In re I.M.

2024 IL App (4th) 231591-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 23, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-1591
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 231591-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 23, 2024 NO. 4-23-1591 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re I.M., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Knox County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 22JA41 v. ) Jessica M., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Curtis S. Lane, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Finding no issues of potential merit to support an appeal in this case, appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶2 Respondent Jessica M. is the mother of I.M. (born in 2022). In November 2023, the

trial court adjudicated the minor to be neglected. In December 2023, the court found respondent

unfit and placed guardianship and custody of the minor with the Illinois Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS). The identity of the minor’s father is unknown.

¶3 Respondent appealed, and her appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In her supporting brief, appellate counsel

contends that this appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. Notice was given

to respondent, and no written response was filed. We grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw

and affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 A. Neglect Petition

¶6 In July 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of I.M. The

petition alleged that the minor was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court

Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) in that his environment

was injurious to his welfare because respondent (1) gave birth to I.M. in Iowa to evade DCFS

involvement, (2) was found dispositionally unfit as to her four older children, (3) is not allowed to

visit her older children due to a no-contact order resulting from her behavior during supervised

visits, and (4) gave false information as to her address and the name of I.M.’s father. Following a

shelter care hearing, the trial court found probable cause to believe I.M. was neglected and granted

temporary custody of the minor to DCFS.

¶7 B. Adjudicatory Hearing

¶8 In October 2022, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. The court took judicial

notice of the case files in Knox County case Nos. 19-JA-35, 21-JA-37, 21-JA-38, and 21-JA-39,

the four cases involving respondent’s older children.

¶9 Brooke Matykiewicz, a DCFS caseworker, testified she was the caseworker in

I.M.’s case and his older siblings’ cases. Matykiewicz believed respondent gave birth to I.M. in

Iowa to “escape DCFS.” She did not know the identity of I.M.’s father. In the cases involving

respondent’s four older children, Matykiewicz stated respondent was found unfit and the

permanency goal for those cases was “[s]ubstitute care pending court determination on termination

of parental rights.”

¶ 10 Matykiewicz described respondent’s behavior at supervised visits with the older

children as “[v]ery chaotic.” She regularly heard respondent yelling, screaming, and cursing in

-2- front of the older children. Eventually, a no-contact order was issued against respondent after she

threatened the older children and the visitation specialist during a supervised visit in January 2022.

Respondent has had no contact with the older children since this incident.

¶ 11 Matykiewicz stated her last in-person meeting with respondent occurred at a child

and family team meeting at the end of June 2022 and her last contact with respondent was through

a text message at the end of July 2022. Respondent initiated the child and family team meeting to

assess the placement of I.M., with whom respondent was pregnant at the time.

¶ 12 Respondent testified on her own behalf. However, after she admitted to contracting

COVID-19, the trial court ordered respondent to leave the courtroom. At the time, a sheriff’s order

prohibited any person with COVID-19 from entering the courthouse. The adjudicatory hearing

was continued.

¶ 13 In October 2022, the adjudicatory hearing resumed. Respondent failed to appear,

and the hearing was again continued. In November 2022, respondent’s counsel filed a motion to

withdraw due to a lack of communication with respondent and her failure to appear at multiple

hearings. Following a December 2022 hearing, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to

withdraw. The court later appointed counsel to represent respondent.

¶ 14 The adjudicatory hearing resumed in November 2023. Respondent testified she

began mental health treatment in 2019. She attended counseling twice a month and had monthly

appointments with her psychiatrist. She testified to consistently taking psychiatric medication over

this period.

¶ 15 Respondent next described the January 2022 visitation incident. According to

respondent, two of the older children alleged abuse in their foster home. Respondent admitted she

“reacted in an inappropriate fashion” but claimed she responded “[l]ike any protective mother

-3- would.” Following the incident, respondent stated she contacted Matykiewicz at least twice a

week, but Matykiewicz refused to respond. Instead, respondent had to set up team meetings

through Matykiewicz’s supervisor.

¶ 16 Respondent completed two parenting programs, finishing the most recent one about

a year before I.M.’s birth. She further completed a domestic violence program in 2018 or 2019 and

a substance abuse evaluation. For her employment, respondent stated she worked as an

independent nursing contractor and was working in a nursing home when I.M. was born.

Respondent claimed she “temporarily” resided in Moline, Illinois, but she did not elaborate on the

location of her current residence.

¶ 17 The trial court adjudicated I.M to be neglected based on anticipatory neglect. The

matter was set for a dispositional hearing.

¶ 18 C. Dispositional Hearing

¶ 19 In December 2023, the trial court held a dispositional hearing, at which respondent

was not present. At the State’s request, the court admitted into evidence a DCFS dispositional

report, service plan, and Court Appointed Special Advocates report, all dated December 2023, and

a parental capacity assessment dated January 2021.

¶ 20 According to the January 2021 parental capacity assessment, DCFS first became

involved with respondent’s family due to domestic violence between respondent and Eric S., the

biological father of the four older children. The older children were removed from the home after

the children sustained repeated physical injuries while in the care of respondent. In November

2017, a medical examination of two of the children revealed bruising and physical injuries

consistent with physical abuse, and it was reported one of those minors ingested

methamphetamine. After being returned to respondent’s care in April 2019, one of the minors

-4- sustained a black eye after respondent allegedly hit the minor in the eye for taking her phone. In

September 2019, another one of the children was taken into DCFS custody after sustaining a skull

fracture while in respondent’s care.

¶ 21 Nicolette Fox, a DCFS child welfare specialist, testified she was assigned to I.M.’s

case in November 2022. Under the service plan, respondent was required to complete a parenting

class, domestic violence services, a mental health assessment, and drug testing; she was also

required to cooperate with DCFS and maintain stable housing and income.

¶ 22 Respondent had not completed an integrated assessment in I.M.’s case. Although

respondent completed two parenting classes in the older children’s cases, she was required to take

an additional parenting class “in light of her parenting capacity.” Respondent also completed a

domestic violence program in the older children’s cases. However, because respondent had not

provided her address, Fox stated there was no way to verify if respondent had any additional

domestic violence incidents. For mental health services, respondent signed the releases and was

currently attending therapy at Robert Young. However, Robert Young reported respondent

discontinued her psychiatric medications in August 2022 “because she didn’t feel like she needed

them anymore.”

¶ 23 As for her cooperation with DCFS, Fox described respondent as “very inconsistent

in contact.” Fox noted respondent would sometimes answer texts and phone calls and set up

meetings, but other times she would not hear from respondent for months. Specifically, after giving

birth to I.M. in July 2022, respondent had no contact with DCFS until January 2023. Fox also

indicated respondent still had not provided her current address. The last two physical addresses

provided by respondent were either vacant lots or invalid addresses when searched on Google

Maps. Respondent never provided any documentation of where she worked.

-5- ¶ 24 Fox testified respondent was also uncooperative with drug testing. Although

respondent was required to complete drug testing twice a month, she provided a total of two

negative drug tests over the course of a year. Respondent told Fox “she drug tests at work so she

doesn’t feel like she needs to at DCFS.” Fox indicated she did not have access to any drug tests

respondent may have completed through her employment.

¶ 25 Respondent has never had visitation with I.M. The first time respondent asked for

visitation was in February 2023, seven months after the minor’s birth. However, Fox explained

that DCFS issued a no-visitation decision for I.M. due to (1) an existing no-visitation decision for

the older siblings and (2) therapeutic and physician recommendations that respondent should not

have visitation with I.M. Fox noted that, regardless, respondent was required to complete her drug

tests as a prerequisite to starting visitation, and her failure to do so meant visitation was not a

possibility.

¶ 26 The trial court found respondent unfit, made I.M. a ward of the court, and placed

guardianship and custody with DCFS. The unfitness finding was based on two grounds: first, she

failed to make reasonable progress or efforts to correct the conditions which led to the removal of

the four older children; and second, she failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest,

concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of I.M. during the first 30 days after his birth.

¶ 27 This appeal followed.

¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29 Appellate counsel moves to withdraw, arguing this case presents no potentially

meritorious issues for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding Anders

applies to parental rights cases). Counsel states in her motion that she has examined the record and

found no issue of arguable merit. She lists two potential issues for review: (1) whether the trial

-6- court erred in finding the minor was neglected and (2) whether the court erred in finding

respondent was unfit and making the minor a ward of the court. Because we agree with counsel

that any argument as to these potential issues would be frivolous, we grant the motion to withdraw

and affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 30 A. Adjudicatory Finding

¶ 31 Appellate counsel contends no potentially meritorious argument could be raised to

challenge the trial court’s order finding I.M. to be neglected.

¶ 32 Under the Juvenile Court Act, the trial court must follow a two-step process when

deciding whether a minor should be made a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18.

In the first step, the court conducts an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor is

abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2022); In re Z.L., 2021 IL

126931, ¶ 59. Section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022))

defines a neglected minor as any minor “whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.”

While the term “injurious environment” is often characterized as an amorphous concept that cannot

be defined with particularity, it has generally been recognized as including “the breach of a parent’s

duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 30.

¶ 33 “[C]ases involving allegations of neglect and adjudication of wardship are

sui generis, and must be decided on the basis of their unique circumstances.” In re Arthur H., 212

Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004). The burden is on the State to prove allegations of neglect by a

preponderance of the evidence, i.e., that the allegations are more probably true than not. A.P., 2012

IL 113875, ¶ 17. On review, a trial court’s finding of neglect will not be reversed unless it is

-7- contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. “A finding is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id.

¶ 34 The allegations in the petition here were premised upon the theory of anticipatory

neglect. Under this theory,

“the State seeks to protect not only children who are the direct victims of neglect

or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse

because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has been

found to have neglected or abused another child.” Id. at 468.

However, “there is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect

of another child in the same household.” Id. Instead, the trial court must assess both “the

circumstances surrounding the sibling” and “the care and condition of the child in question.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[W]here the child is alleged to be neglected under the

theory of anticipatory neglect, *** the court needs to evaluate the individual with whom the child

will reside.” In re Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 34.

¶ 35 In this case, the record adequately supports a finding of anticipatory neglect of I.M.

Between 2017 and 2019, respondent’s older children were taken into protective custody on three

separate occasions after sustaining physical injuries while in her care. Even after the older children

were removed and custody was granted to DCFS, respondent’s behavior around the children

showed no improvement. Her supervised visits at the DCFS office were described as “[v]ery

chaotic,” and she could be heard yelling, screaming, and cursing while in the presence of her

children. Most disturbingly, evidence was presented that respondent directed threats towards the

older children and a visitation specialist during a January 2022 supervised visit. This incident

occurred mere months before respondent gave birth to I.M.

-8- ¶ 36 Respondent’s evasive and uncooperative behavior continued after I.M.’s birth. She

did not report I.M.’s birth to DCFS, despite being told to do so by her caseworker. Matykiewicz

found out about the birth only after calling four or five hospitals. Respondent named multiple

individuals as I.M.’s father, two of whom were DNA tested and eliminated. The identity of the

father remains unknown. Respondent also refused to provide her residential address to DCFS or

the trial court.

¶ 37 At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, respondent remained dispositionally unfit

in the older children’s cases and had not progressed toward their return. The goal for the older

children’s cases was substitute care pending termination of parental rights, and visitation had not

been restored due to the no-contact order against respondent. On this record, the State sufficiently

proved anticipatory neglect of I.M. by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we agree

with appellate counsel that there is no potentially meritorious argument to be made that the trial

court’s finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 38 B. Dispositional Findings

¶ 39 Appellate counsel determined no potentially meritorious argument could be made

to warrant reversal of the trial court’s order finding respondent unfit and making the minor a ward

of the court.

¶ 40 Following an adjudication of neglect, “the trial court then moves to step two, which

is the dispositional hearing.” A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21. At the dispositional hearing, the court

determines “whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a

ward of the court.” 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2022). If the minor’s parents are found to be unfit,

unable, or unwilling to care for the minor, the court may properly place guardianship and custody

of the minor with DCFS. Id. § 2-27(1)(d). A court’s dispositional findings will be reversed “only

-9- if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed

an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re K.B., 2012 IL App (3d) 110655, ¶ 23.

¶ 41 In this case, respondent failed to demonstrate any meaningful effort in completing

the requirements under the service plan. While she completed two parenting classes, a domestic

violence program, and attended therapy, she almost totally failed to comply with drug testing and

discontinued taking her psychiatric medication. Moreover, her lack of cooperation with DCFS

persisted throughout the case. It took respondent seven months after DCFS took protective custody

of I.M. to even request visitation with the minor, which was never granted, due in part to her failure

to comply with drug testing. At the time of the dispositional hearing, respondent had yet to provide

valid proof of her residence or her employment. On this record, we agree with appellate counsel

that no potentially meritorious arguments can be raised on appeal that the trial court’s dispositional

findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

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