In Re Havanec

175 B.R. 920, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2024, 1994 WL 724797
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 22, 1994
Docket19-30527
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 175 B.R. 920 (In Re Havanec) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Havanec, 175 B.R. 920, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2024, 1994 WL 724797 (Ohio 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

DAVID F. SNOW, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Debtor in this case asserts that his exemption claims became final in the chapter *921 11 phase of his case since no creditor objected within the time specified in Rule 4003(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Trustee appointed after the Debt- or converted the case to chapter 7 argues that the Debtor is wrong on two counts: first, because the chapter 11 creditors meeting was never concluded and therefore the 30-day period specified in Rule 4003(b) never started, and second, because conversion of the case to chapter 7 afforded the Trustee and creditors a new 30-day period to object to the Debtor’s exemption claims. For the reasons noted below the Court concludes that the Trustee is correct and that his objection to the Debtor’s exemption claims was timely and effective.

Bankruptcy Rule 4003 sets out the procedure for claiming exemptions as well as the time for objecting to the exemptions claimed. Sections (a) and (b) of Rule 4003 provide:

(a) Claim of Exemptions. A debtor shall list the property claimed as exempt under § 522 of the Code on the schedule of assets required to be filed by Rule 1007. If the debtor fails to claim exemptions or file the schedule within the time specified in Rule 1007, a dependent of the debtor may file the list within 30 days thereafter.
(b)- Objections to Claim of Exemptions. The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a), or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedule unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court. Copies of the objections shall be delivered or mailed to the trustee and to the person filing the list and the attorney for such person.

Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(a) and (b). The sole question in this case is when the 30-day period “after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a)” expired. 1 The difficulty in applying Rule 4003 arises from the fact that the Bankruptcy Code requires the United States Trustee (the “UST”) to convene creditors meetings under Rule 2003(a) both when a chapter 11 case is filed and later when it is converted to chapter 7. Bankruptcy Code §§ 341, 348(b). Read literally, therefore, Rule 4003 permits two 30-day periods during which objections may be made to exemptions claimed by a debtor.

Facts

The Debtor commenced this case on October 12, 1993, by filing a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The creditors meeting was convened on November 16, 1993, at a hearing under the aegis of the UST. The Debtor and his attorney attended that meeting. The UST’s representative stated on the record at the commencement of the hearing that “this meeting will be adjourned indefinitely, as is customary in all chapter 11 proceedings.” The representative repeated this admonition at the end of that day’s hearing. The Debtor did not object to the indefinite adjournment. The Debtor timely claimed exemptions in certain shares of stock, a checking account and in savings bonds. There was no objection to the claimed exemptions during the approximate six months that the ease stayed in chapter 11.

On May 12, 1994, the case was converted to chapter 7 and the UST appointed the Trustee as interim trustee. On June 18, 1994, the Trustee conducted the required chapter 7 creditors meeting. On June 29, 1994, the Trustee filed an objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemptions, well within the 30-day period specified in Rule 4003(b). Therefore, the Trustee’s objection was timely if Rule 4003(b) affords the Trustee the right to object following conclusion of the creditors meeting in the converted chapter 7 or if there never was a deadline for objections arising out of the chapter 11 creditors meeting because that meeting was never concluded.

It is undisputed that the chapter 11 creditors meeting was never formally concluded and that the UST’s representative stated *922 forcefully and publicly at the November 16, 1993, meeting that the chapter 11 creditors meeting was adjourned indefinitely. The Debtor argues, however, that the UST had no right to adjourn that creditors meeting, that the meeting should be deemed to have been concluded on November 16, 1993, for purposes of Rule 4003(b), and that 30 days thereafter the Debtor’s exemptions became absolute with no further right on the part of the Trustee in the converted chapter 7 proceeding to object.

This dispute was the subject of several hearings and the Trustee and the Debtor briefed their positions. The UST also filed a brief explaining his practice of continuing creditors meetings in chapter 11 cases. The Debtor was afforded the opportunity to respond to that brief but has not done so. The UST filed with his brief a transcript of the November 16, 1993, creditors meeting.

The Conclusion of the Chapter 11 Creditors Meeting

Under section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code the UST is charged with the responsibility of convening and presiding at a meeting of creditors in a bankruptcy case. The UST argues convincingly that this mandate carries with it the right to adjourn creditors meetings. Rule 2003(e) confirms the UST’s authority to adjourn a creditors meeting. It provides:

The meeting may be adjourned from time to time by announcement at the meeting of the adjourned date and time "without further written notice.

Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2003(e). Some question has been raised as to whether this language limits the UST to adjournments to a specific date announced at the meeting. This reading seems unduly' constrictive. The more natural meaning of the language is that if the date and time of an adjournment are announced at the meeting, no written notice need be given. See In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181,185 (Bankr.N.D.Okla.1990); In re Levitt, 137 B.R. 881, 883 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992). Moreover, an interpretation which limited adjournments to a specific future date would not necessarily avoid the potential for abuse by the UST or enhance the debtor’s rights. The UST could presumably continue a creditors meeting indefinitely simply by periodic adjournments to later dates. Therefore, the Court interprets the Debtor’s position to be that the UST must conclude a creditors meeting unless he has a specific reason not to adjourn it, which he announces at the meeting.

The Debtor, in effect, requests the Court to conclude that the UST’s general procedure in conducting chapter 11 creditors meetings is unreasonable per se. One bankruptcy court reached this conclusion in the context of a chapter 7 creditors meeting. In re Levitt, supra. In that case the chapter 7 trustee continued the creditors meeting indefinitely.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
175 B.R. 920, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2024, 1994 WL 724797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-havanec-ohnb-1994.