n light of her

marked improvement, and her past visitation with the child," it would

not terminate her parental rights.2 The juvenile court continued:

"That being said, [the mother] needs to ensure that she does not add additional drama or trauma to [the child's] childhood development in the [custodians'] home. These circumstances are the natural consequences of [the mother's] prior actions. She should do everything within her power not to make things worse. One way she can do this is by being supportive of [the child, the custodians], and their 2As none of the actions to which the August 11, 2025, order was

addressed involved a claim seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights, the juvenile court's determination that it would not terminate the mother's parental rights related to the custodians' adoption action, to which the mother had objected.

7 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

relationship with one another. This Order is premised on the belief that [the mother] has progressed enough to do those things; to selflessly put [the child's] development and well- being above her own desires. If she refuses, it may be grounds for a reduction of access to [the child] or even adoption. In other words, as long as [the mother] can be supportive of [the child's] life with the [custodians], she can likely be a part of [the child's] life. If she causes more problems for [the child], access to [the child] may need to be reduced."

(Emphasis in the original.)

Based on its findings, the juvenile court awarded legal and physical

custody of the child to the custodians, permitted the mother and the child

to participate in joint counseling, and awarded the mother visitation with

the child, with the following caveat: "The [juvenile] court also reserves

jurisdiction to adjust visitation based on the circumstances until

February 1, 2026, at which time, unless there is an intervening motion

to reconsider visitation based on occurrences hereafter, this order of

visitation shall be deemed final."

In Trevino v. Blinn, 897 So. 2d 358 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), this court

considered the finality of an order containing similar language regarding

a parent's visitation with a child. In that case, the trial court's order

provided that "the father's temporary custody will continue … 'until the

matter is brought before the court on motion of either party for an order

8 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

of permanent custody' and that the mother shall have 'reasonable'

visitation with the child '[p]ending further orders . ' " Id. at 359. This court

characterized the order as leaving "the parties' rights to custody and

visitation for a final determination upon either party's filing a motion

reviving the issue" in the trial court. Id. at 359-60. We then concluded

that the trial court's order allowing the presentation of additional

testimony was an indication that the trial court did not consider the case

to be finally adjudicated on the merits after the entry of its postjudgment

order, and, therefore, we held that the order was not sufficiently final to

support an appeal. Id. at 360.

In this case, the juvenile court also left open the question of the

mother's visitation with the child and invited the parties to file a motion

to reconsider the visitation award within the next six months, indicating

that, like the trial court in Trevino, it did not consider the .02 action to

be finally adjudicated when it entered the August 11, 2025, order.

Therefore, we conclude that the August 11, 2025, order is not final for

purposes of appeal, and the appeal from the .02 action must also be

dismissed. Id.

9 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

On August 25, 2025, the mother filed a motion seeking the entry of

a final judgment in the adoption action. She renewed her motion on

October 1, 2025, asserting that the August 11, 2025, order addressing the

dependency and custody actions had resolved the adoption action. On

October 2, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order indicating that the

adoption action was "reserved pending the final outcome of the other

cases," i.e., the dependency and custody actions. That day, the mother

filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court, asking this court to

direct the juvenile court to enter a final judgment in the adoption action.

"This Court has consistently held that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary and drastic writ and that a party seeking such a writ must meet certain criteria. We will issue the writ of mandamus only when (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent has an imperative duty to perform and has refused to do so; (3) the petitioner has no other adequate remedy; and (4) this Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked. Ex parte Mercury Fin. Corp., 715 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1997). Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, the standard by which this Court reviews a petition for the writ of mandamus is to determine whether the trial court has clearly abused its discretion. See Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1987)."

Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000).

10 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

We have no reason to believe that, once final judgments are entered

in the dependency and custody actions, the juvenile court will not enter

a final judgment in the adoption action, as it indicated it would in its

October 2, 2025, order. In other words, we cannot say that the juvenile

court has refused to perform its duty; instead, it has indicated when it

intends to perform that duty. The mother has failed to demonstrate that

the juvenile court is obligated to perform that duty earlier than it intends

to, particularly given how the adoption action and the dependency and

custody actions are intertwined. Therefore, the mother's petition for a

writ of mandamus is premature and is due to be denied. See Ex parte

Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 227 So. 3d 519, 521 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017.)

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the mother's appeals from the .02 action,

the .03 action, the .04 action, the .05 action, and the .06 action are

dismissed as being taken from nonfinal judgments. The juvenile court is

instructed to enter judgments consistent with this opinion. The mother's

petition for a writ of mandamus in the .07 action is denied.

The custodians' motion to strike one of the mother's letter briefs is

denied as moot. Their request for an attorney fee is denied.

11 CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025- 0706, and CL-2025-0901

CL-2025-0702 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0703 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0704 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0705 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0706 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0901 -- PETITION DENIED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.