In Re Hagel

171 B.R. 686, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 271, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2207, 1994 WL 477273
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana
DecidedAugust 31, 1994
Docket19-60214
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 171 B.R. 686 (In Re Hagel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Hagel, 171 B.R. 686, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 271, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2207, 1994 WL 477273 (Mont. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN L. PETERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

In this Chapter 13 case the Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”) has objected to confirmation of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan on the grounds it fails to satisfy the “disposable income” test of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) by failing to include $914 per month in exempt social security disability income when determining the amount of payments to be made under the Plan. 1 The Debtors respond that the objection must be overruled as a matter of law since the social security disability income is exempt and thus cannot be disposable income. The objection is sustained and confirmation is denied.

After due notice a hearing on confirmation of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Plan was held at Billings on August 9, 1994. The Debtors appeared and requested time in which to file a response to the Trustee’s objection. No testimony or exhibits were admitted into evidence. The Court granted the Debtors time in which to file a memorandum of law, and took the matter under advisement. After review of the Debtors’ memorandum, the record, and the applicable law this matter is ready for decision.

At issue is whether the Debtors’ exempt social security disability income may be considered in applying the disposable income test under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) and 1325(b)(2)(A). 2 This Court holds it may be considered, adopting the reasoning of In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993), and In re Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr.E.D.Wash.1994).

The Debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition on March 2, 1994, together with Statements and Schedules. The Schedules list a secured claim in the amount of $42,985 which fully encumbers the Debtors only real property, their homestead. Scheduled unsecured claims total $69,001. Comparison of the Schedules shows that, with the possible exception of the Debtors’ dog, all personal property is claimed as exempt. Schedule I lists current income in the amount of $1,706. 3 *688 Schedule J lists expenses in the amount of $1,649, leaving a monthly surplus of $57, $50 of which the Debtors propose to pay under the Chapter 13 Plan filed March 2, 1994.

Under their Plan the Debtors propose to pay $50 per month for 36 months, or $1,800 which after deduction of the Trustee’s fee represents a dividend to unsecured creditors of less than three percent (3%). The Trustee objects to confirmation because the Debtors fail to commit all of their disposable income to make payments under the Plan as required by § 1325(b)(1)(B). The Debtors argue that 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) exempts their social security benefits from any claim of creditor or trustee or bankruptcy law, and thus such income cannot be disposable income, citing NCNB Financial Services, Inc. v. Shumate, 829 F.Supp. 178, 180 (W.D.Va.1993).

NCNB is not a bankruptcy case and is thus of little value in deciding this issue. While § 407(a) may make social security benefits not subject to attachment, levy, or garnishment, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law, it must be remembered that these Debtors voluntarily seek adjustment of debts under Chapter 13. In order to enjoy the benefits of Chapter 13 they must satisfy its requirements, and may not justify the failure to satisfy the confirmation requirements of § 1325 simply by invoking § 407(a). The Court will construe the statutes in a manner so as to give effect to them all where possible.

'While it is true that in a Chapter 7 ease a bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over and cannot administer exempt property because such property could not “conceivably have any effect” on the estate, In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, (9th Cir.1994) (citing In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir.1988)), in the instant case neither the Trustee nor this Court seek to administer exempt property. 4 The issue is simply a matter of whether the Debtors’ Plan satisfies the disposable income confirmation requirement of § 1325(b)(1)(B).

Section § 1322(b)(8) provides that a plan may “provide for the payment of all or part of a claim against the debtor from property of the estate or property of the debtor.” Schnabel, 153 B.R. at 813; In re Tomasso, 98 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1989). Debtors’ memorandum cites no bankruptcy case law in opposition to the Trustee’s argument that the exempt social security income should be included in the disposable income test of § 1325(b).

Applying the disposable income test of § 1325(b)(1)(B), Debtors’ Schedule J shows that their monthly expenses total $1,649. Schedule I shows that they have net income from Ken Hagel’s employment of $1,706, not including the exempt social security disability income. If, as the Trustee argues, the Debtors receive $914 per month in exempt social security disability income, the Debtors may use that income to pay for their living expenses as it is intended, thus freeing their nonexempt income to make payments under the Plan.

In their Chapter 13 Plan the Debtors submit the “future earnings and other income ” to the Trustee. (Emphasis added). They did not reserve their exempt income from their Plan. They will not be permitted to shelter nonexempt income under the guise that it is “reasonably necessary to be expended ... for [their] maintenance or support” without first applying their exempt income to that end. § 1325(b)(2)(A).

*689 While under Chapter 7 debtors are entitled to retain their exempt assets, under Chapter 13 they may keep all their assets, exempt or not, in return for repayment of creditors out of future income. Schnabel, 158 B.R. at 817. In return, this Court has adopted the standard discussed in Schnabel that a debtor’s exempt income must be included when determining “disposable income.” Id.; Matter of Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1984); Matter of Toff, 10 B.R. 101 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981). “Allowing debtors with exempt income to exclude it from the amount they are required to pay under a Chapter 13 plan would thwart the legislative intent that consumer lenders be able to look to the debtor’s future income as a basis for consumer loans.” Id. at 818.

The Debtors voluntarily filed a Chapter 13 petition, and nothing in this opinion or Schnabel stands for the proposition that debtors may be forced to pay exempt income which is “reasonably necessary to be expended — (A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,” to creditors under a plan. § 1325(b)(2)(A).

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Bluebook (online)
171 B.R. 686, 34 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 271, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2207, 1994 WL 477273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hagel-mtb-1994.