Conditionally Grant and Opinion Filed November 12, 2024
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-01123-CV
IN RE HOWARD COLUMBER HOLLAND, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 422nd Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 29317E-422
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Molberg Relator Howard Columber Holland filed an application for writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court on September 8, 2023. In this original proceeding, relator
petitions for writ of mandamus, seeking to direct the trial court to sign an order on
the habeas application. After reviewing the petition and response, we conclude
relator is entitled to the requested relief, and we conditionally grant the writ of
mandamus.
Background
On January 24, 2011, relator was convicted of burglary of a habitation. His
five-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for five years. On February 22, 2017, the trial court found relator had satisfactorily
complied with the terms and conditions of community supervision, and relator was
accordingly discharged.
As pertinent here, on September 8, 2023, relator filed an application for
habeas corpus, alleging involuntary plea and actual innocence. The record reflects
the application was delivered to the district attorney’s office the same day.
On September 24, 2024, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging
the trial court had not signed an order granting or denying the habeas application.
Relator attached to the petition five written requests—dated between December 2023
and August 2024—mailed to the trial court, asking it to rule on the application.
After we requested a response to the petition, on October 7, 2024, the State
filed a response to the habeas application in the trial court, arguing relator failed to
allege claims in his habeas application that could not have been previously alleged,
and alternatively, he failed to claim or show he is suffering from the collateral
consequences of his conviction.
On October 8, 2024, the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, “find[ing] the State’s Response correct and adopt[ing] it as its own.” The trial
court concluded that both of relator’s habeas grounds should be denied and
recommended that the application be denied. The trial court did not enter any order
granting or denying the habeas application.
–2– Discussion
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show (1) the act sought to
be compelled is purely ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law. In re
State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
An act is ministerial if the relator has a clear right to the relief sought. Id. To show
“a clear right to the relief sought,” the relator must show that the facts and
circumstances of the case dictate one rational decision under well-settled and clearly
controlling legal principles. In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (orig. proceeding).
Article 11.072 “establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief
from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering community supervision.” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 1. Immediately upon filing an application under
article 11.072, the applicant shall serve a copy of the application on the attorney
representing the State. Id. art. 11.072, § 5(a). If the State files an answer, it must do
so within thirty days of the date of service, except that for good cause the convicting
court may grant the State one thirty-day extension; however, the State “is not
required to file an answer.” Id. art. 11.072, § 5(b), (c). Not later than the sixtieth
day after the day on which the State’s answer is filed, “the trial court shall enter a
written order granting or denying the relief sought in the application.” Id. art.
–3– 11.072, § 6(a).1 Such an order is required even when the trial court “determines
from the face of an application or documents attached to the application that the
applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief.” Id. art. 11.072, § 7(a) (providing that,
under such circumstances, “the court shall enter a written order denying the
application as frivolous”).
We observe that § 6 of article 11.072 requires the trial court to enter an order
within sixty days of the filing of the State’s answer, yet § 5 expressly states the State
is not required to file an answer. We must give effect to the plain meaning of a
statute’s language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to
absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended. Ex parte Perry,
483 S.W.3d 884, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). To avoid the absurd result of the trial
court not being required to rule on an article 11.072 application in cases where the
State opts not to answer, we construe § 6 to require in such cases an order within
sixty days of the last date on which the State could file an answer. See 43B George
E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, Texas Practice Series: Criminal Practice and
Procedure § 58:33 n.4 (3d ed. 2011) (concluding that this is the likely intent of the
1 In contrast, under article 11.07, the trial court does not grant or deny relief. Instead, the trial court has the duty to determine whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant’s confinement. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(c). If the court decides there are no such issues, the clerk transmits to the court of criminal appeals a copy of the application, among other things. Id. If the court determines there are such issues, it resolves the issues and makes findings of fact, which the clerk then sends, along with the application and other matters used by the court in resolving any issues, to the court of criminal appeals. Id. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The court of criminal appeals ultimately decides the article 11.07 habeas application. Id. art. 11.07, § 5. –4– legislature); Ex parte Betancourt, No. 08-05-00063-CR, 2006 WL 1875576, at *4
(Tex. App.—El Paso July 6, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating
that article 11.072 “expressly requires the trial court to enter a written order in every
case either denying or granting the relief sought in the application”).
Here, the trial court was required to grant or deny relator’s habeas application
within ninety days after it was filed and served on the State on September 8, 2023.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, §§ 5–6. The trial court has not entered such
an order. Although the trial court recommended that relief be denied, we conclude
a mere recommendation is insufficient to meet the statutory requirement that the trial
court “shall enter a written order granting or denying the relief sought in the
application.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 6(a); cf. Ex parte Sinclair,
693 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (plurality op.) (stating that magistrate
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Conditionally Grant and Opinion Filed November 12, 2024
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-01123-CV
IN RE HOWARD COLUMBER HOLLAND, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 422nd Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 29317E-422
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Molberg Relator Howard Columber Holland filed an application for writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court on September 8, 2023. In this original proceeding, relator
petitions for writ of mandamus, seeking to direct the trial court to sign an order on
the habeas application. After reviewing the petition and response, we conclude
relator is entitled to the requested relief, and we conditionally grant the writ of
mandamus.
Background
On January 24, 2011, relator was convicted of burglary of a habitation. His
five-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for five years. On February 22, 2017, the trial court found relator had satisfactorily
complied with the terms and conditions of community supervision, and relator was
accordingly discharged.
As pertinent here, on September 8, 2023, relator filed an application for
habeas corpus, alleging involuntary plea and actual innocence. The record reflects
the application was delivered to the district attorney’s office the same day.
On September 24, 2024, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging
the trial court had not signed an order granting or denying the habeas application.
Relator attached to the petition five written requests—dated between December 2023
and August 2024—mailed to the trial court, asking it to rule on the application.
After we requested a response to the petition, on October 7, 2024, the State
filed a response to the habeas application in the trial court, arguing relator failed to
allege claims in his habeas application that could not have been previously alleged,
and alternatively, he failed to claim or show he is suffering from the collateral
consequences of his conviction.
On October 8, 2024, the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, “find[ing] the State’s Response correct and adopt[ing] it as its own.” The trial
court concluded that both of relator’s habeas grounds should be denied and
recommended that the application be denied. The trial court did not enter any order
granting or denying the habeas application.
–2– Discussion
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show (1) the act sought to
be compelled is purely ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law. In re
State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
An act is ministerial if the relator has a clear right to the relief sought. Id. To show
“a clear right to the relief sought,” the relator must show that the facts and
circumstances of the case dictate one rational decision under well-settled and clearly
controlling legal principles. In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (orig. proceeding).
Article 11.072 “establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief
from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering community supervision.” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 1. Immediately upon filing an application under
article 11.072, the applicant shall serve a copy of the application on the attorney
representing the State. Id. art. 11.072, § 5(a). If the State files an answer, it must do
so within thirty days of the date of service, except that for good cause the convicting
court may grant the State one thirty-day extension; however, the State “is not
required to file an answer.” Id. art. 11.072, § 5(b), (c). Not later than the sixtieth
day after the day on which the State’s answer is filed, “the trial court shall enter a
written order granting or denying the relief sought in the application.” Id. art.
–3– 11.072, § 6(a).1 Such an order is required even when the trial court “determines
from the face of an application or documents attached to the application that the
applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief.” Id. art. 11.072, § 7(a) (providing that,
under such circumstances, “the court shall enter a written order denying the
application as frivolous”).
We observe that § 6 of article 11.072 requires the trial court to enter an order
within sixty days of the filing of the State’s answer, yet § 5 expressly states the State
is not required to file an answer. We must give effect to the plain meaning of a
statute’s language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to
absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended. Ex parte Perry,
483 S.W.3d 884, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). To avoid the absurd result of the trial
court not being required to rule on an article 11.072 application in cases where the
State opts not to answer, we construe § 6 to require in such cases an order within
sixty days of the last date on which the State could file an answer. See 43B George
E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, Texas Practice Series: Criminal Practice and
Procedure § 58:33 n.4 (3d ed. 2011) (concluding that this is the likely intent of the
1 In contrast, under article 11.07, the trial court does not grant or deny relief. Instead, the trial court has the duty to determine whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant’s confinement. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(c). If the court decides there are no such issues, the clerk transmits to the court of criminal appeals a copy of the application, among other things. Id. If the court determines there are such issues, it resolves the issues and makes findings of fact, which the clerk then sends, along with the application and other matters used by the court in resolving any issues, to the court of criminal appeals. Id. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The court of criminal appeals ultimately decides the article 11.07 habeas application. Id. art. 11.07, § 5. –4– legislature); Ex parte Betancourt, No. 08-05-00063-CR, 2006 WL 1875576, at *4
(Tex. App.—El Paso July 6, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating
that article 11.072 “expressly requires the trial court to enter a written order in every
case either denying or granting the relief sought in the application”).
Here, the trial court was required to grant or deny relator’s habeas application
within ninety days after it was filed and served on the State on September 8, 2023.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, §§ 5–6. The trial court has not entered such
an order. Although the trial court recommended that relief be denied, we conclude
a mere recommendation is insufficient to meet the statutory requirement that the trial
court “shall enter a written order granting or denying the relief sought in the
application.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 6(a); cf. Ex parte Sinclair,
693 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (plurality op.) (stating that magistrate
judge’s recommendation within findings of fact and conclusions of law as to habeas
relief “did not purport to actually grant [the appellant] relief”). We agree with relator
that he is entitled to mandamus relief. See Arias v. State, No. 14-04-00972-CR, 2006
WL 2071846, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing that if “the trial court
decline[s] to rule on a properly filed habeas application, as article 11.072 requires,”
applicant may file “a petition for a writ of mandamus . . . requesting that the trial
judge be ordered to rule on his application”).
–5– Conclusion
We conclude the trial court has violated its ministerial duty to rule on relator’s
habeas application in the manner required by statute, and relator is entitled to
mandamus relief. Accordingly, we conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of
mandamus and direct the trial court to (1) enter a written order granting or denying
the relief sought in the habeas application within seven days of the date of this
opinion and accompanying order; and (2) file with the Clerk of the Court, within
eight days of the date of this Court’s opinion and order, a copy of the order
evidencing such compliance. A writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
241123f.p05 /Ken Molberg/ KEN MOLBERG Carlyle, J., would deny relator’s JUSTICE petition as moot.
–6–