In re I.J.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 115279
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re I.J., 2026-Ohio-1191.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE I.J. : : No. 115279 [Appeal by T.J., Father] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. CU-11-110416 and SU-14-704092

Appearances:

Robert C. Aldridge, for appellant.

Sarah R. Murray, pro se.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

Appellant-father (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

denying his motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities and granting, in

part, appellee-mother’s (“Mother”) motion to modify parental rights and

responsibilities. He raises the following six assignments of error for review:

Assignment of Error I: The trial court abused its discretion when it did not exercise sound reasoning when it selectively applied the Local Rules. Assignment of Error II: The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to grant [Father’s] motion to remove the Guardian ad Litem [“GAL”] and motion to exclude the GAL report due to the failure to investigate the best interest of the minor child.

Assignment of Error III: The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to find that a change of circumstance had occurred.

Assignment of Error IV: The trial court erred in making modifications to the parenting order when the evidence failed to show that such modifications were in the best interests of the minor child.

Assignment of Error V: The trial court abused its discretion and erred when it ruled on a motion for GAL fees without an opportunity to respond or request a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 15(D)(5).

Assignment of Error VI: That the trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This appeal arises from motions by both parties to modify their 2016

parental rights and responsibilities agreement (“the agreement”) regarding their

now 15-year-old child, I.J. In the agreement, Mother was designated as the sole

custodial and residential parent and Father was designated as the nonresidential

and noncustodial parent. Father and Mother were never married and have been

fighting over I.J.’s care and custody since 2016. The history of their disagreements

and the underlying facts may be found in the parties’ previous six appeals — In re

I.L.J., 2016-Ohio-7052 (8th Dist.) (“In re I.L.J. I”); In re I.L.J., 2019-Ohio-5241 (8th

Dist.) (“In re I.L.J. II”); In re I.L.J., 2020-Ohio-5434 (8th Dist.) (“In re I.L.J. III”);

In re I.L.J., 2023-Ohio-2960 (8th Dist.) (“In re I.L.J. IV”); In re I.L.J., 2024-Ohio- 454 (8th Dist.) (“In re I.L.J. V”); and In re I.L.J., 2025-Ohio-376 (8th Dist.) (“In re

I.L.J. VI”).

Relevant to this appeal, in June 2024, Mother filed a pro se motion

asking the court to modify the following sections of the agreement: (1) local and

international travel; (2) communication between parents; (3) child’s activities; and

(4) video communications or telephone calls. In response, Father filed his own

motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities in August 2024. Father sought

to change the agreement and become residential parent based on I.J.’s desire to

change schools and play football at Valley Forge High School in Parma, where Father

resides, instead of Shaker Heights, where I.J. attends school and resides with

Mother and his half-brother.

At a pretrial in September 2024, Father requested that the juvenile

court conduct an in camera interview with I.J. and Mother requested a GAL. The

court granted both requests. The court appointed a GAL the same day of the pretrial

and held an in camera interview with I.J. in November 2024. In his interview, I.J.

indicated that he wanted to reside with Father and play football at Valley Forge High

School. The court found that I.J. “does have sufficient reasoning ability to express

his wishes and concerns with respect to allocation of parental rights and

responsibilities for his care. [I.J.] is intelligent and articulate.” (Journal entry, Nov.

26, 2024.)

The matter proceeded to trial in December 2024, and was continued

to two dates in February 2025. Mother and Father appeared at all dates, with Mother proceeding pro se and Father represented by counsel. The testimony at trial

consisted of Mother, Father, I.J.’s half-brother, and the GAL.

In January 2025, following the first trial date, Father filed a motion

to remove the GAL and exclude her report, alleging that the GAL failed to comply

with the local rules of juvenile court and the Ohio Rules of Superintendence

governing GALs. Then on February 7, 2025, Father filed a supplemental motion to

modify parental rights and responsibilities, alleging that Mother did not share I.J.’s

medical information with him in violation of the “illness or injury of a child” section

of the agreement.

At the next trial date on February 13, 2025, the court “struck and gave

no weight to any of the GAL’s opinions as to a ‘change of circumstance.’” (Journal

entry, May 27, 2025.) The court allowed the GAL to orally report on her

investigation and offer an opinion as to the child’s “best interest.” The matter then

concluded on February 14, 2025. The testimony consisted of Mother and Father,

which the court noted was “not corroborated by other witnesses or documents,

except [for I.J.’s half-brother] and the GAL’s investigation.” (Journal entry, May 27,

2025.) Mother and Father both testified as to the reasons why the agreement should

be modified in their favor.

Mother testified as to past issues with Father’s travel itineraries with

I.J. Mother stated that Father either provided late notice or incomplete itineraries.

Mother wanted the agreement to include the requirement that Father include the

travel location with the notification to travel. Mother also indicated that Father was previously found in contempt in 2022 for not revealing I.J.’s location, disabling I.J.’s

cell phone GPS, and taking I.J. to an unknown location.

Father testified regarding his displeasure about having to give notices

to travel beyond state lines. According to Father, giving notice to travel beyond state

lines was arbitrary and did not allow him and I.J. to travel spontaneously for a

relatively short distance. Father’s sister is a flight attendant, which in some cases

means that he does not get the full itinerary until the night before “because the flight

load changes.” (Tr. 222.) His concern is that when they travel by plane there may

be some circumstances where he would not know their final destination until three

days before their trip.

With regard to telephone access to I.J., Father testified that he wanted

I.J. to have two cell phones — the cell phone that Mother purchased for I.J. to use

while in her possession and a second cell phone Father purchased for I.J. to use only

when he is in Father’s possession. Mother testified that she wants I.J. to have only

one cell phone for which she will be financially responsible. I.J. expressed concern

about having two cell phones. He believes that having two cell phones will interfere

with his communication with friends and make things more complicated.

Mother testified that she wanted the costs and fees billed by the

school, including lunches, field trips, activities, and supplies to be shared by both

parents. Father opposed Mother’s meal calculation because it did not consider when

he packs I.J. lunch for school. Father was also opposed to not being notified of

school expenses or field trips before the event occurred. Father testified about I.J.’s interest in football and the need for I.J. to

attend a school where his teammates are serious about the sport. According to

Father, I.J. expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the Shaker Heights football

program. Father believed that Valley Forge High School in Parma, which is near

Father’s house, was the better choice for I.J. because I.J. has told Father that he

wants “a fresh start” and “a clean slate.” (Tr. 402.) Father indicated that he had a

“fresh start” as a kid, which helped him.

Father and Mother discussed a potential change of schools for I.J.

Mother was open to the idea of I.J. switching schools, depending on the school,

location, and academics. Mother provided Father a list of several schools that had a

good football program and good academics. Father did not agree with any of

Mother’s recommendations for various reasons, including tuition expenses, uniform

requirements, the all-male student body, the distance from Father’s house, and the

religious teaching of Catholic schools. The only school acceptable to Father was

Valley Forge High School.

Mother testified that she did not agree with a transfer to Valley Forge

or any other high school that was a “lower-rated worse academic school” than

Shaker Heights. (Tr. 81.) Mother also testified that Valley Forge’s win-loss record

in football was no better than Shaker Heights record.

Father has lived in Parma for 14 years. I.J., however, has no friends

in Parma and is not familiar with Valley Forge High School or its student body and

faculty. Father testified that a change was needed because, within the past two years, I.J. was “jumped” in his neighborhood; I.J. was threatened in the boys’ bathroom at

school; I.J. was threatened after a student jumped off a school bus and struck him;

and I.J. was kicked after practice.

Mother testified that the kicking incident occurred when a student

kicked I.J. and I.J. punched the student in retaliation. At the time of the incident,

Father was nearby and took I.J. to the football coach to explain. According to

Mother, the incident was not reported to school administration and Father did not

notify her about the incident until a month after it occurred. The bathroom incident

involved boys pushing and arguing. Mother testified there were no injuries and the

incident was not reported to school administration. The bus incident occurred when

I.J. threw something at a school bus window and a student sitting at the window

jumped off the bus and struck or threatened I.J. This incident was also not reported.

Both Mother and Father testified I.J. did well academically when he

attended Bedford Elementary School. Mother and I.J. then moved to Shaker

Heights where I.J. received A’s and B’s in sixth and seventh grades. As an eighth

grader, I.J.’s grades were not good. At the beginning of the year, he received B’s and

C’s except for Algebra and Spanish. In the last full grading period, he received an A

in Science, a low C, some D’s, and an F in Algebra. Mother testified that I.J. is

enrolled in RaiderTime, which is a program offered by Shaker Heights schools for

homework and grade assistance, she obtained a private tutor, and talked to I.J.’s

teachers to help with I.J.’s grades. Father testified that he helps I.J. with his

assignments and also talked with the teachers. Father testified that while I.J. is with him, he reduces I.J.’s video game time and phone privileges until I.J. completes his

homework.

The GAL testified her “recommendation in the minor’s best interest

is that the child remain in the legal custody of his mother.” (Tr. 677.) The GAL noted

that throughout the course of her investigation, she had the opportunity to meet and

speak with I.J. on three occasions. And while I.J. stated that his desire was to live

with Father and go to school in Parma, “he was never able to develop that or

substantiate the reason why.” (Tr. 678.) According to the GAL, I.J. never went to

Valley Forge to observe or shadow anyone; he does not know any students there; he

does not know anything about the curriculum and neither did Father.

I.J. did not disclose any issues or conflicts with Mother, his half-

brother, or Father, as well as his extended family. When the GAL asked him what

does a “fresh start” mean “for someone so young,” I.J. replied, “I don’t want anyone

to know me, I don’t want anyone to know anything about me.” (Tr. 680.) The GAL

felt that was odd for “someone of tender years to want a fresh start” when I.J. could

not “express any real issues of concern.” (Tr. 680.)

With regard to football, the GAL testified that she investigated both

the Shaker Heights and Valley Forge programs and stated that “Shaker Heights is

far superior to Valley Forge.” (Tr. 682.) As to academics, the GAL testified that “the

Parma City School District is inferior to Shaker Heights.” (Tr. 686-687.) The GAL

stated: Shaker Heights is superior with regard to academics, sports, diversity, parent-teacher ratios, clubs and activities.

Every category Shaker was superior to Parma.

Back to [I.J.’s] expressed desire and not being able to develop it, I was surprised that he literally didn’t know anything about the school to which he was expressing a desire to attend.

Not knowing anyone, not knowing the coach, coaching staff, student body, players, no one, and likewise father didn’t either.

...

I do believe that it’s in [I.J.’s] best interest to remain at the superior school and because of what I know regarding his talent as an athlete, the better athletic program to enhance him as a young man and a player is Shaker.

There is nothing known to me that Parma can offer this young man to promote him.

(Tr. 687-688.)

As to the issues with I.J.’s grades, the GAL testified that if the poor

grades were caused by attitude and laziness like the school believes, then I.J. needs

assistance in finding a way to remedy that. The GAL did not believe that a change

in schools would solve the problem and that he would be better suited in Shaker.

Following the conclusion of the February 14 hearing, the parties

submitted closing arguments. On May, 27, 2025, the court issued a well-written

judgment entry denying Father’s motion to modify parental rights and

responsibilities and granting, in part, Mother’s motion to modify the parties’

parenting plan. Finding that a modification was in I.J.’s best interest, the court

modified the agreement in the following ways, relevant to this appeal: a) For Travel:

Travel in United States: Five (5) days’ notification, with itinerary, shall be given by parent traveling with [I.J.] by text, email, or in writing that other parent receives at their home five (5) days prior to travel.

b) Local travel: Any travel less than two hundred (200) miles from traveling parent’s home to destination, not overnight, shall require no notification to other parent.

c) International Travel: The full itinerary shall be provided seven (7) days in advance of travel. Each parent may reach [I.J.] by cell phone or video chat once a day but not to interfere with [I.J.]’s activities. Because of Father’s benefits of travel from family members, if there is a change of itinerary, Father may amend the same by immediately contacting Mother with the change by text or email. The same applies for travel in United States.

d) Video Communication or Telephone Calls: [I.J.] may contact either parent at any time without interference. [I.J.] shall be given one cell phone for his personal use and to be used to contact or receive contact from either parent. No parent shall interfere with [I.J.]’s contact with either parent. Mother shall be responsible for the cost of the cell phone up to One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month. Any charge or expense in excess of $150 per month shall be equally divided by the parents fifty-fifty (50/50). Father may disable the GPS feature while [I.J.] is in his possession but neither party shall disable any application or feature designed to locate the cell phone or [I.J.].

e) Cost of Child’s Activities: All costs incurred as a result of a mandatory school-related activity or an optional school activity shall be paid as follows.

1. Any charge less than $150, each parent will pay one-half (1/2) fifty-fifty (50/50).

2. School lunch costs shall be the responsibility of the parent in possession the night before. If a parent prepares school lunch, the parent will not be charged for the school lunch.

3. All other expenses shall be divided per Exhibits A and B, prior Court Orders (Emphasis in original.) (Judgment entry, May 27, 2025.)

Furthermore, the court found that

Father’s Motion to Modify Parental Rights and Responsibilities as well as his Supplemental Motion fails because a “change of circumstances” and “best interest” have not been proved. . . .

Further, the Court ORDERS family counseling. Mother shall select three (3) possible certified family counselors covered through her insurance in close proximity to the parties, and Father shall choose one (1) of the three and notify Mother. Mother shall schedule an appointment so that Father, Mother, and [I.J.] attend. The appointment shall not be scheduled during Father’s parenting time or work hours.

The Court does not ORDER but suggests Mother, Father, and [I.J.] consult the family counselor about a possible compromise for [I.J. and] find a school which has a good football program and excellent academics.

(Emphasis in original.) (Judgment entry, May 27, 2025.)

Father now appeals, raising six assignments of error, which shall be

discussed together and out of order where appropriate.

II. Law and Analysis

A. The Local Rules

In the first assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court

erred when it selectively applied Loc.R. 36 and 37 of the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, by allowing Mother’s witness to testify even

though her witness list was untimely filed but by excluding some of the evidence

Father indicated on his supplemental exhibit list, which was also untimely filed.

In Citibank, N.A. v. Katz, 2013-Ohio-1041 (8th Dist.), we stated: ‘“[C]ourts are to be given latitude in following their own local rules; the enforcement of rules of court is held to be within the sound discretion of the court.’” In re T.W., 8th Dist. Nos. 88360 and 88424, 2007-Ohio- 1441, ¶ 38, quoting Ciokajlo v. Ciokajlo, 1st Dist. No. C-810158, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 12823, *4 (July 28, 1982); see also Dodson v. Maines, 6th Dist. No. S-11-012, 2012 Ohio 2548, ¶ 47 (“[L]ocal rules are of the court’s own making, procedural in nature, and not substantive principles of law.”) (Citations omitted.) So long as a trial court’s failure to comply with or enforce its local rules does not affect due process or other constitutional rights, “there is no error when, in its sound discretion, the court decides that the peculiar circumstances of a case require deviation from its own rules.” Id. (Citations omitted.); see also Wallner v. Thorne, 189 Ohio App.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 2146, 937 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.).

Id. at ¶ 29. We note that an abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its

judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

In this case, Mother filed her witness list on December 4, 2024, which

was seven days prior to the start of trial on December 11, 2024. Father objected to

Mother’s untimely witness list. Juv.Loc.R. 36(A), which governs witness lists,

provides that “witness lists shall be exchanged no later than fourteen (14) days prior

to the trial date[.]” Under the rule, however, the court may, “in its discretion allow

any party to call any witness whose name is not on a witness list, when doing so will

serve the interest of justice.” Juv.Loc.R. 36(B).

Father filed his supplemental exhibit list the day before trial on

December 10, 2024. Mother objected to Father’s use of the supplemental exhibits,

arguing that the list was untimely filed. Juv.Loc.R. 37, which governs exhibits,

provides that “[a]n index of the exhibits to be used at trial, along with a brief description of such exhibits, shall be filed and served upon opposing counsel no later

than one week before the final pretrial and updated no less than one week before the

trial.” Juv.Loc.R. 37(B).

A review of the record reveals that the juvenile court heard arguments

from both Mother and Father and addressed both the witness list and supplemental

exhibit list prior to the start of trial. With regard to Mother’s witness list, Mother

only had one witness listed, I.J.’s adult, half-brother, who lives with Mother and I.J.

The court overruled Father’s objection and allowed I.J.’s half-brother to testify,

stating that “it shouldn’t surprise you that somebody in [Mother’s] household could

be a witness.” (Tr. 25.) The court noted that it gave Father “generous latitude, so [it

was going to] give [Mother] generous latitude too.” (Tr. 24-25.) Juv.Loc.R. 36(B)

gives the court discretion to “allow any party to call any witness whose name is not

on a witness list, when doing so will serve the interest of justice.” And that is exactly

what the court did in this case. Furthermore, I.J.’s half-brother did not testify until

the last day of trial in February 2025, so Father had adequate time to prepare. We

do not find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by allowing I.J.’s half-brother

testify at trial.

As to Father’s supplemental exhibit list, the court noted that Father

had eight items on his list and then went through each item to determine “whether

there’s any prejudice that attaches to any of these exhibits.” (Tr. 18-19.) The court

stated, “[I]f [M]other has knowledge or has possession of some of these things, then

she’s not prejudiced . . . even if due process is not denied, if she had possession of these things or had the ability to have these things.” (Tr. 19.) Ultimately, the juvenile

court sustained Mother’s objection pertaining to I.J.’s private tutoring records

because Mother did not have access to them. The court also limited Father’s use on

two other items on his supplemental exhibit list pertaining to recordings of the

conversations between Father and the GAL and Father’s phone logs. The court

found that these exhibits could not be used in Father’s case-in-chief, but could be

used for credibility issues. We do not find that this was a selective application of the

local rules as Father contends. Rather, the court thoroughly reviewed each item on

Father’s supplemental exhibit list and exercised sound discretion and latitude when

making its determination.

Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Parental Rights and Responsibilities

In the third and fourth assignments of error, Father challenges the

modifications the juvenile court made to the agreement and argues the court abused

its discretion when it failed to find a change in circumstances.

We previously set forth our standard of review in In re I.L.J. IV, as

follows:

Under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), a trial court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities unless it finds[, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree,] that there has been a change in the circumstances of the child or the child’s residential parent, and the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. The requirements of R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) apply to motions to change the designation of residential parent and legal custodian of the child, not to modification of parenting time or visitation rights. In re F.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108934 and 108935, 2020-Ohio-1624, ¶ 52, 154 N.E.3d 245; see also Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 26. Here, Father’s motion included a request that he be named the sole residential parent but the trial court denied the motion. Further, although the court modified various provisions of the shared-parenting plan, it made no changes to its earlier decree designating Mother as the residential parent. Accordingly, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) does not apply to our review of the trial court’s modifications to the shared parenting agreement. See In re A.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111603, 2023-Ohio-1366, ¶ 76 (where court denied father’s request to modify the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities to name him the sole residential parent, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) did not apply to appellate court’s review of trial court’s modifications to the parties’ shared-parenting plan).

Instead, our review is governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), which provides:

The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the children or upon the request of one or both of the parents under the decree. Modifications under this division may be made at any time. The court shall not make any modification to the plan under this division unless the modification is in the best interest of the children.

Unlike R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which states that modification of the designation of residential parent and legal custodian requires a determination that a change in circumstances has occurred and a finding that the modification is in the best interest of the child, “R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) requires only that the modification of the shared- parenting plan be in the best interest of the child.” Fisher at ¶ 34. The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that the best-interest standard in R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) is lower than that contained in R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) because factors in a shared-parenting plan such as which school the child will attend or the physical location of the child during holidays are not as critical to the life of a child as the designation of the child’s residential parent and legal custodian. Id. at ¶ 36.

Because under the lower standard of R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) there is no requirement that the trial court find a change in circumstances before modifying a shared-parenting plan, Father’s argument that the court erred in modifying the plan without finding a change in circumstances is without merit.

With respect to the best interest determination, we recognize that the trial court incorrectly cited R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) in its entry regarding its modifications to the shared-parenting plan. It also incorrectly cited the best interest factors contained in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). See Campana v. Campana, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 88, 2009-Ohio-796, ¶ 3 (the best interest factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) are used only for custody modification motions; the best interest factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) are applied to parenting time and visitation modifications).

A reviewing court will not overturn a trial court’s modification of a parenting agreement absent an abuse of discretion. Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 85, 1994-Ohio 483, 630 N.E.2d 665 (1994).

Id. at ¶ 35-39, 43.

Here, the court correctly found, based on In re I.L.J. IV, that Father’s

motion was to be reviewed under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which first requires a

“change in circumstances” before reaching the “best interest” determination under

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), and Mother’s motion was to be reviewed under

R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), which only requires the child’s “best interest” determination

under R.C. 3109.051(D). We in turn will review the juvenile court’s findings for each

motion under the appropriate standard for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 43, citing

Masters.

1. Change in Circumstances

In this case, the juvenile court noted that Father offered the following

four reasons for the change in circumstances: (1) I.J. wishes to have a “fresh start”

outside of Shaker Heights school system and desires to play football outside of Shaker Heights; (2) I.J.’s poor grades; (3) the passage of time since the May 2016

parenting order; and (4) the breakdown in communication between Mother and

Father. Because these reasons are intertwined, we will discuss them together.

Father argues that while the wishes of a child alone do not

automatically amount to a change of circumstances, various appellate districts have

found scenarios where the child’s wishes can meet the threshold on a case-by-case

basis. As to what factors to look for in determining whether a child’s wishes raise to

the level of a change in circumstances, Father cites to several cases from other

districts that have considered the passage of time since the prior order, the child’s

maturity, and the child’s age, including Boone v. Kaser, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3906

(5th Dist. Aug. 28, 2011); Wilson v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-4978 (4th Dist.);

Khulenberg v. Davis, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3753 (12th Dist. Aug. 25, 1997); and

Butland v. Butland, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2773 (10th Dist. June 27, 1996).

The only case Father cites to from the Eighth District in support of his

position in this regard is In re J.C., 2019-Ohio-107 (8th Dist.), which relies on one

factor — the passage of time. In In re J.C., we found that the “court committed

prejudicial error by not considering facts that occurred since the prior custody

decree when concluding that there was no change in circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 30.

Those facts included: (1) the eight and one-half years that had passed between the

original custody decree and the court’s journal entry denying Mother’s motion for a

custody modification; (2) the children’s ages were three and one when Father was

granted custody, and they were ages 12 and nine when Mother’s motion was denied; (3) Mother moved to the children’s school district but had lived approximately two

hours away when the court granted Father custody in 2009; and (4) when Father

was awarded custody, his mother was the primary caregiver for the children, but at

the time of denial, Father lived with his girlfriend, who was then the primary

caregiver for the children. Id. at ¶ 28-29.

When looking at the passage of time in this case, nine years passed

between the original agreement and the court’s journal entry denying Father’s

motion for modification. And while I.J. was five when Mother was granted sole

custody and 14 years old when Father’s motion was denied, Father failed to

demonstrate that the passage of time resulted in a change in circumstances for I.J.

or Mother. The juvenile court considered Father’s “fresh start” argument and I.J.’s

wishes during the in camera interview and found that there was no change in

circumstances. Moreover, the GAL asked I.J. what he meant by wanting a “fresh

start” and I.J. replied, “I don’t want anyone to know me, I don’t want anyone to know

anything about me.” (Tr. 680.) The GAL felt that was odd for “someone of tender

years to want a fresh start” when he could not “express any real issues of concern.”

(Tr. 680.)

Furthermore, I.J.’s wishes to reside with Father and play football at

Valley Forge High School in Parma are insufficient to warrant a change in

circumstances. A review of the record reveals that Mother was willing to

compromise to Father’s request by recommending several schools with a good football program and academics, but Father ruled out all of Mother’s suggestions for

various reasons. The only high school acceptable to Father was Valley Forge.

The suggested change to Valley Forge, however, was not thoroughly

investigated. Father offered no testimony or exhibits regarding the school’s

academic program, student body, faculty, or support programs for I.J. Neither

Father nor I.J. had toured the school, and there was no testimony that I.J. knew any

students who attended Valley Forge. Additionally, Father failed to offer any

testimony as to the quality of the football program, coaching staff, or future

teammates at Valley Forge. The GAL contacted the Shaker Heights football coach

and the Valley Forge coach to see how I.J. would fit in their program. The Shaker

Heights coach indicated I.J. had skills but he needed to work on his speed and

conditioning, and the Valley Forge coach never returned the GAL’s call.

In its journal entry, the juvenile court noted that football should not

be the reason for a modification of custody unless there is a substantial or material

change to I.J. or Mother as the residential parent. “No proof was offered as to the

effect (positive or negative) that would occur to I.J. if custody was modified to

Father. No school official or coach for either Valley Forge or Shaker Heights

testified. . . . A modification for football does not meet O.R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)

requirements.” We agree with the court’s determination.

Next, Father argues that the recent change in I.J.’s grades is a change

in circumstances. At trial, the evidence demonstrated that I.J. received A’s and B’s

in sixth and seventh grades in Shaker Heights. As an eighth grader, I.J. received B’s and C’s except for Algebra and Spanish. In the last full grading period, he received

an A in Science, a low C, some D’s, and an F in Algebra. In response to I.J.’s decline

in grades, Mother enrolled I.J. in RaiderTime, which is a program offered by Shaker

Heights schools for homework and grade assistance. Mother also obtained a private

tutor and talked to I.J.’s teachers to help I.J. Father testified that he helps I.J. with

his assignments and also talked with the teachers. The GAL contacted I.J.’s teachers

who indicated that I.J.’s poor grades are reflective of his lack of focus and effort,

laziness, not turning in his homework on time, and the need for better study habits.

The court stated that I.J.’s poor grades appear to be because his

“recent lack of desire to achieve or laziness” and “may have been affected by the

present litigation.” (Journal entry, May 27, 2025.) The court aptly noted that the

lack of testimony, school records, or testimony of counselors from the school made

it difficult for the court to infer that a change of residence would affect I.J.’s grades

or motivation. Indeed, no evidence was offered as to why Valley Forge would offer

any different academic plan or result than Shaker Heights. We agree with the

juvenile court that this is not a change in circumstances as contemplated by the

statute.

Father’s final reason for a change in circumstances is the breakdown

in communication between Mother and Father. Father contends that Mother’s

continued pattern of failing to provide reasonable notice regarding I.J.’s medical

well-being, school events, and her continuous attempts to amend terms of the

parenting plan support the finding of a change in circumstances. In addressing this issue, the juvenile court noted that Father can

obtain almost all the information he seeks from the school. The court acknowledged

that Mother has failed to communicate effectively all medical appointments

consistently, but corrected that issue by modifying the agreement. The court further

noted that the breakdown in communication was an ongoing issue and not a change

in circumstances. The court stated, I.J. “has not been harmed by any of the alleged

infractions of notice to Father. In the future, Father may file a contempt motion for

failure to abide by the clarified Order.” (Journal entry, May 27, 2025.) We agree

with the juvenile court — Father failed to demonstrate that the communication

issues constituted a change in circumstances.

Lastly, Father contends the juvenile court erroneously held him to a

higher standard than in the statute by stating in its order that he must prove “a

substantial ‘change of circumstances.’” (Journal entry, May 27, 2025.) We note that

the Ohio Supreme Court has held that for a trial court to make the threshold finding

of a change in circumstances, “the change must be a change of substance, not a slight

or inconsequential change. The nomenclature is not the key issue.” Davis v.

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997). The Davis Court explained:

“The clear intent of that statute is to spare children from a constant tug of war between their parents who would file a motion for change of custody each time the parent out of custody thought he or she could provide the children a ‘better’ environment. The statute is an attempt to provide some stability to the custodial status of the children, even though the parent out of custody may be able to prove that he or she can provide a better environment.”

Id., quoting Wyss v. Wyss, 3 Ohio App.3d 412, 416 (10th Dist. 1982). Here, the juvenile court issued a detailed analysis of each change in

circumstances alleged by Father and concluded that Father failed to prove any

material change that would satisfy the standard set forth in R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).

The court found that “Father’s motion, while stating what Father believed was a []

change of circumstances pursuant to [R.C.] 3109.04(E)(1)(a), was illusory and not

proved to be material or a change of substance.” (Journal entry, May 27, 2025.)

Upon review, we agree with the juvenile court. The court did not

abuse its discretion in finding no change in circumstances based on the four reasons

Father alleged, and therefore was not required to proceed to a best interest analysis.

There is ample evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s findings.

2. Best Interest of the Child

Next, Father argues that the juvenile court made several revisions to

the agreement that are not in I.J.’s best interest. Specifically, Father argues: (1) the

notice requirements for the travel revisions are arbitrary and harmful to I.J.; (2) the

modification requiring I.J. to have one cell phone provided by Mother is not in I.J.’s

best interest; and (3) requiring Father to pay for school lunches and other activities

is in Mother’s best interest, not I.J.’s.

When making a best interest determination under R.C. 3109.051(D),

the court shall consider all of the following factors, in relevant part:

(1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, and other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, and with the person who requested companionship[;] (2) The geographical location of the residence of each parent and the distance between those residences[;]

(3) The child’s and parents’ available time, including, but not limited to, each parent’s employment schedule, the child’s school schedule, and the child’s and the parents’ holiday and vacation schedule;

(4) The age of the child;

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community;

(6) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers, pursuant to division (C) of this section, regarding the wishes and concerns of the child as to parenting time by the parent who is not the residential parent . . ., as to a specific parenting time or visitation schedule . . . the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;

(7) The health and safety of the child;

(8) The amount of time that will be available for the child to spend with siblings;

(9) The mental and physical health of all parties;

(10) Each parent’s willingness to reschedule missed parenting time and to facilitate the other parent’s parenting time rights[;]

(11) In relation to parenting time, whether either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child[;]

(13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;

(14) Whether either parent has established a residence or is planning to establish a residence outside this state;

(16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child. We note that, in general, absent any evidence to the contrary, “a reviewing court will

presume that the trial court considered the relevant statutory factors.” In re I.R.Q.,

2018-Ohio-292, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Quint v. Lomakoski, 2006-Ohio-3041 (2d

Dist.).

Here, the juvenile court modified the agreement to eliminate the

notice requirement for nonovernight travel within two hundred miles and required

that the parent traveling with I.J. give the other parent five days of notification prior

to travel within the United States and seven days for international travel. Father

contends that the notification requirements limit his ability to take advantage of his

travel benefits and are not in I.J.’s best interest. Additionally, the court ordered that

I.J. have one cell phone. Father contends that this obligates him to the risk and

responsibility of Mother’s property. The court modified the school lunch obligation

to be paid by the parent in possession the night before and split the costs of activities

that are less than $150. Father complains that these modifications were in Mother’s

best interests not I.J.’s. We disagree with Father’s contentions.

Throughout the proceedings the court was cognizant of the

acrimonious history between Mother and Father. The court determined that neither

Mother nor Father is flexible. The court addressed the factors set forth in

R.C. 3109.051(D), considered the GAL’s testimony, conducted an in camera

interview with I.J., and concluded that the modifications to the agreement were in

I.J.’s best interest. The travel notice requirements establish a clear deadline and address any last-minute changes to travel plans, thereby resolving an issue that has

been an ongoing source of conflict between the parties.

With regard to the cell phone, the court stated in its modification to

the agreement that “Father may disable the GPS feature while [I.J.] is in his

possession but neither party shall disable any application or feature designed to

locate the cell phone or [I.J.].” While Father claims that this is a “technological

impossibility,” both parties concede and we find that the court devised a

compromise between Mother and Father and took I.J.’s request into consideration

by ordering one cell phone for I.J. and allowing Father to retain the ability to disable

the GPS while I.J. is in his possession. See Father’s appellate brief, p. 21 (“While it

might be the result of technological naivety, the intent of the court seemed to be to

address [Father’s] concerns about the location tracking, but these specific

requirements are fundamentally conflicting.”) And Mother’s appellate brief, p. 26

(“[Father’s] claim of ‘technological impossibility’ is hyper-technical and designed to

frustrate the Trial Court’s clear intent to ensure the child has a single, functional

device while respecting [Father’s] concerns about surveillance.”).

Lastly, as to the school lunches and expenses, the court clarified the

agreement by ensuring that I.J.’s school lunches, activities, and field trips were

shared by both parents to address the dispute over what Father considers is “school

costs.”

After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case and applying the

relevant factors and applicable law, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the juvenile court for modifying the agreement. The juvenile court’s modifications serve

I.J.’s best interests.

Therefore, the third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

We note that in Father’s sixth assignment of error, he argues that the

juvenile court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Father,

however, fails to include the authority upon which he relies in support of his sixth

assigned error. “Ohio courts have consistently held that ‘[a]n appellate court may

disregard an assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) if an appellant fails to

cite to any legal authority in support of an argument as required by

App.R. 16(A)(7).’” Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski, 2025-Ohio-2690, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.),

quoting Strauss v. Strauss, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.), and citing Hausser &

Taylor, LLP v. Accelerated Sys. Integration, Inc., 2005-Ohio-1017, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.)

(“It is not the duty of this court to sort through the record to root out arguments and

evidence in support of an appellant’s assignment of error.”); Shaker HTS ex rel.

Lake v. Shaker Hts., 2024-Ohio-3007, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (“Appellate courts are not

advocates, and the appellant bears the burden of constructing the legal arguments

necessary to support their assignments of error.”); and State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-

2633, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.) (“Moore’s failure to cite any legal authority to support his

arguments that the trial court erred in some capacity renders his assignment of error

a nullity pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2).” (Emphasis in original.)). Nevertheless, we

addressed Father’s concerns with the juvenile court’s determination in the third and fourth assignments of error. Therefore, pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7),

we disregard Father’s sixth assignment of error.

C. The GAL’s Report

In the second assignment of error, Father contends that the juvenile

court erred when it failed to grant his motion to remove the GAL and exclude the

GAL’s report.

Father maintains that the juvenile court should have granted his

motion to remove the GAL and exclude the GAL’s report because the GAL failed to

investigate the best interest of the child in contravention of the court’s September

11, 2024 journal entry appointing the GAL. In this entry, the court ordered that the

GAL “is to . . . assist in determining the best interest of the child.” (Journal entry,

Sept. 11, 2024.) The court further ordered that the GAL “shall comply with Rule 48

of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio and Rule 18 of the Cuyahoga

County Local Rules of the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division [and] . . . Local

Rule 15 of the Cuyahoga County Rules [of the] Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile

Division.” (Journal entry, Sept. 11, 2024.) Father argues that the GAL failed to

comply with the local rules and Sup.R. 48.03(A)(5) when the GAL did not notify the

court of the conflict between I.J.’s wishes to reside with Father and attend Parma

Schools and her recommendation that Mother continues to be the residential parent

and legal custodian of I.J.

The role of a GAL is to protect the child’s interest, ensure that the

child’s interests are represented throughout the proceedings, and assist the trial court in its determination of what is in the child’s best interest. Sup.R. 48.03.

Relevant to this case, Sup.R. 48.03(A) and Juv.Loc.R. 15 and 18 address the role and

responsibilities of the GAL. Juv.Loc.R. 15 governs the appointments of GALs and

states that “(G) Responsibilities of a Guardian ad Litem[.] A Guardian ad

Litem shall comply with all requirements as listed in Sup. R. 48-48.07.” (Emphasis

in original.) Sup.R. 48(A)(1) and (5) provide in relevant part:

(A) General responsibilities

The responsibilities of a guardian ad litem shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Provide the court recommendations of the best interest of the child. Recommendations of the best interest of the child may be inconsistent with the wishes of the child or other parties.

(5) Upon becoming aware that the recommendations of the guardian ad litem differ from the wishes of the child, immediately notify the court in writing with notice to the parties or affected agencies. The court shall take action as it deems necessary.

(Emphasis in original.)

Juv.Loc.R. 18(G) addresses the content of the GAL’s report and

provides:

Each Guardian ad Litem Report shall detail the following when disclosure is in the best interests of the child:

(10) Specific recommendations, including recommendations of disposition, and the Guardian ad litem’s reasons for that position;

(11) All other recommendations, suggestions or concerns that the Guardian ad litem can identify as in the child’s best interests[.] As this court has previously recognized, “‘Sup.R. 48 provides [. . .]

good guidelines for the conduct of a guardian ad litem in meeting his or her

responsibilities in representing the best interest of a child in order to provide the

court with relevant information and an informed recommendation.’” In re C.O.,

2013-Ohio-5239, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), quoting In re K.G., 2010-Ohio-4399, ¶ 12 (9th

Dist.). The Rules of Superintendence are only “‘general guidelines for the conduct

of the courts’” and ‘“do not create substantive rights in individuals or procedural

law.’” In re C.O. at ¶ 14, quoting In re K.G. at ¶ 11, Sultaana v. Giant Eagle, 2008-

Ohio-3658, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.).

“As such, it has been generally held that a guardian ad litem’s failure

to comply with Sup.R. 48 is not, in and of itself, grounds for reversal of a custody

determination.” In re K.Z., 2019-Ohio-707, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.), citing In re C.O. at ¶ 14;

In re N.B., 2017-Ohio-1376, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.); Miller v. Miller, 2014-Ohio-5127, ¶ 14-

18 (4th Dist.). And as we discussed above, the enforcement of local rules is generally

within the sound discretion of the court. Therefore, as “‘long as a trial court’s failure

to comply with or enforce its local rules does not affect due process or other

constitutional rights, “there is no error when, in its sound discretion, the court

decides that the peculiar circumstances of a case require deviation from its own

rules.’”” In re K.Z. at ¶ 73, quoting Katz, 2013-Ohio-1041, at ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting

Dodson v. Maines, 2012-Ohio-2548, ¶ 47 (6th Dist.).

Here, Father takes issue with the opinion the GAL expressed in her

report. According to Father, rather than making a “best interest of the child determination” as the court mandated, the GAL instead opined that “Father has not

shown a substantial change of circumstances to warrant a change of custodian status

in this case.” (GAL report, Dec. 4, 2024.) Father contends that this

recommendation is outside the scope of the requirements for the GAL as set forth in

Sup.R. 48.03 and Juv.Loc.R. 15 and 18. Father brought this to the court’s attention

in his motion and at trial, and asked the court to strike the entire report. While

discussing Father’s motion, the GAL clarified that “with regards to the

recommendation, the recommendation is a best interest recommendation.”

(Tr. 283.)

Ultimately, the court sustained Father’s motion in part and denied it

in part, striking “anywhere in the report where it talks about change of

circumstance.” (Tr. 286.) The court noted that “[c]hange of circumstance is a

legality that the Court must determine, not the Guardian ad Litem. . . . The Guardian

ad Litem is involved in the best interest of the child and reporting to the Court facts

and circumstances that the Guardian ad Litem sees that would not be available to

the Court.” (Tr. 286.) The court believed that “there has been implied best interest

[and] . . . any prejudice that would occur from that being stated expressly as the best

interest given the fact the circumstance that the Guardian ad Litem reported will be

cured by the fact that the Guardian ad Litem will report orally to the Court sometime

during this evidentiary hearing at which point in time the parties may ask

questions.” (Tr. 286-287.) Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused

its discretion when it denied Father’s motion to remove the GAL and exclude the

GAL’s report. The court recognized that the GAL’s report contained an improper

legal conclusion and struck that portion from the report. The court reasoned that

any prejudice would be cured by the fact that the GAL would testify at trial and be

subject to examination. The court further reasoned that the GAL report is a tool and

it is the court’s ultimate determination as what is I.J.’s best interest. As this court

has previously stated:

Although a trial court is generally obliged to consider the recommendation of a child’s guardian ad litem, it is “not bound to adopt” it. In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98566 and 98567, 2013- Ohio-1706, ¶ 152. The “ultimate decision” is for the trial judge who “must act upon a consideration of all evidence presented.” Id., citing In re T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92816, 2009-Ohio-5496, ¶ 34.

In re K.Z., 2019-Ohio-707, at ¶ 78 (8th Dist.).

Additionally, in this case, the court completed an in camera interview

with I.J. where I.J. expressed to the court his wishes as to where he wants to live and

where he wants to go to school. And while the GAL may not have notified the court

that her recommendation differs from I.J.’s wishes to live with Father and attend

Parma Schools, this difference did not prejudice Father because the court was

already aware of I.J.’s wishes by virtue of the in camera interview. Therefore,

Father’s due-process or other constitutional rights were not violated and the court

exercised its discretion appropriately.

Accordingly, Father’s second assignment of error is overruled. D. The GAL’s Fees

In the fifth assignment of error, Father contends that the juvenile

court erred when it granted the GAL’s motion for fees without giving Father the

opportunity to request a hearing as set forth in Juv.Loc.R. 15(D)(5), which provides

that “[u]nless a Hearing is requested by a party or the Court within fourteen days

after a Motion for Guardian ad Litem Fees is filed, the Court may rule on the Motion

without a Hearing.”

“We review a juvenile court’s order regarding compensation to a GAL

for abuse of discretion.” In re I.L.J. V at ¶ 13, citing In re I.A.G., 2016-Ohio-3326, ¶

22 (8th Dist.); Robbins v. Ginese, 93 Ohio App.3d 370 (8th Dist. 1994); Beatley v.

Beatley, 2003-Ohio-4375 (5th Dist.); Longo v. Longo, 2014-Ohio-4880, ¶ 18 (11th

In the instant matter, the GAL filed a motion for fees on December 4,

2024, requesting that the court release the $1,500 bond on deposit to pay for her

fees. On December 13, 2024, the court issued a journal entry ordering that Mother

and Father each pay $750 from the bond to the GAL and each post an additional

bond of $2,067.50 by January 27, 2025. In response, Father filed a “motion for

reconsideration GAL bond release” on December 23, 2024, asking the court to

reconsider its decision because the fees were ordered before either party could

request a hearing.1 Father also filed a motion for extension to pay the GAL bond,

1 In our review of the record, it does not appear that the trial court issued a specific

ruling on this motion. which the court denied. Both parties posted the bonds, and no other payments were

made to the GAL.

Then, at the conclusion of the final trial date on February 14, 2025,

the parties revisited the GAL’s fees. The GAL stated that her final bill was the

previous bill she presented to the parties with the addition of trial time. The GAL

added “the 12-11 trial date, 5 hours, yesterday’s trial time for 7 hours, and today as

at 5 hours.” (Tr. 720.) The court then noted to the parties that it has “learned in

regards to the local rule, you have 14 days to object.” (Tr. 720-721.) Father’s counsel

agreed with the court. A review of the docket reveals that no objection was filed after

the final hearing date on February 14, 2025. Then on April 2, 2025, the court issued

a journal entry ordering the parties to each pay $3,141.25 in fees to the GAL for the

statement period “September 11, 2024, through December 11, 2024/February ___

2o25” and releasing each parent’s bond to the GAL. (Journal entry, Apr. 2, 2025.)

Contrary to Father’s assertion, the court did not prematurely rule on

the GAL’s motion for fees without allowing the parties fourteen days to request a

hearing. The record is clear that at the end of the February 14, 2025 hearing, the

court specifically advised the parties that they had 14 days to object to the GAL’s fee

request. Father never filed an objection or requested a hearing. Therefore, it was

within the court’s authority under Juv.Loc.R. 15(D) to rule on the GAL’s motion in

April 2025, which was over a month after the 14-day window lapsed. Father’s

argument is unpersuasive.

Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled. Judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR