In re Hulitt

96 F. 785, 10 Ohio F. Dec. 29, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio
DecidedOctober 4, 1899
DocketNo. 5,323
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 96 F. 785 (In re Hulitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Hulitt, 96 F. 785, 10 Ohio F. Dec. 29, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (circtsdoh 1899).

Opinion

THOMPSON, District Judge.

This is an application by John Hulitt, receiver of the First National Bank of Hillsboro, Ohio, for instructions as to his duty in respect to the claims of certain shareholders to be reimbursed for an assessment paid by them under section 5205 of- the Revised Statutes of the United States.

On the 25th day of April, 1896, the following notice was given to the bank by the comptroller of the currency:

“Treasury Department, Office of Comptroller of the Currency.
“Washington, D. C., April 25, 1896.
“Whereas, it appears to the satisfaction of the comptroller of the currency that the capital stock of the fet National Bank of Hillsboro, Ohio, has become impaired to an extent which malíes necessary an assessment of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) upon the shareholders of said association to make good such deficiency: Now, therefore, notice is hereby given to said association, under the provisions of section 5205 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States, to pay the said deficiency in its capital stock by assessment upon its shareholders, pro rata, for the amount of the capital stock held by each; and if such deficiency shall not be paid, and said bank shall refuse to go into liquidation, as provided by law, for three months after this notice shall have been received by it, a receiver will be appointed to close up the business of the association, ■according to the provisions of section 5234 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States. In testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name and caused my seal of office to be affixed to these presents, at the treasury department, in the city of Washington and District of Columbia, this 25th day of April, A. D. 1896.
“[Signed] James H. Eckels,
“[Seal.] Comptroller of the Currency.
“To the Eirst National Bank, Hillsboro, Ohio.”

Thereupon, on the 27th day of April, 1896, the directors adopted a resolution making the assessment. Between the 27th day of April, 1896, and the 16th day of July, 1896, the shareholders, representing 545 shares of the capital stock, paid their proportion of the assessment, amounting to $27,250, but the other shareholders refused to pay their part thereof. . On the 16th day of July, 1896, the bank, being wholly insolvent, suspended payment; and on the 22d day of July, 1896, it was placed, by the comptroller of the currency, in the hands of John Hulitt, as receiver. Afterwards, the receiver, under instructions from the comptroller of the currency, brought suit in this court to recover, from the nonpaying shareholders, their proportion of the assessment. But the court held that the assessment should have been made by the shareholders, and not by the directors, and that the attempted assessment by the directors was therefore illegal, and dismissed the bill. Afterwards an assessment was made by the comptroller of the currency, under section 5151 of the Revised Statutes, which was paid. Ninety per cent, of the debts of the bank have since been paid, and there is money enough in the hands [787]*787of the receiver to pay the remainder, leaving quite a large surplus for distribution to the shareholders. The shareholders who paid the iirst assessment claim to be creditors of the trust to the extent of that payment, but, under an agreement with certain of the share' holders, have waived the right to reimbursement until the general creditors of the bank are paid in full. They insist, however, as against the nonpaying shareholders, that they should be reimbursed for the moneys j)aid by them under that'assessment, before final distribution is made to all the shareholders. They have presented their claims to the receiver, but the receiver has refused to allow them, unless instructed so to do by the court.

The comptroller of the currency advised the bank that its capital stock had been impaired to the extent of 50 per cent., and required it to assess its shareholders in that amount to restore the loss. And I think it is fair to assume that the action of the comptroller was based on knowledge of the condition of the bank (derived through the department examiners and inspectors) more thorough and complete than that of any of the shareholders, save those who were its directors and officers, and in control of the management of its, affairs. And no question is made but that the paying shareholders paid the assessment in good faith, believing that the capital stock was im paired to the extent of 50 per cent.; that the assessment was legal and binding on all the shareholders; and that its payment would restore the loss, and save the hank. Yet, in fact, the entire capital stock had been lost, the assessment was illegal, and, within the three -months allowed for its payment, the bank suspended payment, and was placed, by the comptroller of the currency, in the hands of a receiver, and the purpose for which the assessment was made wholly failed.

The assessment was illegal, but, as a matter of fact, the paying shareholders did not know that the law required it to he made by the shareholders instead of the directors, and did not; know that, if paid in full, it would be wholly insufficient to restore the actual loss which the hank had sustained; and while, in view of their relation to the hank and their means of knowledge, their ignorance in these respects might not avail them as against the creditors of the hank, yet, as between them and the nonpaying shareholders, there certainly can l>e no application of the doctrine of voluntary payments, which will entitle the nonpaying shareholders to participate, on equal terms, with the paying shareholders, in the distribution of the fund remaining after tin creditors have been paid, — a fund which was in part (‘rented by the contributions of the paying shareholders. These moneys wore received by the hank to and for the use of the paying shareholders, and could not, in equity and good conscience, he retained by the bank. The paying shareholders became creditors of the hank, so far, at least, as the nonpaying shareholders are concerned.

In the case of Winters v. Armstrong, 37 Fed. 508, Winters subscribed to an increase of the capital stock of the Fidelity National Hank of Cincinnati, and paid the amount of the subscription into the bank. The increase, however, was not approved by the comptroller [788]*788of the currency, and never became valid and effective. Judge Jackson, at page 522, says:

“Winters could nave recovered his deposit made on his subscription as against the association, and he is entitled to its allowance as a valid claim against the assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, so far as anything disclosed by the pleadings appears. Subscribers may not in every case recover back deposits paid on subscribing for .shares in contemplated corporations, or proposed increases of capital, where the scheme of incorporation or the proposed change proves a failure. In some cases, the right of recovery will depend on the meaning and intention of the parties as expressed in the subscription agreement. If, for instance, it appears to have been the intention or understanding of the parties that the deposit made on the subscription should be used and applied towards the furtherance or accomplishment of the scheme, and it is so applied, the subscriber may not be able to recover it upon the failure of the enterprise.

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Bluebook (online)
96 F. 785, 10 Ohio F. Dec. 29, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hulitt-circtsdoh-1899.