In re I.A.

2021 IL App (4th) 200483-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 19, 2021
• Docket: 4-20-0483
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200483-U FILED This Order was filed under February 19, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0483 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re I.A., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Livingston County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA21 v. ) Tosha H., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding. ) ) ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holder White and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit to parent her minor child or in terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 On June 30, 2020, the trial court found respondent, Tosha H., unfit to parent her

minor child, I.A. (born June 27, 2018). On August 25, 2020, the court terminated respondent’s

parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court erred both in finding that she was an

unfit person and in finding termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of I.A. We

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 25, 2018, the State filed a petition for wardship, alleging I.A. was neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2016)). In the first three counts of

the petition, the State alleged I.A. was neglected in that her environment was injurious to her

welfare (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) because (1) respondent and Jeffrey Arnold, I.A.’s father, had substance

abuse issues which prevented them from properly parenting I.A., (2) I.A. had access to illegal

substances and other harmful materials, and (3) respondent failed to correct the conditions that led

to the removal of I.A.’s siblings from her care. The State additionally alleged I.A. was neglected

because, at birth, her blood, urine, or meconium contained a controlled substance (id. § 2-3(1)(c)).

That same day, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and entered an order granting the

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) temporary custody of I.A.

¶5 On August 16, 2018, the Center for Youth and Family Solutions (CYFS), an agency

operating under contract with DCFS, implemented a family service plan. Under the plan,

respondent was required to, among other things, complete an integrated assessment, cooperate

with DCFS and CYFS to complete necessary services, complete a substance abuse assessment,

stop using “alcohol, illegal drugs[,] and non-prescribed medication,” and participate in weekly

visits with I.A.

¶6 On October 24, 2018, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding I.A. was

neglected as a result of respondent’s and Arnold’s substance abuse issues (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) and

because at birth, I.A.’s blood, urine, or meconium contained opioids (id. § 2-3(1)(c)). A month

later, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit to parent I.A., making I.A. a

ward of the court, and granting custody and guardianship of I.A. to DCFS. The court additionally

ordered that respondent comply with the requirements of DCFS, CYFS, and the service plan.

¶7 On September 26, 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental

-2- rights. (We note the State also sought to terminate the parental rights of Arnold and that, ultimately,

his parental rights were terminated; however, he is not a party to this appeal, and we discuss the

facts only as they relate to respondent.) In the petition, the State alleged respondent was an unfit

person in that she failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility

as to I.A.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)); (2) protect I.A. from conditions within

her environment injurious to her welfare (id. § 50/1(D)(g)); (3) make reasonable efforts to correct

the conditions that were the basis for I.A.’s removal (id. § 50/1(D)(m)(i)); and (4) make reasonable

progress toward the return of I.A. during the nine-month period from October 24, 2018, to July 24,

2019, and the period from December 17, 2018, to September 17, 2019 (id. § 50/1(D)(m)(ii)).

¶8 On January 28, 2020, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. At the hearing, the

State first presented testimony from Officer Brian Enderli of the Pontiac Police Department.

According to Officer Enderli, on July 23, 2018, he responded to a call regarding a possible

overdose at respondent’s apartment. When he arrived at the apartment, he found Arnold

unconscious in the bedroom he shared with respondent and I.A. In the bedroom where he found

Arnold, Officer Enderli also discovered, among other things, a syringe cap, a spoon that “had burn

marks on the bottom side of it,” several “brownish-red capsules,” and a dinner plate with “white

residue” on it, all of which indicated to Officer Enderli that Arnold had overdosed on heroin.

Several of the items Officer Enderli found were located on a dresser next to I.A.’s crib and were

surrounded by I.A.’s “baby care items.” Although respondent was in the apartment when Officer

Enderli arrived, he did not see her or I.A. in the bedroom with Arnold, and respondent did not

appear under the influence of drugs.

¶9 The State next called Brittany Barth, a CYFS foster care family worker who, until

-3- March 2019, served as I.A.’s caseworker. Barth testified that, after I.A. was removed from

respondent, respondent had returned to live with her parents in Missouri. Barth explained, because

respondent lived outside of Illinois, she was unable to schedule random drug screenings for

respondent or to refer respondent for individual counseling. Barth further testified respondent was

uncooperative and uncommunicative with CYFS and, by the time Barth stopped working as I.A.’s

caseworker, had not started any substance abuse treatment. According to Barth, even though CYFS

purchased train tickets and made hotel reservations for respondent to attend visits with I.A.,

respondent failed to attend these visits “very frequently,” usually without providing a reason.

When respondent did attend visits, she was “engaged with [I.A.].”

¶ 10 Finally, the State called Kaitlynn Stigall, who became I.A.’s caseworker in April

2019. Stigall testified, since she became involved in I.A.’s case, respondent had started substance

abuse counseling but she attended so infrequently that, in July 2019, her counselor warned that she

would be unsuccessfully discharged if she continued to miss appointments. In October 2019, she

stopped attending substance abuse counseling altogether and was ultimately discharged from the

treatment program. Stigall further testified that, in April 2019, respondent completed three drug

screenings, all of which came back negative. However, respondent refused to complete other drug

screenings that were required by CYFS and by her substance abuse counseling program, and in

June and July 2019, she tested positive for fentanyl and opiates. Stigall also testified respondent

had not begun individual counseling, which had been recommended following respondent’s

integrated assessment, and had attended few of her scheduled visits with I.A. When respondent

did appear for visits, I.A. was “very upset.” During her visits with respondent, I.A. cried, “wanted

to stay with the foster mom,” and showed no signs that “she was bonded in any way to

-4- [respondent].” Following her visits with respondent, I.A. showed “regression signs.” Respondent

did not attend any visits with I.A. after August 26, 2019.

¶ 11 At the end of the fitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit based on

each ground alleged by the State.

¶ 12 In August 2020, CYFS filed a best interest report. In the report, the agency

indicated respondent had not participated in required services since October 2019 and had not

visited with I.A. since August 2019. The agency further indicated I.A. was “happy, healthy, and

thriving in her current placement” and concluded it was “in the best interest of [I.A.]” that

respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 13 On August 25, 2020, the trial court conducted a best interest hearing. At the

beginning of the hearing, the court admitted the best interest report filed by CYFS and agreed to

take judicial notice of the evidence from the fitness hearing. No other evidence was presented.

After argument, the court found termination of respondent’s parental rights was in I.A.’s best

interest.

¶ 14 This appeal followed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred both in finding that she was an

unfit person and that termination of her parental rights was in I.A.’s best interest.

¶ 17 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 18 In a proceeding to terminate a parent’s rights to her minor child, the State must first

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an “unfit person” as defined in section

1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018);

-5- In re M.C., 2018 IL App (4th) 180144, ¶ 22, 110 N.E.3d 346. “A reviewing court accords great

deference to a trial court’s finding of parental unfitness, and such a finding will not be disturbed

on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” M.C., 2018 IL App (4th)

180144, ¶ 22. A court’s finding that a parent is an unfit person is against the manifest weight of

the evidence “only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69.

¶ 19 In the present case, the trial court found respondent was an unfit person on each

ground alleged by the State. However, to uphold the court’s judgment, we need only determine the

State properly established respondent’s unfitness on a single ground. See In re J.H., 2020 IL App

(4th) 200150, ¶ 74. (“[M]eeting only one of the statutory definitions in section 1(D) of the

Adoption Act [citation] is enough to make the parent an ‘unfit person[.]’ ”). Here, the State

adequately demonstrated respondent was an unfit person under section 50/1(D)(m)(ii) of the

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)).

¶ 20 Section 50/1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides a parent may be found to be

an unfit person where she fails to “make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to [her]

during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglect[ ] or abuse[ ] *** under Section

2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018). As we have

previously determined, “reasonable progress is an objective standard” which is satisfied when “the

progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is

sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to

order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d 227. Reasonable progress is

-6- measured by a parent’s “compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives in light of the

conditions that gave rise to the removal of the child and in light of other conditions that later

became known and would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.”

In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1051, 796 N.E.2d 1175, 1183 (2003).

¶ 21 Here, the trial court found respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward

the return of I.A. from December 17, 2018, to September 19, 2019. The evidence presented at the

fitness hearing demonstrated that, during this period, respondent failed to complete any of the

directives in her service plan and that any progress respondent made toward completion of the

directives was minimal at best. For example, while respondent attended some of her visits with

I.A., she failed to attend the majority of them, even when CYFS was paying for her transportation.

Additionally, while respondent began participating in some required services, such as substance

abuse counseling, her attendance was so sporadic that her provider anticipated she would be

unsuccessfully discharged from the program just a few months after she started. Notably, even

while respondent was participating in substance abuse counseling, she tested positive for fentanyl

and opiates. In light of respondent’s failure to make any demonstrable progress toward completion

of her service plan, it cannot be said the trial court would have been able to order that I.A. be

returned to her in the near future. Accordingly, the court’s finding that respondent was an unfit

person was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 22 B. Best-Interest Finding

¶ 23 Following a finding of parental unfitness, the trial court “considers the ‘best

interest’ of the child in determining whether parental rights should be terminated.” In re J.L., 236

Ill. 2d 329, 337-38, 924 N.E.2d 961, 966 (2010) (quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-93(2) (West 2008)).

-7- Section 1-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 lists multiple factors the trial court must consider

prior to finding termination of a parent’s rights is in the minor’s best interest. 705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). Those factors, which must be considered in the context of the child’s

age and developmental needs, are: (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development

of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments;

(5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and

siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks associated with substitute care;

and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. Id.

¶ 24 On review, “[w]e will not reverse the trial court’s best-interest determination unless

it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918

N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009). The court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only

if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result.” Id.

¶ 25 The best interest report filed by CYFS indicated I.A. had been in the same foster

home for two years as of the date of the best interest hearing. According to the report, I.A. was

“thriving” in her foster home, was “loved and appreciated” there, and had “a strong attachment to

her foster family.” The report also indicated allowing I.A. to remain in the foster home “would

provide [her] with the permanency that is necessary to continue her developmental progress and

trust in adults.” By contrast, the report noted I.A. “ha[d] not interacted with her biological parents

for a year and she would not recognize them as a familiar face.” Indeed, the evidence showed that,

during the last visits respondent had with I.A., I.A. did not show “any signs that she was bonded

in any way to [respondent]” and, following the visits, when I.A. returned to her foster family, she

-8- showed “regression signs from her seeing her parents.” In light of this evidence, it cannot be said

that the trial court’s finding that it was in I.A.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental

rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 28 Affirmed.

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