In Re Helmick

117 B.R. 187, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1673, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1386, 1990 WL 113919
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 26, 1990
Docket19-20776
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 117 B.R. 187 (In Re Helmick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Helmick, 117 B.R. 187, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1673, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1386, 1990 WL 113919 (Pa. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERNARD MARKOVITZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) filed by the United States Trustee (“Trustee”).

*188 Trustee.contends that Gerald and Bette Jo Helmicks’ (“Debtors”) Chapter 7 bankruptcy case should be dismissed because Debtors’ Schedule of Current Income and Current Expenses (“Schedule”) reflects a monthly disposable income (income less expenses) of $294.51. Because Debtors list $26,495.25 as nonpriority unsecured claims against them, Trustee avers that Debtors have the ability to fund a Chapter 13 Plan.

Debtors response takes the form of a proposed amended Schedule, which basically increases existing expenses and adds new expenses to an already non-spartan budget.

Granting Debtors relief under Chapter 7 would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of that Chapter because it would appear that Chapter 13 is a viable alternative.

Trustee’s motion to dismiss pursuant to § 707(b) will be granted. However, should Debtors request reconsideration and attach a viable Chapter 13 petition thereto, within ten (10) days, the Court will reconsider and determine at that time whether Debtors should be permitted to proceed under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.

FACTS

Debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 30, 1990. Their Statement of Financial Affairs represents that Debtor Gerald L. Hel-mick has been employed at the USX Cumberland Mine for a period of twelve (12) years and is presently the Assistant Mine Foreman. Debtor Bette Jo Helmick has recently been gainfully employed but at present is voluntarily unemployed.

Debtors list their gross income for 1988 as $52,231.03 and their gross income for 1989 as $69,400.00. However, Debtors list their estimated future monthly take home •pay as $2,700.00 (or $32,400.00 per year). Mr. Helmick testified that the figures for 1988 and 1989 represented Debtors’ combined gross pay, including compensation paid Mr. Helmick for overtime work. He advised that he would be performing less overtime work in the future due to a recent voluntary change in work status from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’ the mine.

Debtors' list of estimated future monthly expenses includes substantial sums for shelter, utilities, and food. In addition, it also includes items which border on luxuries.

Debtors, in response to Trustee’s motion, seek to amend their Schedule to reflect increased expenses for clothing (an additional $140.00 for a total $290.00 per month) and transportation (an additional $60.00 for a total $190.00 per month, not including their listed car payments and auto insurance). In addition, Debtors seek to list previously unreported monthly expenses for eye care, estimated house repairs, payment on a riding lawn mower, as well as payment on two (2) automobiles.

Debtors’ original Schedule showed a monthly surplus of disposable income of $294.51. Debtors’ proposed amended Schedule shows a monthly deficit of disposable income of $500.60.

Debtors’ unsecured debt primarily consists of credit card debt for cash advances and for the purchase of, inter alia, weightlifting equipment, furniture, fishing supplies, gifts, jewelry, cologne, and various miscellaneous items. Debtors’ unsecured debt totals $26,495.25.

Debtors’ secured debt consists of the mortgage on their residence, located in Carmichaels, Pennsylvania, and the debt on two automobiles. This secured debt totals $43,735.88.

Trustee filed the pending Motion To Dismiss based on the original Schedule’s monthly surplus of $294.51. A hearing on the Motion was held on July 10, 1990, wherein testimony was taken.

ANALYSIS

Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code reads as follows:

After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are ¡ primarily consumer *189 debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1986).

The pending Motion was filed by the Trustee and not by any party in interest. Trustee’s Motion To Dismiss avers that Debtors’ debts are primarily consumer in nature as defined in the Code. Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), ¶ 5. “Consumer debt” is defined as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7).

After examining the nature of Debtors’ obligations, and the definitions provided in the Code, the Court is convinced that these debts are in fact primarily consumer. There is no suggestion that any of this debt was incurred for a purpose other than personal, family, or household. The Court concludes, therefore, that Debtors’ obligations are primarily consumer debts within the meaning of § 707(b). See, e.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 912-13 (9th Cir.1988) (home mortgage is a consumer debt. Look to purpose of debt to determine if it serves a personal, family, or household purpose and, therefore, is consumer debt).

Even though Debtors’ obligations are primarily consumer debts, dismissal is not authorized pursuant to § 707(b) unless the Court additionally finds that to do otherwise would be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7’s provisions. Congress chose not to provide a definition for ‘substantial abuse’. As a result, courts have been left to infer Congressional intent. Courts have generally looked to see if the bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith or if the debtor had the apparent ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan. Substantial abuse has been found to exist when a filing has been in bad faith or the debtor is able to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See, e.g., In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir.1989); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1989); Kelly, 841 F.2d at 908; In re Grant, 51 B.R. 385 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 1985), Filing in bad faith and ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan are often intertwined. A bad faith filing often makes it appear as if a Chapter 13 plan is not feasible. Such is the case in the pending action.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 B.R. 187, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1673, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1386, 1990 WL 113919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-helmick-pawb-1990.