[Cite as In re I.M., 2025-Ohio-2154.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE I.M. : No. 114643 A Minor Child :
[Appeal by Mother, M.M.-S.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD23907225
Appearances:
Wegman Hessler Valore and Matthew O. Williams, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Appellant-mother M.M.-S (“appellant’) appeals a judgment of the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, granting permanent
custody of her minor child, I.M., to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
Family Services (“CCDCFS”). She raises the following assignments of error: 1. The trial court’s decision to terminate Appellant’s parental rights and to award permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS was not supported by sufficient evidence.
2. The trial court’s decision to terminate Appellant’s parental rights to award permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3. The trial erred in adjudicating and disposing of CCDCFS’s Motion to Modify Temporary Custody to Permanent Custody where it lacked jurisdiction to do so because said Motion was not properly served upon Appellant-Mother.
CCDCFS concedes there is merit to appellant’s third assignment of
error. After a thorough review of the record and arguments, we agree that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order granting permanent custody due to
failure of service on appellant. Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s third assignment
of error, which moots the remaining two assignments of error. We vacate the trial
court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On March 25, 2023, the child, I.M., was removed from appellant’s
custody and placed in the emergency, predispositional temporary custody of
CCDCFS pursuant to an ex parte telephonic order issued by a magistrate. This
action was prompted by appellant’s admission to a psychiatric hospital.
On June 23, 2023, CCDCFS voluntarily dismissed and refiled its
complaint for predispositional temporary custody due to the court’s failure to
conduct a hearing and issue a final disposition within the 90-day period required for
doing so by R.C. 2151.35(B)(1). Following hearings held on September 12, 2023, the trial court
adjudicated I.M. as dependent and determined that it was in the child’s best interest
to remain in the temporary custody of CCDCFS.
On February 13, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary
custody to permanent custody. At a pretrial hearing on May 20, 2024, appellant’s
counsel confirmed that appellant had reviewed the motion but challenged the
adequacy of service. Counsel asserted that the certified mail receipt evidencing
delivery of the motion bore a signature that did not match appellant’s and was not
recognized by her. Upon comparing the signatures, the magistrate agreed they did
not match and concluded that service had not been perfected.
CCDCFS attempted service again via certified mail. At a hearing held
on June 26, 2024, appellant’s counsel again confirmed that appellant had reviewed
the motion but reiterated the objection to service because the second certified mail
receipt bore the same signature as the prior one, which again did not resemble
appellant’s signature. Counsel further noted that appellant was at work during the
time of delivery and that no one else resided with her who could have signed for the
document. Based on these facts, counsel suggested that the postal carrier may have
signed the receipt.1 In response, the magistrate asked about the appellant’s work
schedule. Appellant explained that she was at work when the certified mail was
1 In her briefing, appellant highlights recent case law indicating that, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, some postal carriers signed certified mail return receipts on behalf of recipients — a practice that has been found to constitute improper service of process. See Cuc Properties VI, L.L.C. v. Smartlink Ventures, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3428, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.); see also In re Adoption of M.J.A., 2022-Ohio-3275, ¶ 16-23 (12th Dist.). delivered on June 16, 2024, at 7:40 a.m., and stated that both her manager and
timecards could confirm her presence at work during that time.
After confirming consistent signatures on both certified mail receipts
and verifying delivery to appellant’s correct address, the magistrate concluded that
service was properly perfected. The case proceeded to trial on November 20, 2024.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a journal entry terminating appellant’s parental
rights and committing I.M. to the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
II. Law and Analysis
A court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant to enter a
valid judgment against the defendant. See Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Cherrier,
2020-Ohio-3280, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). One way a court acquires personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is through proper service of process. See Maryhew v. Yova, 11
Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984).
Civ.R. 4.1 outlines the methods for obtaining service of process within
this State and includes service via certified mail. See TCC Mgmt. v. Clapp, 2005-
Ohio-4357, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Pursuant to Civ.R. 4.1(A), service by certified mail must
be “[e]videnced by return receipt signed by any person . . . .” Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a).
“The plaintiff bears the burden of obtaining proper service on a
defendant.” FIA Card Servs. NA v. Adler, 2022-Ohio-4631, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Emge, 124 Ohio App.3d 61, 63 (1st Dist. 1997). “Where the
plaintiff follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient
evidence of nonservice.” Id., citing Hook v. Collins, 2017-Ohio-976, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
A trial court’s determination on the validity of service is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion arises when the court
exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it
has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
Upon review of the record, we agree with the appellant and CCDCFS
— which has conceded the error — that the appellant successfully rebutted the
presumption of proper service. Although the certified mail receipts reflect that the
motion for permanent custody was delivered on two separate occasions to the
appellant’s address, the appellant maintained that she never received the motion.
The magistrate found this assertion credible with respect to the first attempt at
service, specifically noting that the signature on the certified mail receipt did not
correspond to the appellant’s known signature. Indeed, at the hearing on May 20,
2024, after comparing the signature on the return receipt with the appellant’s state-
issued identification, the magistrate observed, “I’m not an expert, but they don’t look
like they match at all, so I’ll find that service hasn’t been perfected.”
Notwithstanding this finding, at the June 26, 2024 hearing regarding
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[Cite as In re I.M., 2025-Ohio-2154.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE I.M. : No. 114643 A Minor Child :
[Appeal by Mother, M.M.-S.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD23907225
Appearances:
Wegman Hessler Valore and Matthew O. Williams, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Appellant-mother M.M.-S (“appellant’) appeals a judgment of the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, granting permanent
custody of her minor child, I.M., to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
Family Services (“CCDCFS”). She raises the following assignments of error: 1. The trial court’s decision to terminate Appellant’s parental rights and to award permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS was not supported by sufficient evidence.
2. The trial court’s decision to terminate Appellant’s parental rights to award permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3. The trial erred in adjudicating and disposing of CCDCFS’s Motion to Modify Temporary Custody to Permanent Custody where it lacked jurisdiction to do so because said Motion was not properly served upon Appellant-Mother.
CCDCFS concedes there is merit to appellant’s third assignment of
error. After a thorough review of the record and arguments, we agree that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order granting permanent custody due to
failure of service on appellant. Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s third assignment
of error, which moots the remaining two assignments of error. We vacate the trial
court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On March 25, 2023, the child, I.M., was removed from appellant’s
custody and placed in the emergency, predispositional temporary custody of
CCDCFS pursuant to an ex parte telephonic order issued by a magistrate. This
action was prompted by appellant’s admission to a psychiatric hospital.
On June 23, 2023, CCDCFS voluntarily dismissed and refiled its
complaint for predispositional temporary custody due to the court’s failure to
conduct a hearing and issue a final disposition within the 90-day period required for
doing so by R.C. 2151.35(B)(1). Following hearings held on September 12, 2023, the trial court
adjudicated I.M. as dependent and determined that it was in the child’s best interest
to remain in the temporary custody of CCDCFS.
On February 13, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary
custody to permanent custody. At a pretrial hearing on May 20, 2024, appellant’s
counsel confirmed that appellant had reviewed the motion but challenged the
adequacy of service. Counsel asserted that the certified mail receipt evidencing
delivery of the motion bore a signature that did not match appellant’s and was not
recognized by her. Upon comparing the signatures, the magistrate agreed they did
not match and concluded that service had not been perfected.
CCDCFS attempted service again via certified mail. At a hearing held
on June 26, 2024, appellant’s counsel again confirmed that appellant had reviewed
the motion but reiterated the objection to service because the second certified mail
receipt bore the same signature as the prior one, which again did not resemble
appellant’s signature. Counsel further noted that appellant was at work during the
time of delivery and that no one else resided with her who could have signed for the
document. Based on these facts, counsel suggested that the postal carrier may have
signed the receipt.1 In response, the magistrate asked about the appellant’s work
schedule. Appellant explained that she was at work when the certified mail was
1 In her briefing, appellant highlights recent case law indicating that, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, some postal carriers signed certified mail return receipts on behalf of recipients — a practice that has been found to constitute improper service of process. See Cuc Properties VI, L.L.C. v. Smartlink Ventures, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3428, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.); see also In re Adoption of M.J.A., 2022-Ohio-3275, ¶ 16-23 (12th Dist.). delivered on June 16, 2024, at 7:40 a.m., and stated that both her manager and
timecards could confirm her presence at work during that time.
After confirming consistent signatures on both certified mail receipts
and verifying delivery to appellant’s correct address, the magistrate concluded that
service was properly perfected. The case proceeded to trial on November 20, 2024.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a journal entry terminating appellant’s parental
rights and committing I.M. to the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
II. Law and Analysis
A court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant to enter a
valid judgment against the defendant. See Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Cherrier,
2020-Ohio-3280, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). One way a court acquires personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is through proper service of process. See Maryhew v. Yova, 11
Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984).
Civ.R. 4.1 outlines the methods for obtaining service of process within
this State and includes service via certified mail. See TCC Mgmt. v. Clapp, 2005-
Ohio-4357, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Pursuant to Civ.R. 4.1(A), service by certified mail must
be “[e]videnced by return receipt signed by any person . . . .” Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a).
“The plaintiff bears the burden of obtaining proper service on a
defendant.” FIA Card Servs. NA v. Adler, 2022-Ohio-4631, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Emge, 124 Ohio App.3d 61, 63 (1st Dist. 1997). “Where the
plaintiff follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient
evidence of nonservice.” Id., citing Hook v. Collins, 2017-Ohio-976, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
A trial court’s determination on the validity of service is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion arises when the court
exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it
has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
Upon review of the record, we agree with the appellant and CCDCFS
— which has conceded the error — that the appellant successfully rebutted the
presumption of proper service. Although the certified mail receipts reflect that the
motion for permanent custody was delivered on two separate occasions to the
appellant’s address, the appellant maintained that she never received the motion.
The magistrate found this assertion credible with respect to the first attempt at
service, specifically noting that the signature on the certified mail receipt did not
correspond to the appellant’s known signature. Indeed, at the hearing on May 20,
2024, after comparing the signature on the return receipt with the appellant’s state-
issued identification, the magistrate observed, “I’m not an expert, but they don’t look
like they match at all, so I’ll find that service hasn’t been perfected.”
Notwithstanding this finding, at the June 26, 2024 hearing regarding
the second attempt at service, the magistrate concluded that proper service had been
effectuated — despite the certified mail return bearing the same signature as the first
receipt and appellant’s assertion that she was at work at the time of delivery. This determination is inconsistent with the magistrate’s prior credibility finding and
raises concerns as to the sufficiency of service under the applicable rules.
In light of these unique circumstances, we conclude that the
magistrate abused her discretion by determining that service was properly perfected
on the appellant.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellant’s third assignment of
error. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to
CCDCFS due to improper service of the motion on appellant. This determination
renders all remaining assignments of error moot. Accordingly, we vacate the trial
court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment vacated and cause remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR