In re H.C.

2026 Ohio 189

Opinion

[Cite as In re H.C., 2026-Ohio-189.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE H.C. : : No. 115276 A Minor Child : : [Appeal by Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 22, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD-24911635

Appearances:

Michael P. Dunham, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Appellant-Mother appeals the juvenile court’s judgments overruling

her objections and adopting the magistrate’s decisions that adjudicated her child

abused and neglected and awarded temporary custody to appellee Cuyahoga

County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For

the reasons that follow, this court affirms the juvenile court’s decisions. I. Facts and Procedural History

In November 2024, the agency filed a complaint alleging that H.C.,

then 18-months old, (“the child”) was abused and neglected and requesting

temporary custody. The complaint alleged, in relevant part, that (1) the child

suffered sub-acute corner fractures to her left femur, which medical professionals

determined were nonaccidental in nature and that the child’s Mother and Father

failed to provide a plausible explanation for the fractures; (2) the child was in pre-

dispositional temporary custody from April 2024 to September 2024, due in part

to unexplained fractures in both of her legs; (3) Mother and Father lacked

appropriate parenting and decision-making skills, which interfered with their

ability to provide necessary care for the child’s safety, and both parents minimized

the child’s current and prior injuries; and (4) the child lost weight when she was

recently returned to Mother’s care, demonstrating a failure to provide for the basic

needs of the child. Following a hearing, the court committed the child to the pre-

dispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.

On March 5, 2024, the parties appeared for an adjudicatory hearing,

which was assigned to a magistrate. The magistrate granted Mother’s motion in

limine, prohibiting the agency from offering expert testimony of medical

professionals from whom the agency failed to provide expert reports. Prior to

hearing testimony, Father stipulated to an amended complaint, agreeing to an

abuse and neglect finding and for the agency to have temporary custody of the

child. Mother disputed the allegations in the amended complaint and proceeded with trial at which the agency introduced photographs, genetic testing results, and

the child’s medical records, and presented testimony from four witnesses: (1) Dr.

Abigail Kacpura, a medical geneticist at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, (2)

Ebony Sheffey, CCDCFS social worker in the medical investigation unit, (3) Amber

May, CCDCFS supervisor in extended services, and (4) Kaitlyn Kedierski, Mother’s

CCDCFS extended caseworker.

The testimony and evidence revealed that the child suffered from

multiple unexplained leg fractures while in Mother’s care and custody. Despite

Mother’s assertion and belief that the child suffered from Osteogenesis Imperfecta,

commonly known as Brittle Bone Disease (hereinafter “OI”), medical testimony

and genetic testing revealed that the child did not suffer from such disease. The

agency’s testimony further established that the child did not suffer from any injury

or fractures while in agency custody during a prior removal.

Following the hearing, the magistrate issued his decision, finding

the child abused and neglected. A week later, the magistrate conducted a

dispositional hearing, receiving testimony from (1) Father, (2) May, and (3) Glenda

Hoyle, a CCDCFS extended services caseworker. The child’s guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) also presented his recommendation. The magistrate subsequently issued

a decision granting the agency’s request for temporary custody of the child, finding

this disposition to be in the best interest of the child.

Mother filed timely objections to both decisions, contending that (1)

during the adjudication hearing, the magistrate improperly relied on hearsay testimony contained in the child’s medical records, specifically, statements made

by other medical professionals, and (2) the agency failed to present clear and

convincing evidence that the child was abused or neglected and that temporary

custody was in the child’s best interest.

The juvenile court overruled Mother’s objections and adopted the

magistrate’s decisions regarding both the adjudication and award of temporary

custody, ordering them into effect. This appeal followed.

II. The Appeal

Mother raises five assignments of error. At the outset, however, we

note that in Mother’s second assignment of error, she challenges the juvenile

court’s order striking her objections to the magistrate’s decision. Following a

clarification order, the court noted it only struck Mother’s usage of personal

identifiers in her objections, not the entirety of the objections. Accordingly,

Mother has withdrawn her second assignment of error as moot.

A. Adjudication and Disposition

In her first assignment of error, Mother challenges the juvenile

court’s adjudication and disposition. She first contends that the agency presented

insufficient evidence to support an abuse and neglect adjudication and that the

adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mother

asserts that the agency failed to prove that the child was abused because the record

lacks evidence to support the conclusion that the child’s leg fractures indicated

child abuse as opposed to accidental or unexplained means, and (2) the agency failed to prove that the child was neglected because Mother took the child to the

hospital when the injuries occurred.

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.35(A)(1) and Juv.R. 29(E)(4), the juvenile

court was required to determine whether CCDCFS presented clear and convincing

evidence to prove that the child should be adjudicated abused and neglected.

Whether the agency’s evidence satisfies the clear-and-convincing evidence

standard, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

“Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus. “‘Where the proof required must be clear and

convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the

trier of fact[] had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of

proof.’” Z.C. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990), citing

Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus.

In reviewing a juvenile court’s decision under a manifest weight

challenge, however,

the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Z.C. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. With these standards in mind and based on the record, we find that

the juvenile court’s adjudication of the child as abused and neglected is supported

by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1. Finding the Child an “Abused Child”

The agency’s complaint alleged that the child was abused as defined

in R.C. 2151.031(D), which states an “abused child” is any child who “[e]xhibits

evidence of any physical or mental injury or death, inflicted other than by

accidental means, or an injury or death which is at variance with the history given

of it.” Mother contends that to withstand the agency’s burden of proving abuse, it

had to prove how the child’s injury occurred and that it was not accidental. We

disagree.

The plain language of R.C. 2151.031(D) clearly indicates that

parental fault is not required for a finding of abuse. In re A.C., 2010-Ohio-4933,

¶ 43 (6th Dist.). Courts, including this court, have found that

[d]uring the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings to determine whether a child is an “abused child,” the juvenile court does not have to find any fault on the part of the parent, guardian, or custodian in order to conclude that the child is “abused” pursuant to R.C. 2151.031. All that is necessary is that the child be a victim, regardless of who is responsible for the abuse.

In re Pitts, 38 Ohio App.3d 1 (5th Dist. 1987), paragraph two of the syllabus; In re

E.B., 2020-Ohio-4139, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.); In re R.W., 2024-Ohio-2223 (3d Dist.)

(rejecting the argument that the agency is required to establish a specific cause for

an injury in proving the child was abused). In this case, the evidence before the court demonstrated that in April

2024, the child suffered from unexplained fractures in both of her legs. According

to the medical records for this injury, the child presented to the Cleveland Clinic

emergency room with a “spiral fracture distal meta diaphysis of the left tibia with

prominent periosteal new bone formation along the medial diaphysis and distal

metaphysis of the tibia.” See exhibit No. 4. As a result, the agency filed a complaint

alleging abuse and neglect; the child was removed from Mother’s custody. During

this time that the child was in agency custody, the child sustained no further

injuries, including fractures.

After the agency dismissed the April 2024 complaint and returned

the child to Mother’s care, the child suffered another fracture, this time to her left

femur, causing the child to be placed in a leg brace. Mother did not inform her

caseworker that the child suffered another leg fracture, despite speaking with her

the day after this new injury. When CCDCFS staff questioned Mother about the

new fracture, Mother stated that the child had fallen walking into daycare, but then

later told caseworkers that the child had fallen at daycare — a fall unbeknownst to

daycare staff. Mother did not have a reasonable explanation for the injury, except

to assert that the child was diagnosed with OI.

Dr. Kacpura testified about the child’s genetic testing for OI.

Although the testing resulted in a finding for a “variant of uncertain significance”

in the COL1A2 gene — only one of the 67 genes tested — Dr. Kacpura testified the

genetic testing did not present any pathogenic variants in any of the 67 genes associated with genetic disorders that cause bone fragility. She further stated

although Father had the same variant as the child, she opined that the variant was

benign because Father had no unexplained fractures despite him playing contact

sports. Dr. Kacpura stated that based on the Father’s history and not observing

any other suggestive features of the disease, the child’s variant is also likely benign.

Accordingly, Dr. Kacpura stated that it was her professional opinion that the child

was not affected by OI.

Based on foregoing, the juvenile court’s decision finding the child

abused was supported by sufficient clear and convincing evidence and was not

against the weight of the evidence. Although there was no specific justification or

reasoning as to how the child’s injuries occurred, the evidence clearly showed that

the child suffered from repeated leg fractures only while in Mother’s care and

custody; no fractures occurred while the child was in agency custody.

2. Finding the Child a “Neglected Child”

The juvenile court’s decision finding the child neglected was also

supported by clear and convincing evidence. The agency’s amended complaint

alleged that the child was neglected pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) that defines a

“neglected child” as any child “[w]ho lacks adequate parental care because of the

faults or habits of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian[.]” “Adequate

parental care” means “the provision by a child’s parent or parents, guardian, or

custodian of adequate food, clothing, and shelter to ensure the child’s health and

physical safety and the provision by a child’s parent or parents of specialized services warranted by the child’s physical or mental needs.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(1).

R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) “requires some showing that parents, a guardian, or a custodian

is at fault before a finding of a lack of proper (or adequate) care can be made.” In

re Riddle, 79 Ohio St.3d 259, 262 (1997).

In its adoption of the magistrate’s decision, the juvenile court found

that “based upon [Father’s] admission to the allegations in the Amended

Complaint and the testimony heard, that a danger to the child exists.” Accordingly,

it is uncertain whether the court’s finding of neglect was based entirely on Father’s

stipulation or whether Mother failed to ensure the child’s health and physical

safety. Admittedly, Mother presented the child to the emergency room on multiple

instances for treatment of leg fractures. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that the child

suffered these fractures only while in Mother’s care and custody. Moreover,

although not indicated in the magistrate’s decision adjudicating the child

neglected, testimony was offered expressing concerns about a decrease in the

child’s weight while in Mother’s care.

Based on the stipulation by Father and the testimony presented, we

find that the agency presented sufficient clear and convincing evidence, which is

also not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the child was neglected.

3. Disposition of Temporary Custody to the Agency

Mother next asserts that the juvenile court’s decision awarding

temporary custody to the agency was an abuse of discretion in violation of her

rights to due process and to parent her child. She contends that court should have awarded her legal custody with protective supervision because the agency did not

present any evidence that she did not comply with her case plan during the

pendency of the case, but rather the agency failed to provide her with an

opportunity to complete her parenting class and the child had missed medical

visits since being placed in agency care.

“Following an adjudicatory hearing, if the juvenile court finds clear

and convincing evidence that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent, the

court must hold a separate dispositional hearing before issuing a disposition

order.” In re J.S., 2022-Ohio-1679, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.35(A)(1) and

2151.53. The juvenile court then “is authorized to order a disposition for the child,

which includes (1) placing the child in protective supervision; (2) committing the

child to the temporary custody of the agency; (3) awarding legal custody of the

child to either parent or another person; or (4) committing the child to the

permanent custody of the agency.” In re K.E., 2022-Ohio-3333, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.),

citing R.C. 2151.353(A). In choosing between these dispositions, the court’s

“primary concern remains the best interest of the child.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing In re

Ka.C., 2015-Ohio-1148, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).

“An award of temporary custody to a public or private children’s

services agency is substantially different from an award of permanent custody,

where parental rights are terminated.” Ka.C. at ¶ 20. In this instance, “the parent

only loses temporary custody of a child and retains residual parental rights,

privileges, and responsibilities.” Id. Because parents may regain custody of their child, “‘the juvenile court employs the less restrictive “preponderance of the

evidence” standard in temporary custody cases as opposed to the “clear and

convincing” standard of evidence employed at the dispositional stage in permanent

custody cases.’” Id., quoting In re M.J.M., 2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).

Mother’s argument that she had not “failed any parts of her case plan

while this case was pending” does not undermine the juvenile court’s judgment

because compliance with a case plan is just one factor that is considered in whether

temporary custody is in the child’s best interest.

On the record before us, the juvenile court’s decision awarding

CCDCFS temporary custody of the child and finding that it is in the child’s best

interest is supported by the record. Despite Mother working through her case plan

and regularly visiting with the child, the court noted that Mother exhibited a few

inappropriate and concerning behaviors during those visits. The court relied on

testimony that Mother made lengthy telephone calls to relatives during the visits.

And the agency presented evidence that Mother provided age-inappropriate snack

choices for the child. Glenda Hoyle explained that she had continuing concerns

over Mother’s seeming resistance to instruction meant to improve her ability to

care for the child and to meet her needs; Mother had to be redirected at times when

interacting with the child.

But the most concerning issue expressed by the court was that

Mother refused to acknowledge that the child’s injuries had not been caused by OI

and that this lack of understanding posed an ongoing risk to the child’s safety. In fact, the court found that despite her belief that the child suffers from OI, Mother

permitted the child to stand on her shoulders, holding up the child by her arms.

On this basis, the child’s GAL recommended temporary custody to

the agency, explaining that “[w]e have a small child who cannot self-protect with

two incidences of very serious injuries for which there’s no plausible explanation.”

The GAL further observed that although the genetic testing offered an “uncertain”

finding — “the geneticist saying that the Brittle Bone Syndrome is not present at

this time” and that “there’s no evidence, medical evidence, to support that

[diagnosis], and there is medical evidence that rules it out,” he noted that the child

in her current placement “is very active, jumps off of the sofas, and runs through

the yard, goes on play equipment, has had a few falls, but there’s never been an

injury.”

Based on the foregoing, we find that the juvenile court’s decision

awarding the agency temporary custody of the child was in the child’s best interest

and supported by sufficient clear and convincing evidence.

Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Evidentiary Challenges

In her third assignment of error, Mother challenges the admission

of certain evidence and testimony during the adjudication hearing, contending that

the challenged testimony and evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay.

Specifically, she contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion or

committed plain error in (1) permitting Dr. Kacpura to testify as a fact witness, base her testimony and conclusions on what social workers told her, and to testify

as an expert regarding other doctors’ diagnoses, circumventing the expert report

requirement; (2) admitting the entirety of the child’s medical records because they

contained statements from other medical professionals who did not testify; (3)

permitting Sheffey to read the medical records proffered by Dr. Kacpura into the

record and testify about the child’s current placement and prior removals; (4)

permitting May to testify about the child’s medical conditions and offer a theory

about the cause of the child’s injuries; and (5) allowing Kedzirski to read agency

documents into the record.

Although Mother raises a myriad of evidentiary rulings on appeal,

her objections to the magistrate’s decision did not assert the same challenges.

Rather, Mother’s only objection regarding the admissibility of hearsay testimony

concerned statements made by other medical professionals contained in the

medical records from UH Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital, certified by Dr.

Aditi S. Parikh, M.D., a genetics physician. Specifically, she contends that the

progress notes containing other professional’s statements were hearsay.

Under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(ii), an objection to a magistrate’s decision

must be “specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” “Except

for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s

adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically

designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law. . . unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).” Juv.R.

40(D)(3)(b)(iv).

Accordingly, because Mother did not raise any challenge to the

magistrate’s decision regarding the admissibility of other instances of alleged

prejudicial hearsay statements and testimony, this court will not consider them on

appeal. See, e.g., In re R.A., 2021-Ohio-4126 (8th Dist.) (where a party fails to raise

an issue in its objections to a magistrate’s decision, the party waives the issue for

purposes of appeal). This court will, however, address Mother’s assertion

regarding hearsay contained in the medical records as preserved in her objections.

We review objected-to evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. In

re A.G., 2025-Ohio-4371, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.). Hearsay is defined as “a statement,

other than one made by the declarant while testifying . . . offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid.R. 801(C). If hearsay

falls within any of the exceptions enumerated in Evid.R. 803, then it may be

admissible. In re S.H., 2024-Ohio-4495, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.).

A trial judge is presumed to be capable of disregarding improper

testimony. In re S.D-S., 2024-Ohio-255, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.). In fact, in response to

Mother’s objections, challenging various witness statements and testimony, the

juvenile court magistrate repeatedly reminded the parties that it would only

consider relevant and admissible evidence in making his decision. Accordingly,

even if the juvenile court admitted improper hearsay, Mother must show that the

court actually relied on that evidence in its judgment. S.D-S. at ¶ 36, In re Fountain, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 672, *18 (8th Dist. Feb. 24, 2000). “The

erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless if other evidence, apart from

the erroneously admitted evidence, has been offered to prove that which the

challenged evidence was offered to prove.” S.D-S. at id., citing In re M.H., 2022-

Ohio-2968, ¶ 73 (8th Dist.).

On appeal, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in

admitting the entirety of the child’s medical records because they contained

statements from other medical professionals who did not testify. Mother did not

object to the admission of the child’s medical records, and in fact, relied on the

medical records, including statements and notes by other medical professionals

who did not testify, during her cross-examination.1 Notwithstanding the failure to

object and inviting any error, if one occurred, the child’s self-authenticated,

certified medical records fall within a recognized hearsay exception. R.C. 2317.422

and Evid.R. 803(4). Under Evid.R. 803(4), statements “made for purposes of

medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past and present

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause

or external source thereof” are admissible.

Here, the medical records were clearly for diagnosis and treatment

of the child’s injuries and whether she suffered from OI. Mother’s argument that

the records were made in anticipation of litigation is summarily rejected.

1 Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not take advantage of an error that

the party invited or induced. State v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-2627, ¶ 69 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, we find no error regarding the admissibility of the child’s medical

records or the juvenile court’s reliance on the information therein.

Regarding Mother’s other evidentiary challenges that were not

properly objected to either at trial or in challenging the magistrate’s decision, even

if not waived, we would not find plain error requiring this court to reverse the

juvenile court’s decision. Regarding Dr. Kacpura’s challenged testimony, we find

that her testimony did not contain hearsay statements and if they did, were not

prejudicial to Mother. Moreover, the challenged testimony offered by Sheffey was

either not hearsay or prejudicial, or it was cumulative to the other unobjected-to

admissible exhibits. Finally, we summarily reject the challenged testimony offered

by May and Kedzirski because the testimony was neither inadmissible nor

prejudicial because the testimony was cumulative to the unobjected-to exhibits,

including medical records, and prior witness testimony.

The magistrate stated repeatedly in response to the many objections

raised by Mother during the hearing that any impermissible testimony would not

be considered in rendering his decision. Mother has not demonstrated otherwise.

Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise, with the juvenile court’s

evidentiary rulings. The third assignment of error is overruled.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In her fourth assignment of error, Mother contends that she was

deprived of effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to properly object to the purported inadmissible testimony and evidence, thus potentially waiving the

issue on appeal.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mother must

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced her, thus depriving her of a fair trial. State v. Trimble,

2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

The failure to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it unnecessary for a

court to consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing

Strickland at 697. This standard of review is applicable in custody proceedings.

S.D-S., 2024-Ohio-255, at ¶ 42 (8th Dist.), citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619,

627 (9th Dist. 1994) (Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims can be raised in

custody cases.).

In this case, Mother has not and cannot prove that counsel’s

performance was deficient. Her arguments on appeal focus on counsel’s failure to

properly object to certain testimony and evidence. Having previously found no

error in the admissibility of the challenged testimony and evidence, counsel’s

performance cannot be deemed deficient under the Strickland standard.

Accordingly, Mother was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The fourth

assignment of error is overruled. D. Cumulative Error

Mother contends in her fifth assignment of error that the cumulative

effect and prejudice of the errors by the juvenile court and trial counsel merit

reversal under the doctrine of cumulative error.

Under the cumulative-error doctrine, a final decision will be

reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprived the appellant of a

fair trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735,

¶ 321. The cumulative-error doctrine applies in civil cases, including custody

cases. S.D-S., 2024-Ohio-255, at ¶ 47 (8th Dist.).

To find cumulative error, this court must find: (1) that multiple

errors were committed by the juvenile court, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for

the combination of the separately harmless errors. State v. Viceroy, 2012-Ohio-

2494, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-1404, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.). In

this case, having found no errors, we summarily overrule Mother’s fifth assignment

of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR