CONNOR, J.
The petitioner, Dr. R. B. Hayes, was correctly advised by his counsel that no appeal would lie from the judgment at the hearing on the return of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The only remedy available to the petitioner for a review by this Court of the judgment, in order to determine its validity, was a petition for a writ of
certiorari,
which in proper cases is a substitute for an appeal. C. S., 630.
S. v. Edwards,
192 N. C., 321, 135 S. E., 37;
In re McCade,
183 N. C., 242, 111 S. E., 3;
In re Croom,
175 N. C., 455, 95 S. E., 903;
In re Holley,
154 N. C., 163, 69 S. E., 872. The petition for a writ of
certiorari
was allowed. On the return to said writ, this Court has .jurisdiction to review the judgment, and the proceedings in which it was rendered, in order to determine whether or not there is error of law in the judgment. The findings of fact upon which the order was made by tbe Chairman, of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, under which the petitioner was arrested and held in custody by the sheriff of Orange County, were conclusive at the hearing on the return to the writ of
habeas
corpus,
if the said Chairman had the power to make the order, punishing the petitioner for contempt. These findings are also conclusive in this Court, and will not he reviewed. The only question, therefore, presented to Judge Harris for his decision, was whether the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, upon the facts shown by the record of the hearing before said Chairman, had the power to adjudge the petitioner in contempt, and upon such adjudication to order that he be imprisoned in the common jail of Orange County for a period of ten days as punishment for such contempt. Judge Harris answered this question in the affirmative, and thereupon refused to discharge the petitioner and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff of Orange County. We are of the opinion that there is
no
error in the judgment rendered by Judge Harris.
The question raised by the petitioner at the hearing before the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission by his refusal to answer the question propounded to him by the said Chairman, on the ground that the question was addressed to him as an expert, and that he could not he required to answer the question until he had been paid, or until he had been assured by the said Chairman that he would be j>aid; a fee as an expert witness, in amount satisfactory to him, is not presented on the record now in this Court. The question has not heretofore been decided by this Court. It has, however, been presented to and decided by courts in other jurisdictions. It has been held in a few cases that a witness who has been summoned as an expert in a judicial investigation cannot be adjudged in contempt for refusing to give such testimony unless he has been compensated for his professional opinion. The better opinion, however, is that an expert summoned to testify who refuses to answer questions without compensation other than his witness fees is in contempt. And when an expert voluntarily submits himself to an examination as such, he can in no case refuse to answer one particular question after having, without objection, answered others. 13 C. J., sec. 33, at p. 27, and cases cited in notes. In this State it is provided by statute that experts, when compelled to attend and testify as witnesses shall be allowed such compensation and mileage as the court in its discretion may allow. C. S., 3893. It would seem that this statutory provision for their compensation ought to -be sufficient assurance to experts who are called upon to testify in the courts of this State, that they will be paid for their attendance and testimony a fair and reasonable amount.
On the record now before this Court, the only question presented for its decision is whether the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, or any member of said Commission, has the power to adjudge a witness who has refused to answer a question propounded to
him at a bearing before said Chairman or member of said Commission, of a canse pending before said Commission, and duly assigned to said Chairman or member for bearing in contempt for such refusal, and upon such adjudication to punish the witness by imprisonment.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission, consisting of three members appointed by the Governor of the State, one of whom has been designated by him as Chairman, was created by statute. Chapter 120, Public Laws 1929. It is primarily an administrative agency of the State, charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. In cases where an employer and an employee, subject to the provisions of said act, have agreed as to the compensation to be paid by the employer and to be received by the employee, under the provisions of the act, for injuries sustained by the employee, and resulting from an accident which has occurred during the course of the employment, a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by said Commission, accompanied by a full and complete medical report, shall be filed with and approved by the Commission. If, however, the employer and the injured employee fail to reach an agreement in regard to the compensation, or if after having reached an agreement, which has been approved by the Commission, they disagree as to whether said agreement has been complied with in any respect, either party may apply to the Commission for a hearing in regard to the matter in controversy and for a ruling by the Commission thereon. The, Commission or any one of its members, after receipt of an application for such hearing, shall set a time and place for a hearing, and shall notify each party of such time and place. “The Commission or any of its members shall hear the parties in issue, their respresentatives and witnesses, and shall determine the dispute in a summary manner. The award, together with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue shall be filed with the record of the proceedings and a copy of the award shall immediately be sent to the parties in dispute.”
Where the hearing is before a Commissioner, either party may have his decision reviewed by the full Commission by an application to said Commission made within seven days from the date when the notice of the award was received by such party. The award of the Commission, when the hearing was before the full Commission, or when the award of a Commissioner at a hearing before him has been reviewed by the full Commission upon the application therefor by a party to such award, shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Either party may, however, appeal to the Superior Court from an award of the full Commission and on such appeal be heard as to alleged
errors of law in the award. “Any party in interest may file in the Superior Court of the county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the Commission, or of an order or decision of the Commission, or of an award of the Commission unappealed from or of an award of the Commission affirmed upon appeal; whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties.
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CONNOR, J.
The petitioner, Dr. R. B. Hayes, was correctly advised by his counsel that no appeal would lie from the judgment at the hearing on the return of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The only remedy available to the petitioner for a review by this Court of the judgment, in order to determine its validity, was a petition for a writ of
certiorari,
which in proper cases is a substitute for an appeal. C. S., 630.
S. v. Edwards,
192 N. C., 321, 135 S. E., 37;
In re McCade,
183 N. C., 242, 111 S. E., 3;
In re Croom,
175 N. C., 455, 95 S. E., 903;
In re Holley,
154 N. C., 163, 69 S. E., 872. The petition for a writ of
certiorari
was allowed. On the return to said writ, this Court has .jurisdiction to review the judgment, and the proceedings in which it was rendered, in order to determine whether or not there is error of law in the judgment. The findings of fact upon which the order was made by tbe Chairman, of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, under which the petitioner was arrested and held in custody by the sheriff of Orange County, were conclusive at the hearing on the return to the writ of
habeas
corpus,
if the said Chairman had the power to make the order, punishing the petitioner for contempt. These findings are also conclusive in this Court, and will not he reviewed. The only question, therefore, presented to Judge Harris for his decision, was whether the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, upon the facts shown by the record of the hearing before said Chairman, had the power to adjudge the petitioner in contempt, and upon such adjudication to order that he be imprisoned in the common jail of Orange County for a period of ten days as punishment for such contempt. Judge Harris answered this question in the affirmative, and thereupon refused to discharge the petitioner and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff of Orange County. We are of the opinion that there is
no
error in the judgment rendered by Judge Harris.
The question raised by the petitioner at the hearing before the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission by his refusal to answer the question propounded to him by the said Chairman, on the ground that the question was addressed to him as an expert, and that he could not he required to answer the question until he had been paid, or until he had been assured by the said Chairman that he would be j>aid; a fee as an expert witness, in amount satisfactory to him, is not presented on the record now in this Court. The question has not heretofore been decided by this Court. It has, however, been presented to and decided by courts in other jurisdictions. It has been held in a few cases that a witness who has been summoned as an expert in a judicial investigation cannot be adjudged in contempt for refusing to give such testimony unless he has been compensated for his professional opinion. The better opinion, however, is that an expert summoned to testify who refuses to answer questions without compensation other than his witness fees is in contempt. And when an expert voluntarily submits himself to an examination as such, he can in no case refuse to answer one particular question after having, without objection, answered others. 13 C. J., sec. 33, at p. 27, and cases cited in notes. In this State it is provided by statute that experts, when compelled to attend and testify as witnesses shall be allowed such compensation and mileage as the court in its discretion may allow. C. S., 3893. It would seem that this statutory provision for their compensation ought to -be sufficient assurance to experts who are called upon to testify in the courts of this State, that they will be paid for their attendance and testimony a fair and reasonable amount.
On the record now before this Court, the only question presented for its decision is whether the Chairman of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, or any member of said Commission, has the power to adjudge a witness who has refused to answer a question propounded to
him at a bearing before said Chairman or member of said Commission, of a canse pending before said Commission, and duly assigned to said Chairman or member for bearing in contempt for such refusal, and upon such adjudication to punish the witness by imprisonment.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission, consisting of three members appointed by the Governor of the State, one of whom has been designated by him as Chairman, was created by statute. Chapter 120, Public Laws 1929. It is primarily an administrative agency of the State, charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. In cases where an employer and an employee, subject to the provisions of said act, have agreed as to the compensation to be paid by the employer and to be received by the employee, under the provisions of the act, for injuries sustained by the employee, and resulting from an accident which has occurred during the course of the employment, a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by said Commission, accompanied by a full and complete medical report, shall be filed with and approved by the Commission. If, however, the employer and the injured employee fail to reach an agreement in regard to the compensation, or if after having reached an agreement, which has been approved by the Commission, they disagree as to whether said agreement has been complied with in any respect, either party may apply to the Commission for a hearing in regard to the matter in controversy and for a ruling by the Commission thereon. The, Commission or any one of its members, after receipt of an application for such hearing, shall set a time and place for a hearing, and shall notify each party of such time and place. “The Commission or any of its members shall hear the parties in issue, their respresentatives and witnesses, and shall determine the dispute in a summary manner. The award, together with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue shall be filed with the record of the proceedings and a copy of the award shall immediately be sent to the parties in dispute.”
Where the hearing is before a Commissioner, either party may have his decision reviewed by the full Commission by an application to said Commission made within seven days from the date when the notice of the award was received by such party. The award of the Commission, when the hearing was before the full Commission, or when the award of a Commissioner at a hearing before him has been reviewed by the full Commission upon the application therefor by a party to such award, shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Either party may, however, appeal to the Superior Court from an award of the full Commission and on such appeal be heard as to alleged
errors of law in the award. “Any party in interest may file in the Superior Court of the county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the Commission, or of an order or decision of the Commission, or of an award of the Commission unappealed from or of an award of the Commission affirmed upon appeal; whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same, as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.”
Power is expressly conferred by the statute creating the North Carolina Industrial Commission, upon said Commission or upon any member thereof, to subpoena witnesses for either party to a cause, pending-before said Commission, to attend and testify at a hearing before the full Commission or before any member thereof. A witness, when a subpoena has been duly served on him, is required to attend the hearing, and to testify, after he has been duly sworn. His answers to questions propounded to him at the hearing constitute evidence from which the Commission or the Commissioner presiding at the hearing finds the facts upon which the award is made. ■ Without such evidence, when the facts are in dispute, neither the full Commission nor the Commissioner can perform the duties imposed by the statute. If a witness in attendance at a hearing, after having been duly sworn, can refuse to answer a question propounded to him, which is pertinent to the matters in dispute between the parties, with impunity, then it is manifest that the North Carolina Industrial Commission, created by statute to administer the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, and to determine the rights and liabilities of employers and employees, subject to its exclusive jurisdiction under the provisions of the act, is without adequate power to perform its duties prescribed by statute, to the people of this State and to the parties to a cause pending before the said Commission. It is provided in the statute that “the Superior Court shall, on application of the Commission, or any member or deputy thereof, enforce by proper proceedings the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production and examination of books, papers and records.” This provision is clearly not adequate for a situation such as that disclosed by the record of the hearing at which the petitioner herein, upon the facts found by the Commissioner and set out by him in the record, was adjudged in contempt and'punished therefor. Under this provision, in proper cases, the Superior Court has the power to aid the Commission in procuring the attendance of witnesses at hearings before the Commission or before any member or deputy thereof. It does not, however, by its express terms or by implication, deprive the
Commission or any member thereof, while conducting a hearing as required by statute, of the power to compel a witness, in attendance at said hearing, after having-been, duly sworn, to testify.
It has been uniformly held by this Court and by courts of other jurisdictions that the power to punish for contempt committed in the presence of the court, is inherent in the court, and not dependent upon statutory authority.
Snow v. Hawkes,
183 N. C., 365, 111 S. E., 621,
Ex Parte McCown,
139 N. C., 95, 51 S. E., 957, 13 C. J., 46. Without such power the court cannot perform its judicial function. This principle is especially applicable when the contempt consists in the refusal of a witness in attendance upon the court, after having been duly sworn, to answer a question propounded to him for the purpose of eliciting evidence material to the issue to be decided by the court. On this indnciple with regard to the question chiefly discussed on the argument and in the briefs filed in this Court, as to whether or not the North Carolina Industrial Commission is a court, within definitions to be found in the cited cases and in the text-books, we are of the opinion that the Commission or any of its members, when conducting a hearing for the purpose of deciding questions upon which the rights and liabilities of an employer and an employee, under the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, are to be determined by the Commission or by one of its members, has the power to adjudge a witness who has deliberately and persistently refused to answer a question propounded to him, in contempt, and to punish such witness for such contempt, by fine or imprisonment. C. S., 981. When conducting hearings as required by the statute, the Commission or the Commissioner, is 'performing duties which are judicial in their nature. These duties are prescribed by statute. It cannot be held that the Commission or Commissioner is without adequate power to perform these duties. One of these statutory duties is to subpoena witnesses, and to require witnesses, who are in attendance at a hearing, and who have been duly sworn, to testify. Upon the contemptuous refusal of such witness to testify, the Commission or Commissioner presiding at the hearing, has the power to adjudge the witness in contempt and to punish for such contempt, within the limitations prescribed by statute.
In re Oldham,
89 N. C., 23.
In accordance with this opinion the judgment certified to this Court for review is
Affirmed.