In re: In the Matter of J.A.J.R.

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: CL-2026-0321
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: July 2, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________

CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321 _________________________

Ex parte P.R.P.

PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Matter of J.A.J.R.)

(Marshall Juvenile Court: JU-19-739.01 and JU-19-739.03)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

As recounted by this court in P.R.P. v. Marshall County

Department of Human Resources, 419 So. 3d 1018 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)

("P.R.P."), J.A.J.R. ("the child") was born in Guatemala in 2014 to F.M.

("the father") and P.R.P. ("the mother"). In early 2019, with the

permission of the mother, the child illegally immigrated to the United CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

States with the father. In March 2019, the father and the child settled

in Marshall County, while the mother remained in Guatemala. On July

18, 2019, the father was arrested and charged with a sexual offense

against the child, and, without contacting the mother, the Marshall

County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") took the child into

protective custody and commenced dependency proceedings relating to

the child in case number JU-19-739.01 ("the .01 action"). Id. The

Marshall Juvenile Court adjudicated the child to be a dependent child,

and DHR placed the child into foster care.

In June 2020, still without having contacted the mother, DHR filed

a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and of the father;

that petition was assigned case number JU-19-739.02. See P.R.P., supra.

In December 2023, the juvenile court entered a judgment terminating the

mother's parental rights, finding, among other things, that the mother

had abandoned the child and that reunification was impossible or that

DHR's reunification efforts had failed because of the distance between

DHR and the mother and the language barrier. The mother appealed.

On appeal, this court determined that the juvenile court had

acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the child pursuant to Ala. Code

2 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

1975, § 30-3B-201(a)(2), a part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction

and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et

seq. See P.R.P., 419 So. 3d at 1021 n.1. We also determined that the

evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the mother had

abandoned the child by allowing the child to immigrate to Alabama. Id.

at 1025. We further concluded that, in the absence of abandonment, DHR

had a duty to use reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the mother,

regardless of any language or geographic barriers. Id. As we explained,

that duty required DHR to use reasonable efforts to locate the mother, to

identify any obstacles to reuniting the child with the mother, to notify

the mother of those issues, to develop a plan tailored to overcome any

reunification problems, to execute that plan, and to assess the success of

that plan. Id. at 1025-30. We held that DHR had not used reasonable

efforts to reunite the mother with the child. Id. at 1030.

First, we held that the evidence showed that DHR had not used

reasonable efforts to locate the mother. 419 So. 3d at 1027. Eventually,

the mother learned that the child was in DHR's custody and that the

juvenile court had entered a judgment terminating her parental rights

on July 12, 2021. The mother secured legal counsel and successfully

3 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

moved the juvenile court to set aside that judgment on January 19, 2022.

Id. at 1021.

Second, we held that DHR had failed to provide the mother with an

opportunity to address its concerns relating to her relationship with the

father. DHR finally met with the mother for the first time on July 6,

2022, to formulate an individualized-service plan ("ISP") to reunite the

mother with the child. Id. at 1028. DHR did not present any evidence of

the barriers to family reunification it had identified, but the evidence

showed that the mother had met all the goals set for her in the ISP. Id.

At trial, however, DHR social workers testified regarding their concern

that the mother had not separated from the father, and, based on that

evidence, the juvenile court determined that the mother lacked

appropriate protective capacity to safeguard the child from the father.

Id. at 1028-29. However, this court determined that the mother had not

been informed of that concern by DHR and that she had not been given a

fair opportunity to rectify that barrier to reunification. The court said:

"Before trial, DHR never identified the mother's alleged continuing relationship with the father as an impediment to her reunification with the child, nor did it establish any means by which the mother could strengthen her protective capacity, assure that the father would be restrained from the child, or verify his absence from the family home."

4 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

419 So. 3d at 1029. We concluded that DHR had not followed the

framework established in H.H. v. Baldwin County Department of Human

Resources, 989 So. 2d 1094, 1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion),

to make a fair and serious attempt to rehabilitate the mother and to

reunite her with the child. Therefore, we reversed the judgment, and we

"remand[ed] the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion." 419 So. 3d at 1030 (emphasis added).

In our opinion, we noted that DHR had established a concurrent

permanency plan for the child of either return to the mother or

termination of her parental rights with subsequent adoption by the

child's foster parents. 419 So. 3d at 1028. DHR had already worked

toward adoption. It was this court's intention that, on remand, DHR

would formulate a proper ISP designed to achieve the concurrent

permanency plan of reuniting the mother with the child by identifying

any and all circumstances it considered to be impeding the reunification

of the mother and the child, communicating those concerns to the mother,

developing a reasonable plan with the mother tailored toward alleviating

the identified problems as quickly and as safely as possible, and assessing

the success of that plan. We contemplated that the juvenile court would

5 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

conduct periodic permanency hearings to determine the appropriate

permanency plan for the child, as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-

315, and that it would enter appropriate orders determining whether

DHR had used reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for the

child, as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-312(a)(3) and § 12-15-

315(c)(3). Finally, we remanded the case for the juvenile court to conduct

proceedings to ultimately decide the proper disposition of the child, i.e.,

whether reasonable family-reunification efforts had succeeded so that

the child could be safely returned to the custody of the mother, whether

those efforts had failed so that the concurrent permanency plan of

termination of parental rights with adoption by the foster parents should

be finalized, or whether some other final disposition would serve the best

interests of the child.

On remand, the juvenile-court clerk assigned a new case number --

JU-19-739.03 ("the .03 action") -- for the further proceedings ordered by

this court.1 Beginning on March 6, 2025, the mother filed several motions

1In April 2025, the mother filed a petition for the writ of mandamus

requesting that this court direct the juvenile court to dismiss the .03 action for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction. This court determined that our holding in P.R.P. that the juvenile court had UCCJEA jurisdiction was 6 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

in the .03 action to facilitate her reunification with the child in

compliance with our remand instructions, as she understood them. In

those motions, the mother claimed that DHR was not using reasonable

efforts to reunite the child with her and that it had unilaterally, and not

collaboratively, developed an ISP for her that was designed to obstruct

family reunification. DHR responded to those motions by insisting that

it was following proper ISP protocol in formulating a plan tailored toward

ameliorating the obstacles to reunification that it had identified. On

January 14, 2026, the juvenile court held a hearing to discuss the status

of the case, and, at that hearing, it stated that a "dispositional" hearing

should be held to determine whether DHR had used reasonable efforts to

finalize the concurrent permanency plan, whether the mother had

cooperated with those efforts, whether the efforts had failed or succeeded,

and whether the child should be returned to the custody of the mother or

another petition to terminate parental rights should be filed. On

January 15, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order in the .03 action

the law of the case, and we denied the petition. Ex parte P.R.P. (No. CL- 2025-0293, June 6, 2025). 7 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

scheduling the hearing for March 11, 2026,2 which it later rescheduled to

April 29, 2026.

On April 22, 2026, the juvenile court entered an administrative

order transferring all motions and orders entered in the .03 action to the

.01 action. On April 24, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order in the

.01 action providing that, on April 29, 2026, it would be conducting both

a permanency hearing and a dispositional hearing in the .01 action. On

April 27, 2026, the mother filed two identical petitions for the writ of

mandamus with this court, one referencing the .01 action and the other

referencing the .03 action.

In her petitions, the mother primarily argues that the juvenile court

has been violating the mandate of this court from P.R.P. Seeking

mandamus relief is a proper method to test whether a trial court has

properly interpreted and applied an appellate opinion. Ex parte

2On the same date, the juvenile court entered an order denying the

mother the right to attend hearings remotely via the Zoom videoconferencing application. The mother petitioned this court for the writ of mandamus, and we granted the petition, directing the juvenile court to reconsider its order. See Ex parte P.R.P., [Ms. CL-2026-0223, Apr. 24, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026). Upon reconsideration, the juvenile court entered an order allowing the mother to attend hearings remotely.

8 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

Edwards, 727 So. 2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1998). A trial court must comply

strictly with an appellate mandate, but, when the appellate court gives

no precise directions as to how a matter must proceed on remand, the

trial court may proceed in any manner that is not inconsistent with the

appellate court's opinion. See J.B. v. J.R., 426 So. 3d 1222, 1227-28 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2025). The writ of mandamus will be issued only when it is

shown that the lower court has acted in a manner inconsistent with the

appellate court's mandate. See, e.g., Ex parte United States Fid. & Guar.

Co., 585 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1991).

The mother argues that the juvenile court has not complied with

our mandate because, she says, it has failed to order DHR to reunite the

child with her. However, this court did not order the juvenile court to

conduct further proceedings to ensure that the child was promptly

returned to the mother's custody, as she contends. We ordered only that

the juvenile court conduct further proceedings to ensure that DHR was

making reasonable efforts toward finalizing the concurrent permanency

plan and that the juvenile court conduct further proceedings to evaluate

the success of those efforts before disposing of the permanent custody of

the child. In the months between March 2025 and January 2026, the

9 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

mother filed several motions asserting that the ISP developed by DHR

was not reasonably formulated to achieve the permanency goal of

returning the child to the mother, and she advanced her own alternative

reunification plan to facilitate that goal. On January 14, 2026, after

hearing oral argument, the juvenile court concluded that it needed to

conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions so that it

could determine the reasonableness and success of DHR's efforts, and it

scheduled a hearing for that purpose, as well as for the purpose of

determining the final permanency plan for the child. Although the

juvenile court could have scheduled the hearing sooner, we do not

perceive that the juvenile court has acted in a manner inconsistent with

our mandate.3

We also do not agree that the juvenile court has violated our

mandate by maintaining the .01 action. The mother contends that, in

3We do not express any opinion on the merits of the ISP developed

by DHR, or the propriety of the manner in which the ISP was formulated, which issues remain subject to discretionary review by the juvenile court at this time. A writ of mandamus may compel the exercise of discretion, but it will not direct the manner in which discretion must be exercised when the requested act depends on the ascertainment of facts or the exercise of judgment. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131 (Ala. 2013). 10 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

P.R.P., we determined that the child was no longer dependent because

she had not abandoned the child. However, this court did not review,

much less reverse, the dependency judgment that had been entered in

the .01 action. Our determination that the mother had not abandoned

the child did not mean that we determined that the child was no longer

dependent. Dependency, within the meaning of Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-

102(8), is not even an issue in a termination-of-parental-rights

proceeding. See M.G.S. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 403 So. 3d 166,

181 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). We determined in P.R.P. only that the mother

had not abandoned the child, so DHR had to exhaust reasonable efforts

toward reuniting her with the child before the juvenile court could

consider terminating her parental rights. We did not find that the child

was no longer dependent as to the mother so that she would have a right

to his custody. The dependency determination made in the .01 action

remains intact. The juvenile court intends to hold a permanency hearing

and a dispositional hearing in the .01 action only to adjudicate the

11 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

outstanding issues affecting the permanency and final custodial

disposition of the child, in accordance with our mandate.4

In Ex parte C.B.S., [Ms. CL-2025-0653, Sept. 26, 2025] ___ So. 3d

___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025), this court restated the standard governing

mandamus review:

" 'This Court has consistently held that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary and drastic writ and that a party seeking such a writ must meet certain criteria. We will issue the writ of mandamus only when (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent has an imperative duty to perform and has refused to do so; (3) the petitioner has no other adequate remedy; and (4) this Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked. Ex parte Mercury Fin. Corp., 715 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1997). Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, the standard by which this Court reviews a petition for the writ of mandamus is to determine whether the trial court has clearly abused its discretion. See Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1987).'

"Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000)."

4We do not consider any other arguments objecting to the order

scheduling a dispositional hearing. The juvenile court originally entered an order on January 15, 2026, setting the case for a dispositional hearing. The mother had 14 days to file a petition for the writ of mandamus directed toward that order. See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. The orders continuing the hearing to a later date did not revive her time to file a petition or present good cause for filing an untimely petition. See Ex parte Cassimus, 426 So. 3d 403 (Ala. 2025). 12 CL-2026-0319 and CL-2026-0321

We conclude that the mother has not met that exacting standard to

warrant extraordinary mandamus relief in this case. For the

aforementioned reasons, we deny the petitions.

CL-2026-0319 -- PETITION DENIED.

CL-2026-0321 -- PETITION DENIED.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.