In re G.V.

2021 IL App (3d) 190566-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 11, 2021
• Docket: 3-19-0566
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 190566-U

Order filed April 30, 2021 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

In re G.V., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, a Minor ) Will County, Illinois. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal Nos. 3-19-0566, 3-19-0570 ) Circuit No. 15-JA-152 v. ) ) Vincinte V. and Sarah N., ) The Honorable ) Paula A. Gomora, Respondents-Appellants). ) Judge, presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment. Justice Holdridge specially concurred. _____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: In an appeal in a juvenile neglect case, the appellate court found that: (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by admitting certain State exhibits into evidence at the new adjudicatory hearing that was held on the original neglect petition following a remand in this case; (2) the respondent mother could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling, which granted the State leave to immediately file another motion to terminate the respondents’ parental rights and caused a change in the minor’s permanency goal, because the trial court’s ruling in that regard was not a final and appealable order; and (3) the trial court did not err in again finding that the respondent father was a dispositionally unfit parent after a new dispositional hearing had been held following remand. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 The State filed a juvenile petition alleging that the minor child, G.V., was a neglected

minor and seeking to make the child a ward of the court. After hearings were held, the trial court

found that the child was a neglected minor and that the child’s parents—respondents, Vincinte V.

and Sarah N.—were dispositionally unfit parents. The trial court made the child a ward of the

court and named the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as the child’s

guardian. Several months later, the State filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights

to the minor, which the trial court granted after holding hearings on the matter. On appeal, this

court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to hold a new

adjudicatory hearing on the initial neglect petition. In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶ 34.

The trial court did so and again found that G.V. was a neglected minor. A new dispositional

hearing was held, and the trial court again found that respondents were dispositionally unfit

parents, again made G.V. a ward of the court, and again named DCFS as G.V.’s guardian. In

addition, as the dispositional hearing was concluding, the trial court granted, over respondents’

objections, the State’s request for leave to immediately file another motion to terminate

respondents’ parental rights to the minor. Respondents appeal, arguing that the trial court erred

on remand by: (1) admitting certain State exhibits into evidence at the new adjudicatory hearing

on the neglect petition; (2) granting the State leave to immediately file another motion to

terminate respondents’ parental rights at the conclusion of the new dispositional hearing; and (3)

again finding that Vincinte was a dispositionally unfit parent. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

2 ¶4 Respondents, Sarah and Vincinte, were the biological parents of the minor child, G.V.,

who was born in November 2015. Shortly after G.V.’s birth, DCFS took protective custody of

the minor based upon a hotline call it had received from a caseworker in a parallel agency in

Connecticut, where Sarah had previously lived. The information that DCFS had received was

that Sarah's two other minor children (J.A. and A.V.) had been removed from her care, that

Sarah’s oldest child (J.A.) lived with the child's father, and that Sarah's rights to her middle child

(A.V.) were in the process of being terminated by the court in Connecticut. The information

provided to DCFS also indicated that Sarah's father, with whom Sarah was living in Illinois, had

lost his parental rights to her when she was a child due to physical and sexual abuse.

¶5 After DCFS took protective custody of G.V., the State filed a juvenile petition in the trial

court seeking to have G.V. found to be a neglected minor and made a ward of the court. The

petition alleged that G.V.’s environment was injurious to his welfare. Respondents were given

court-appointed attorneys to represent them in the juvenile-court proceedings.

¶6 On May 4, 2016, the initial adjudicatory hearing was held on the juvenile neglect

petition. During the hearing, the trial court allowed the State, over respondents’ objections, to

admit into evidence as an indicated report the entire DCFS investigatory report regarding G.V.,

which apparently showed that Sarah’s two other minor children (J.A. and A.V.) had been

removed from her care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in Connecticut and

that Sarah had not completed the services required to rectify the conditions for removal. In

addition, at the time of the initial adjudicatory hearing, the biological father, Vincinte, had not

yet established his paternity of G.V. Based upon the indicated report and the status of Vincinte,

the trial court found that G.V.’s environment was injurious to his welfare and that G.V. was a

neglected minor.

3 ¶7 In July 2016, a dispositional hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial

court found that respondents were unfit parents. The written dispositional order indicated that

Sarah was found unfit because she needed to comply with all recommended services and that

Vincinte was found unfit because he had not completed an integrated assessment and had not

filed a paternity case as to G.V. The trial court made G.V. a ward of the court and named DCFS

as G.V.’s guardian. The permanency goal was set for G.V. to be returned home within 12

months.

¶8 Over the next several months, two permanency review hearings were held. After the

second permanency review hearing, the trial court found that respondents had not made

reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward the return home of G.V.

¶9 In August 2017, the State filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights to G.V.

After hearings were held, the trial court granted the State’s motion and terminated respondents’

parental rights to the minor. Respondents appealed.

¶ 10 In October 2018, on appeal, this court found that the trial court had erred in admitting the

entire DCFS investigatory report into evidence at the initial adjudicatory hearing on the neglect

petition. G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶ 34. 1 In reaching that conclusion, this court noted,

among other things, that: (1) the investigatory report that was admitted into evidence contained a

substantial amount of information that was unverified and lacked any supporting documentation;

(2) the DCFS investigator did not testify at the adjudicatory hearing; (3) the DCFS witness who

did testify at the adjudicatory hearing was a placement supervisor who was familiar with the case 1 In its opinion, this court did not clearly indicate how at that stage of the proceedings—an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to terminate parental rights—it was able to consider and rule upon an error that was made at the initial adjudicatory hearing more than two-years earlier, although the opinion seems to imply that the trial court may not have properly admonished respondents as to their appeal rights following the dispositional ruling on the neglect petition. See G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶¶ 7, 10, 38; see also In re Ay. D., 2020 IL App (3d) 200056, ¶¶ 40-41 (declining to follow the decision in G.V. as it related to jurisdiction). 4 file but had not participated in the investigation; (4) other than testifying that the exhibit was a

true and accurate copy of the investigatory report and that it qualified as an indicated report, the

DCFS witness that testified provided no other foundation and did not explain whether DCFS had

received the files from the Connecticut agency or was relying on the phone conversations

between caseworkers; (5) there was no detailed explanation of the Connecticut findings or a

certified copy of them; (6) there was no explanation of the services Sarah was required to

complete in Connecticut or her progress in those service tasks; and (7) the information from the

investigatory report was provided and accepted without any verified basis in the record. Id. ¶¶

30-32. This court stated that the proper remedy was “to vacate all orders entered on and after the

May 4, 2016, adjudicatory hearing and [to] begin anew with the wardship proceedings.” Id. ¶

34.

¶ 11 In August 2019, following the remand, the trial court held another adjudicatory hearing

(the remand adjudicatory hearing, the remand hearing, or the current hearing) on the original

neglect petition that the State had filed. Sarah and Vincinte were both present in court for the

hearing and were represented by their court-appointed attorneys. At the outset of the hearing,

during the opening statements, the attorneys and the trial court discussed the parameters of the

prior remand and the concerns that this court had expressed in its decision regarding the evidence

that had been admitted in the previous adjudicatory hearing. The State told the trial court that it

was going to “fix” those problems in the current adjudicatory hearing.

¶ 12 During the hearing, the State presented the testimony of two witnesses and sought to

admit three documentary exhibits into evidence. The first exhibit, People’s Exhibit No. 3

(People’s Exhibit No. 3 or Exhibit 3), was a three-page portion of the DCFS investigatory report

regarding G.V. The first page of the exhibit was the allegation page of the investigatory report.

5 The allegation in this particular case was that G.V. was at a substantial risk of physical

injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect. Sarah was listed as the alleged

perpetrator in the report, and G.V. was listed as the alleged victim. The allegation finding was

listed as “[i]ndicated.” As for the evidence suggesting that an incident had occurred and that the

alleged perpetrator was responsible, the first page of the exhibit stated that: (1) DCFS had

received a report that Sarah had lost custody of two of her children, one of whom for which

Sarah had been declared unable to care; (2) a petition to relinquish Sarah’s parental rights and for

her second child to be adopted was filed in court in Connecticut; and (3) Sarah was provided

with services in Connecticut but was unable to adequately care for her child, even with those

services. With regard to the allegation rationale, the first page of the exhibit stated, among other

things, that based upon Sarah’s history of failure to adequately care for her oldest child, her

failure to comply with services to retain custody of her oldest child, and her inability to

demonstrate that she could adequately parent either child even with services provided, the

newborn baby, G.V., would have been placed in real and significant danger of physical injury.

¶ 13 The second page of Exhibit 3 referred to an allegation that had been made as to Sarah’s

father that allegedly put G.V. in substantial risk of sexual abuse. That allegation was determined

to be “[u]nfounded.” The evidence section (both the evidence that supported and contradicted

the allegation) on that page of the report stated that: (1) Child Protective Services in Connecticut

had reported that Sarah’s father had sexually and physically abused Sarah as a child and that

Sarah was removed from her parents’ custody as a child for that reason; (2) Sarah’s father denied

that he had sexually abused anyone; and (3) G.V. was never in Sarah’s father’s presence

unsupervised since G.V. was removed from the hospital and placed into care. As for the

allegation rationale, page two of the exhibit stated that the allegation was determined to be

6 unfounded because there was no evidence that G.V. had been put in substantial risk of being

sexually abused by Sarah’s father since G.V. was removed from Sarah’s custody at the hospital

and was not in Sarah’s father’s care. A separate section on page two of the exhibit contained a

detailed description of the incident information. That description stated, among other things, that

Sarah had fled from Connecticut to avoid having G.V. removed from her care and that the recent

concerns about Sarah in Connecticut were that Sarah had severe mental health issues, cognitive

limitations, and a history of domestic violence, and that Sarah did not have the capacity to safely

parent G.V.

¶ 14 The third page of Exhibit 3 contained a listing of important names, dates, and other

information with regard to the DCFS case, such as the name of the minor, the name of the DCFS

worker who had taken protective custody of the minor, and the date that protective custody was

taken.

¶ 15 The State’s second exhibit, People Exhibit No. 2 (People’s Exhibit No. 2 or Exhibit 2),

consisted of copies of two adjudicatory/dispositional orders from the Connecticut court cases.

The first order was entered in December 2014 and indicated that Sarah’s oldest child, J.A. (born

in March 2011), was found to be a neglected minor in February 2014 and that guardianship of

J.A. was given to the minor’s father, Christopher A. The order contained a statement at the end

or bottom of the order signed by a clerk and dated October 2018 stating that it was a true copy of

the order and that it had been mailed to the Commissioner of Children and Families

(Commissioner). The second order was signed in May 2016 and indicated that Sarah had

knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights as to her middle

child, A.V. (born in June 2014), and that her parental rights were, therefore, terminated. The

7 order contained a statement at the end or bottom signed by a clerk and dated October 2018

stating that it was a true copy of the order and that it had been mailed to the Commissioner.

¶ 16 The State’s third exhibit, People’s Exhibit No. 1 (People’s Exhibit No. 1 or Exhibit 1),

was the report from a psychological evaluation that had been completed on Sarah in July 2014 as

part of the juvenile court proceedings in Connecticut. The evaluation had been conducted by a

licensed psychologist. Attached to the front of the evaluation report was a certification of

records, which had been made pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018)) and was signed by the Director of Medical

Records (in this case, the psychologist who had conducted the evaluation).

¶ 17 The psychological evaluation report was lengthy and contained a vast amount of

information, including information about Sarah’s childhood and her relationship with her

parents, the agency and court involvement in Sarah’s and her children’s lives, Sarah’s

involvement with the fathers of her children, Sarah’s mental health, and certain other matters.

As for Sarah’s childhood, the report indicated that Sarah was born in 1988 and had spent most of

her childhood in the foster-care system after her mother had accused Sarah’s father of molesting

Sarah, an allegation that Sarah’s father denied. Sarah had graduated from high school but had

never held a job and supported herself with government assistance and occasional money from

her mother. Sarah did not get along well with her mother but talked to her mother on the phone

almost every day. Sarah’s father’s parental rights had been terminated when she was two years

old, and she had not seen her father since that time, although she had talked to him in the past.

¶ 18 With regard to the agency and court involvement in Sarah’s and her children’s lives, the

report indicated that at the time of the psychological evaluation, Sarah had two children: J.A.,

who was born in March 2011 and was three-years old; and A.V., who was born in June 2014 and

8 was five-weeks old. Neither child was currently in Sarah’s care, although she did have visits

with the children. The Connecticut DCF became involved with Sarah’s family shortly after J.A.

was born when the hospital reported that Sarah and J.A.’s father, Christopher, had not shown an

ability to adequately care for J.A.’s basic needs. J.A. was removed from Sarah and Christopher’s

care, was returned home almost a year later, and was removed again in February 2014 because of

safety concerns.

¶ 19 In June 2014, Sarah’s middle child, A.V., was born. DCF took custody of A.V. at the

hospital because the agency already had custody of Sarah’s other child, J.A. Sarah did not know

that it was standard for DCF to take other children away and told the evaluator that DCF had

kidnapped A.V. At the time of the psychological evaluation, Sarah believed that Vincente was

A.V.’s father. Sarah told the evaluator that DCF refused to let A.V. go with Vincente and his

wife, Dani, because Vincente and Dani would not allow DCF to come to their house if A.V. was

there. DCF opened a case on Vincinte, Dani, and their children, which Sarah thought was done

to keep Vincinte and Dani from getting custody of A.V.

¶ 20 As for Sarah’s involvement with the fathers of her children, the psychological evaluation

report indicated that there had been a history of domestic violence in Sarah’s relationship with

Christopher (J.A.’s father). According to Sarah, during the four years that she and Christopher

were together, Christopher had pounded on her, had stepped on her head on the floor, had

choked her, had hit her, and had slammed her against a wall. Sarah remained in the relationship

because she did not want to take J.A. away from J.A.’s father (Christopher), as Sarah’s mother

had done to her when she was a child. Sarah left Christopher in about July 2013 because

Christopher had beaten Sarah and her mother. Sarah did not report the beating. Sarah stated

further that Christopher had raped her almost every day but that no one believed her. Sarah did

9 not report the things that Christopher had done because Christopher had threatened to kill her

and she was scared of Christopher. In August 2013, the police reported to DCF that Christopher

had been arrested for violating a restraining order that Sarah had obtained after she alleged that

Christopher had hit, punched, and choked her in J.A.’s presence.

¶ 21 Sarah was involved with Vincinte from October 2013 until March 2014 but was no

longer involved with him, thanks to DCF. According to Sarah, the social worker did not like

Vincinte or their relationship and told Sarah that her lifestyle was not appropriate for J.A. and

that it was not healthy for J.A. to be around Vincinte. Sarah disagreed and stated that J.A. loved

Vincinte, was very close to him, and called Vincinte “dad.” In addition, although Vincinte’s

wife, Dani, initially had a problem with the relationship, she eventually got used to it, loved J.A.,

and helped take care of J.A.

¶ 22 With regard to Sarah’s mental health, Sarah stated during her evaluation that she had

suffered from anxiety and depression all of her life. Sarah had previously been diagnosed with

manic episodes and generalized anxiety disorder but had not been consistent in participating in

treatment. According to Sarah, she was depressed because the state had custody of her children

and was upset because she was doing everything she was told to do, but the state was giving J.A.

to J.A.’s abusive father (Christopher). Sarah was not taking any medications at the time of the

psychological evaluation and refused to do so, stating that she had been on medications most of

her life, thanks to DCF. According to Sarah, DCF shoved pills down children’s throats so that

no one had to deal with the children’s issues. Sarah had attended therapy from November 2013

until April 2014. During about that same time period, DCF and other groups worked with Sarah

in her home. Concerns were noted in one instance where Sarah had allegedly become frustrated,

yelled at J.A., and pushed J.A. backwards. Additional concerns were expressed due to Sarah’s

10 continued yelling and lack of affection toward J.A. Concerns were also raised about the unsafe

conditions in Sarah’s home, with dirty diapers and garbage on the floor. Sarah did not view

those conditions as safety issues for J.A. Sarah also denied that she had pushed J.A. on the prior

occasion and stated that she had merely moved J.A. Sarah did not like counselors, did not find

counseling helpful, and did not say much or work on anything when she was in counseling.

Sarah had been in therapy since she was five years old and did not believe that she needed any

further treatment. Sarah was, however, scheduled to restart therapy in August 2014 with a new

counselor and was also scheduled to start parenting classes.

¶ 23 During the evaluation, a series of tests were conducted on Sarah. Results of some of the

testing indicated that Sarah had strong symptoms of dependency. Sarah was passive and highly

dependent on others to meet both tangible and emotional needs and found it difficult to be on her

own. Because of her strong dependency needs, it was difficult for Sarah to leave a relationship,

even if the relationship had very negative components. Sarah was likely to tolerate domestic

violence, substance abuse, and other negative aspects to a relationship, rather than leave and risk

being on her own. Her judgment with regard to relationships was poor. She was likely to allow

her children to be exposed to negative situations if she felt that she was receiving a benefit from

being in a particular relationship. As a result, Sarah had reported remaining in abusive or

emotionally-difficult situations and did not recognize that those conflictual situations were

harmful to her children.

¶ 24 Other results indicated that Sarah had significant issues around depression and anxiety

and that she possibly had posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Sarah looked at things in a

defeatist way and had, therefore, little motivation to try to make positive changes. She got little

pleasure from life and experienced chronic feelings of distress. Sarah believed that she had

11 gotten a raw deal from life and that people could not be trusted. Her family relationships were

strained and conflicted. She questioned the motives of those around her and mistrusted people.

Sarah tended to be withdrawn and isolated. She had likely difficulties with PTSD, panic

disorder, and possible psychosis. Sarah blamed much of her difficulty on others, which made it

more difficult for her to see the need for change on her part. She was angry with DCF and with

Christopher and saw them both as being the reason that she was unable to have her children.

¶ 25 Sarah was also emotionally reactive. She was easily angered, had insufficient control

over her emotions, and sometimes felt as though she might explode. Sarah could become

physically or verbally aggressive during times when she was feeling particularly stressed. She

was easily impatient with people and was prone to serious disagreements with those close to her.

It was difficult for Sarah to make decisions without a strong impact from her emotions, which

could lead to significant distress for children in Sarah’s care, as she minimized the need for her

to control her emotional expression.

¶ 26 Although Sarah clearly loved both of her children and wanted very much to be able to

raise them, she had only a limited understanding of her own ability to do so and of what changes

she needed to make in order to do so in a positive way. Sarah had very limited support and was

not particularly emotionally stable, in order to provide stability in her parenting. In the

evaluator’s opinion, Sarah needed long-term therapy to work on her mood and anxiety issues,

interpersonal relationships, judgment, and understanding of her children’s needs. Separate

domestic violence treatment and continued hands-on parenting training were also appropriate.

¶ 27 As noted above, in addition to the exhibits, the State presented two witnesses at the

remand adjudicatory hearing. The first witness that the State called to testify was DCFS

Administrative Case Reviewer LaTanya Hoskins. Hoskins testified that in November 2015,

12 while she was an investigator for DCFS, she was involved in an investigation regarding the

minor child, G.V., who was born earlier that same month. Hoskins’s investigation involved

conversations she had with the State of Connecticut. As a result of her complete investigation

into the matter, Hoskins indicated G.V.’s mother, Sarah, for substantial risk of physical injury

and environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect.

¶ 28 During her testimony, Hoskins was shown People’s Exhibit No. 3. Hoskins identified the

exhibit as the “allegation page” 2 of the DCFS investigatory report—the page where it stated

whether the allegation had been determined to be to be indicated or unfounded. In this particular

case, the allegation against Sarah was determined to be indicated. The indicated finding was

Hoskins’s finding at the time of the report and was still Hoskins’s finding as of the time of the

current hearing.

¶ 29 After Hoskins’s brief testimony about Exhibit 3, the State moved to admit the exhibit into

evidence. Vincinte’s attorney objected, claiming that additional documentation or verification

was required, and Sarah’s attorney objected on the basis of foundation. The trial court overruled

the objections and allowed the exhibit to be admitted into evidence.

¶ 30 Hoskins testified further that she had spoken to Sarah in 2015 on the day of the temporary

custody hearing. Sarah told Hoskins that what Hoskins had stated in court regarding Sarah’s

psychological evaluation in Connecticut was correct. According to Hoskins, People’s Exhibit

No. 3 was something that Hoskins had personally investigated, but at the temporary custody

hearing, Hoskin’s report had not yet been finished.

¶ 31 After Hoskins’s testimony concluded, the State moved to admit into evidence People’s

Exhibit No. 2, the adjudicatory/dispositional orders from the Connecticut court. The State told

2 It is unclear from the record whether Hoskins was identifying the first page or all three pages of the exhibit as the “allegation page.” 13 the trial court that the exhibit had a seal on it, stating, “you have to feel it, but there is a seal from

the State of Connecticut on here,” and represented to the trial court that the documents were

properly certified. Sarah’s attorney objected to admission of the exhibit, stating, in pertinent

part:

“Although I have seen the original and felt it, I don’t know how it works in the

State of Connecticut, but in Illinois, that would not be considered a certified

document. It should be an official stamp on there saying this is certified. I agree

it says it’s a copy of a court order from that time in Connecticut, but I don’t

believe this is a reasonable certification of the orders.”

Vincinte’s attorney also objected, stating that the orders were not relevant and material as to

Vincinte, and asked the trial court to only consider the orders for the purpose of deciding the case

as to Sarah. After listening to the parties’ arguments, the trial court overruled the objections and

admitted People’s Exhibit No. 2 into evidence.

¶ 32 The State also moved to admit into evidence People’s Exhibit No. 1, the certified copy of

Sarah’s psychological evaluation report. No objections were made, and the exhibit was admitted

into evidence.

¶ 33 Following the admission of all three exhibits, the State called Sarah to the witness stand.

Sarah testified that she was the mother of G.V., who was born in November 2015. Prior to

G.V.’s birth, Sarah lived in Connecticut. Sarah moved to Illinois in August 2015 when she was

about six months pregnant with G.V. In Illinois, Sarah lived with her grandfather and her father.

¶ 34 As a child, Sarah had been taken into care by the State of Connecticut when she was three

or four years old and had been a ward of that State until she was 19 or 20, when she signed

herself out of the system. During that entire time period, Sarah’s father did not regain custody of

14 Sarah. Prior to moving to Illinois, the last time that Sarah had contact with her father was in

2011 after J.A. was born.

¶ 35 While Sarah lived in Connecticut, she had two children (J.A. and A.V.). Sarah confirmed

that there had been domestic violence in the home when she was in a relationship with

Christopher (J.A.’s father) and admitted that she had not taken domestic violence counseling

because she did not think it was necessary.

¶ 36 Sarah initially believed that Vincinte was the father of A.V. Vincinte was present when

DCF took custody of A.V. and was initially part of the DCF case in Connecticut. DNA testing

later determined, though, that Vincinte was not A.V.’s biological father. Sarah denied during her

testimony that she had ever been in a relationship with Vincinte but admitted that she had

engaged in sexual relations with him. Sarah had lived in Vincinte’s house with Vincinte and his

wife for a two-week period to get away from her abusive ex-boyfriend (presumably Christopher).

Sarah had told Vincinte that she was pregnant with G.V. and had also told Vincinte that she was

moving to Illinois. Vincinte did not try to stop Sarah from moving because he wanted Sarah to

be away from her abusive ex-boyfriend. Sarah acknowledged during her testimony, however,

that she was no longer in a relationship with her ex-boyfriend when she moved to Illinois. Sarah

believed that Vincinte’s home in Connecticut was an appropriate placement for G.V.

¶ 37 According to Sarah, when she moved to Illinois, she was no longer involved with the

State of Connecticut with regard to her other two children and had been told that the cases were

done. Sarah had signed over her rights to A.V. because she was harassed by her lawyer and the

DCF worker and was told that she would never see A.V. again if she did not do so. Sarah was

required to attend counseling and parenting classes in Connecticut and initially indicated during

her testimony that she had been compliant with those services.

15 ¶ 38 When Sarah was confronted with the number of absences that she had in counseling, she

stated that she moved to Illinois and told the people in Connecticut that she would not be going

to counseling anymore. The State pointed out to Sarah that the counseling records dated back to

2014 and that Sarah had not left Connecticut until 2015. Sarah responded that the counselor had

lied and that she had gone to almost every one of her appointments. When asked by the State if

everyone lied with regard to her, Sarah responded, “[m]y entire case is a lie, if you want to be

technical.”

¶ 39 Upon being questioned further, Sarah indicated that she had gone to domestic violence

counseling on her own to learn how to deal with J.A.’s father. The State objected because no

discovery had been tendered to support that testimony, and Sarah’s attorney agreed that he did

not have any documentation regarding the matter. Sarah testified further that she did not have a

certificate or any other type of document showing that she had completed domestic violence

counseling in Connecticut and stated that the counselors in Connecticut did not give attendees

such documents. When Sarah was asked if she had a mistrust of the entire system, she stated, “I

don’t have enough words—I don’t have enough words in the world to explain all of the distrust I

have for this agency or any of these courtrooms.”

¶ 40 After calling Sarah to testify, the State rested its case. Neither Sarah nor Vincinte

presented any additional evidence. Following closing arguments, the trial court took its decision

under advisement until the following morning. The attorneys indicated that neither Sarah nor

Vincinte would be present in court for the court’s decision the next day. Vincinte had to fly back

to Connecticut, and Sarah had to take Vincinte to the airport. Sarah’s and Vincinte’s attorneys,

however, told the trial court that they would be present in court on behalf of their clients.

16 ¶ 41 At the resumed adjudicatory hearing the following day, the trial court announced its

decision. The trial court found that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

G.V.’s environment was injurious to his welfare and that G.V. was a neglected minor. The trial

court noted that its finding was supported by the testimony of Hoskins (the DCFS investigator),

the three exhibits admitted by the State, and the testimony of Sarah. The trial court commented

during its ruling that it was inferring that Sarah moved to Illinois to either avoid DCF in

Connecticut from taking G.V. or to avoid being required to do services in Connecticut that she

had not yet completed with respect to her two other minor children.

¶ 42 The next month (September 2019), the trial court held a dispositional hearing with regard

to G.V. Sarah and Vincinte were both present in court for the hearing and were represented by

their court-appointed attorneys. On motion of the State, the dispositional report and the service

plan were admitted into evidence without objection. Among other things, the dispositional

report indicated that both parents (Sarah and Vincinte) had certain services yet to complete; both

parents were currently cooperating with DCFS; and both parents were visiting with the minor,

either in person (Sarah) or by telephone (Vincinte). In addition, and of relevance to this appeal,

the service plan indicated that although Vincinte had no criminal history, his mental history and

financial stability were unknown to DCFS.

¶ 43 Sarah testified in her own behalf at the dispositional hearing and stated that the first time

she had seen that particular service plan was the morning of the dispositional hearing, although

the DCFS worker had discussed the service plan with her previously. Sarah confirmed, however,

that she knew what services were required.

¶ 44 Sarah also called the DCFS caseworker, Theresa Bruns, to testify. Bruns stated that she

had told Sarah the services that Sarah needed to complete. Sarah was asked to perform a

17 domestic violence counseling assessment, a psychological evaluation, and a parenting capacity

assessment (and, presumably, to comply with any recommendations that were made). Vincinte

was required to have an interstate compact home study completed. Although the paperwork for

the interstate compact had been filled out, the home study had not yet been done.

¶ 45 After all of the evidence had been presented, the attorneys made their closing arguments.

Of relevance to this appeal, Vincinte’s attorney argued that the trial court should find that

Vincinte was not unfit or should delay its ruling on the matter until DCFS had completed its

home study and had determined whether G.V. should be placed with Vincinte. In the alternative,

Vincinte’s attorney stated that he was “asking at least that there be a finding of unable at this

point and that we set the case for dispositional hearing—or permanency review.”

¶ 46 Following the completion of the arguments, the trial court made its ruling. The trial court

found that both respondents were dispositionally unfit and that it was in G.V.’s best interest to be

made a ward of the court. The trial court stated that the basis of its finding was that both

respondents had services yet to complete in their service plan and noted the services to which

Bruns had testified. In addition, with regard to Vincinte, the trial court commented that over the

past three years, there had been resistance to providing the names of the individuals who were

living in Vincente’s home and to providing background-check information. The trial court

indicated, although somewhat implicitly, that the permanency goal was to return the minor home

and noted that respondents’ visits with the minor were at the discretion of the agency but should

be frequent and liberal. A written dispositional order was later entered.

¶ 47 As the trial court was finishing announcing its ruling, the State asked leave to file another

motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights to G.V. and asked the trial court to set the

permanency goal to substitute care pending a court ruling on the termination motion. The State

18 pointed out to the trial court that the policy of DCFS under such circumstances was that visits

with the minor would take place only once per month. Respondents’ attorneys objected to the

State’s request for leave to file the termination motion. The trial court overruled the objections

and reminded respondents’ attorneys that they were free to file any motions they wanted with

regard to the State’s motion to terminate parental rights. The trial court also ruled, however, that

it was going to keep respondents’ visits with the minor at once a week for two hours as the court

had previously ordered.

¶ 48 Respondents filed separate appeals, and this court later consolidated those appeals for

appellate review on the motion of the minor.

¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 50 A. The Finding of Neglect and the Admission of Evidence at the Remand Adjudicatory Hearing

¶ 51 On appeal, Sarah argues that the trial court erred in finding that G.V. was a neglected

minor. Sarah asserts that the remand adjudicatory hearing did not conform to this court’s

mandate from the previous appeal. More specifically, Sarah contends that the trial court erred by

admitting the DCFS indicated report (People’s Exhibit No. 3) into evidence at the remand

hearing because the report contained inadmissible hearsay and lacked sufficient foundation (a

certification or verification statement) to be admitted as a business record. Sarah contends

further that the trial court also erred by admitting the adjudication/disposition orders from

Connecticut (People’s Exhibit No. 2) into evidence at the remand hearing because the orders did

not contain a proper certification or attestation to qualify as self-authenticating documents under

Illinois Rule of Evidence 902 (eff. Sept. 28, 2018). Finally, Sarah maintains that although her

psychological evaluation report from Connecticut (People’s Exhibit No. 1) was properly

admitted at the remand hearing as a business record, without the other two exhibits, the

19 evaluation lacked a “predicate” and became mere speculation. For all of the reasons stated,

Sarah asks that we reverse the trial court’s finding of neglect and that we dismiss this case

without remand.

¶ 52 As with Sarah, Vincinte also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its neglect

finding. Vincinte asserts that the trial court committed the same error at the remand adjudicatory

hearing that it had committed at the original adjudicatory hearing by admitting the DCFS report

into evidence as an indicated report under the hearsay exception (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(b) (West

2018)), even though the report contained a substantial amount of information that was unverified

and that lacked any supporting documentation. According to Vincinte, the entire report was

merely a summary of the information that came from Connecticut, which this court previously

ruled was inadmissible hearsay. For that reason, Vincinte asks this court to again reverse the

trial court’s finding of neglect and, presumably, to remand this case for further proceedings.

¶ 53 The minor argues that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings at the remand adjudicatory

hearing were proper and that the trial court’s finding of neglect should be upheld. As for the

DCFS indicated report, the minor asserts that the evidence presented by the State at the remand

adjudicatory hearing rectified all of the concerns stated by this court in the prior appeal since the

investigator testified at the remand hearing about her investigation and her indication of the

hotline report, including her contact with Connecticut and her confirmation of the psychological

evaluation findings with Sarah at the temporary custody hearing. Furthermore, the minor insists,

much of the information contained in the indicated report was confirmed by Sarah’s own

testimony at the remand hearing and by the psychological evaluation report, which was admitted

into evidence. As for the court orders from Connecticut, the minor asserts that the record in this

case shows that during the remand adjudicatory hearing, both Sarah’s attorney and the Assistant

20 State’s Attorney represented to the trial court that the exhibit contained a raised seal and that

Vincente’s attorney did not make an objection to the exhibit on that basis. In addition, the minor

maintains, Evidence Rule 902 does not require that the signature on a sealed document be made

under oath. Finally, in the alternative, the minor asserts that even if the trial court erred in

admitting the two exhibits, any error that occurred was harmless because the trial court’s finding

of neglect was not against the manifest weight of the remaining, properly admitted, evidence.

For all of the reasons set forth, the minor asks, therefore, that we affirm the trial court’s finding

of neglect.

¶ 54 The State also argues that the trial court’s finding of neglect was proper and should be

upheld. The State asserts that the trial court properly admitted the DCFS indicated report into

evidence at the remand adjudicatory hearing, not for the truth of the matters asserted, but to show

the reasons that the DCFS investigation was started. Thus, the State contends that the remand

hearing entirely conformed with this court’s mandate from the previous appeal. As to the

adjudication/disposition orders from Connecticut, the State points out that Sarah’s attorney

acknowledged at the remand hearing that he could feel the raised seal on the document. The

State asserts, therefore, that any error in not submitting the original document as part of the

record in this appeal so that the presence of a raised seal could be proven must be construed

against Sarah and Vincinte as the appellants. The State asserts further that since the Connecticut

orders contained both a raised seal and an attestation that they were true and correct copies, the

documents complied with the self-authentication requirements of Evidence Rule 902(1) and were

properly admitted. In the alternative, the State maintains that even if the two exhibits (People’s

Exhibit Nos. 3 and 2) were admitted in error, the trial court’s finding of neglect should still be

upheld because the remaining evidence presented at the remand hearing was of such strength that

21 it overwhelmingly proved the neglect petition and made any error that occurred harmless. For all

of the reasons set forth, the State asks that we affirm the trial court’s finding of neglect.

¶ 55 Although a trial court’s finding of neglect in a juvenile proceeding will generally not be

reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence (see In re A.P., 2012

IL 113875, ¶ 17), in this particular case, the issue raised by the parties focuses upon the

admissibility of evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. A determination as to the admissibility of

evidence at an adjudicatory hearing rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In re A.W., Jr., 231 Ill. 2d 241, 256 (2008).

The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high one and will not be overcome unless it

can be said that the trial court's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no

reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. See Blum v. Koster, 235

Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009); In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008). In addition, even if the trial

court committed an abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence, a new trial should not be

ordered unless the trial court's erroneous ruling appears to have affected the outcome of the trial.

See Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460; Troyan v. Reyes, 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732-33 (2006); In re

J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 29 (recognizing that errors in the admission of evidence at an

adjudicatory hearing may be deemed harmless where ample evidence supports a trial court's

finding of neglect).

¶ 56 A wardship proceeding constitutes a significant intrusion into the sanctity of the family

and should not be undertaken lightly. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18. The primary consideration in

such a proceeding is the best interests of the minor involved, and the focus is on whether that

particular minor is neglected, not on whether the minor’s parents are neglectful. Id. ¶¶ 18-20. At

the trial level, the burden is on the State to prove the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of

22 the evidence. Id. ¶ 17. If the State fails in that burden, the neglect petition must be dismissed.

Id.

¶ 57 There is no fixed meaning for the term "neglect" but it has been generally defined as the

failure to exercise the level of care that is required under the circumstances, and it encompasses

both the willful and the unintentional disregard of parental duty. Id. ¶ 22. Pursuant to the Act,

neglect may be found where a minor's environment is injurious to his or her welfare. 705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018); A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22. In general, the term "injurious

environment" has been defined as the breach of a parent's duty to ensure a safe and nurturing

shelter for his or her children. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22. Like the term "neglect," however,

the term "injurious environment" does not have a fixed meaning and must be determined from

the unique facts of each particular case. See id.

¶ 58 "Under the anticipatory neglect theory, the State seeks to protect not only children who

are the direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to

neglect or abuse because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has

been found to have neglected or abused another child." In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 468

(2004). Evidence of abuse or neglect of one minor is admissible on the issue of the abuse or

neglect of any other minor for whom the parent is responsible. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West

2018). Such evidence, however, does not constitute conclusive proof of neglect of the minor in

question. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. Rather, in determining whether a particular minor is

neglected, a trial court should consider not only the circumstances surrounding the prior neglect

of that minor’s sibling or siblings but also the care and condition of the minor in question. Id.

When faced with evidence of prior neglect by a parent or parents, a trial court need not wait to

take action until after each particular minor suffers an injury. Id. at 477.

23 ¶ 59 At an adjudicatory hearing in a juvenile neglect proceeding, the trial court must

determine whether the minor is a neglected minor as alleged in the petition. See 705 ILCS

405/2-18(1) (West 2018); J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 18. The standard of proof and the

rules of evidence in the nature of civil proceedings generally apply in an adjudicatory hearing.

See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2018); J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 18. Although

hearsay may be admitted in a dispositional hearing, it may not be admitted in an adjudicatory

hearing, unless it falls within an exception under the Act. G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶ 28.

One such exception is provided for in section 2-18(4)(b) of the Act, the statute at issue here,

which allows any indicated report filed pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting

Act (325 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2018)) to be admitted into evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.

See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(b) (West 2018); J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 17; G.V., 2018 IL

App (3d) 180272, ¶ 27. Another relevant provision, Illinois Rule of Evidence 902 (eff. Sept. 28,

2018), allows for the self-authentication of certain domestic public documents that bear a seal,

such as the one that was allegedly present on People’s Exhibit No. 2 (the adjudication/disposition

orders from Connecticut).

¶ 60 In the present case, however, we need not determine whether the DCFS indicated report

(People’s Exhibit No. 3) or the adjudicatory/dispositional orders (People’s Exhibit No. 2) were

properly admitted into evidence at the adjudicatory hearing on the neglect petition because the

remainder of the evidence presented—the admissibility of which is not contested in this appeal—

overwhelmingly established that G.V. was a neglected minor. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)

(West 2018) (indicating that neglect may be found where a minor's environment is injurious to

his or her welfare); 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2018) (allowing evidence of abuse or neglect of

one minor to be admitted on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any other minor for whom the

24 parent is responsible); A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22 (setting forth the definition of an injurious

environment); Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468 (describing the anticipatory neglect theory); Leona

W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460 (recognizing that an error in the admission of evidence does not require a

reversal unless the error appears to have affected the outcome of the trial); Troyan, 367 Ill. App.

3d at 732-33 (same); J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 29 (same). Specifically, Sarah’s own

testimony established that she had two minor children in Connecticut who were removed from

her care by DCF for safety concerns; that care of the children had not been restored to Sarah,

even though she had been provided with services to help her improve her parenting skills; that

Sarah had not completed all of the services she had been given in Connecticut; that Sarah had

left Connecticut when she was about six months pregnant with G.V. and had moved to Illinois to

live with her grandfather and her father; that Sarah had been removed from her father’s care as a

child based upon allegations that her father had molested her; and that Vincinte knew that Sarah

was pregnant with G.V. and that she was moving to Illinois, but did not make any effort to try to

stop Sarah from doing so or to protect G.V.

¶ 61 The psychological evaluation report confirmed much of that information and provided

more detail. In addition, the psychological report established that Sarah had problems with

anxiety, depression, PTSD, and possibly psychosis. She was highly dependent on others to meet

her tangible and emotional needs, had difficulty ending even negative relationships, and did not

recognize that those conflictual situations were harmful to her children. She was emotionally

reactive, angered easily, and had insufficient control over her emotions. She could become

physically or verbally aggressive when stressed and had difficulty making decisions without a

strong impact from her emotions, which could lead to significant distress for children in Sarah’s

care, as she minimized the need for her to control her emotional expression. Sarah had very

25 limited support and was not particularly emotionally stable, in order to provide stability in her

parenting. Finally, although the psychologist who evaluated Sarah opined in the report that

Sarah needed long-term therapy to work on psychological issues and that domestic violence

treatment and continued hands-on parenting would also be appropriate for Sarah, there was no

indication that Sarah had successfully completed the recommended treatment.

¶ 62 In sum, after reviewing Sarah’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report, we

find that the neglect petition was overwhelmingly proven, even without consideration of the

State’s other exhibits. We, therefore, conclude that any error in the admission of the other

exhibits would not have affected the outcome of this case and was harmless. See Leona W., 228

Ill. 2d at 460; Troyan, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 732-33; J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 29.

Accordingly, we reject respondents’ challenge to the admissibility of the evidence at the remand

adjudicatory hearing and uphold the finding of neglect.

¶ 63 B. Sarah’s Challenge to the Filing of the Termination Motion and the Changing of the Permanency Goal

¶ 64 As her second issue on appeal, Sarah argues that the trial court erred in granting the State

leave to immediately file another motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights at the

conclusion of the new dispositional hearing on the initial neglect petition. Sarah asserts that the

trial court’s ruling deprived her of due process because it allowed the State to change the minor’s

permanency goal without prior notice having been given to Sarah and without a prior

permanency review hearing having been held. As the minor correctly notes, however,

permanency orders are temporary in nature and are not final and appealable orders. 3 In re S.B.,

3 The State argues that the trial court’s rulings, allowing the State to file the termination motion and changing the permanency goal of the minor, were proper. Because we have found that we do not have jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of this issue, we need not address the State’s argument further. 26 373 Ill. App. 3d 224, 226 (2007). We, therefore, have no jurisdiction to rule upon this issue and

accordingly dismiss it. See id.

¶ 65 C. Vincinte’s Challenge to the Finding of Parental Unfitness

¶ 66 As his second issue on appeal and the final issue to be addressed in this case, Vincinte

argues that the trial court erred in finding after the new dispositional hearing that he was an unfit

parent. Vincinte asserts that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because the finding of neglect

was based solely upon Sarah’s conduct and the State failed to present any evidence in the

dispositional hearing to establish that Vincinte was an unfit parent. Thus, Vincinte contends, that

the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof in the hearing to Vincinte to show that he

was a dispositionally fit parent, rather than requiring the State to prove that Vincinte was a

dispositionally unfit parent. In making that claim, Vincinte notes that although the trial court

based its finding on the fact that a home study had not yet been completed, no evidence was

presented by the State to establish when the home study was ordered, why the home study had

not yet been completed, or when the home study would be completed, and the trial court seemed

to just merely assume that those processes were addressed in a timely manner following the

remand in this case. For all of the reasons stated, Vincinte asks that we reverse the trial court’s

finding that he was a dispositionally unfit parent and, presumably, that we remand this case for

further proceedings.

¶ 67 The minor argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. The

minor asserts first that Vincinte’s challenge to the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness is

forfeited and moot because Vincinte’s attorney asked the trial court at the dispositional hearing

to find that Vincinte was “unable” to care for the minor, rather than “unfit,” and, therefore,

conceded that an order of wardship was appropriate in this case. Second, and in the alternative,

27 the minor asserts that the trial court’s dispositional finding was properly based upon the fact that

Vincinte had not yet completed services (the home study and the recommendations contained

therein) and had been resistant to facilitating the completion of services over the past 3½ years.

In making that assertion, the minor notes that contrary to Vincinte’s contention on appeal, the

finding of neglect was not based solely upon the conduct of Sarah but was also based upon

Vincinte’s failure to take action to try to prevent Sarah from leaving the State of Connecticut

with G.V. prior to G.V’s birth or to protect G.V. after G.V.’s birth. Thus, the minor contends

that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Vincinte at the dispositional

hearing and that the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness was not based upon “no evidence”

as Vincinte claims. For all of the reasons set forth, the minor asks that we affirm the trial court’s

finding that Vincinte was a dispositionally unfit parent.

¶ 68 The State also argues that the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness was proper and

should be upheld. The State asserts that the evidence presented at the dispositional hearing

showed that although Vincinte had been involved in this case for the past 3½ years and had been

put on notice by the neglect petition that his fitness would be at issue, he had only just started

cooperating with DCFS in late 2019 and was essentially an “unknown” to the agency. The State

asserts further that the finding of unfitness was Vincinte’s own fault since Vincinte’s refusal to

cooperate with DCFS over the past several years prevented DCFS from confirming whether

Vincinte’s home was an appropriate placement for the minor. For those reasons, the State asks

that we affirm the trial court’s finding that Vincinte was a dispositionally unfit parent.

¶ 69 A trial court’s dispositional finding of parental unfitness made pursuant to section 2-27 of

the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West 2018)) will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008). A trial court's

28 finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if it is clearly apparent from the

record that the trial court should have reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at 102, 104. Because

of the trial court’s position as trier of fact, deference is given to the trial court’s findings of fact

in a juvenile-neglect proceeding. Id.

¶ 70 Section 2-27 of the Act provides that a minor who has been adjudged a ward of the court

may be placed with someone other than his or her parents if the trial court determines that the

parents are either "unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone,

to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so, and that the health,

safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of

his or her parents." 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2018); In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245,

256-57 (2001). The standard of proof for a trial court’s section 2-27 finding of parental unfitness

that does not result in a complete termination of all parental rights is by a preponderance of the

evidence. April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 257. In making that determination, all relevant and

helpful evidence may be considered. 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2018); April C., 326 Ill. App.

3d at 261.

¶ 71 In the present case, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err

in finding that Vincinte was a dispositionally unfit parent. The evidence presented at the

dispositional hearing established that although Vincinte had no criminal history and was

currently cooperating with DCFS, he still had services left to complete (the home study and any

recommendations contained therein) and his mental and financial history were not yet known by

DCFS. In addition, as the trial court noted, during previous years in this case, Vincinte had

refused to provide background-check information to DCFS and had refused to provide DCFS

with information about who was living in his home. Thus, based upon the evidence presented at

29 the dispositional hearing, we find that the trial court's determination that Vincinte was an unfit

parent was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 102-04.

¶ 72 In reaching that conclusion, we decline to rule that Vincinte’s challenge to the trial

court’s parental unfitness finding was forfeited or moot on appeal, as asserted by the minor in

this case. Although in making his argument at the dispositional hearing, Vincinte’s attorney

requested that the trial court find, in the alternative, that Vincinte was “unable,” rather than

“unfit,” to care for the minor, the trial court made only a finding of parental unfitness. Thus, we

are not convinced that Vincinte conceded in the trial court that he was an unfit parent. Compare

In re Harriett L.-B., 2016 IL App (1st) 152034, ¶ 31 (indicating that the respondent mother’s

challenge to the parental unfitness determination was forfeited and moot on appeal where the

respondent mother conceded at the dispositional hearing that she was unable to care for the

minor, the trial court found that the respondent mother was both unable and unfit to care for the

minor, the respondent mother on appeal challenged only the parental unfitness finding and not

the finding that respondent mother was unable to care for the minor, and either finding would

have been sufficient to justify the trial court’s ruling).

¶ 73 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 74 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 75 Affirmed.

¶ 76 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:

¶ 77 I write separately to reiterate that this court failed to consider its jurisdiction to vacate the

adjudicatory and dispositional orders in G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, ¶ 34. See Ay.D., 2020

IL App (3d) 200056, ¶¶ 37-41. Since the respondents appealed following the termination of their

parental rights, which occurred well beyond 30 days after the dispositional order, the court only

30 had jurisdiction to vacate orders entered subsequent to the dispositional order. G.V., 2018 IL App

(3d) 180272, ¶ 45; see In re Z.M., 2019 IL App (3d) 180424, ¶ 50.

¶ 78 Despite the erroneous decision in G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272, I wholly agree with

the majority’s analysis and affirmance of the circuit court’s judgment in this case. In contrast to

the first appeal, this court now has jurisdiction to review the validity of the adjudicatory and

dispositional orders as the respondents appealed within 30 days of the court’s dispositional order.

See In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000).