[Cite as In re H.F., 2025-Ohio-356.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ATHENS COUNTY
In re: H.F. : Case No. 24CA19 : Adjudicated Dependent Child. : DECISION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY _____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brittany E. Leach, Assistant Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee. _____________________________________________________________
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, H.D, the father of minor child, H.F., appeals the judgment
of the Juvenile Division of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas terminating
his parental rights and placing H.F. in the permanent custody of Athens County
Children Services (hereafter “ACCS”). Appellant raises a single assignment of
error on appeal, contending that the trial court’s decision terminating his parental
rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.1 However, because we
conclude that the permanent custody award is not against the manifest weight of
1 Although the H.F.’s mother’s parental rights were also terminated, she has not appealed the judgment. Athens App. No. 24CA19 2
the evidence, we overrule the sole assignment of error and affirm the juvenile
court's judgment.
FACTS
{¶2} On August 25, 2021, an Ex Parte Order for Emergency Custody was
journalized granting ACCS temporary emergency custody of H.F., who at that time
was only 13 days old. The very next day, on August 26, 2021, ACCS filed a
complaint alleging that the minor child was abused and dependent because he had
tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, benzodiazepines,
buprenorphine, marijuana, and fentanyl at birth. The complaint further stated that
the child was born at O’Bleness Hospital in Athens, Ohio, but had to be transferred
to Grant Medical Center in Columbus, Ohio, due to the fact that he was suffering
from symptoms of withdrawal. The complaint stated that the child’s mother did
not have stable housing, had unresolved traffic and criminal charges, had substance
abuse issues, and had another child that had been adjudged a dependent child.
With respect to Appellant, the complaint alleged that he had failed to establish
paternity and had failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child since his
birth. The complaint further alleged that Appellant was incarcerated for
aggravated possession of drugs, disrupting public services, and domestic violence,
the victim of which was the child’s mother. Athens App. No. 24CA19 3
{¶3} A motion for emergency custody with an affidavit in support was filed
the same day and it was granted by the trial court that day. Thereafter, a CASA
volunteer was appointed to the case and ACCS filed a case plan which included
only the child’s mother, as Appellant was expected to be incarcerated for the next
three years. An adjudicatory hearing was held on October 19, 2021. Appellant
was served but was not present. The child’s mother stipulated to a finding of
dependency, the allegations of abuse were dismissed, and she also stipulated to
temporary custody being awarded to ACCS. As the matter progressed, genetic
testing was ordered and Appellant was determined to be the father of the child. A
home study was also conducted in attempt to place the child with his maternal
grandmother, however, she was found to be unsuitable for placement.
{¶4} ACCS filed a motion to modify the disposition to permanent custody
on August 14, 2023. The affidavit filed in support of the motion averred that the
child’s mother had been recently released from incarceration, that she was
currently residing at The Counseling Center, and that she had failed to consistently
visit and communicate with the child. It also averred that the mother had an older
child that had been adjudicated a dependent child and that was in the custody of its
father due, in part, to mother’s substance abuse. Further, it averred that Appellant
was still incarcerated with an expected release date of April 16, 2024. Appellant
subsequently filed a motion seeking a continuance and requesting that he be added Athens App. No. 24CA19 4
to the child’s case plan. Appellant alleged that he was scheduled to be released to
transitional control on September 30, 2023, and that he would be eligible for
supervised visits beginning in October of 2023. The request for a continuance was
denied but Appellant was eventually added to the case plan.
{¶5} The matter came on for hearing as scheduled on October 16, 2023,
however, the trial court decided to hold the matter in abeyance at the request of
ACCS due to recent progress being made by the child’s mother. ACCS thereafter
formally amended the case plan to extend the mother’s visits in order to support
reunification and further amended the case plan to reflect the visits Appellant had
been having with the child. Unfortunately, the case plan was updated again on
December 14, 2023, to indicate that the child’s mother had tested positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamines on December 4, 2023.
{¶6} A permanent custody hearing was held on February 13, 2024. ACCS
presented the testimony of: (1) Stephanie Blaine, ACCS Kinship Coordinator; (2)
Destiny Hooper, ACCS Family Support Worker; and 3) Mary Timms, ACCS
Ongoing Caseworker. Blaine testified that despite searching for a relative
placement for the child, none was found. She testified that the child’s maternal
grandmother was found to be an unsuitable placement due to her own criminal
history and substance abuse issues, as well as the fact that she was currently on
probation and moved around a lot. Hooper testified her role was to supervise or Athens App. No. 24CA19 5
monitor visitation. She testified that the child’s mother had been “kicked off” of
the visitation schedule multiple times for missing scheduled visitation. She
testified that out of 11 scheduled visits the mother had between November of 2023
to January of 2024, she had only showed up for 3 of them. She testified upon
cross-examination that Appellant’s first visit with the child was November 7, 2023,
and that his visits went very well. She testified that the child warmed up to
Appellant, was affectionate with Appellant, and that she did not have any concerns
regarding Appellant during the visits.
{¶7} Timms testified that the child was two and one-half years old at the
time of the hearing and that he had been in the temporary custody of ACCS for 2
years and 172 days. She testified that the child had been in the same foster home
since initially being placed there as an infant. She testified that the child was born
with NAS (Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome), and that the child’s foster parents
ensure he goes to all necessary appointments. She testified that the child requires
occupational therapy as well as behavioral therapy. Timms further testified that
she had significant concerns regarding the child being placed in the custody of
Appellant. Some of her concerns included that Appellant had been incarcerated
and ACCS had not been able to assess how he would adapt after being released and
that Appellant had been incarcerated for domestic violence committed against the Athens App. No. 24CA19 6
child’s mother while she was pregnant with the child. She was also concerned
about the length of time the child had been in the temporary custody of the agency.
{¶8} Timms agreed that Appellant had completed all aspects of the case plan
and she testified that he should be commended for that. However, she testified that
“at the end of the day,” the child needed a place to go. Her recommendation was
that permanent custody be granted to ACCS due to the lack of progress on the case
plan,2 the fact that the child had been in the temporary custody of ACCS for 2
years and 172 days, and because there was no other environment that had been
assessed as safe for the child to return to at that time. ACCS rested its case after
presenting these three witnesses.
{¶9} Appellant thereafter testified, explaining that he had a housing option
in Coolville upon release, but that he had concerns about going there due to the
people around that area. He said he had no other leads on housing at the time. He
testified that he had support people that could help with the child while he worked,
including his brother. He testified that his days were consumed with taking classes
to better himself. He testified that he had been visiting with the child and the visits
had gone great, but that he needed the visits to be longer. He testified that he
2 It should be noted that an overall reading of Timms’ hearing testimony indicates that Timms was referring to the general lack of progress on the case plan that led to the filing of the motion for permanent custody. Although Appellant had recently been added to the case plan and had completed the requirements of the case plan, he did so only after the motion for permanent custody had been filed and after the child had been in the temporary custody of ACCS for over two years. Athens App. No. 24CA19 7
believed the child deserved to be with his family, but he conceded that he had not
been present due to incarceration and substance abuse.
{¶10} Finally, the court asked CASA volunteer Tara Huffman to testify.
She testified that the child’s mother had recently relapsed, having positive drug
screens on December 4, 2023 and December 28, 2023. She testified that the
child’s mother was currently homeless, having been recently evicted. She testified
that although she understood this was a “12 of 22” case and the child had been in
the agency’s custody for two and one-half years, she was struggling to recommend
terminating parental rights after considering how hard both parents had worked
after being released from incarceration. With respect to Appellant, she testified
that she was recommending he be granted “more time,” specifically, six more
months. She admitted, however, that she had concerns with the fact that Appellant
had been incarcerated for committing domestic violence against the child’s mother.
She also testified that the child “does amazing” with his foster parents and that the
foster parents themselves were “amazing.” Finally, she testified that the child’s
foster parents intended to adopt the child.
{¶11} The court issued its judgment on July 19, 2024, granting permanent
custody to ACCS. The specific findings made by the court will be discussed in
detail below. Appellant now brings his timely appeal, setting forth a single
assignment of error for our review. Athens App. No. 24CA19 8
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TERMINATING [APPELLANT’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶12} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that the juvenile
court’s decision terminating his parental rights is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. More specifically, Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in
making its best interest determination under R.C. 2151.414(D). ACCS responds
by arguing that clear and convincing evidence was presented which supported a
finding that terminating Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of the
child.
Standard of Review
{¶13} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court's permanent
custody judgment unless the judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. E.g., In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). When an appellate
court reviews whether a trial court's permanent custody judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ “ ‘weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its Athens App. No. 24CA19 9
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” ’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20,
quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115 (9th Dist. 2001), quoting
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶14} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing
court is “whether the juvenile court's findings ... were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. In determining whether
a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing
court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55
Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). “Thus, if the children services agency presented
competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could
have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court's
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” R.M., 2013-Ohio-
3588, at ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).
{¶15} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may
reverse the judgment only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the
conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial Athens App. No. 24CA19 10
ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at
175. A reviewing court should find a trial court's permanent custody judgment
against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id.; see Black's Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest weight of the evidence” “denotes
a deferential standard of review under which a verdict will be reversed or
disregarded only if another outcome is obviously correct and the verdict is clearly
unsupported by the evidence”).
{¶16} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is
“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’
demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-
3146, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). As the Ohio Supreme Court long ago explained:
In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through independent investigation can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.
Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13 (1952).
Permanent Custody Framework
{¶17} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) specifies that a trial court may grant a children
services agency permanent custody of a child if the court finds, by clear and Athens App. No. 24CA19 11
convincing evidence, that (1) the child's best interest would be served by the award
of permanent custody, and (2) any of the following conditions applies:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents.
(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.
In the case at bar, the juvenile court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies.
Appellant does not dispute this finding, but instead argues that the juvenile court’s Athens App. No. 24CA19 12
finding that placing the child in the agency’s permanent custody was in the child’s
best interest was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶18} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a trial court to consider all relevant, as
well as specific, factors to determine whether a child's best interest will be served
by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The specific factors
include: (1) the child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents,
siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child's wishes, as expressed directly
by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's
maturity; (3) the child's custodial history; (4) the child's need for a legally secure
permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without
a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed
under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶19} Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children
services agency will promote a child's best interest involves a delicate balancing of
“all relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory
factors.” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513,
¶ 56; accord In re C.G., 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.); In re N.W., 2008-Ohio-
297, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). However, none of the best interest factors requires a court
to give it “greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57. Instead, the Athens App. No. 24CA19 13
trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest
determination. In re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-
Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child's best interest is served by
placing the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and
security.” In re C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of
Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991).
{¶20} In the case at bar, Appellant contends that the evidence does not
support the court's finding that placing the child in the agency’s permanent custody
was in the child’s best interest. He challenges the trial court’s finding as to each
best interest factor. Therefore, we will review the trial court’s findings related to
each factor.
1. Interactions and Interrelationships of the Children
{¶21} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) requires consideration of the interactions and
interrelationships of the children with their parents, caregivers, and others who
may significantly affect the children. The juvenile court found that the child, who
was two years old at the time of the hearing, was thriving in his foster home, where
he was well-bonded and loved by his foster parents, and where he had resided for
the majority of his life. The court also found that the child’s interactions with his
parents had been limited and inconsistent. More specifically, the court found that
the child’s interaction with his mother “had been spotty to the point that Mother Athens App. No. 24CA19 14
has been removed from the visitation schedule on more than one occasion[,]”
attributing this to mother’s continued substance abuse, which the court found
“continued to be a barrier for her visitation with her child.”
{¶22} With respect to Appellant, the court found that he had been
incarcerated since the child’s birth and had only recently been released from
prison. As such, the court found the child had had limited interaction and that
although the court “appreciate[d]” Appellant’s love and desire to be with his child,
the length of the case as well as the many “unknowns” in Appellant’s life, were
“not fair to the child and his development.” There is competent and credible
evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that a consideration of this factor
supported a grant of permanent custody to ACCS.
2. Wishes of the Children
{¶23} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of “[t]he wishes of the
child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem,
with due regard for the maturity of the child.” Here, the child was too young to
express his wishes and although there was not a guardian ad litem appointed to the
case, there was a CASA volunteer appointed who served as a guardian ad litem.
The CASA volunteer submitted a report, however, the report only addressed
mother’s involvement because Appellant was still incarcerated at the time of the
report. The CASA volunteer testified at the hearing and updated her report to Athens App. No. 24CA19 15
make recommendations regarding Appellant’s involvement. Ultimately, she
recommended that the case be continued to give Appellant six more months to
demonstrate his ability to care for the child. The volunteer admitted that she
struggled in making the recommendation one way or the other. She also conceded
that Appellant had no solid housing plans upon his release from the halfway house.
She testified that the child had been in the same foster home since birth, that the
foster parents were interested in adopting him, that the child was doing “amazing”
in the foster home, and the foster parents were “amazing.”
{¶24} This Court has observed that “while guardians ad litem play important
roles in child custody matters and in evaluating the interest of children, a trial court
is not bound by their recommendations.” In re: K.K., 2021-Ohio-3338, fn. 4 (4th
Dist.), citing Gould v. Gould, 2017-Ohio-6896, ¶ 57 (4th Dist.); In re R.N., 2004-
Ohio-4420, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.). Although the child’s wishes as expressed through the
CASA volunteer tended to favor denying the agency’s motion for permanent
custody, the trial court was not bound by the volunteer’s recommendations.
Further, it is clear that the trial court considered this factor in making its final
determinations regarding the child’s best interests. However, the court simply
rejected the CASA volunteer’s recommendation, which it was permitted to do.
3. Custodial History Athens App. No. 24CA19 16
{¶25} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) requires consideration of the custodial history
of the child. Here, the trial court found that the child had not only been in the
agency’s custody for 12 of a consecutive 22 month period, it found that the child
had been in the agency’s custody for 23 months at the time it filed its motion for
permanent custody, which was 6 months prior to the final hearing. Thus, at the
time of the hearing, the child had been in the agency’s temporary custody for 29
months and, as noted by the court, the child had only been in his parent’s custody
for a total of 13 days. The court further found that the child’s mother had failed to
comply with or benefit from the case plan, and Appellant had been incarcerated
prior to the child’s birth until shortly before the hearing. As such, we conclude the
evidence at the hearing competently and credibly supported the juvenile court's
findings on this factor.
4. Legally Secure Placement
{¶26} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires consideration of the child's need for
a legally secure permanent placement. “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not
define the term ‘legally secure permanent placement,’ this court and others have
generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment
where a child's needs will be met.” In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.),
citing In re Dyal, 2001 WL 925423, *9 (4th Dist. Aug. 9, 2001) (implying that
“legally secure permanent placement” means a “stable, safe, and nurturing Athens App. No. 24CA19 17
environment”); see also In re K.M., 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) (observing
that legally secure permanent placement requires more than stable home and
income but also requires environment that will provide for child's needs); In re
J.H., 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95 (11th Dist.) (stating that mother was unable to provide
legally secure permanent placement when she lacked physical and emotional
stability and that father was unable to do so when he lacked grasp of parenting
concepts); In re J.W., 2007-Ohio-2007, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting)
(stating that a legally secure permanent placement means “a placement that is
stable and consistent”); Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure”
to mean, in part, “not exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable or firm as to insure
safety”); Id. (defining “permanent” to mean, in part, “[c]ontinuing or enduring in
the same state, status, place, or the like without fundamental or marked change, not
subject to fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to be fixed; lasting; abiding;
stable; not temporary or transient”). Thus, “[a] legally secure permanent
placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses
a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable
adults who will provide for the child's needs.” M.B. at ¶ 56.
{¶27} Here, there is ample clear and convincing evidence showing that
neither Appellant nor the child's mother can provide the child with a legally secure
permanent placement. The child was removed from the mother’s custody less than Athens App. No. 24CA19 18
two weeks after his birth, on August 25, 2021, because he tested positive at birth
for amphetamines, methamphetamines, benzodiazepines, buprenorphine,
marijuana, and fentanyl. At the time the permanent custody motion was filed
on August 14, 2023, mother had been released from incarceration but was residing
at The Counseling Center. Further, Appellant was incarcerated at the time of the
child’s birth for domestic violence, the victim being the child’s mother. He
remained incarcerated at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed
nearly two years later. Although Appellant had been released from prison at the
time of the permanent custody hearing on February 13, 2024, he was still residing
in a halfway house. Moreover, the agency investigated but failed to find any
relative placement options that were acceptable.
{¶28} The juvenile court found that the minor child desperately needed a
secure and permanent placement which could not be achieved unless ACCS was
granted permanent custody. The court found that “unknowns” related to whether
or not mother would remain sober and whether or not Appellant would be able to
maintain a law-abiding life while providing for the child’s basic needs would result
in the child being in limbo for additional time after already being in limbo for over
two years. The court further found that although Appellant expressed a willingness
to be a parental figure for the child, there were unanswered questions related to Athens App. No. 24CA19 19
“housing instability” and Appellant’s “ability to provide * * * for the child’s needs
as well as protection.”
{¶29} Appellant has not cited any authority that required the court to
continue the child in the agency's temporary custody while he completed his stay at
a halfway house, and then further continue the case to see if Appellant would be
able to obtain suitable housing and arrange for suitable caregivers, when the
remaining evidence indicated that the child's best interest would be served by
placing him in the agency's permanent custody. See generally In re K.M., 2014-
Ohio-4268, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.) (“If permanent custody is in the child's best interest,
legal custody or placement with [a parent or other relative] necessarily is not.”).
We conclude the evidence at the hearing competently and credibly supported the
court’s findings on this factor as well.
5. Factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (E)(11)
{¶30} Although the court did not make any express findings related to these
factors, it stated it had considered these factors in reaching its decision. Appellant
does not specifically challenge any findings related to these factors other than to
state they are not applicable. We agree with Appellant’s assessment that these
factors do not apply to the present case. Athens App. No. 24CA19 20
Conclusion
{¶31} We conclude that the juvenile court’s best interest finding is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. ACCS presented competent and
credible evidence upon which the court reasonably could have formed a firm belief
that grant of permanent custody to the agency was in the best interest of the child.
As set forth above, although two of the factors arguably weighed in favor of
denying the agency’s motion, the other three factors weighed heavily in favor of
granting permanent custody to the agency. Thus, the record demonstrates that the
court considered the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest
determination. Therefore, we conclude the permanent custody award is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of
error is overruled and the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Athens App. No. 24CA19 21
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court – Probate-Juvenile Division to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Abele, J., and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court, _____________________________ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.