NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme November 13, 2019 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed 2019 IL App (4th) 190377-U 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL NOS. 4-19-0377, 4-19-0378, 4-19-0379 cons.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re I.L., a Minor ) Appeal from ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 17JA90 v. ) Brittany L., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re A.Q., a Minor ) ) No. 17JA91 (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. ) Brittany L., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re K.L., a Minor ) ) No. 17JA92 (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. ) Honorable Brittany L., ) Karen S. Tharp, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s findings respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act and it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In September 2018, the State filed motions for the termination of the parental rights of respondent, Brittany L., as to her minor children, I.L. (born in January 2017), A.Q.
(born in November 2013), and K.L. (born in October 2011). The State later filed amended
termination motions. After a four-day hearing, the Sangamon County circuit court found
respondent unfit as alleged in the amended termination motions. At a June 2019 hearing, the
court found it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶3 Respondent appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by (1) finding her unfit and
(2) concluding it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We
affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 I.L. and A.Q.’s father is Kenneth Q., and K.L.’s father is Joshua L. Kenneth Q.
filed his own appeal, which this court docketed as case Nos. 4-19-0389 and 4-19-0390. Joshua
L. never entered an appearance in this case. In June 2017, the State filed petitions for the
adjudication of wardship of the minor children, which alleged the minor children were neglected
pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2016)). Specifically, the petition contended the minor children were not
receiving the proper care and supervision necessary for their well-being, in that respondent failed
to a make a proper care plan for the minor children. At a November 2017 hearing, respondent
stipulated the minors were neglected as alleged in the petitions and the circuit court adjudicated
the minor children neglected. After a December 2017 hearing, the court found respondent was
unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for the minor children, made the minor children wards of the
court, and placed their custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS).
¶6 In September 2018, the State filed motions to terminate respondent’s parental
-2- rights to the minor children. The motions asserted respondent was unfit because she failed to
(1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor children’s
welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)) and (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions which were the basis for the removal of the minor children from her within nine
months after the neglect adjudication, specifically November 8, 2017, to August 8, 2018 (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2018)). The next month, the State filed amended motions for the
termination of parental rights alleging respondent was unfit because she failed to (1) maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor children’s welfare (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)); (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were
the basis for the removal of the minor children from her within nine months after the neglect
adjudication, specifically November 8, 2017, to August 8, 2018 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West
2018)); and (3) make reasonable progress toward the minor children’s return to her within nine
months after the neglect adjudication, specifically November 8, 2017, to August 8, 2018 (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)).
¶7 On December 12, 2018, the circuit court commenced the fitness hearing. The
State presented the testimony of (1) Dr. Joel Eckert, a clinical psychologist; (2) Laura Bell, a
case supervisor employed by Camelot Care Center (Camelot); and (3) Chazla Johnson, a
caseworker at Camelot. Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of
(1) Laura Salesski, a family advocate at Primed for Life; (2) Brenda Wilder, a licensed counselor
at Tazwood; (3) Mekya Lackey, a friend of respondent; and (4) Jesse Pilkington, respondent’s
boyfriend. Kenneth Q. testified on his own behalf. The evidence relevant to the issues on appeal
is set forth below.
¶8 Dr. Eckert testified he had been in private practice as a clinical psychologist since
-3- 1990, and the parties stipulated he was an expert witness in the field of clinical psychology. Dr.
Eckert completed a psychological evaluation on respondent in January 2018. The evaluation was
comprised of a clinical interview and psychological testing, intelligence testing, and academic
achievement testing. Dr. Eckert had also received some background information and documents
from DCFS, which he did not review until after his interview of respondent. After conducting
the evaluation, he drafted a 16-page report that was admitted as State’s Exhibit A.
¶9 During the clinical interview, Dr. Eckert learned respondent had prior psychiatric
intervention, including inpatient treatment. Dr. Eckert described respondent’s history as very
complex. From the interview, Dr. Eckert gained the impression respondent’s life had been
chaotic and disorganized since birth. Respondent appeared to lack stability as evidenced by her
many moves and different relationships. The tests indicated respondent’s intellectual ability was
within the low average range but not low enough to be a concern. Moreover, Dr. Eckert
diagnosed respondent with an adjustment disorder. He gave her this conservative diagnosis
because of the lack of information he could glean from the psychological testing. Specifically,
Dr. Eckert noted respondent was guarded throughout the evaluation, which impeded his ability to
make a detailed diagnosis. Dr. Eckert admitted being guarded was not unexpected for a person
referred by DCFS. Additionally, Dr. Eckert testified respondent could be easily influenced by
others and opined respondent’s “core personality is poorly glued together.”
¶ 10 Based on her history of instability and lack of nurturing as a child, Dr. Eckert was
“very concerned” about respondent’s ability to parent. He testified respondent needed 12 months
of “intensive counseling” followed by group treatment. In the treatment, respondent would need
to be less guarded and defensive for the treatment to have an effect. In his experience, “past
behavior is always the best predictor of future behavior.” Dr. Eckert further noted the “longer
-4- the track record, the more valuable that is.” Dr. Eckert testified he believed respondent could
improve her ability to parent but respondent would have to dedicate herself to the process.
¶ 11 Bell testified she was assigned as the supervisor for the minor children’s case in
September 2017. She explained the first service plan covered June 2017 to December 2017.
That plan required respondent to find a legal means of support, obtain housing, cooperate with
parenting classes, engage in mental-health treatment, and cooperate with DCFS and Camelot.
DCFS had already made the necessary referrals for respondent’s services before Bell received
the case. When the service plan was reviewed in December 2017, respondent received a
satisfactory rating for cooperation with the agencies. As to housing, respondent received an
unsatisfactory rating because she moved away from her children in Springfield in October 2017.
Bell had offered to help her with housing in Springfield, but respondent chose to live with a
friend in Pekin, Illinois. Respondent also received an unsatisfactory rating for maintaining a
legal means of support because she was not employed during the period. Respondent also did
not cooperate with the mental-health treatment. Additionally, while respondent completed a
parenting class, she did not show she had gained any knowledge from it during visits with the
minor children. Bell referred respondent to Primed for Life to get additional assistance with
parenting. Respondent’s overall rating on the first service plan was unsatisfactory.
¶ 12 Bell next testified about the second service plan which covered January 2018 to
June 2018. Respondent’s tasks stayed the same. Bell noted Camelot had made new referrals
when respondent moved to Pekin. When the service plan was reviewed in June 2018, respondent
again received an overall unsatisfactory rating. Respondent did receive a satisfactory rating for
cooperation with DCFS and Camelot. She again was rated unsatisfactory on housing. She had
lived with Lackey, who had exotic animals in the home. Respondent also received an
-5- unsatisfactory rating for mental-health treatment. Moreover, respondent still had the task of
parenting classes because she was still having difficulty at visits. Respondent was employed
during the period with part-time jobs at Dollar General and Kroger.
¶ 13 Bell also testified about the third service plan, which started in June 2018 and
ended in December 2018. With the third service plan, respondent received an unsatisfactory
rating for mental-health treatment because she was only attending counseling once a month.
Respondent was living with Pilkington, her boyfriend. Pilkington was not asked to engage in
services because respondent was never to the point where the minor children were close to
returning home.
¶ 14 As to visitation, respondent started with weekly hour-long visits that were
supervised at the Camelot office or a community location. The visits were supervised by case
aides, and Bell had been present for about five of the visits. Respondent never had unsupervised
visits and never had home visits. At some point, the visits were increased to two hours a week.
In April 2018, Bell reduced K.L.’s visits with respondent to twice a month because K.L. was
having behavioral problems after visits. Respondent only missed two or three visits, and the
absences were due to transportation issues. Respondent was good about bringing gifts for the
minor children’s birthdays and on holidays, and she also brought games and snacks to visits. A
few times, respondent brought inappropriate meals or snacks. In Bell’s opinion, respondent was
unable to demonstrate she had learned anything from parenting classes. According to Bell,
respondent was unable to parent all three children at the same time. For example, one of the
children would be wandering in the hallway, and respondent would not even notice the child was
gone. Respondent also was unable to appropriately console a crying child.
¶ 15 Bell also testified DCFS and Camelot were never close to returning the minors to
-6- respondent because respondent did not make significant progress. The progress respondent did
make was cooperating with DCFS and Camelot and maintaining employment. Respondent did
attend a counseling program in the Peoria area, but she was discharged due to absences. The
Crittenton Center, which provided the parenting coach program, also dropped respondent from
the services about three months before the hearing for failure to attend meetings. Additionally,
Bell testified she made copies of the minors’ social security cards and returned the original cards
to respondent.
¶ 16 Johnson testified she was employed by Camelot as a caseworker from May 2017
to August 2018. She became the caseworker for the minor children in April 2018. When
Johnson took over the case, all the referrals were in place for respondent. Johnson also testified
respondent received an overall unsatisfactory rating in June 2018 for the second service plan.
According to Johnson, respondent received satisfactory ratings for cooperation, parenting, and
legal means of income. However, respondent received unsatisfactory ratings for housing and
mental-health treatment because she was not attending counseling regularly and lived in a home
with exotic animals. During Johnson’s time as a caseworker, respondent had three different jobs.
Respondent worked at Dollar General and Kroger, and in June 2018, she started working for a
telemarketing company in Peoria.
¶ 17 As to visitation, Johnson testified respondent had weekly visits that were two
hours long. Johnson observed the visits at least twice a month. While she was the caseworker,
respondent was never given unsupervised visits due to the chaotic nature of respondent’s
supervised visits. Johnson explained multiple incidents occurred where the children would run
out of the room and respondent would not even know they were gone. Johnson personally
observed a time when I.L. was chewing on a crayon and then walked over to an electrical outlet
-7- and tried to stick her wet hand in the outlet. At the same time, A.Q. was running wild in the
room. Based on the visits, a parenting capacity assessment was recommended, but it did not take
place before Johnson left the agency. Johnson did a safety check on respondent’s home in
August 2018 and found it unsafe because it was a “construction zone” with plaster in the tub and
no running water. Johnson also noted the home had limited furniture. Additionally, Johnson
testified she was never close to returning the minor children to respondent’s care because
respondent had not completed all her services on the service plan.
¶ 18 Salesski testified she was a family advocate for respondent from early 2017 to
June 2018. Her role was to help respondent navigate the DCFS process and services.
Specifically, Salesski observed respondent’s visits with her children, provided respondent
transportation, and helped respondent understand the process. In respondent’s case, Camelot
provided her with transportation. Salesski also assisted respondent in getting her children’s birth
certificates and social security numbers, which respondent needed to obtain housing. Salesski
explained in November 2017 respondent was “couch surfing” after being kicked out of her aunt’s
home. Respondent applied for housing with the housing authority and was told she needed her
minor children’s social security cards to put the children’s names on the lease. According to
Salesski, the caseworker and supervisor would not give respondent the copies they had of the
minor children’s social security cards because they believed respondent would be defrauding the
state. Respondent finally got the information in March 2018. From December 2017 to March
2018, respondent was living with a friend named Travis in Pekin, Illinois. After living with
Travis, respondent had a residence in the Peoria area with several roommates and was paying her
part of the rent. In June 2018, respondent moved into a home respondent believed would be
appropriate for the minor children, but Salesski never visited the residence.
-8- ¶ 19 Additionally, Salesski testified she observed 12 to 15 of respondent’s visits with
the children because respondent claimed the case aides were reporting things that were not
happening. Salesski testified the visits were typical for three small children in a cramped room.
She admitted the visits would “get a little crazy.” The visits were not moved out of Camelot’s
visitation room because Camelot had concerns respondent could not control the minor children.
Respondent was good about getting one child engaged in something, then turning her attention to
another child, and going back and forth. According to Salesski, the minor children were always
vying for respondent’s attention. Moreover, respondent also provided the minor children with a
healthy snack and juice. Salesski testified the case aides did complain the juices were too
sugary.
¶ 20 As to respondent’s other goals, Salesski testified respondent always had a job
from April 2017 forward and did not require Salesski’s assistance to get employment.
Respondent’s caseworkers had an issue with respondent’s employment because respondent
changed jobs frequently and then the caseworker would need to rearrange respondent’s visits.
Moreover, Salesski was unaware of any services Camelot provided to respondent or referrals the
agency made for respondent. Salesski admitted DCFS had made referrals for respondent before
Camelot received the case. According to Salesski, respondent found her own counselor and was
paying for it with a medical card. Salesski also testified she never heard of any complaints about
respondent from her counselor. When Salesski last met with respondent, respondent was in
counseling, her visits were going well, respondent was working, and respondent was remodeling
a residence that was appropriate for her and the minor children. Respondent also had a car and
was working on getting her driver’s license. In Salesski’s opinion, respondent was doing what
she needed to be doing.
-9- ¶ 21 Wilder testified she had been a licensed professional counselor since May 2018
and had been treating respondent at Tazwood since August 2018. She met with respondent twice
a month for an hour session in accordance with Tazwood’s policy. Weekly sessions were only
for those experiencing a mental-health crisis. Before Wilder was her counselor, respondent
received counseling from a Tazwood social worker from January 2018 to June 2018. During that
period, respondent had attended only four sessions due to conflicts with respondent’s work
schedule. Respondent switched counselors because Wilder’s hours were more accommodating
to respondent’s work schedule. Wilder testified anxiety was a concern for respondent and they
created goals for addressing, managing, and reducing it. Wilder did not find respondent had any
other mental-health problems. Wilder explained anxiety was graded on a 10-point scale with 10
being the highest level. Respondent had been able to reduce her anxiety level from the seven to
eight range to the four to five range. As a policy, Wilder did not address past issues unless the
client raised the issues. Respondent’s sessions with Wilder were paid for by respondent’s
Medicaid insurance. Respondent lost her insurance and had paid for some of the sessions
herself. Respondent had not attended a session since January 25, 2019.
¶ 22 Lackey testified she had known respondent since December 2016. Respondent
had asked for help in obtaining public housing for her and the children. In February 2018,
respondent told her she could not get public housing because she was unable to get her children’s
birth certificates and social security cards. Lackey then started looking for affordable housing
for herself and respondent to share the expenses. In March 2018, Lackey signed a lease for a six-
bedroom house in Peoria. The first month Lackey spent around $3000 making sure the home
was safe for respondent’s children. Lackey and respondent moved into the home around April
13, 2018. Lackey owned two foxes, one tarantula, three snakes, two turtles, one iguana, and five
- 10 - sugar gliders. The animals were all in Lackey’s bedroom, which was locked when she was not
present. The animals did not run loose in the home. DCFS would not allow respondent to live in
the home due to the exotic animals. According to Lackey, no one from DCFS ever came to
inspect the home. Around May 20, 2018, respondent moved out of the home and went to live
with her boyfriend in Canton. In July 2018, respondent showed Lackey her new apartment,
which was the downstairs of a home. Respondent had remodeled the apartment to make it three
bedrooms.
¶ 23 Pilkington testified he was a customer service representative at Hindaiju Global
Solutions (HGS) where respondent also worked. He had been dating respondent since April
2018. On May 28, 2018, Pilkington and respondent signed a month-to-month lease for a lower-
story apartment with $500 monthly rent. The apartment consisted of three bedrooms, a main
room, kitchen, bathroom, and front and back porches. They moved in and began remodeling the
apartment. In July 2018, Pilkington talked to Johnson and provided his information for a
background check. He also told Johnson he was willing to do services. Pilkington did not have
children of his own. Additionally, Pilkington testified he had 2016 misdemeanor convictions for
(1) possession of under 2.5 grams of cannabis for which he paid a $500 fine and (2) battery for
which he served 30 days in jail. Pilkington also had some traffic infractions and did not have a
valid driver’s license. For the past three to four months, respondent had done all the driving
because she had obtained her driver’s license.
¶ 24 After Johnson had twice canceled the home inspection, she inspected Pilkington
and respondent’s apartment on August 13, 2018. Pilkington explained they were in the middle
of painting when Johnson came and some electrical outlet covers were removed for painting
purposes. The water line was shut off because Pilkington had cut a water line when he tiled the
- 11 - bathroom. They remedied the problems within two or three days of the inspection.
¶ 25 Respondent testified she was currently 27 years old. She married Kenneth Q. in
March 2013. They moved several times, and K.L. was in temporary custody for a period. In
October 2016, she left Kenneth Q. in California and moved to Springfield, Illinois, with her two
children (she was pregnant with the third) to live with her mother’s sister. At the time of the
fitness hearing, neither she nor Kenneth had initiated divorce proceedings.
¶ 26 In Springfield, respondent initially moved in with her aunt but then ended up
living in several different residences. DCFS became involved in May 2017. Respondent
testified DCFS had made a referral for services in Springfield. In August 2017, respondent
decided to move to Pekin, and DCFS told her she would not receive any assistance if she moved
to Pekin because it was out of its jurisdiction. Respondent felt she could get on her feet faster in
Pekin, so she moved there and lived with a friend named Travis. Respondent admitted her living
situation in Pekin was not appropriate for the minor children. While she lived in Pekin, DCFS
did provide her transportation to her visits in Springfield.
¶ 27 In January 2018, respondent began trying to get housing through the Pekin
Housing Authority and learned she needed to present the minor children’s social security cards.
According to respondent, her first caseworker had taken the social security cards and had never
given them back. Since she could not get the social security cards, respondent started looking for
other housing. Respondent did eventually get the cards back in June or July 2018 when Johnson
became her caseworker.
¶ 28 In April 2018, respondent moved into the Peoria home with Lackey. Respondent
testified her name was not originally on the lease, but she added her name within a few days of
moving in. Respondent testified her caseworker refused to inspect the home, so she moved out
- 12 - in May 2018 to her current home in Canton. The Canton home required remodeling. According
to respondent, Johnson cancelled the inspection three times. On the day Johnson did inspect the
home, respondent and Pilkington were painting the residence and the water was turned off due to
the pipe problem. According to respondent, the point of Johnson’s visit was to notify respondent
DCFS was seeking the termination of her parental rights, and Johnson did not meaningfully
inspect the home. Respondent also testified she never received any assistance from DCFS in
getting housing.
¶ 29 As to employment, respondent started working part-time at the Pekin Family
Dollar in November 2017. Respondent obtained full-time employment at Kroger in February
2018. She worked both jobs for a short time. In May 2018, respondent started working full-time
at HGS and still worked there. At the time of the hearing, respondent worked 40 hours a week at
HGS. Respondent never received any kind of aid or money from DCFS for financial support.
¶ 30 Additionally, respondent testified Dr. Eckert’s report contained numerous errors.
Respondent denied ever receiving inpatient mental-health treatment. She admitted she had
anxiety and had failed to obtain consistent treatment for it. Respondent obtained her own
counselor. In her opinion, she had been engaged in “tough” counseling for about eight months at
the time of the hearing. Respondent felt the counseling was helping her a great deal.
Respondent testified in August 2018 she was doing everything she needed to complete her
service plan. She had a job and a home and was attending counseling and visits.
¶ 31 Kenneth testified he did not recall respondent being hospitalized when they lived
in the state of Washington. Kenneth did testify respondent had panic attacks about twice a
month in Washington and sought counseling at a local counseling facility. According to
Kenneth, respondent had panic attacks less often in California and did not seek treatment for
- 13 - them.
¶ 32 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found all three of the
parents involved in this case unfit on all grounds alleged in the petition. On April 25, 2019, the
court entered the written adjudication order finding respondent unfit.
¶ 33 On June 13, 2019, the circuit court held the best-interests hearing. The State
presented the testimony of Adrianna Stevenson, a caseworker at Camelot, and respondent
testified on her own behalf.
¶ 34 Stevenson testified she had been the caseworker for the minor children’s case
since October 2018. K.L. was now seven years old and had been in her placement since June
2017. The placement is a specialized one because K.L. has posttraumatic stress syndrome and
“behaviors.” Since being in the home, K.L.’s behaviors had significantly decreased, she was
doing better in school, and K.L. was involved in the community. K.L. attended church with her
foster family. K.L. got along with her 16-year-old foster sister and referred to her foster parents
as mom and dad. K.L. was bonded with her foster parents and sought comfort from them. Her
foster parents were willing to adopt her and keep a relationship open with respondent.
¶ 35 Stevenson further testified I.L. was now two years old and A.Q. was five years
old. They too had been in their placement since June 2017. K.L.’s foster mother was a cousin of
one of A.Q. and I.L.’s foster fathers, which allowed for sibling visits. A.Q. and I.L. were also
making progress in their placement. A.Q.’s speech had improved, and both children were
thriving. I.L. was in gymnastics, and A.Q. was in swimming. They too attended church with
their foster fathers and referred to their foster fathers as “dad.” Stevenson said a bond existed
between A.Q. and I.L. and their foster fathers.
¶ 36 Stevenson had observed five to six visits between respondent and the minor
- 14 - children. The minor children referred to her as mom and know she is their mother. The minor
children had never indicated they do not want to go home to respondent. According to
Stevenson, respondent had trouble tending to the needs of all three minor children. Respondent
also discussed with the minor children she was getting their rooms ready for them to come home.
After visits, A.Q. would not listen to his foster father. K.L. got really anxious before visits with
respondent. K.L. was not placed with her siblings because she had some aggressive and negative
behaviors toward them. At sibling visits, the minor children got along well. In Stevenson’s
opinion, respondent’s parental rights should be terminated.
¶ 37 Respondent testified she had been living in the same home and had the same job
for over a year. She also had the same boyfriend and their relationship was going well.
Respondent had not missed any visits with the children and wanted to have future contact with
them. Respondent planned on staying in Illinois permanently. She was still in counseling and
planned on starting classes for her general equivalency diploma in July 2019. Respondent also
had a driver’s license and owned a car.
¶ 38 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found it was in the minor
children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. On June 13, 2019, the court
entered a written order terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor children.
¶ 39 On June 17, 2019, respondent filed a notice of appeal in sufficient compliance
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1,
2001) (providing the rules governing civil cases also govern appeals from final judgments in all
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, except for delinquency cases). Thus, this court has
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 40 II. ANALYSIS
- 15 - ¶ 41 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2018)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the
State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as that term is defined in
section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.
2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the circuit court makes a finding of unfitness, then
the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the minor children’s best
interests that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366, 818 N.E.2d 1214,
1228 (2004).
¶ 42 Since the circuit court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and witnesses, it is in the best position to determine the credibility and
weight of the witnesses’ testimony. In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667, 756 N.E.2d 422, 427
(2001). Further, in matters involving minors, the circuit court receives broad discretion and great
deference. E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d at 667, 756 N.E.2d at 427. Thus, a reviewing court will not
disturb a circuit court’s unfitness finding and best-interests determination unless they are
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354, 830
N.E.2d 508, 516-17 (2005) (fitness finding); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 344, 924 N.E.2d 961, 970
(2010) (best-interests determination). A circuit court’s decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at
354, 830 N.E.2d at 517.
¶ 43 A. Respondent’s Fitness
¶ 44 Respondent contends the circuit court erred by finding her unfit. The State asserts
it proved respondent was an unfit parent for failure to make reasonable progress.
¶ 45 In this case, the circuit court found respondent unfit on three separate grounds,
- 16 - one of which was under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2018)). That section provides a parent may be declared unfit if he or she fails “to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period
following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court
Act.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018). Illinois courts have defined “reasonable progress”
as “demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007) (quoting In re
C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 211, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1047 (2001)). Moreover, they have explained
reasonable progress as follows:
“ ‘[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent’s “progress toward the
return of the child” under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act
encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and
the court’s directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to
the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which
later became known and which would prevent the court from
returning custody of the child to the parent.’ ” Reiny S., 374 Ill.
App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at
216-17, 752 N.E.2d at 1050).
Additionally, this court has explained reasonable progress exists when a circuit court “can
conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental
custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future
because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to
the parent in order to regain custody of the child.” (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.
- 17 - App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991). We have also emphasized “ ‘reasonable
progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d
227 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 577 N.E.2d at 1387).
¶ 46 In determining a parent’s fitness based on reasonable progress, a court may only
consider evidence from the relevant time period. Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d
at 844 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 237-38, 802 N.E.2d 800, 809 (2003)). Courts are
limited to that period “because reliance upon evidence of any subsequent time period could
improperly allow a parent to circumvent her own unfitness because of a bureaucratic delay in
bringing her case to trial.” Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844. In this case,
the petition alleged the relevant nine-month period was November 8, 2017, to August 8, 2018.
¶ 47 While respondent made some progress during the relevant nine-month period, she
was never close to having the minor children returned to her. Although respondent completed a
parenting class, she struggled to implement the parenting skills during visits with the minor
children. Bell and Johnson both testified respondent had difficulty parenting the three children at
the same time. The caseworkers never allowed visits outside the agency’s visitation room due to
concerns about respondent’s ability to control the minor children. Also, in April 2018,
respondent’s visits with K.L. were reduced due to K.L. having behavior problems after visits.
¶ 48 Additionally, Dr. Eckert completed a psychological evaluation of respondent and
was concerned about respondent’s ability to parent because of her chaotic history and lack of
nurturing. He recommended respondent engage in 12 months of intense counseling followed by
group therapy. Dr. Eckert further explained respondent would need to be fully dedicated to that
therapy process. During the relevant nine-month period, respondent attended only four therapy
sessions. At the end of the period, respondent had started with a new counselor. However, that
- 18 - counselor only addressed respondent’s anxiety and not any of her past issues. Thus, respondent
had not engaged in the necessary therapy during the nine-month period. Additionally,
respondent had lacked a suitable home for the minor children during the nine-month period.
¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court’s finding respondent unfit based on
section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 50 Since we have upheld the circuit court’s determination respondent met the
statutory definition of an “unfit person” on the basis of failure to make reasonable progress (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)), we do not address the other bases for respondent’s unfitness
finding. See In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891, 819 N.E.2d 813, 820 (2004).
¶ 51 B. Minor Children’s Best Interests
¶ 52 Respondent also challenges the circuit court’s finding it was in the minor
children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. The State disagrees and contends the
court’s finding was proper.
¶ 53 During the best-interests hearing, the circuit court focuses on “the child[ren]’s
welfare and whether termination would improve the child[ren]’s future financial, social and
emotional atmosphere.” In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 784 N.E.2d 304, 309 (2002). In
doing so, the court considers the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act
(705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West Supp. 2017)) in the context of the children’s age and
developmental needs. See In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959-60, 835 N.E.2d 908, 912-13
(2005). Those factors include the following: the children’s physical safety and welfare; the
development of the children’s identity; the children’s family, cultural, and religious background
and ties; the children’s sense of attachments, including continuity of affection for the children,
the children’s feelings of love, being valued, security, and familiarity, and taking into account the
- 19 - least disruptive placement for the children; the children’s own wishes and long-term goals; the
children’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; the children’s need for
permanence, which includes the children’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; the uniqueness of every family and each child; the
risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and the wishes of the persons available to
care for the children. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West Supp. 2017).
¶ 54 We note a parent’s unfitness to have custody of his or her children does not
automatically result in the termination of the parent’s legal relationship with the children. In re
M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002). As stated, the State must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the termination of parental rights is in the minor children’s
best interests. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 1228. “Proof by a preponderance of
the evidence means that the fact at issue *** is rendered more likely than not.” People v. Houar,
365 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686, 850 N.E.2d 327, 331 (2006).
¶ 55 A review of the best-interests factors favors the termination of respondent’s
parental rights. All three minor children had lived in their respective foster homes for more than
two years and were doing well in their foster homes. They were all safe in their foster homes,
and their individual needs were provided for. K.L. was bonded with her foster sister. Moreover,
all three minor children were involved in community activities and attended church with their
foster families. The foster parents were all willing to provide the children with permanence and
to maintain sibling bonds. While respondent had made many improvements in her life since the
minor children came into care and indicated she was willing to do whatever it took to bring them
home, she was still struggling with parenting all three children at the same time during
supervised visits. The children were also bonded with respondent, but it was not clear if and
- 20 - when respondent would be able to provide the stability and permanency the children needed.
¶ 56 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s conclusion it was in the minor children’s
best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Sangamon County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 59 Affirmed.
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