In Re Hagan

145 B.R. 515, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, 1992 WL 248898
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedSeptember 18, 1992
Docket19-50044
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 145 B.R. 515 (In Re Hagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Hagan, 145 B.R. 515, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, 1992 WL 248898 (Va. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACKWELL N. SHELLEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Trustee’s Amended Application for Compensation filed on October 22, 1991. Upon consideration of the Trustee’s Amended Application and after evidence and argument, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Marcia L. Hagan (“Hagan” or “debtor”) filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition under 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (“Bankruptcy Code”) on March 6, 1990. Kevin R. Huen-nekens (“Trustee”), the Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of the debtor, was appointed on March 14, 1990, as Interim Trustee and subsequently confirmed as Trustee at the § 341 meeting of creditors held on April 11, 1990.

The Trustee’s Amended Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses seeks reimbursement for $1,458.85 of itemized expenses, including $1,236 for an expense item labeled “F. Paralegal Support.” Time sheets submitted with the application document costs of paralegal time in excess of $1,236. Under the heading “Professional Services Rendered,” the Itemized Time Sheets reveal that the Trustee charged the bankruptcy estate for paralegal time in making phone calls, dealing with potential purchasers of real estate, conferring with the Trustee on a plan for administering the bankruptcy case, drafting a real estate sales contract, and drafting motions, legal notices, and complaints.

The Trustee also seeks full statutory compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 326 in the amount of $2,072.66. The Trustee never obtained Court approval for the appointment of an attorney or paralegal to assist the Trustee in carrying out the Trustee’s duties.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Answering the controversial question of whether a this Court can reimburse the Trustee for the expenses of paralegal services requires a discussion of the interplay between sections 330, 326, and 327 of the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history surrounding Congress’ intent on the issue, and case law relevant to the particular facts in this case. According to the Code, section 330 provides for compensation to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person, or to the debtor’s attorney. Since the Trustee seeking compensation is certainly neither an examiner nor the debtor’s attorney, but has submitted Itemized Time Sheets in the nature of an Application for Compensation of a Professional Person, the Court will analyze the statutes of the Code that provide for the reimbursement of the expenses of paralegals employed by a trustee and by a professional person.

*517 1. Section 330 Compensation to Trustees for Expense of Paralegal

Although 11 U.S.C. § 330 by its plain meaning authorizes the trustee to utilize paraprofessionals in case administration, the trustee cannot recover the cost of employing the paraprofessional beyond the limit 11 U.S.C. § 326 places on the trustee’s compensation. In re Berglund Construction Co., Inc., 142 B.R. 947 (Bankr.E.D.1992). Title 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) plainly states that an award of compensation is “subject to [11 U.S.C.] § 326.” Section 326 sets the maximum limits allowed in compensation to a trustee for trustee duties. The court in Berglund Construction held that §§ 326 and 330 must be considered together to determine whether a trustee can request compensation for a paralegal in excess of the trustee’s statutory limit.

In that case, the United States Trustee objected to the Chapter 7 trustee’s application for additional compensation in excess of the § 326 limit for services rendered by a paralegal. The objection argued that the services rendered by the paralegal, preparing interim reports and reconciling estate accounts, were in the nature of standard trustee duties and therefore subject to the limitations of § 326(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee argued that § 326 only limited the compensation of his personal services, and that § 330(a)(1) authorized a trustee to employ and the estate to separately compensate a paralegal.

The court in Berglund Construction found the statutory language to be clear and unambiguous on its face, and relied on traditional methods of statutory analysis to ascertain its meaning. Along with a look to the plain language of a statute, another fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that a specific statute will prevail over a general statute. In re Berglund Construction, 142 B.R. at 949. The court found section 330 to be a general statute governing the compensation of trustees, examiners, and other professionals. Section 330(a)(1) 1 treats the services of paraprofessionals separately from the services of a trustee and permits the court to award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee, ... and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee....” Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (emphasis added); In re Berglund Construction, 142 B.R. at 949.

However, 11 U.S.C. § 330 plainly states “... and subject to section 326.” Section 326 specifically limits the compensation awarded to a trustee. Even though 11 U.S.C. § 330 provides generally for the employment and compensation of a paralegal by a trustee, it will not be held to prevail over the specific language in 11 U.S.C. § 326 which limits the trustee to his statutory compensation. The court held that neither professionals nor paraprofessionals may be separately compensated for performing trustee duties beyond the limits of 11 U.S.C. § 326. In re Berglund Construction, 142 B.R. at 949.

This Court and the court in Berglund Construction recognize that courts reached the opposite conclusion in In re Orthopaedic Technology, Inc., 97 B.R. 596 (Bankr.D.Colo.1989) and Cavazos v. Simmons, 90 B.R. 234 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1988). In each of these cases, the court concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 326 did not limit the compensation of a paraprofessional employed by a trustee. The court in Berglund Construction refused to follow the decisions in Cavazos and Orthopaedic, which depended on the statutory interpretation that 11 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
145 B.R. 515, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, 1992 WL 248898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-hagan-vaeb-1992.