In Re HME Records, Inc.

62 B.R. 611
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedNovember 3, 1986
DocketBankruptcy No. 385-03557, Misc. Docket Nos. 3-86-X-11, 3-86-0248
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 62 B.R. 611 (In Re HME Records, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re HME Records, Inc., 62 B.R. 611 (Tenn. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

GEORGE C. PAINE, II, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the court on referral from the district court in order to con *612 duct an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) and the district court’s order of March 20, 1986, the following shall constitute proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations.

The referral by the district court involves the motions of two unsecured creditors, Azuma, N.V. (“Azuma”) and Banesto Banking Corporation (“Banesto”), to transfer the bankruptcy case of HME Records, Inc. (“debtor”) to the Southern District of New York.

These venue motions were originally filed in the bankruptcy court. By order of February 6, 1986, Azuma’s motion was denied because it appeared that 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1408 and 1412 required the motion to be addressed to the district court. Azuma and Banesto then filed motions to transfer venue in the district court. The district court referred the matter back to this court and the motions were heard by this court on May 6.

I.

Azuma and Banesto argue that venue is improper in the Middle District of Tennessee, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West Supp.1986). 1 They further argue that even if the court determines venue is proper, it should be changed to New York because “justice or the convenience of the parties” dictate such a transfer. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (West Supp.1986). 2

At the hearing, Lawrence Pollack, current President and Chairman of the Board of the debtor, testified. An earlier deposition of Mr. Pollack was also introduced into evidence, as were the debtor’s petition, schedules, and statements of affairs.

Upon consideration of the testimony presented at the hearing, exhibits, and the entire record, the court makes the following findings.

The debtor is a publicly-held New York corporation that formerly did business in New York City. Its business dwindled, and the debtor surrendered its New York City premises in August, 1985. Its books and records were thereupon stored in a bonded warehouse in New Jersey.

Mr. Pollack specializes in management consulting work for debtors-in-possession and other companies that need help in financial reorganizations. Because of this expertise, Mr. Pollack met with representatives of the debtor in October of 1985 to discuss his possible employment. On October 31, 1985, Mr. Pollack was elected President and Chairman of the Board of the debtor.

Mr. Pollack testified that during October, 1985, the debtor “moved” to Tennessee when it shipped its books and records from the New Jersey warehouse to Tennessee. However, Mr. Pollack also testified that the debtor’s books and records were still in New Jersey one month later, when the debtor filed bankruptcy. Because the court looks to location of the debtor’s “principal assets” to determine proper venue, this inconsistency in Mr. Pollack's testimony does not affect the court’s holding.

On November 8, 1985, approximately 30 days after the October “move,” the debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Middle District of Tennessee.

The debtor’s principal assets consist of approximately 400 master tapes of music *613 artists’ recordings. About one-fourth of the tapes are owned by the debtor directly; the others are owned by Memory Productions, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the debtor. This subsidiary is a Tennessee corporation.

Mr. Pollack testified that most of the 400 master tapes were stored in Tennessee at the date of bankruptcy. He further testified that these tapes had been located in Tennessee for at least a year, and perhaps as long as two or three years prior to bankruptcy. Most of these tapes remained in Tennessee at the date of the hearing.

A majority of the debtor’s over 200 unsecured creditors are located in New York. Only a handful are located in Tennessee. Two of the debtor’s current directors are from Tennessee; the other three are located in New York. Four directors who resigned in the last year were located in New York or New Jersey, as were two corporate officers who also resigned. A majority in amount and number of the debtor’s five secured creditors are located in New York, including the largest.

II.

Under Title 28 as amended in 1984, proper venue of a bankruptcy case is governed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1408. This section permits commencement of a bankruptcy case in the district in which one of the following have been located for a longer portion of the 180 days preceding bankruptcy: 1) debtor’s domicile; 2) debtor’s residence; 3) debtor’s principal place of business in the United States; ór 4) debtor’s principal assets in the United States.

The debtor argues that venue is proper in this district because its “principal assets” were located here for at least a year prior to bankruptcy. Despite the seeming incongruity of a pre-bankruptcy debtor operating from New York while storing its master tapes in Tennessee, Mr. Pollack’s testimony to this effect is uncon-tradicted. Since its principal assets 3 were located here during the 180 days preceding bankruptcy, venue is proper in the Middle District of Tennessee.

Discretionary transfer of venue between districts is now governed by 28 U.S. C.A. § 1412. 4 The party seeking transfer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that transfer is warranted in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties. Frazier v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Butcher), 46 B.R. 109 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1985).

Factors relevant to transfer of venue include:

(1) the proximity of creditors to the court;
(2) the proximity of the debtor to the court;
(3) the proximity of necessary witnesses;
(4) the location of assets; and
(5) the economics of administration of the estate.

See Butcher, 46 B.R. at 112; In re Almeida, 37 B.R. 186 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984); Cole Associates, Inc. v. Howes Jewelers, Inc. (In re Cole Associates, Inc.), 7 B.R. 154 (Bankr.D.Utah 1980); and McLemore v. Thomasson (In re Thomasson), 60 B.R. 629 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1986).

The most important of the factors listed above is “economic and efficient administration of the estate.” See Landmark Capital Co. v. North Central Development Co. (In re Landmark Capital Co.), 20 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'g, In re Landmark Capital Co., 19 B.R. 342 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982); In re Walston Air-business, Inc., 26 B.R. 955 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1983). This factor “encompasses all of the preceding factors.” In re Walston Airbusiness, Inc., 26 B.R. at 958 (quoting In re *614 One-Eighty Investments, Ltd., 18 B.R.

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Bluebook (online)
62 B.R. 611, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hme-records-inc-tnmb-1986.