Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-8029
IN RE: PAUL S. HUGHES,
Respondent.
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
Before
Aframe, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Paul S. Hughes, pro se, respondent.
November 18, 2025 PER CURIAM. Paul Hughes was disbarred from practicing
law in Massachusetts state court because he misused client funds.
This Court ordered Hughes to show cause why it should not impose
the same sanction. Hughes responded that this Court should order
a lesser penalty on the ground that the Massachusetts proceedings
were infected by bar counsel's knowing use of false testimony to
make his conduct seem more egregious than it was. We reject
Hughes' argument and impose the same disbarment punishment.
In May 2023, a single justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") adopted the recommendation of the
Board of Bar Overseers ("Board") that Hughes be disbarred. Hughes
decided not to appeal the single justice's decision to the full
SJC. We summarize the salient facts from the Board's findings.
Hughes focused his law practice on representing
homeowners in negotiations with insurance companies after
suffering major property damage. The allegations leading to
Hughes' disbarment involved his misuse of client funds belonging
to two couples that he represented in separate negotiations after
home fires.
For the first couple, Hughes withdrew from his IOLTA
account approximately $139,000 in insurance settlement proceeds
beyond the amount he was entitled to pay himself as a fee. When
the couple sought to pay off the mortgage on their damaged home to
buy a new house, there were insufficient settlement funds in the
- 1 - IOLTA account. Hughes obtained a loan from family members to
reimburse the couple. But the delay in providing the couple with
access to their settlement proceeds caused them to lose out on
certain real estate purchase opportunities and to pay an extra
$8,000 in mortgage interest.
The Board found that when Hughes withdrew the couple's
funds from his IOLTA account, he had not yet informed them that
there had been a settlement with the insurance company. This
conclusion was based on the couple's testimony to that effect and
that they had never endorsed a check from the insurance company.
Hughes contends that the couple's testimony was fraudulent because
he presented a check showing their endorsements. Hughes further
asserts that their additional testimony about intending to buy a
new house was also false. He argues that they intended to rebuild
their original home and decided to buy a new house only after he
had returned their misused funds. Thus, according to Hughes, the
couple was not harmed by the belated return of the settlement
funds.
As to the second couple, the insurance company sent a
settlement check to Hughes' IOLTA account for $376,000. Hughes
misspent $35,750 of those funds. After bar counsel had opened its
investigation into Hughes, Hughes gave the couple a check for
$22,219. Hughes justified the difference between the amount
misspent and the final amount he paid the couple by pointing to
- 2 - additional fees he claimed to have earned for (1) representing the
couple in a lawsuit against the insurance company, and (2)
assisting the couple in selling their damaged home and buying a
new house.
To support his arguments, Hughes presented evidence that
the couple had agreed to the additional fees. His proof consisted
of evidence that he had sent the couple a full accounting of his
fees, that the couple had accepted the final check for $22,219,
and that the couple had authored a letter to bar counsel stating
that Hughes' summary of charges was accurate. The couple
testified, however, that they did not understand that Hughes was
paying them less than the amount he misspent, that they had not
seen a summary of charges, and that Hughes had provided them with
the language that appeared in their letter to bar counsel. The
Board rejected Hughes' arguments, concluding that (1) the couple
had not agreed for Hughes to work on real estate transactions, and
(2) the lawsuit against the insurance company was part of Hughes'
original agreement to represent the couple, which was limited to
a five percent contingency from the insurance settlement.
Hughes did not dispute in the Massachusetts proceedings
and does not dispute here that he misused client funds. He argues,
however, that the SJC imposed an overly harsh sanction because the
single justice found his conduct to be more egregious than it was.
He points to the single justice's conclusions that his conduct
- 3 - "caused harm" to the first couple by frustrating their efforts to
buy a new house and that he "failed to make full restitution to
the second couple" because he still owed them the difference
between the $35,750 balance and the $22,291 payout. He contends
that these adverse conclusions followed from bar counsel knowingly
presenting false testimony from the couples.
The general rule in this Court is that "discipline
similar to that imposed in the state court will be imposed in a
reciprocal proceeding." In re Oliveras López de Victoria, 561
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009). There are, however, exceptions for
situations where:
1. . . . the procedure used by the other court was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
2. . . . there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
3. . . . the imposition of substantially similar discipline by this Court would result in grave injustice; or
4. . . . the misconduct established is deemed by the Court to warrant different discipline.
Id. (quoting In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (quoting 1st Cir. R. Att'y Discip. Enf. II.C)). In resolving
a challenge to the imposition of reciprocal discipline, "the state
court's substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to a high degree
- 4 - of respect," and the burden rests with the challenging party to show
"by clear and convincing evidence, that the imposition of
substantially similar discipline is unwarranted." Id. (quoting In
re Williams, 398 F.3d at 118).
If Hughes had established that bar counsel had suborned
perjury by offering the couples' false testimony to make his
conduct appear more aggravating that it was, we might have serious
questions about the appropriate sanction to impose. But Hughes
has not come close to making such a showing or even establishing
that there was any infirmity in the proof presented to support his
disbarment.
Under Board procedures, the hearing committee is the
"sole judge of the credibility of the testimony." In re Hayes,
112 F.4th 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §
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Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-8029
IN RE: PAUL S. HUGHES,
Respondent.
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
Before
Aframe, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Paul S. Hughes, pro se, respondent.
November 18, 2025 PER CURIAM. Paul Hughes was disbarred from practicing
law in Massachusetts state court because he misused client funds.
This Court ordered Hughes to show cause why it should not impose
the same sanction. Hughes responded that this Court should order
a lesser penalty on the ground that the Massachusetts proceedings
were infected by bar counsel's knowing use of false testimony to
make his conduct seem more egregious than it was. We reject
Hughes' argument and impose the same disbarment punishment.
In May 2023, a single justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") adopted the recommendation of the
Board of Bar Overseers ("Board") that Hughes be disbarred. Hughes
decided not to appeal the single justice's decision to the full
SJC. We summarize the salient facts from the Board's findings.
Hughes focused his law practice on representing
homeowners in negotiations with insurance companies after
suffering major property damage. The allegations leading to
Hughes' disbarment involved his misuse of client funds belonging
to two couples that he represented in separate negotiations after
home fires.
For the first couple, Hughes withdrew from his IOLTA
account approximately $139,000 in insurance settlement proceeds
beyond the amount he was entitled to pay himself as a fee. When
the couple sought to pay off the mortgage on their damaged home to
buy a new house, there were insufficient settlement funds in the
- 1 - IOLTA account. Hughes obtained a loan from family members to
reimburse the couple. But the delay in providing the couple with
access to their settlement proceeds caused them to lose out on
certain real estate purchase opportunities and to pay an extra
$8,000 in mortgage interest.
The Board found that when Hughes withdrew the couple's
funds from his IOLTA account, he had not yet informed them that
there had been a settlement with the insurance company. This
conclusion was based on the couple's testimony to that effect and
that they had never endorsed a check from the insurance company.
Hughes contends that the couple's testimony was fraudulent because
he presented a check showing their endorsements. Hughes further
asserts that their additional testimony about intending to buy a
new house was also false. He argues that they intended to rebuild
their original home and decided to buy a new house only after he
had returned their misused funds. Thus, according to Hughes, the
couple was not harmed by the belated return of the settlement
funds.
As to the second couple, the insurance company sent a
settlement check to Hughes' IOLTA account for $376,000. Hughes
misspent $35,750 of those funds. After bar counsel had opened its
investigation into Hughes, Hughes gave the couple a check for
$22,219. Hughes justified the difference between the amount
misspent and the final amount he paid the couple by pointing to
- 2 - additional fees he claimed to have earned for (1) representing the
couple in a lawsuit against the insurance company, and (2)
assisting the couple in selling their damaged home and buying a
new house.
To support his arguments, Hughes presented evidence that
the couple had agreed to the additional fees. His proof consisted
of evidence that he had sent the couple a full accounting of his
fees, that the couple had accepted the final check for $22,219,
and that the couple had authored a letter to bar counsel stating
that Hughes' summary of charges was accurate. The couple
testified, however, that they did not understand that Hughes was
paying them less than the amount he misspent, that they had not
seen a summary of charges, and that Hughes had provided them with
the language that appeared in their letter to bar counsel. The
Board rejected Hughes' arguments, concluding that (1) the couple
had not agreed for Hughes to work on real estate transactions, and
(2) the lawsuit against the insurance company was part of Hughes'
original agreement to represent the couple, which was limited to
a five percent contingency from the insurance settlement.
Hughes did not dispute in the Massachusetts proceedings
and does not dispute here that he misused client funds. He argues,
however, that the SJC imposed an overly harsh sanction because the
single justice found his conduct to be more egregious than it was.
He points to the single justice's conclusions that his conduct
- 3 - "caused harm" to the first couple by frustrating their efforts to
buy a new house and that he "failed to make full restitution to
the second couple" because he still owed them the difference
between the $35,750 balance and the $22,291 payout. He contends
that these adverse conclusions followed from bar counsel knowingly
presenting false testimony from the couples.
The general rule in this Court is that "discipline
similar to that imposed in the state court will be imposed in a
reciprocal proceeding." In re Oliveras López de Victoria, 561
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009). There are, however, exceptions for
situations where:
1. . . . the procedure used by the other court was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
2. . . . there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
3. . . . the imposition of substantially similar discipline by this Court would result in grave injustice; or
4. . . . the misconduct established is deemed by the Court to warrant different discipline.
Id. (quoting In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (quoting 1st Cir. R. Att'y Discip. Enf. II.C)). In resolving
a challenge to the imposition of reciprocal discipline, "the state
court's substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to a high degree
- 4 - of respect," and the burden rests with the challenging party to show
"by clear and convincing evidence, that the imposition of
substantially similar discipline is unwarranted." Id. (quoting In
re Williams, 398 F.3d at 118).
If Hughes had established that bar counsel had suborned
perjury by offering the couples' false testimony to make his
conduct appear more aggravating that it was, we might have serious
questions about the appropriate sanction to impose. But Hughes
has not come close to making such a showing or even establishing
that there was any infirmity in the proof presented to support his
disbarment.
Under Board procedures, the hearing committee is the
"sole judge of the credibility of the testimony." In re Hayes,
112 F.4th 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §
8(5)(a) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the SJC will not
reject a finding unless "it can be said with certainty that the
finding was wholly inconsistent with another implicit finding."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hughes raised his suborning perjury contention to the
SJC single justice. The single justice rejected Hughes' claim,
describing it as a "dispute over witness credibility" for which
the Board's conclusions are controlling because they "are
supported by the record."
- 5 - We see no basis for disagreeing with that conclusion.
There was testimony from both couples that aligns with the single
justice's determination about the harm that Hughes caused them.
Hughes testified to different facts and provided some documents
that he said supported his position. But there was also evidence
about Hughes' lack of candor, which provided a basis for
questioning the validity of some of his documentary evidence and
his testimony concerning the couples' knowledge and intentions.
Nothing has been presented to suggest that Hughes was
denied the opportunity to testify in his own right or restricted
in his ability to impeach the couples' testimony. Based on all
the evidence presented, the single justice accepted the
determination that the couples testified credibly. We have no
reason for ignoring that decision or for accepting Hughes'
suggestion that bar counsel engaged in any sort of misconduct.
See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 102 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that "discrepancies in the evidence do not . . . establish
that the government offered perjured testimony, knowingly or
not").
Hughes also complains that he was denied the ability to
contest the fairness of his discipline hearing in a separate
proceeding before the SJC. But Hughes' arguments about the
application of state procedures for bringing a separate challenge
to the fairness of his state disciplinary hearing has no apparent
- 6 - connection to whether this Court should impose reciprocal
discipline based on the SJC's disbarment finding. In any event,
the SJC single justice considered and rejected the
due-process-based argument about conflicting testimony that Hughes
presented in this Court as the basis for seeking a lesser penalty.
Hughes has failed to show cause for this Court to impose
a different sanction from the one imposed by the SJC. Attorney
Paul Hughes is therefore disbarred from the practice of law before
this Court. The Clerk of Court shall forward to the SJC a copy of
this opinion.
So ordered.
- 7 -