In re Hamer
This text of 537 S.E.2d 552 (In re Hamer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is a judicial disciplinary matter. Respondent served as a Municipal Court Judge for the town of Sellers and is charged with misconduct. The hearing panel recommended Respondent be publicly reprimanded and enjoined from holding a judicial position in the future. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Panel.
Respondent has never been licensed to practice law in South Carolina. She is an attorney formerly licensed in California who resigned from the California bar as a result of a disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to respond to these charges. Thus, the Panel held respondent in default. Re[439]*439spondent has not filed anything with this Court since the filing of the formal charges.1
Respondent was indicted on May 5,1999, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, for among other things, credit card fraud, supplying false tax returns, false employment information, and false social security numbers in applying for a loan, filing false federal income tax returns, mail fraud, and money laundering. The Court placed respondent on interim suspension on June 4, 1999. On September 28,1999, respondent filed a petition with this Court seeking to lift the interim suspension. In her petition, respondent stated the jury had acquitted her on the federal charges on September 24, 1999. On September 24, 1999, however, respondent had been found guilty of all charges in the indictment.
Respondent’s conviction of these federal crimes constitute “serious crimes” as defined in Rule 2(z), of Rule 502, SCACR, and are crimes of moral turpitude.2 Thus, respondent’s convictions of these federal charges are grounds for discipline under Rule 7(a)(3), Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 502, SCACR.3 Further, under the Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement, respondent is in default and is deemed to have admitted all allegations in the two complaints served upon her. Rule 24, Rule 502, SCACR; In re Thornton, 327 S.C. 193, 489 S.E.2d 198 (1997). Accordingly, the charges of misconduct against respondent are deemed [440]*440admitted and we must determine only the appropriate sanction.
We conclude respondent has violated Rule 7(a)(1) and (2) of the Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 502, SCACR, for the California misconduct and failing to respond to the investigation.4 Further, respondent has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR (Canons 1, 2, and 4).5 Respondent no longer holds the position of municipal court judge. For this reason, we publicly reprimand respondent, the maximum sanction we may impose. In addition, respondent shall not seek future appointment to any judicial office within the unified judicial system of South Carolina unless authorized by this Court.
PUBLIC REPRIMAND AND INJUNCTION.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
537 S.E.2d 552, 342 S.C. 437, 2000 S.C. LEXIS 202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hamer-sc-2000.