In re Guardianship of J.O.

2025 IL App (4th) 241026-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 18, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1026
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241026-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 18, 2025 NOS. 4-24-1026, 4-24-1063 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re GUARDIANSHIP OF J.O., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (James Ort Sr., ) Winnebago County Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 21P304 v. (No. 4-24-1026) ) Jasmine Oliver, ) Respondent-Appellee). ) ) In re GUARDIANSHIP OF J.O., a Minor ) ) (James Ort Jr., ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) v. (No. 4-24-1063) ) Jasmine Oliver, ) Respondent-Appellee). ) Honorable ) Gwyn Gulley, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: (1) If, after being served with a complaint, a party fails to appear in the case, the party is not entitled, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 104(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), to be served with further documents that are filed in the case.

(2) In a proceeding to terminate the guardianship of a child, the only relief the circuit court may grant under section 11-14.1(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022)) is discharge of the guardian and termination of the guardianship, not relocation of the child.

(3) Because the termination of the guardianship in this case was premised on the mother’s being able to relocate the child from Illinois to Arizona, and because her petition for relocation that she had filed in a separate case had not yet been granted, the decision to terminate the guardianship was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Originally, in this guardianship case, the circuit court of Winnebago County

found that J.O. (the child) was a minor who lacked parents who were ready, willing, and able to

make day-to-day decisions regarding his care. Consequently, the court granted a petition by the

child’s paternal grandfather, James Ort Sr. (the grandfather), to be appointed as the child’s

guardian.

¶3 Pursuant to section 11-14.1(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755

ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022)), the child’s mother, Jasmine Oliver (the mother), filed a petition

in this case to terminate the guardianship. Then, in an amended petition, she requested not only

to terminate the guardianship but also to relocate the child from Illinois to Arizona. After several

days of evidentiary hearings, the circuit court not only terminated the guardianship but also gave

the mother permission to relocate the child.

¶4 The trouble is, this relocation was inconsistent with the parenting plan and

allocation judgment to which the mother and the child’s father, James Ort Jr. (the father), had

agreed in a separate case, Winnebago case No. 17-F-955 (the family law case). After the mother

petitioned in the present case to terminate the guardianship, the father sought relief in the family

law case. He filed a petitioned in the family law case to (1) restrict her parenting time and

(2) prohibit her from relocating the child to Arizona. The mother responded in kind in the family

law case. She petitioned for (1) a restriction of the father’s parenting time, (2) permission to

relocate the child to Arizona, and (3) modifications of the parenting plan and allocation judgment

to accommodate the proposed relocation. It appears that those petitions by the mother and father

are still pending in the family law case.

¶5 Nevertheless, in this guardianship case, the circuit court ordered not only the

-2- termination of the guardianship but also the relocation of the child to Arizona. The court took up

the issue of relocation despite its earlier refusal to consolidate the family law case with the

guardianship case.

¶6 This perceived end-running of the family law case is one of the reasons why the

grandfather and the father appeal in the guardianship case. They argue that, in the proceeding

under section 11-14.1(b) of the Probate Act, the circuit court lacked statutory authority to order

the relocation of the child. They maintain that the court had such authority only in the family law

case. They also challenge the court’s decision to terminate the guardianship, arguing that the

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Besides challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence, they criticize the decision as the product of various other errors: a refusal to

continue the trial to allow more time for discovery on the mother’s amendments to her petition, a

consideration of documents that were never offered in evidence, and a disregard of the automatic

stay in section 2-1203(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(b) (West

2022)). Another supposed procedural error, of which the father complains, is that the mother

never served any of her pleadings or motions upon him in the guardianship case.

¶7 The father, however, was served with the pleading that initiated the guardianship

case: the grandfather’s petition to be appointed as the child’s guardian. Nevertheless, it was not

until years later that the father appeared in the guardianship case. Until he appeared in the

guardianship case, he was not entitled to be served with any of the documents filed therein. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 104(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018).

¶8 Under the parenting plan, though, the father had the right to written notice of the

proposed relocation, including the address of the intended new residence. Also, the father and the

grandfather have a point about the circuit court’s lack of authority, under section 11-14.1(b) of

-3- the Probate Act, to order the relocation of the child. Under that section of the Probate Act, all the

court had authority to do was “discharge the guardian and terminate the guardianship.” 755 ILCS

5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022). Relocation, by contrast, was governed by section 609.2 of the Illinois

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2022)), the

statute the mother invoked in the family law case.

¶9 Refusing to consolidate the family law case into the guardianship case ultimately

caused the decision to terminate the guardianship to be against the manifest weight of the

evidence. The circuit court explicitly premised its termination decision on the child’s relocation

to Arizona. The proposed relocation, however, was not yet authorized—or not yet authorized in

the family law case, the only case in which the proposed relocation could be legitimately

authorized. The plan to relocate the child from Illinois to Arizona was crucial to the court’s

decision to terminate the guardianship. The mother now lived in Arizona, and she and the

grandfather were the only available caregivers. So, the only options for the child, until the father

overcame his criminal law difficulties and achieved stability, were to be relocated with the

mother or to continue living with the grandfather. But the availability of relocation was, in a

manner of speaking, a fact not in evidence. Whether the child could be relocated was an issue yet

to be resolved in the family law case. Treating relocation as a fait accompli in the guardianship

case was legally and factually unjustified. Under section 609.2 of the Marriage Act, there were

procedures to be followed and factors to be considered, and relocation should not have been

prejudged.

¶ 10 Because the circuit court lacked statutory authority in the guardianship case to

order the relocation of the child, and because the termination of the guardianship was based on

the plan to relocate the child, the termination of the guardianship was against the manifest weight

-4- of the evidence. (We do not reach the remaining issues raised in these appeals.) Therefore, we

reverse the court’s judgment in this guardianship case, and we remand this case with directions

to consolidate this guardianship case for hearing and disposition into the family law case,

Winnebago case No. 17-F-955, and to hold further proceedings in the family law case not

inconsistent with this order.

¶ 11 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 12 A. The Parenting Plan and Allocation Judgment

¶ 13 On February 2, 2016, the child was born to the mother and the father.

¶ 14 On October 13, 2017, in the family law case, the mother petitioned for custody of

the child. She named, as the respondent, the father, whose paternity of the child had been

established.

¶ 15 On November 2, 2017, in the family law case, the mother and the father signed a

document titled “Parenting Plan.” According to this document, the mother lived in Machesney

Park, Illinois, and the father lived in Loves Park, Illinois. The mother and the father agreed to

“provide to the other party at least sixty (60) days prior written notice of the intention to change

his or her residence.” Such notice was to include, “[a]t minimum,” “the intended date of the

change of residence and the address of the new residence.”

¶ 16 The mother and the father further agreed to the following.

¶ 17 First, in four “Types of Significant Decision Making” regarding the child, the

decision making would be “Joint”: (1) “Educational,” (2) “Medical/Dental/Mental Health,”

(3) “Religious,” and (4) “Extracurricular and Recreational Activities.”

¶ 18 Second, the mother and the father would have “equal parenting time under the

parenting schedule set forth” in the “Parenting Plan.” Specifically, the child would be in the

-5- mother’s care on Wednesdays and Thursdays and every other weekend from Friday to Sunday,

with drop-offs at 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. The child would be in the father’s care on Mondays and

Tuesdays and every other weekend, with drop-offs at 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. This “weekday and

weekend schedule [would] apply for all 12 calendar months[,] with no specific changes during

the summer.” In addition, there was a schedule for “Holidays and Special occasions.” The “Party

starting parenting time” was to “provide transportation.”

¶ 19 Third, the mother and the father agreed that “[i]f a parent wishe[d] to relocate the

child(ren) from their primary residence, he or she [had to] have the agreement of the other parent

or permission from a judge.” The term “[r]elocation” was defined to include relocation “[f]rom a

primary residence anywhere in Illinois to a new residence out of Illinois[ ] if the move [would]

be more than 25 miles from the current residence.”

¶ 20 The parent who proposed a relocation had to follow a notice procedure, which

was substantially the procedure prescribed in subsections (c) to (g) of section 609.2 of the

Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609.2(c) to (g) (West 2022)). To quote the parenting plan:

“(d) The parent seeking to relocate shall provide at minimum sixty (60)

days written notice before the relocation unless such notice is impracticable.

At minimum the party must provide the following:

I. The intended date of the party’s relocation.

II. The address of the new residence, if known.

III. The length of time the relocation will last if the relocation is

not for an indefinite or permanent period.”

¶ 21 The relocation procedure then forked into two paths: one path if the nonrelocating

parent signed the notice, thereby signifying his or her consent to the proposed relocation, and the

-6- other path if the nonrelocating parent did not consent to the proposed relocation. The parenting

plan provided:

“(e) If the non-relocating parent signs the notice provided by the

relocating parent and the relocating parent files the notice with the court, the

relocation shall be allowed without any further court action. The court shall

modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment to accommodate a parent’s

relocation as agreed by the parties as long as the agreed modification is in the

child’s best interests. If the non-relocating parent objects to the relocation, fails to

sign the notice or the parties cannot agree on modifying the parenting plan or

allocation judgment, the parent seeking [relocation] must file a petition seeking

permission or [sic] relocate.”

¶ 22 The same day the mother and the father signed the parenting plan, they filed it in

the family law case, and Judge Nordquist entered an order providing as follows: “The Parenting

Plan attached hereto is approved by the Court and the parties are ordered to comply with the

terms thereof.”

¶ 23 B. The Appointment of a Guardian

¶ 24 On July 1, 2021, in the present case, the grandfather filed a petition to be

appointed as the child’s guardian. The petition alleged that the proposed appointment would be

in best interests of the child because “the parents dropped [the child] off on June 25[.] [T]hey got

in trouble [and] haven’t been back,” and the grandfather “need[ed] to be able to make decisions

[and provide] medical [care] for [the child].”

¶ 25 On July 7, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the guardianship petition. The

mother and the father did not appear at the hearing, although, according to the grandfather’s

-7- certificate of service, he had served them by mail. The grandfather appeared pro se. After

questioning the grandfather under oath, the court entered an order appointing him as the guardian

of the child’s person. The reason for the appointment, according to the order, was that the child

“[did] not have parent(s) ready, willing, and able to carry out the day to day care decisions.”

¶ 26 C. The Amended Petition to Terminate the Guardianship

¶ 27 On September 25, 2023, in the guardianship case, the mother filed an amended

petition to terminate the guardianship. In the amended petition, she alleged that, since July 7,

2021, when the circuit court appointed the grandfather as the child’s guardian, there had been a

material change in circumstances. See 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022). She claimed she had

“turned her life around.” Specifically, she met Anthony Filatov in October 2022 and married him

on February 22, 2023. They lived in a three-bedroom house on 4.5 acres in Meadview, Arizona.

The amended petition did not specify an address, but according to the amended petition, the

house included, for the child’s use, a “clean bedroom” with its own bath and bathtub. Filatov, a

veteran of the United States Navy, worked from home as a litigation specialist and was able to

financially support the mother and the child. The mother, who was unemployed, volunteered at

the local Veterans of Foreign Wars as a cook.

¶ 28 The amended petition further claimed a material change in the child’s

circumstances (see id.), in that the child allegedly had been denied a relationship with the mother

and had not been provided dental care and “the appropriate education and medical care.”

¶ 29 The prayer for relief was not only that the guardianship be terminated but also that

the mother “be awarded custody of [the child] and that she be able to relocate with the *** child

to the State of Arizona.” This request for relocation was new. It was not in the previous version

of the petition for termination of the guardianship.

-8- ¶ 30 The record appears to contain no proof of service of the amended petition for

termination of the guardianship. On the day the amended petition was filed, there was a status

hearing. At the end of the hearing, after the mother and the grandfather agreed that a trial on the

original petition for termination of the guardianship would be held on November 27, 2023,

November 29, 2023, and December 1, 2023, the mother’s attorney mentioned that she “filed an

amended petition today too.” The circuit court said, “Okay.”

¶ 31 D. Petitions in the Family Law Case

¶ 32 On November 9, 2023, in the family law case, the father filed a document titled

“Emergency Petition to Modify and Restrict Allocation of Parental Responsibilities—Decision

Making and Parenting Time.” (The record in this guardianship case includes some of the

documents filed in the family law case.) He claimed that, “since entry of the Order incorporating

the parties[’] parenting plan *** on November 2, 2017,” there had been a “substantial change in

circumstances.” One change, according to the petition, was that the father would be released

from jail on December 1, 2023. Another change, which the father alleged on “information and

belief,” was that the mother was “trying to relocate with the minor child to the State of Arizona.”

Still other changes were various alleged shortcomings of the mother. Because of those alleged

shortcomings, the father invoked section 603.10 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/603.10 (West

2022)), requesting that the circuit court

“B. Enter an Order restricting and/or suspending [the mother’s] parenting

time.

C. Enter an Order granting [the father] sole decision making for [t]he

minor child.

D. Enter an Order prohibiting [the mother] from relocating the minor child

-9- to the State of Arizona.”

¶ 33 On November 27, 2023, in the family law case, the mother filed a document

similarly titled “Petition for Modification of Allocation of Parental Responsibilities—Decision

Making and Parenting Time and for Restricted Parenting Time.” This petition pointed out that,

“[o]n November 14, 2023, [Judge] Nordquist ruled that this matter should be consolidated with

[the guardianship case] and that further proceedings in this case are to be heard by the Honorable

Gwyn Gulley.” We observe that, according to the Winnebago County circuit court’s website, of

which we may take judicial notice (see In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 39), the docket

entry for November 14, 2023, in the family law case reads, “Cause Continued for Hearing with

Judge Gulley Alongside the [guardianship case] that was previously set.” The mother noted in

her petition for modification:

“A proposed order setting forth Judge Nordquist’s decision following the

November 14, 2023, court appearance was se[n]t by [the mother’s] counsel to [the

father’s] counsel on November 15, 2023, and a revised proposed Order was sent

by [the mother’s] counsel to [the father’s] counsel on November 20, 2023, but

neither proposed Order has been approved by [the father’s] counsel and neither

Order has been entered yet by the Court.”

¶ 34 The mother’s petition continued that, since the entry of the order incorporating the

parenting plan, a substantial change in circumstances had occurred in that (1) the mother had

married Filatov and had moved to Arizona and (2) the father had allegedly misbehaved in a

variety of ways and had displayed numerous shortcomings. Therefore, the petition requested the

entry of an order

“C. Granting the [mother] sole decision-making authority for all major

- 10 - decisions regarding the parties’ minor child.

D. Granting the [mother] the majority of the parenting time with the minor

child.

E. Designating the [mother] as the custodial parent for the parties’ minor

F. Restricting any parenting time between [the father] and the parties’

minor child.”

¶ 35 Also on November 27, 2023, in the family law case, the mother filed a document

titled “Petition for Temporary and Permanent Relocation.” In this petition, she requested that the

circuit court (1) “grant [her] the ability to remove the *** child to the State of Arizona on a

temporary and permanent basis” and (2) “[e]nter an appropriate restricted parenting time order

for parenting time between the [father] and the *** child.”

¶ 36 On May 28, 2024, according to the circuit clerk’s website, the circuit court

appointed Maureen M. Lawson as the guardian ad litem in the family law case—the same

attorney who was the guardian ad litem in the guardianship case.

¶ 37 E. A Hiatus in Contact and Visitation

¶ 38 On June 7, 2023, the circuit court entered an order granting the mother one week

of parenting time, from June 12, 2023, at 10 a.m., to June 19, 2023, at 7 p.m. The mother and

Filatov traveled from Arizona to Illinois, towing a camper, for the one week of visitation.

¶ 39 On June 29, 2023, the mother moved for an order terminating the guardianship or,

alternatively, for more parenting time.

¶ 40 On August 8, 2023, the circuit court ordered that, from August 4, 2023, onward,

the mother was to have parenting time every other weekend from Friday at 5 p.m. until Sunday

- 11 - at 5 p.m. The court further ordered that the mother was to be allowed phone calls, video calls, or

both with the minor, outside the presence of the grandfather and his wife and without

interference by them. The mother and Filatov stayed in Illinois, living in the camper on the

mother’s grandmother’s property in Rockford, so that the mother could exercise her right to the

additional parenting time.

¶ 41 At trial, the guardian ad litem was asked why the mother and Filatov lived in the

camper instead of with a family member. She answered:

“I was told the reason is because [the mother] had stolen, you know, during the

time that she had issues with drugs, she had stolen from her grandmother, and so

her grandmother didn’t want her in that home, in her home at night, I guess,

because she did in the past steal from her grandma.”

¶ 42 On November 17, 2023, the mother’s parenting time was temporarily suspended

when, in Winnebago County case Nos. 23-OP-2956 and 23-OP-2957, the grandfather was

granted emergency orders of protection against the mother and Filatov. The reason for these

orders was that a neighbor reportedly had seen Filatov shove the child at Carlson Ice Arena in

Rockford.

¶ 43 The guardian ad litem interviewed the child about this incident at the ice skating

rink. The child told her that when he went to greet a friend of his, a boy named Jaden, Filatov

“grabbed [the child] and shoved him out of the way[ ] because he didn’t want him to talk to

Jaden.” The mother then said, either to Jaden or to somebody who was with Jaden, “ [‘]What the

F*** are you looking at[?’] ” This incident “scared” the child (he recounted to the guardian

ad litem). The child explained to the guardian ad litem “that [the mother] and [Filatov] didn’t

want him to be around Jaden while they were at the skate park, and that [the mother] doesn’t

- 12 - want him to be around his friends.” The guardian ad litem testified to her perception that the

child was close to his friends.

¶ 44 On December 18, 2023, the emergency orders of protection against the mother

and Filatov were rescinded because the circuit court found no substantial likelihood of

irreparable harm or continued abuse.

¶ 45 In December 2023, purportedly because the mother was frightened by the order of

protection proceedings, she and Filatov drove back to Arizona. At trial, the guardian ad litem

was asked:

“Q. Okay. You’re shaking your head. Do you believe what [the mother]

reported to you as her reason why she moved to Arizona?

A. No. Because I don’t understand what she would be afraid of. The

emergency order was vacated. I don’t understand. But she reported that she was

afraid that she would get in trouble, so she went back to Arizona.”

¶ 46 Because the mother was pregnant at the time of this return trip to Arizona, the

drive back was arduous for her, according to her testimony. She did not feel up to further travel.

¶ 47 The mother testified that on December 19 or 20, 2023, after she and Filatov

returned to Arizona, she asked the grandfather’s attorney if the child might come to Arizona

during the winter break. Because “it was not good for [the mother] to have all that travel time

being pregnant” (to quote her testimony), she asked if her mother or sister or Filatov could pick

the child up after school on Friday, when the mother’s parenting time was scheduled to begin.

The grandfather’s attorney agreed to allow the child to go to Arizona for a visit but insisted that

the mother personally pick up the child.

¶ 48 Because the mother had found that traveling while pregnant was a “very rough

- 13 - ride,” the Arizona visit did not happen during the winter break in 2023. Contact between the

mother and the child then fell off. The mother called the child on his birthday, February 2, 2024,

but she sent him no birthday present, and, in 2023, she sent him no Christmas gift.

¶ 49 The guardian ad litem was asked:

“Q. [The mother has] been able to exercise her parenting time since

December 18th of ’23, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And it’s April 1st of ’24?

Q. And is it correct that she’s not exercising her parenting time since that

time?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that [the mother] doesn’t call [the child] since

December 18th, except for twice?

A. That’s what [the child] told me, yes.

Q. How does this make—did [the child] express any feelings about his

mom going back to Arizona?

A. Yeah. He is very angry.

Q. Okay. Based on that, do you believe that—do you believe that [the

child] would do well with [the mother] alone in Arizona?

A. I know he doesn’t want to go. I know he’s hurt. I know he feels that his

mother just goes in and out of his life. I think he feels that nothing has changed

with her. So now he feels that she’s unsafe. And that [the child] remembers his

- 14 - mom when she had a drug problem, right.”

¶ 50 F. The Motion for Consolidation in the Guardianship Case

¶ 51 On November 22, 2023, in the guardianship case, the mother filed a motion titled

“Motion to Consolidate.” In this motion, she informed the circuit court that, on November 14,

2023, in the family law case, Judge Nordquist “ruled that the family [law] case should be

consolidated with the guardianship case and that further proceedings in the family [law] case are

to be heard by [Judge] Gulley.”

¶ 52 The motion further noted that, in Winnebago County case Nos. 23-OP-296 and

23-OP-297, in response to petitions by the grandfather, the circuit court had issued emergency

order of protections against the mother and Filatov (which, as we have noted, were soon

afterward rescinded).

¶ 53 The motion for consolidation argued:

“10. The guardianship case, the family [law] case and the two orders of

protection cases all involve the same minor child, the same subject matter, and

similar issues.

11. A consolidation of all of the cases would not prejudice either party.

12. In the interest of judicial economy, the cases should be consolidated.”

Although the motion argued that the guardianship case, the family law case, and the order of

protection cases all should be consolidated, the concluding paragraph of the motion merely

requested “an Order consolidating [the order of protection cases] with [the guardianship case].”

¶ 54 On November 27, 2023, in the guardianship case, the circuit court heard the

motion for consolidation. The mother’s attorney argued that “Judge Nordquist had granted the

motion to consolidate” and that the court likewise should consolidate the two order of protection

- 15 - cases with the guardianship case. The following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: But that is not consolidated with these cases.

MS. HUNT [(THE GRANDFATHER’S ATTORNEY)]: That’s correct.

They filed a motion to consolidate. They set it down for today. They are asking

that the F case and the OP case be consolidated in front of [Y]our Honor.

The OP case is set to be heard in front of Judge Bruscato on their motion

to vacate or reconsider 8:30 on Thursday.

***

THE COURT: Which can still be heard by Judge Bruscato. We don’t

necessarily have to consolidate the OP with this case.

MS. EPSTEIN [(THE MOTHER’S ATTORNEY)]: The only problem is,

of course, then she can’t take the child. That is the whole purpose, right? The

whole purpose is to do whatever they can to make sure that she can’t have her

child after like nine months of being up here. That is what the whole purpose of

this is.

THE COURT: Right, that is why—it is my thought that we need to deal

with the guardianship issue—

MS. EPSTEIN: Let’s do it.

THE COURT: —and then all these other issues may fall in place or they

may be separate issues.

MS. EPSTEIN: Okay. Understood.

MS. HUNT: So as it relates to their part of that motion, their motion to

consolidate, is their request to consolidate 2023 OP 2956 and 2023 OP 2957

- 16 - denied?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.”

¶ 55 At this hearing, Judge Gulley also declined to hear the family law issues. She

possessed a draft of the proposed order of consolidation, which she at first mistakenly thought

that Judge Nordquist had signed:

“You know, I am thinking about this consolidation order. I mean, he

signed it and he says once the guardianship issues are resolved, then it is

transferred back to him.

MS. HUNT: That is why I said he didn’t actually consolidate it. He

referred to you to handle the probate matter.

THE COURT: But I am not going to handle it, that is the—it makes no

sense.

MS. HUNT: I know.

THE COURT: I mean, to me, because the only thing I am hearing is the

guardianship case, so—

MS. HUNT: That’s correct.

THE COURT: There is really no need for it to be consolidated.

MS. EPSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you understand what I am saying?

MS. EPSTEIN: Yeah, I do.

MS. HUNT: Yes.

THE COURT: Because we’re not dealing with the F case or any issues

regarding the F case. So if it is consolidated, it is just kind of hanging out there.

- 17 - And if you sub me—

MS. EPSTEIN: I gotcha.

THE COURT: —there is really no—I get the sub. So even if it were to go

back to him, you know, it is still going to be his case and I am just handling the

guardianship cases.

MS. EPSTEIN: Right.

MS. HUNT: So are you denying their motion to consolidate then? Because

what I am representing to the Court is that Judge Nordquist did not consolidate

the cases.

THE COURT: Did he sign this order?

MS. HUNT: No.

MS. EPSTEIN: No.

THE COURT: There is a dispute over the order, which is why I had

ordered the trial transcripts this morning when I walked in and saw the motion to

consolidate.

MS. EPSTEIN: That’s okay. We will just keep it.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I just want to make sure it is clear for the

record because—

MS. HUNT: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: You know, because I am not hearing anything on the F

case. You subbed me on that case because—which there really wasn’t a reason to

sub me because I am not hearing anything on it.

- 18 - MS. HUNT: It was my understanding that you had granted Attorney

Epstein’s motion to consolidate the F case with the P case. That is why I instanter

filed the motion to sub.

THE COURT: And that was because, and like I was explaining on the

record, we’re just dealing with the guardianship case. I don’t have anything to do

with the F case.

MS. EPSTEIN: I am okay.

THE COURT: So for whatever reason it needs to follow, and sometimes

there are issues like if somebody is asking for child support or something. That is

not what we’re doing here. We’re just—it is whether I need to decide whether to

terminate the guardianship. I don’t have anything to do with the F case and it is

unlikely that I would. So I would say I am not granting that consolidation.

MS. EPSTEIN: Okay. No problem.

THE COURT: So that way it is clear.

MS. HUNT: So you want your order to say motion to consolidate denied.

THE COURT: Is denied, yes.

MS. HUNT: Okay.

THE COURT: That way the F case is still there. When we’re done with

this—

MS. EPSTEIN: Yep.

THE COURT: —just like he says, it should come back to him because it

should, and then there is no need for your motion to sub.

- 19 - THE COURT: Okay.”

¶ 56 On December 13, 2023, in the guardianship case, Judge Gulley followed up with

a written order, stating: “Over [the mother’s] objection, [the mother’s] Motion to Consolidate is

heard and denied.”

¶ 57 G. The Oral Ruling on the Amended Petition to Terminate the Guardianship

¶ 58 On May 23, 2024, in the guardianship case (with Judge Gulley presiding), the

circuit court orally announced it had decided to grant the mother’s amended petition to terminate

the guardianship. The court found a material change in circumstances in that the mother

“appear[ed] to have turned her life around.” She no longer pursued her “previous lifestyle of

crime and drug use and instability.” She had moved to Arizona, had married Filatov, and was

expecting a child. According to the mother’s testimony, she and Filatov had a stable living

environment, and Filatov provided for her financially so that she did not have to work.

¶ 59 The father, by contrast, had continuing difficulties with the criminal law system.

The grandfather’s wife, Jessica Bagnall, had testified that there were outstanding warrants for the

father’s arrest, in multiple counties, for theft.

¶ 60 After finding that the mother had materially changed her previous circumstances

of drug abuse and criminal misconduct, the circuit court turned its attention to the grandfather’s

case. The court found that the grandfather had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

that keeping the guardianship in force would be in the best interests of the child. The court did

not believe that the grandfather would facilitate visitation. The grandfather had obtained

emergency orders of protection against the mother and Filatov, but soon afterward the orders

were rescinded. The court suspected that the order of protection proceedings had been a ruse to

frustrate the mother’s visitation of the child.

- 20 - ¶ 61 Although the child did not want to move to Arizona and preferred to continue

living with the grandfather, the circuit court chose not to give much weight to the child’s wish,

considering that the child was only eight. The court noted evidence that the child enjoyed visiting

the mother. The court concluded it would be in the best interests of the child that the child be

relocated to Arizona, to live with the mother and Filatov and to attend school in Arizona. The

court found that the grandfather had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of the guardianship would not be in the best interests of the child.

¶ 62 The grandfather’s attorney then alerted the circuit court that, in the family law

case, there was “a petition for relocation that hasn’t been decided,” as well as a petition to enjoin

the proposed relocation.

¶ 63 The following exchange then took place:

“MS. EPSTEIN: Judge, we can’t—Judge Nordquist sent it to you, okay,

again because this is what’s going to happen: We’re going to end up going back

there and they’re going to file a motion, which they’ve been doing. Every time we

leave you, they go up there and file a motion to prevent us from doing something

else, and now you—

THE COURT: But Judge Nordquist is going to be aware of my decision—

MS. HUNT: That’s correct—

THE COURT: —to allow—

MS. HUNT: —yeah.

THE COURT: —the minor to relocate, so I doubt—

THE COURT: It is highly unlikely that he’s going to go against that, but I

- 21 - don’t know.

So file whatever—

MS. HUNT: So the relocation issue is going to be litigated with Judge

Nordquist.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EPSTEIN: Oh, no, we asked for it. We asked—our prayer for—to be

able to relocate to Arizona. You can order that, Judge. You’re able to order that.

THE COURT: Well, that’s what I’ve ordered.

MS. EPSTEIN: Yeah. Okay. So then I think Ms. Hunt and I—is saying

that you’re not ordering that.

THE COURT: No, that’s—that’s what I—I mean, this is what I said. The

child is going to be going to school in Arizona, so—

THE COURT: —clearly that’s my decision.”

The court requested that the mother’s attorney draft an order reflecting the oral judgment.

¶ 64 H. The Motion to Stay Enforcement of the Judgment

¶ 65 On June 4, 2024, in the guardianship case, the grandfather filed a document titled

“Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgement [sic].” In this motion, he pointed out that petitions to

modify the allocation of parental responsibilities were pending before Judge Nordquist in the

family law case, in which the grandfather had moved to intervene. The grandfather requested

that, in the guardianship case, the circuit court “stay[ ] the enforcement of the Court’s order to

- 22 - terminate the guardianship, and as to relocation, school enrollment, and parenting time, and that

the court maintain the status quo pending further orders by Judge Nordquist as to intervention,

parental allocation[,] and relocation.”

¶ 66 I. The Entry of the Written Order Terminating the Guardianship

¶ 67 On June 5, 2024, in the guardianship case, the circuit court entered an order titled

“Order Terminating Guardianship.” In this order, the court found that the mother had proven, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that, since the establishment of the guardianship, her

circumstances had materially changed. The court further found that the grandfather had failed to

carry his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the

guardianship would not be in the best interests of the child. Therefore, the court discharged the

grandfather from his position as guardian and revoked his letters of office.

¶ 68 But the order did not stop there. It further provided for the relocation of the child

to Arizona, subject to a transitional period of visitation with the grandfather:

“D. [The child] shall reside with [the mother] in the State of Arizona.

E. [The mother] shall register [the child] for school commencing in July of

2024 in the State of Arizona.

F. [The child] shall complete his second grade education this school year

at Windsor Elementary School until his last day on May 31, 2024.

G. [The child] shall stay with [the grandfather] until May 31, 2024.

H. [The mother] shall communicate with the school to enable her

grandmother, Rose Zadek, to pick up [the child] from Windsor Elementary

School on May 31, 2023 [sic], at 2:30 p.m. or at such time when [the child’s]

school day ends on May 31, 2024. ***

- 23 - I. [The mother] shall arrange for [the child] to be escorted by her

grandmother by airplane, or other transportation, from the State of Illinois to the

State of Arizona on or after May 31, 2024.

J. [The child] shall be in [the mother’s] care after May 31, 2021 [sic] at

2:30 pm with the exception of one transition period for [the child] with [the

grandfather] commencing June 29, 2024 at 9:00 am until July 6, 2024 at 6:00 pm

so the minor child may vacation in Door County, Wisconsin with [the

grandfather].

K. [The mother] or her grandmother, shall bring [the child] to [the

grandfather’s] residence located [in] Loves Park, Illinois at 9:00 am on July 6,

2024 [sic].

L. [The mother] or [her] grandmother shall pick [the child] up on July 6,

2024 at 6:00 p.m[.] at [the grandfather’s residence]. [The grandfather] shall make

the child available at that time.”

¶ 69 J. The Joint Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Judgment

¶ 70 On June 12, 2024, in the guardianship case, the grandfather and the father filed a

document entitled “Joint Motion to Reconsider and Vacate June 5, 2024 Judgment.” In support

of their request that the circuit court vacate the termination of the guardianship, they alleged

numerous errors. They requested that, pursuant to section 2-1203(b) of the Code (735 ILCS

5/2-1203(b) (West 2022)), the court “[s]tay enforcement of the judgment pending ruling on this

Motion.”

¶ 71 K. The Grandfather’s Petition to Intervene in the Family Law Case

¶ 72 On May 28, 2024, in the family law case, the grandfather petitioned to intervene.

- 24 - He also filed an emergency petition for the allocation of parental responsibilities and an

emergency petition for injunctive relief.

¶ 73 On June 11, 2024, Judge Nordquist held a hearing on the grandfather’s petitions.

At the hearing, the attorneys for the mother, the father, and the grandfather appeared. The

guardian ad litem also appeared.

¶ 74 The grandfather’s attorney argued that although, on June 5, 2024, the circuit court

entered an order terminating the guardianship, the grandfather still had “an unconditional right to

intervene” under section 2-408(a)(1) of the Code (id. § 2-408(a)(1)) and section 601.2 of the

Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/601.2 (West 2022)). The grandfather’s attorney continued:

“So what I’m asking from the Court is twofold: One, grant my petition to

intervene and grant the petition for injunctive relief preventing [the mother] from

relocating [the child] outside of the State of Illinois. She already has petitions

pending to relocate which are set before you as well as a petition to modify the

allocation of parental responsibilities, and so we need the guardian ad litem to do

an investigation into all the pending motions and make a recommendation and

ultimately set this case for trial.”

¶ 75 The father’s attorney agreed that the grandfather, with whom the child had lived

all his life, had a right to intervene.

¶ 76 The mother’s attorney disagreed. She argued that because the circuit court had

terminated the guardianship, the grandfather lacked standing and that his interference should be

put to an end. She complained, “[E]very time Judge Gulley makes a ruling, then they bring the

case in front of Your Honor to circumvent her rulings.” The mother’s attorney argued that the

mother should have custody of the child. The father was “in jail,” the mother’s attorney

- 25 - observed, and the mother “now has the child restored to her.” The grandfather, however,

“doesn’t like the decision in Judge Gulley’s courtroom so now he’s filing all these motions here

trying to intervene.”

¶ 77 The grandfather’s attorney responded, “Judge Gulley already made the decision

regarding the guardianship. That’s all she has jurisdiction over. You [(Judge Nordquist)] have

jurisdiction over custody.”

¶ 78 Judge Nordquist then turned to the guardian ad litem, asking her to “do a report to

the Court what’s going on there and then we can go forward.”

¶ 79 The guardian ad litem explained:

“It’s my understanding that the guardianship has been terminated. So under the

law once a guardianship is terminated, then that case is closed. Judge Gulley did

not elect to take the family [law] case so it is before you, Your Honor, so it is for

you to determine the allocation of parental responsibilities as well as the motion

to intervene by the grandparents.

[The child] has not seen [the mother] since before Christmas because she

voluntarily chose to go back to Arizona. [The child] has never been to Arizona, is

very upset about why [the mother] left Illinois and stopped seeing him. I do not

think it’s in the child’s best interest [that the] child be sent to Arizona yet. This

Court needs to decide the intervention—you know, whether or not the

grandparents are going to intervene and whether or not [the mother] can relocate.

So while that’s pending, I believe [the child] should remain here and should be

put back with the grandparents instead of with this relative that the child doesn’t

really know very well.”

- 26 - ¶ 80 The following exchange then occurred:

“THE COURT: Is there still pendings [sic] in the probate court with Judge

Gulley? Is there something still pending there?

MS. EPSTEIN: Yes; a motion to stay the enforcement of the judgment. I

got to respond to that. ***

MS. CHUDOBA [(THE FATHER’S ATTORNEY)]: The only thing left

before Judge Gulley is a motion to stay. *** [I]t has to go back to your court

because she chose not to consolidate the two cases. She then stepped back and

said she would look at the motion to stay but said that she had to revert to you.

She knew that this was up before you next and perhaps you would consider her

thought process, but it is in your court and your jurisdiction to determine what

happens with the child now.

I’d ask that you follow the direction of the [guardian ad litem] because

you have to decide based on the best interests of the child and that’s what she’s

here for and she’s telling you what she believes is in his best interest right now.”

¶ 81 Judge Nordquist decided to keep the status quo pending further arguments, and

the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to keep the status quo as to what was

going on based upon the report from the guardian ad litem over objection of

everybody here maybe and that is that the child stay here in Rockford, Illinois.

MS. EPSTEIN: The status quo of what Judge Gulley said or what you’re

- 27 - saying now? There’s a difference.

THE COURT: That the child be with grandpa and that—

MS. EPSTEIN: The child is not with grandpa.

THE COURT: The child is staying here in Rockford, Illinois. Whoever the

child has been living with primarily over the last year—the child stays here.

Okay? And then we’ll sort all this stuff out. You can do it in probate court and

you can come back and do it in the family court, but I’ll give you time to do all

that but we’re going to keep the status quo here.

MS. EPSTEIN: Wait—

(Simultaneous speaking.)

THE COURT: Don’t argue. I’m going to give you a date to come back so

I can see what’s going on, but the child stays here.

MS. EPSTEIN: I don’t understand.

THE COURT: I’m going to direct that Attorney Hunt prepare that order.

MS. EPSTEIN: Judge, you’re overruling Judge Gulley’s decision.

THE COURT: I guess—that’s what I’m doing. Sorry.

MS CHUDOBA: May the order reflect that the transfer happen today at

5:00 p.m. at Loves Park?

THE COURT: Yes. That is all for today.”

- 28 - ¶ 82 L. The Hearing on the Motion for a Stay

¶ 83 On June 14, 2024, in the guardianship case, Judge Gulley held a hearing on the

“Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgement [sic].” In denying the request for a discretionary

stay, she reasoned:

“Pursuant to section 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1 of the Probate Act, the Court has

jurisdiction to terminate guardianship and did so allowing the parties to be

heard after multiple days of hearing. The Court reached the difficult decision after

consideration of the evidence presented, the credibility of the witnesses, and

thorough consideration of the best interest factors of [the child]. Those factors are

similar to those in the [Marriage Act]. At no time did [the] father appear as a

witness or file any pleadings before this Court. The grandparents were

present and had the opportunity to be heard. The petition sought termination as

well as custody. When the Court terminates guardianship, the minor has to be

placed somewhere, and in this case the parent seeking termination resides in

Arizona. [The father] did not offer any opinion as to whether he was in favor of

the termination. The grandparents did not meet their burden under the Probate Act

to show that it was not in [the child’s] best interest to return him to the mother.”

¶ 84 Thus, in the guardianship case, the circuit court denied the grandfather’s motion

for a discretionary stay. The court memorialized the denial in a written order entered that same

day. Paragraph 4 of the order provided, “The child is allowed to be transported to Arizona by

[the mother’s grandmother,] Rose Marie Zadek[,] on June 14, 2024, or 6/15/24 and returned by

June 28, 2024[,] with pick-up to be done by [the child’s paternal grandmother,] Jessica Bagnall[,]

from the Las Vegas Airport.”

- 29 - ¶ 85 M. The Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Judgment

¶ 86 On June 26, 2024, in the guardianship case, Judge Gulley held a hearing on the

grandfather and father’s “Joint Motion to Reconsider and Vacate June 5, 2024 Judgment.” At the

hearing, the father’s attorney argued:

“All the Court needed to do was terminate the guardianship and turn the child

over, and after that the issue between the parties as far as where the child goes,

where he lives, where he goes to school, whether or not he can go temporarily to

Arizona, those are issues before the family law court.”

¶ 87 Judge Gulley responded that she had to require that the child be turned over to

someone if she terminated the guardianship. She acknowledged that there was a family law case.

She said, however, “[I]f they want it to be permanent, that’s where they deal with it. That’s not

part of my ruling, that it’s a permanent—That was not my decision that it was a permanent

relocation.”

¶ 88 “But, [Y]our Honor,” the father’s attorney said, “you ordered the child to live in

her—to be in her sole care and to be enrolled in school in Arizona.” What Judge Gulley could do

alternatively, the father’s attorney argued, is “order the child to be turned over to [the mother] at

the police station” and then allow Judge Nordquist to decide the remaining issues in the family

law case. “[B]ut I was not making it a permanent decision,” Judge Gulley replied—the child

“had to be turned over to the mother,” who “just so happened to be *** residing in Arizona.” The

following exchange then occurred:

“THE COURT: Well, I—I believe I did have the authority to have the

child go with [the mother] to Arizona; so, again, that was my ruling; and that’s

why, you know, I considered best interest and that was my ruling.

- 30 - MS. CHUDOBA: But not under the Marriage Act.

THE COURT: I’m—I was—Under the Probate Act, which I—I do daily. I

do it daily. Okay.

MS. CHUDOBA: Even if two cases are consolidated, a family law case

and a probate case—

THE COURT: But, again, ultimately—Again, the family, [the mother] and

[the father], just like [the grandfather] said, [‘L]et them hash it out in family

court.[’] They will certainly do that. But right now because [the mother] was the

one that stepped before this Court and said, [‘]hey, I want my child back[’]—[the

father] didn’t do that. [The mother] did it. So [the mother]—I ruled in her favor.

[The mother] happens to reside in Arizona. So that’s where the child goes until

Judge Nordquist decides if that’s a permanent situation or just, you know, the

child needs to be returned. That’s his decision.”

¶ 89 Observing that there was “already a parental allocation judgment,” the father’s

attorney said she did not “understand why the probate order [was] trying to modify that when

there’s already a judgment.”

¶ 90 The following exchange then occurred:

“THE COURT: Well, I wasn’t trying to modify anything. I was just

making the rulings that were before the Court. So I was not trying to step into

Judge Nordquist’s shoes.

MS. CHUDOBA: I understand, but the result of the child being enrolled in

Arizona equates to almost a permanent relocation. The child—You’re ordering—

Under the Marriage Act the child can’t be enrolled in school in Arizona unless

- 31 - there’s a relocation petition that modifies the parties’ allocation judgment. So the

ordering of the child to be enrolled in school in Arizona is a modification of that

judgment. It was not done under the Marriage Act. Does [Y]our Honor understand

what I’m saying?

THE COURT: No. I understand exactly what you’re saying. But, again—

MS. CHUDOBA: Okay.

THE COURT: —this was on a temporary basis because [the mother] is in

Arizona.

MS. CHUDOBA: I understand. Enrollment in school though I don’t view

as temporary.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.”

¶ 91 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Gulley said she would take under

advisement the motion to reconsider and vacate the judgment.

¶ 92 The father’s attorney then attempted to sum up, “So it’s my understanding the

child is supposed to be turned over back to [the grandfather] on the 28th. *** [W]e also have an

order from Nordquist that the child is supposed to be returned to [the grandfather].”

¶ 93 The mother’s attorney complained:

MS. EPSTEIN: Do you believe that? Like status quo. Return to [the

grandfather]. So now we’re going back to [the grandfather]. After we leave here,

we’re going to go back up there because they’re going to say the child has to be

returned to [the grandfather]; now we’re not going to return him. See.”

¶ 94 The father’s attorney rejoined that “[t]he family law court has jurisdiction to make

continuing rulings regarding this child as far as parental allocation” and that “Judge Gulley

- 32 - cannot reconsider Judge Nordquist’s order.” Judge Gulley agreed—“just like he can’t reconsider

mine.” She noted that neither she nor Judge Nordquist was “the Appellate Court.”

¶ 95 The mother’s attorney said:

“I need an order from you, Judge, saying that the child—today that the child goes

back to [the mother] on July 6th and how it’s going to happen. Because right now

they got Judge Nordquist’s order in between your orders and they’re going to say

that’s the one in effect.”

The father’s attorney responded, “I’m not sure under what jurisdiction the Court could enter

another order.”

¶ 96 Judge Gulley declined to enter a new custody order, but she made a nunc pro tunc

correction to her judgment order of June 5, 2024. Paragraph K, on the final page of the order,

read that the mother or her grandmother was to bring the child to the grandfather’s residence “on

July 6, 2024.” Judge Gulley changed that date to “6/28/2024” so that paragraph K would be

consistent with the rest of the order. The gist of the order as a whole was that there was to be a

“transition visitation period” with the grandfather from “June 29, 2024[,] at 9:00 am until July 6,

2024[,] at 6:00 pm,” to quote paragraph J. Then, according to paragraph L, the mother or her

grandmother was to pick up the child from the grandfather’s residence at 6 p.m. on July 6, 2024.

Thus, the correct beginning date of the transitional visitation period, in accordance with the rest

of the order, was June 28, 2024 (or, more precisely, June 29, 2024), not July 6, 2024, as

paragraph K incorrectly said. On the corrected order, Judge Gulley wrote that the change to

paragraph K was “nunc pro tunc 6/14/24” (which, perhaps, should have been June 5, 2024, when

she originally signed the order).

¶ 97 N. The Entry of a Conflicting Order in the Family Law Case

- 33 - ¶ 98 On June 11, 2024, in the family law case, a docket entry was made that reads as

follows: “Order to be submitted by counsel, minor to stay in Illinois with [the grandfather].”

¶ 99 A docket entry for June 25, 2024, likewise reads:

“Order: minor to stay in Illinois with [the grandfather]. Additional terms

of this order are set forth herein.

Cause continued.

See order filed.”

This “order filed” in the family law case does not appear to be in the record on appeal.

¶ 100 O. The Denial of the Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Judgment

¶ 101 On July 17, 2024, in the guardianship case, the circuit court entered an order

providing, “The Joint Motion to Reconsider and Vacate June 5, 2024[,] Judgment filed on or

about June 12, 2024[,] is heard and denied for reasons stated on the record.”

¶ 102 P. The Appeals

¶ 103 The grandfather filed his notice of appeal in the guardianship case on July 25,

2024, and an amended notice of appeal on August 1, 2024.

¶ 104 The father filed his notice of appeal in the guardianship case on July 31, 2024.

¶ 105 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 106 A. Our Jurisdiction

¶ 107 Even if the parties do not question our jurisdiction, we have a duty to make sure

that we have jurisdiction over the appeal. See Ontiveroz v. Khokar, 2025 IL 130316, ¶ 1. Every

final judgment in a civil case is appealable as of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). “A

final judgment is a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which

ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit.” Big Sky

- 34 - Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 232-33 (2005). To fix absolutely

and finally the rights of parties, the judgment being appealed must still be in effect.

¶ 108 The father and the grandfather appeal Judge Gulley’s order of June 5, 2024, in the

guardianship case: an order in which she (1) terminated the guardianship and (2) gave the mother

permission to relocate the child to Arizona. Is that order still in effect?

¶ 109 On June 11, 2024, in the family law case, Judge Nordquist “overrul[ed]” Judge

Gulley’s order. He ordered that the child was to remain with the grandfather. When Judge

Nordquist spoke, it was the circuit court speaking, just as when Judge Gulley spoke, it was the

circuit court speaking. On June 11, 2024, then, the court changed its mind about terminating the

guardianship and allowing the child to be relocated to Arizona. The court “overrul[ed],” or

vacated, the termination of the guardianship and the granting of permission to relocate the child.

¶ 110 On June 25, 2024, in the family law case, Judge Nordquist entered a written order

that the child was to remain with the grandfather.

¶ 111 On July 17, 2024, though, in the guardianship case, Judge Gulley denied a motion

by the father and the grandfather to vacate her order of June 5, 2024. Thus, the circuit court

changed its mind again: the order of June 5, 2024, was not vacated after all. The latest word, it

appears, is that the order of June 5, 2024, still stands.

¶ 112 Therefore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals. The order

that the father and the grandfather appeal still exists—it is still in force. See Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 15 (1982) (“When in two actions inconsistent final judgments are

rendered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment that is accorded conclusive effect in a third

action under the rules of res judicata.”).

¶ 113 B. An Explanation for Our Delay in Issuing This Disposition

- 35 - ¶ 114 We note that this case is an accelerated appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). That rule obliged us to issue our decision within 150 days after the

filing of the notice of appeal unless we had good cause for delay. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff.

July 1, 2018). In this case, we were required to issue a decision by December 23, 2024, a

deadline we missed. The delay is attributable, however, to the appellants’ motion for an

extension of time to file the record on appeal, the grandfather’s motion for an extension of time

to file his opening brief, and the mother’s motion for leave to file her appellee’s brief late.

Because of those delays, this case was not submitted for our review until December 19, 2024,

when the grandfather filed his reply brief. Oral argument was held on February 25, 2025. Given

the delays, which we could not avoid, we find that we had good cause for issuing our decision

after the 150-day deadline.

¶ 115 C. A Consolidation That Never Quite Happened

¶ 116 On November 14, 2023, in the guardianship case, over which Judge Nordquist

presided, the following docket entry was made: “Cause Continued for Hearing with Judge Gulley

Alongside the [guardianship case] that was previously set.” This docket entry appeared to order a

consolidation of the family law case into the guardianship case.

¶ 117 On November 27, 2023, however, Judge Gulley effectively rescinded that

consolidation order, ruling that she would handle only the guardianship case, not the family law

case.

¶ 118 This undoing of the consolidation of the family law case into the guardianship

case was unfortunate. The actions in the two cases needed to be decided together. Because Judge

Gulley’s decision to terminate the guardianship was explicitly premised on the child’s relocation

to Arizona with the mother, the termination of the guardianship was ill-founded without

- 36 - simultaneous rulings in the mother’s favor on her petitions in the family law case, i.e., her

petitions for relocation and for modification of the parenting plan and allocation judgment.

¶ 119 D. The Limited Relief Available in the Guardianship Case

¶ 120 If someone has been appointed as a minor’s guardian, a parent of the minor may

petition for the termination of the guardianship. Section 11-14.1(b) of the Probate Act provides

as follows:

“(b) Upon the filing of a petition by a minor’s living, adoptive, or

adjudicated parent whose parental rights have not been terminated, the court shall

discharge the guardian and terminate the guardianship if the parent establishes, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that a material change in the circumstances of

the minor or the parent has occurred since the entry of the order appointing the

guardian; unless the guardian establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of the guardianship would not be in the best interests of the minor. In

determining the minor’s best interests, the court shall consider all relevant factors

including:

(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the minor with the

parent and members of the parent’s household.

(2) The ability of the parent to provide a safe, nurturing

environment for the minor.

(3) The relative stability of the parties and the minor.

(4) The minor’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and

community, including the length of time that the minor has lived with the

parent and the guardian.

- 37 - (5) The nature and extent of visitation between the parent and the

minor and the guardian’s ability and willingness to facilitate visitation.”

755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022).

¶ 121 Thus, at a hearing on a petition for termination of a guardianship, if the circuit

court decides to grant the petition, the court has authority to “discharge the guardian and

terminate the guardianship.” Id. Under section 11-14.1(b), the court does not have authority to

order the relocation of the child to another state. In paragraphs D through L of the order of June

5, 2024, which was the “Order Terminating Guardianship,” the court specified what was to be

done with the child after “Letters of Office are revoked,” as paragraph C put it. According to

paragraphs D through L, the child was to have a transitional visitation period with the

grandfather and then was to be moved to Arizona to live with the mother. Paragraphs D through

L were statutorily unauthorized in the proceeding for termination of the guardianship. See id.

The relief available under section 11-14.1(b) was discharge of the guardian and termination of

the guardianship—nothing more. See id.

¶ 122 A parent’s relocation with a child is a family law matter governed by section

609.2 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2022)), which requires consideration of

factors different from, and more numerous than, the factors in section 11-14.(b) of the Probate

Act. Cf. id. § 609.2(g) with 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b)(1) to (5) (West 2022). Relocation would

require a modification of the parenting plan and allocation judgment in the family law case. See

750 ILCS 5/609.2(g) (West 2022).

¶ 123 The parenting plan is a contract between the mother and the father (see In re

Marriage of Coulter, 2012 IL 113474, ¶ 19), a “negotiated agreement,” in which “[e]ach party

has agreed to certain terms in exchange for other terms” and “terms [are] related to each other”

- 38 - (id. ¶ 31). Not only is the parenting plan a contract, but because of its incorporation into the

allocation judgment, it is a court order. Relocating the child to Arizona without following the

procedures in the parenting plan and allocation judgment—i.e., the procedures for giving notice

to the father and for modifying the parenting plan and allocation judgment—would be a breach

of contract and a violation of the judgment in the family law case. The same would be true of

unilaterally enrolling the child in a school in Arizona. Educational decision making is supposed

to be joint. Having chosen to proceed solely under the Probate Act and having rejected

consolidation, Judge Gulley lacked statutory authority to order relocation, “temporary” or

otherwise. By ordering relocation without modification of the parenting plan and allocation

judgment in the family law case, the circuit court participated in a breach of contract and in a

defiance of its own previous judgment.

¶ 124 Judge Gulley reasoned that when terminating the guardianship, she had to order

that custody of the child be given to someone—and that because the new custodian was to be the

mother, who lived in Arizona, it was necessary to relocate the child to Arizona. At oral

arguments, the mother’s attorney repeated that reasoning. The mother’s attorney then was asked

to suppose that, instead of living in Arizona, the mother lived in Taiwan: would terminating the

guardianship necessitate an order permitting the relocation of the child to Taiwan? The mother’s

attorney answered yes. That answer cannot be correct. Apart from the lack of statutory authority

that we already have pointed out, the circuit court’s reasoning is disproved by the absurd

conclusion to which the reasoning logically leads. When the guardianship is terminated, the

parenting plan and allocation judgment spring back into force. Under the terms of those binding

documents, the mother must exercise her custody rights exclusively in Illinois until the parenting

plan is modified through the procedures prescribed therein.

- 39 - ¶ 125 E. Lack of Notice to the Father in the Guardianship Case

¶ 126 The father complains that, in the guardianship case, “[n]o service of any of the

pleadings, motions, or orders were even attempted on [him].” He notes that “[t]he Amended

Petition to Terminate Guardianship was filed on September 25, 2023, set for trial [15] minutes

later, and set for trial on November 27, 2023, and no service was even attempted upon [him].”

He maintains that he “was entitled to notice of each and every document filed in the guardianship

case.”

¶ 127 In July 2021, at the inception of the guardianship case, the grandfather served the

guardianship petition on the father by mail in accordance with section 11-10.1(a) of the Probate

Act (755 ILCS 5/11-10.1(a) (West 2020)). Nevertheless, the father did not appear in the

guardianship case until some three years later. The father informs us in his brief that “[t]he first

time he appeared in the guardianship case was via counsel Brandi Chudoba, on June 5, 2024, for

the purpose of objecting to notice and jurisdiction.”

¶ 128 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 104(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) provides:

“Pleadings subsequent to the complaint, written motions, and other documents

required to be filed shall be filed with the clerk with a certificate of counsel or

other proof that the documents have been served on all parties who have appeared

and have not theretofore been found by the court to be in default for failure to

plead.” (Emphasis added.)

The “complaint” in the guardianship case was the petition for guardianship. All documents filed

after the petition for guardianship had to be served only on parties who had appeared and had not

been declared to be in default for failure to plead. See id. The mother filed her amended petition

for guardianship on September 25, 2023. The father did not appear in the guardianship case until

- 40 - June 5, 2024. Before his appearance, he was not entitled to be served with documents filed in the

guardianship case—including the amended petition for the termination of the guardianship. See

id.

¶ 129 The moral is this. It is a bad idea to fail to appear in court after being served with

a complaint. Being frozen out under Rule 104(b) is one of the resulting disadvantages.

¶ 130 The father still had the right to insist, however, on the notice procedure in the

parenting plan and in section 609.2(c) and (d) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609.2(c), (d)

(West 2022)). One item in the required notice is “the address of the parent’s intended new

residence.” Id. § 609.2(d)(2). The record does not appear to contain such a written notice to the

father. We see no indication in the record that the guardian ad litem has inspected this Meadview

residence. See In re Marriage of Gualandi, 2024 IL App (5th) 240238, ¶ 87 (“The GAL did not

*** inspect the condition of Mother’s house.”). The father might want to be told, formally, in

writing, the address in Meadview where it is proposed that the child will live, if only to confirm

for himself that there really is a house at that address and that the house is habitable. We point

out this deficiency to show the distance between the notice procedure in this case and the notice

procedure to which the father is entitled in the family law case.

¶ 131 F. The Termination of the Guardianship

¶ 132 1. A Material Change in Circumstances

¶ 133 a. The Concept of Materiality

¶ 134 At the hearing on a petition for termination of the guardianship, the parent has the

initial burden of proof: the parent must prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that a

material change in the circumstances of the minor or the parent has occurred since the entry of

the order appointing the guardian.” 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022).

- 41 - ¶ 135 Which changes in circumstances are “material,” that is to say, of real importance?

The answer is inferable from the reason for this rule that a change in circumstances must be

proven. “ ‘The logic of this rule is that[,] absent a change in circumstances, a court would be

merely ruling on the exact issue previously decided.’ ” In re Estate of Andre T., 2018 IL App

(1st) 172613, ¶ 29 (quoting In re Wadman’s Estate, 110 Ill. App. 3d 302, 305 (1982)). To avoid

putting the court in the position of ruling on the same issue on which the court ruled previously

when granting the petition for the appointment of a guardian, the parent must prove that the

court’s factual justification for establishing the guardianship no longer holds true.

¶ 136 For example, in Wadman’s Estate, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 308, “[t]he original petition

on which the agreed guardianship was entered alleged that [the mother] was ‘unable to properly

care for the minor at [that] time.’ ” The Fourth District upheld the termination of the

guardianship because “at least some showing was made that a change in circumstances existed,”

specifically, the mother’s testimony that “she no longer felt unable to cope with the child” and

that “she was no longer working the late night hours as before.” Id.

¶ 137 b. The Resolution of the Mother’s Criminal Law Difficulties

¶ 138 On July 7, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the grandfather’s petition to be

appointed as the child’s guardian. At the hearing, no evidence was presented regarding the

mother other than the grandfather’s testimony that the allegations in the guardianship petition

were true. In his petition, he alleged it would be in the best interests of the child to appoint him

as guardian because “the parents dropped [the child] off on June 25[.] [T]hey got in trouble and

haven’t been back. I need to be able to make decisions and [provide] medical [care] for [the

child].”

- 42 - ¶ 139 At the trial on the mother’s amended petition to terminate the guardianship, the

evidence tended to show that the mother was no longer on the run from the police and that she

was now stable and law-abiding. It does not seem unreasonable to characterize such a change as

“material” (see id. § 11-14.1(b)), considering that the mother’s being “in trouble” was important

enough to include in the guardianship petition as the reason for the parents’ not having “been

back.”

¶ 140 Two different answers to a question can be within the range of reasonableness,

and our standard of review is deferential. The question for us is whether the decision to terminate

the guardianship is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Estate of K.E.S., 347

Ill. App. 3d 452, 461 (2004). The supreme court has explained, “A judgment is against the

manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent, or when the

findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.” Leonardi v. Loyola

University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995). It was not arbitrary to regard being in trouble

with the law as material if the guardianship petition—and presumably, the order granting the

petition—regarded that circumstance as material.

¶ 141 According to the grandfather, it is irrelevant that the mother is now crime-free and

drug-free. What is unchanged, the grandfather argues, is the mother’s “inability to stay in the

child’s life.” It is that circumstance which occasioned the guardianship. The grandfather asserts

that, after marrying Filatov, the mother “once again disappeared again for seven (7) months.”

That assertion is unaccompanied by a citation to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.

1, 2020) (“Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons

therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.”). It appears that

- 43 - for a period of about five months, from November 2023 to April 2024, the mother’s only contact

with the child was two telephone calls.

¶ 142 Nevertheless, the mother petitioned for more parenting time, and after her petition

was granted, she and Filatov came to Rockford in a camper so that she could avail herself of the

additional parenting time. A reasonable trier of fact could regard those efforts as a substantial

improvement over leaving the child with the grandfather, with no guardianship arrangements,

and running away to a destination unknown. So, the evidence is not all on one side. It is mixed:

there is evidence of intense interest and evidence of insufficient interest.

¶ 143 2. The Best Interests of the Child

¶ 144 Even after the parent proves a material change in circumstances, the proceeding to

terminate the guardianship is not necessarily over. Rather, under section 11-14.1(b) of the

Probate Act, the burden then shifts to the guardian to prove, by a higher standard of proof—

“clear and convincing evidence”—“that termination of the guardianship would not be in the best

interests of the minor.” 755 ILCS 5/11-14.1(b) (West 2022). In determining the best interests of

the minor, the circuit court is to consider a nonexhaustive list of factors, those set forth in

subsections (1) to (5) of section 11-14.1(b) (id. § 11-14.1(b)(1) to (5)).

¶ 145 One of the statutory factors is “[t]he ability of the parent”—that is, the parent

petitioning for the termination of the guardianship—“to provide a safe, nurturing environment

for the minor.” Id. § 11-14.1(b)(2). The grandfather argues that the mother’s “return to Arizona”

and the “subsequent breakdown in the relationship between [the mother and the child] warranted

continuation of the guardianship.”

¶ 146 The circuit court, however, regarded the mother’s move to Arizona as positive: as

part of the mother’s success in “[finding] a new life and *** now [having] something to offer

- 44 - [the child].” In the court’s analysis, the move to Arizona made the factor in section 11-14.1(b)(2)

favor the termination of the guardianship. The court said:

“The Court considered the ability of the parent to provide a safe and

nurturing environment. There was testimony from the mother that she *** is

living with her husband in Arizona in a three-bedroom home owned by her

husband who is a veteran and is employed as a litigation specialist. He testified

that he is willing to support [the child] financially and emotionally.”

Also, the court cited Filatov’s testimony that “Meadview, Arizona, is a safe and wonderful place

to raise children” and a statement by an Arizona friend of the mother and Filatov, Ladonna Dose,

that “they live in a very supportive community and would help with the care of [the child] if

needed.”

¶ 147 This finding with respect to the factor in section 11-14.1(b)(2) seemed important

to the circuit court’s decision. The problem with this finding, though, is its presupposition that

the child would be relocated to Arizona upon the termination of the guardianship. Treating

relocation as a given was unjustified. At oral arguments, the mother’s attorney agreed that we

should decide de novo whether, in the termination proceedings, the circuit court considered an

improper factor. We decide, de novo, that the court considered an improper factor: the

availability of relocation. The mother’s petitions for relocation and for modification of the

parenting plan and allocation judgment were still pending—and remain pending, as far as we

know. In the family law case, the mother will have “the burden of proving that *** relocation is

in the child’s best interests” considering the 11 factors in section 609.2(g) (750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)

(West 2022)). Gualandi, 2024 IL App (5th) 240238, ¶ 77. In addition to considering the factors

in section 609.2(g), the circuit court will have to consider the 15 factors in section 602.7(b) (750

- 45 - ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2022)) when deciding whether to modify parenting time. See Gualandi,

2024 IL App (5th) 240238, ¶ 78. An investigation by the guardian ad litem will have to address

the best interests factors. See id. ¶ 88. It was impossible to know the outcome of those family law

proceedings until the petitions were ruled on.

¶ 148 Because the father “currently [had] active warrants for his arrest since being

released from jail,” to quote the circuit court, and because he did not join in the mother’s request

to terminate the guardianship, the grandfather, apparently, was the only party in Illinois who

could take care of the child. Whether the relocation of the child to Arizona would be allowed, so

that the mother would be able to take care of him, was yet to be determined in the family law

case. Therefore, by finding that the grandfather had failed to prove that continuing the

guardianship would be in the best interests of the child, the court made a finding that, given the

present posture of the family law case, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See

K.E.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 461. The finding assumed a fact that was not in evidence: that

relocation necessarily would be allowed. Until the petition for relocation was ruled on, that fact

was not established.

¶ 149 What remained established, under the unmodified parenting plan and allocation

judgment, was the father’s right to equal parenting time. The visitation schedule in the parenting

plan was still intact. The guardianship merely suspended the parents’ rights under the parenting

plan and the allocation judgment. With the termination of the guardianship, those rights would

spring back into force. Theoretically, then, on any Monday or every other weekend, the father

would be able to show up in Arizona and pick up the child, making the child’s education

impossible. The possibility of such disruption would not be in the best interests of the child.

¶ 150 III. CONCLUSION

- 46 - ¶ 151 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand

this guardianship case with directions to consolidate this case for hearing and disposition into the

family law case, Winnebago County case No. 17-F-955, and to hold further proceedings in the

family law case that are not inconsistent with this order.

¶ 152 Reversed and remanded with directions.

- 47 -