In re Hasson

37 Pa. D. & C.5th 97
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County
DecidedOctober 28, 2013
DocketNo. 1669 PR of 2012
StatusPublished

This text of 37 Pa. D. & C.5th 97 (In re Hasson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Hasson, 37 Pa. D. & C.5th 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

HERRON, J.,

On August 9, 2010, Bridget Hasson executed a power of attorney appointing her niece, Mary Bransfield, as her agent. Bridget, who is 85, had been employed as a nurse in Philadelphia for more than thirty years and owned a home at 1605 Frankford Avenue. In late 2011, she returned to Northern Ireland where she presently resides. On November 26, 2012, Rita Greene, on behalf of Bridget Hasson, filed a petition seeking an accounting by Mary Bransfield of her actions as the agent of Bridget Hasson.1 Ms. Bransfield filed an account on January 30, 2013 covering the period August 2010 through December 31, 2012. In response, Rita Greene filed objections to the account as well as a petition to remove Mary Bransfield as agent for Bridget Hasson.2 [99]*99In that petition, Rita Greene stated that on January 23, 2013, she had been appointed by Bridget Hasson as her agent under a durable power of attorney. Ms. Bransfield objected to the petition to remove her as agent, asserting, inter alia, that Ms. Greene has conflicts of interest that are adverse to Bridget Hasson.

A hearing was held on the objections to the account as well as the petition to remove Mary Bransfield as agent. Following that hearing, briefs were filed that identified the issue before this court as whether Bridget Hasson was legally competent in January 2013 to appoint Rita Greene as her agent to assist with the management of her financial affairs.3

Legal Analysis

Under Pennsylvania law, the “mental competency of a person who executes an instrument is presumed and the burden of proof is upon the person who alleges incompetency.” In re Meyers, 410 Pa. 455, 468, 189 A.2d 852, 858 (1963). These general principles have been applied in cases where the validity of a power of attorney is challenged:

Written instruments are not to be set aside except upon convincing testimony that their execution was tainted with fraud, either actual or constructive, or that the person so executing them did not have what the law considers sufficient mental capacity to do so...Contracts made with an incompetent before his adjudication as weak-minded are voidable and can be avoided only on [100]*100proper showing that he was incompetent at the time.... When mental competency is at issue the real question is the condition of the person at the very time... he executed the instrument.... Competence is best determined by a person’s words or acts. The testimony of persons who observed the alleged incompetent on the date in question is generally superior to testimony as to observations made prior to and subsequent to that date. Ordinarily competence is presumed, and the burden of proof is on the person who alleges the incompetence....
Kovalenko Estate, Fid.Rep. 2d 403, 407-08 (Carbon Cty. O.C. 2000), quoting Weir by Gasper v. Estate of Ciao, 521 Pa. 491, 502-03, 556 A.2d 819, 824 (1989) (citations omitted).

In general, courts encounter three classes of testimony as to competency: “(1) the testimony of those who observed the speech and conduct of the person on the day of execution of the instrument whose validity is challenged; (2) the testimony of those who observed the speech and conduct of the person a reasonable time before and after the day of execution of the instrument, (3) the testimony of those who never observed the speech and conduct of the person..” In re Meyers, 410 Pa. 455, 476, 189 A.2d 852, 862 (1963). The last class of testimony is given the least weight. Id.

The nature of the “competency” required for the execution of a valid document, moreover, can vary depending on the type of document at issue. In the case of releases, for instance, a court seeks to determine whether a person had an intelligent understanding of the release by focusing on such factors as (1) the mental and physical [101]*101condition of the signer; (2) the circumstances in which the release was obtained; (3) the amount paid for the release; and (4) the span of time between the accident and the signing of the release.” Taylor v. Avi, 272 Pa. Super. 291, 297, 415 A.2d 894, 897 (1979). In the case of trusts, in contrast, the requisite mental capacity to execute a trust has been defined as whether a person had an “ability to understand the nature and effect of the trust agreement.” In re Meyers, 410 Pa. at 471, 189 A.2d at 859. The mental capacity for executing a power of attorney has recently been refined by a tripartite analysis in In re Robinson, Incapacitated Person, 28 Fid. Rep. 2d 65 (Mont. Cty. O.C. 2008). In that case, Judge Stanley Ott concluded that at a minimum it was necessary to show that the principal who executed a power of attorney understood the following: (1) the authority he was giving to the agent; (2) the assets that would be subject to that authority, and (3) the plain language of the notice. Id. at 82. Where the mental capacity of someone who has executed a durable power of attorney is challenged, courts require that the lack of capacity be shown by clear and convincing evidence. In re McKinney, 27 Fid. Rep. 2d 359, 360 (Chester Cty. O.C. 2007).

Resolution of this threshold issue of whether Bridget Hasson was legally competent to appoint Rita Greene as her agent is severely handicapped in this case by the failure of Bridget Hasson herself to appear at the hearing. The task is further complicated by her residence since late 2011 in Northern Ireland. Since the account filed by Mary Bransfield states that Ms. Hasson has assets in excess of $600,000 in the United States, control over those assets raises serious concerns.

Instead of direct testimony by the principal, testimony [102]*102was presented by the two putative agents — Rita Greene and Mary Bransfield — as well as by Bridget’s niece Margaret Thompson. In addition, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of two reports by Dr. T. Flynn, a “consultant psychiatrist specializing in disorders of old age.”4 In the report dated February 8, 2012, Dr. Flynn diagnosed Ms. Hanson as having “significant anterograde short term memory deficits in the setting of a good social facade” which “is consistent with early Alzheimer dementia.” In more general terms, he noted “I felt at her initial appointment she was incapable of managing her finances correctly but she would be capable of instructing someone to act on her behalf as Enduring Power of Attorney.” Ex. P-6. In the report dated June 15, 2012, in contrast, Dr. Flynn likewise diagnosed Bridget with early Alzheimer dementia but concluded:

She has insight into her memory problems but has inadequate knowledge of her finances to make coherent decisions about them. She would be vulnerable to financial abuse...She lacks capacity to make decisions regarding her finances and her affairs, both in Ireland and in the U.S. These would need to be safeguarded. She is aware that her memory is poor and that her finances would need to be legally supervised.
Ex. P-7.

[103]*103Dr.

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Related

Weir by Gasper v. Estate of Ciao
556 A.2d 819 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Taylor v. Avi
415 A.2d 894 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1979)
Girsh Trust
410 Pa. 455 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1963)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 Pa. D. & C.5th 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hasson-pactcomplphilad-2013.