In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIV; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIX

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided December 11, 2013·No. 12-06338·Unknown

Opinion

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO IN RE: CASE NO. 12-06338 GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE CHAPTER 11 TRUST Debtor © |TIN RE: CASE NO. 12-06339 GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE TRUST XIV CHAPTER 11 Debtor TIN RE: CASE NO. 12-06340 GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE 1] TRUST XIx CHAPTER 11 Debtor OPINION AND ORDER These three (3) cases are before the court upon the motion requesting reconsideration in each case of this Court’s Orders denying the GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE TRUST I, GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE TRUST XIV, and GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE XIV, and GULFCOAST IRREVOCABLE TRUST XIX (hereinafter referred to as the “Trusts” or “Debtors”) an evidentiary hearing based on the court’s ruling that the proffered facts, even if proven (or shown), do not establish that the Debtors are business trusts since they failed to satisfy the crucial test of whether the trust was created to transact business or a commercial activity for the benefit of a group of investors (Case No. 12-06338, Docket No. 101, Case No, 12-06339, Docket No. 100 and Case No. 12-06340, Docket No. 100). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for Westernbank Puerto Rico (hereinafter referred to as the “FDIC-R”) opposed the Debtors’ motion for reconsideration in all three (3) cases (Case No. 12- 06338, Docket No. 102, Case No. 12-06339, Docket No. 101 and Case No. 12-06340, Docket

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□□□ 101). For the reasons stated below the motions for reconsideration in all three (3) cases are hereby denied. Fed. R. Civ. P 59(e) A motion for reconsideration of an order or judgment is not recognized by the Federa Rules of Civil Procedure. In re Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. 212, 218 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1999) aff'd 2001 WL 958803 (1" Cir. 2001) (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F. 2d 1241, 1243 (10° g || Cir. 1991)). Federal courts treat such a motion as either a motion to alter or amend judgmen g || under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion for relief of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Thes two rules are distinct; they serve different purposes and produce different consequences. Whic rule applies depends essentially on the time a motion is served. If a motion is served withi fourteen (14) days of the rendition of judgment, the motion ordinarily will fall under Rule 59(e). If the motion is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b). Id. In the instant case, th Debtors’ motions for reconsideration were filed thirteen (13) days after the Orders for whic reconsideration was sought were entered. Therefore, the motion will be treated as one under □□□□ R. Civ. P. 59(e) made applicable here through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) authorizes the filing of a written motion to alter or amend judgment after its entry. The motion must demonstrate the “reason why the court shoul reconsider its prior decision” and “must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature” t /induce the court to reverse its earlier decision. Pabon Rodriguez, 233 B.R. at 218 (citation omitted). The movant “must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must presen newly discovered evidence.” Id. See also; BBVA v. Vazquez (In re Vazquez), 471 B.R. 752, 76 93 (B.A.P. Ist Cir. 2012), citing Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).The part cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to cure its own procedural failures or to introduce new evidenc ||or advance arguments that could and should have been presented originally to the court. Id| Generally, when a party is made aware that a particular issue will be relevant to its case but fail 97 produce readily available evidence pertaining to that issue, the party may not introduce tha

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evidence to support a Rule 59(e) motion. Id. Neither can the party use this motion to raise nove legal theories that it had the ability to address in first instance. Id. The federal courts hav consistently stated that a motion for consideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remed that must be used sparingly because of interest in finality and conservation of scarce judicia resources. Id. In practice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions are typically denied because of th narrow purposes for which they are intended. Id. Debtors’ Arguments & Discussion The court in its June 20, 2013 Order held that: “...an evidentiary hearing is not necessary ] as the proffered facts, even if established, do not establish that the Debtors are business trusts since they fail to satisfy the crucial test of whether the trust was created to transact business or }|commercial activity for the benefit of a group of investors. See In re Medallion Realty Trust, 103 B.R. 8, 9-10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) aff'd, 120 B.R. 245 (D. Mass. 1990).” (Case No. 12-06338, Docket No. 98, Case No. 12-06339, Docket No. 97 and Case No. 12-06340, Docket No. 97). Th Debtors argue that the court: “...failed to take into account multiple factors that support sai }|conclusion. Furthermore, Debtors respectfully understand that the Court placed undue emphasis on criteria that bear no relevance in the proper evaluation of whether the trusts are business trust || or not.” (Case No. 12-06338, Docket No. 102, Case No. 12-06339, Docket No. 101 and Case No| 12-06340, Docket No. 101). The Debtors further argue that: (i) “...to qualify as a business trus the operations of the Trusts need not be undertaken on a for profit basis. Thus, the test is whethe the Debtors generate income or not, but rather if they are engaged in business;” (1i) “Debtors ar not passive owners or holders of shares of certain corporations but rather actively participate i business affairs';” and (iii) “...by perfecting the necessary financing to facilitate the operations ' The Debtors argue that they engage in the following business activities: “(a) [s]election of the type of projects to develop, i.e.; commercial (retail or office) or residential (multi-family or single family); (b) [rleview appropriate market areas in Puerto Rico to develop the projects. Locate a specific suitable property for the development; (c) [p]lrepare market/feasibility studies and appraisals prepared by licensed appraisers in Puerto Rico; (d) [i]nvestigate financing options with various lending institutions in Puerto Rico; (e) [p]repare cost estimates to ascertain the financial viability of the projects; (f) [d]evelop comprehensive sales and marketing plans;” (g) [nJegotiate and close financing of the projects; including the execution of guarantees to obtain the necessary financing. (Case No. 12- 06338, Docket No. 102, Case No. 12-06339, Docket No. 101 and Case No. 12-06340, Docket No. 101).

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In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIV; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIX, (prb 2013).

In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIV; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIX (In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIV; In re: Gulfcoast Irrevocable Trust XIX) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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