In re Guardianship of Hyde

2024 Ohio 1878

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 17, 2024
• Docket: C-230576
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF ARIANA : APPEAL NO. C-230576 HYDE TRIAL NO. 2018003726 :

: O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Probate Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 17, 2024

Glenda A. Smith, for Appellant Melissa Payne,

Resch, Root, Philipps & Graham, LLC, and Derek Graham, for Appellee Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} Following years of mental health challenges and a severe mental health-

related incident, Ariana Hyde (at age 18) was involuntarily committed to the care of

the Southern Ohio Developmental Center (“SODC”). Given Ms. Hyde’s serious mental

health and cognitive diagnoses, appellee Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc.

(“APSI”) filed an application for guardianship. Appellant Melissa Payne (Ms. Hyde’s

mother) also sought guardianship at the same time. But because Ms. Payne struggled

to acknowledge and address her daughter’s mental health, the probate court opted to

appoint APSI as guardian. Years later, frustrated with the delayed efforts to transition

Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive environment, Ms. Payne moved to remove APSI as

guardian and to appoint herself as guardian. Following a hearing, the magistrate

denied the motions, citing APSI’s attentiveness and its plan (created in partnership

with SODC) to transition Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive setting. Ms. Payne objected to

the magistrate’s decision, but the probate court denied her objections and adopted the

magistrate’s decision. Ms. Payne now appeals.

{¶2} At the outset, we acknowledge that it is clear from the record that Ms.

Payne loves her daughter and is doing her best to look out for her daughter’s interests.

Unfortunately, the legal inquiry before us is not simply whether the parent genuinely

cares for the child. When a child has significant needs, and a probate court has

determined that the child’s best interests are served by a different guardian, we cannot

overturn that decision of the probate court unless it fails to comply with the governing

legal standards. After a thorough and complete review of the record, we ultimately

affirm the probate court’s judgment denying Ms. Payne’s motions.

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I.

{¶3} Ms. Hyde presented as a typical child until she began to experience

psychotic symptoms at age 13. Between the ages of 13 and 15, she was hospitalized

repeatedly (some of her hospitalizations resulted from medication non-compliance

while in Ms. Payne’s care). During this time, she engaged in self-harm. Ultimately,

she was diagnosed with schizophrenia with catatonia and developmental disabilities.

She returned to school and was placed on an Individualized Education Plan because

she began struggling to keep up with her classwork. But even with this support

structure, she could not stay on top of her studies, and she eventually dropped out of

school.

{¶4} In 2017, Ms. Hyde went to live with her grandmother. Ms. Payne was

working and completing nursing school at the time and felt that the grandmother

would have more time to supervise her. But while living with her grandmother, Ms.

Hyde jumped from the fifth floor of her grandmother’s apartment building in a suicide

attempt. Following this incident, she was again hospitalized and was ultimately

involuntarily committed to SODC pursuant to a civil commitment order. She has

resided in SODC since age 18, and she is now 24 years old. The record demonstrates

that she has made substantial progress and is stabilized, but she is not capable of

independently carrying out the activities of daily life.

{¶5} In 2018, APSI, a private, nonprofit entity dedicated to protecting the

rights of adults in Ohio with developmental disabilities, filed an application for

guardianship of Ms. Hyde. Ms. Payne filed a competing application. Because the

probate court did “not believe [Ms. Payne] will be able to make all requisite decisions

necessary to properly provide for Ariana’s needs given her reluctance to fully accept

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her daughter’s mental health diagnosis[,]” in February 2019, it appointed APSI as the

legal guardian of Ms. Hyde.

{¶6} Ms. Payne and Ms. Hyde reunite at weekly visits where Ms. Payne takes

her daughter from the SODC’s facility for about eight hours at a time. By all accounts,

everything seems to proceed well during these visits. As a result, Ms. Payne has

requested overnight visits, but so far, APSI has denied her requests. Ms. Payne

provides Ms. Hyde with personal hygiene products and clothing. It is undisputed that

she has capably advocated for her daughter’s needs, including her quality of care at

SODC and her transition to a less restrictive environment.

{¶7} In August 2022, Ms. Payne moved to remove APSI from the position of

guardian of Ms. Hyde and to appoint herself as guardian. In January 2023, the

probate court convened a hearing on the motions. Ms. Payne called four witnesses:

Dr. Stuart Bassman (the chief psychologist at SODC), Jill Esz (a supervisor at SODC),

Kristina Gaible (a regional director at APSI), and she testified as well. The APSI

employee directly assigned to Ms. Hyde (Mr. Potter) could not attend the hearing

because of his paternity leave.

{¶8} Dr. Bassman testified regarding his role as chief psychologist, Ms.

Hyde’s significant progress while at SODC, SODC’s plans to move her to a less

restrictive facility “within weeks,” his communications with Ms. Payne and Mr. Potter,

Ms. Hyde’s lack of any unmet needs, and his lack of concern with APSI’s performance

as guardian.

{¶9} Ms. Esz shared her role as a liaison between the agency, families, courts,

and other entities, her understanding regarding Ms. Hyde’s stability with her

medication, her relationship with Ms. Payne and her observations that Ms. Payne has

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her daughter’s best interests at heart and has served as a good advocate, the attempts

to move Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive facility, Ms. Hyde’s desire to have an apartment

(which she will have at the new facility), APSI’s support in moving her to a less

restrictive setting, and her observations that APSI has acted in her best interests and

has met its responsibilities as guardian.

{¶10} Ms. Gaible communicated APSI’s role as court appointed guardian, her

role overseeing Ms. Hyde’s direct assigned representative (Mr. Potter), Mr. Potter’s

visits with Ms. Hyde, Mr. Potter’s training, Ms. Hyde’s dislike for her current

placement at SODC, the team’s challenges in finding a less restrictive placement

suitable for her, and her current involuntary commitment at SODC.

{¶11} And finally, Ms. Payne testified to Mr. Potter’s lack of attendance at the

annual mental health hearings, her visits with her daughter, what she provides, her

concerns with Ms. Hyde’s care and quality of life at the SODC facility, her

communication with Mr. Potter and Ms. Esz, the denial of an overnight visit pass, and

her perception that APSI sought to block the move into a less restrictive setting. She

also shared that she feels that she acts in her daughter’s best interests while Mr. Potter

does not.

{¶12} APSI called one witness: Amanda Lee (a residential care supervisor at

SODC). Ms. Lee discussed her regular interaction with Ms. Hyde over the past two

and a half years, her observation that her needs are being met, APSI’s ability to meet

her needs, her need for 24-hour care, and her failure to express any desire to stay

overnight with her mother.

{¶13} The magistrate issued his decision denying the motion to remove APSI

as guardian (and therefore, he also denied Ms. Payne’s motion to be appointed

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guardian). In response, Ms. Payne filed objections arguing that APSI breached its duty

of care to Ms. Hyde, that the court should apply the “best interest” standard to

terminate APSI’s guardianship, and that she has a constitutional right to the

maintenance of the parent-child relationship. In October 2023, the probate court

denied her objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate. Ms. Payne now

appeals.

II.

{¶14} The decisions of probate courts regarding guardianship matters are not

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Guardianship of Keane,

7th Dist. Carroll No. 19 CA 0934, 2020-Ohio-1105, ¶ 65, citing In re Estate of

Bednarczuk, 80 Ohio App.3d 548, 551, 609 N.E.2d 1310 (12th Dist.1992). An abuse of

discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in

regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah,

166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. And “[w]hen reviewing

the trial court’s [factual] findings, this court must be guided by the presumption that

the trial court’s findings were correct.” In re Guardianship of Rahbek, 3d Dist. Shelby

No. 17-19-11, 2020-Ohio-3223, ¶ 22, citing In re Guardianship of Slone, 3d Dist.

Crawford No. 3-04-13, 2004-Ohio-6041, ¶ 3.

{¶15} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Payne contends that the magistrate

did not make a best interests finding and that the record supports a determination that

it is in the best interests of Ms. Hyde to appoint her mother as her guardian. Before

analyzing this assignment of error, we must sketch the statutory background. R.C.

Chapter 2111 governs guardians and conservatorships, but it fails to address the

process of removal of the guardian of an incompetent ward. R.C. Chapter 2109, on the

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other hand, governs fiduciaries appointed by the probate court with respect to

financial matters. It contains a provision that specifically enumerates the permissible

reasons to remove a fiduciary: “habitual drunkenness, neglect of duty, incompetency,

or fraudulent conduct, because the interest of the property, testamentary trust, or

estate that the fiduciary is responsible for administering demands it, or for any other

cause authorized by law.” R.C. 2109.24.

{¶16} Because R.C. Chapter 2111 does not contain a removal standard for

guardians of incompetent wards, Ohio courts have generally borrowed the removal

standard of R.C. 2109.24 to apply to the removal of such guardians. See, e.g., In re

Spangler, 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2007-G-2800 and 2007-G-2802, 2011-Ohio-6686,

¶ 25. Based on the arguments presented by the parties, we have no reason to question

this conclusion. Moreover, probate courts serve as the “superior guardian” of any

ward. R.C. 2111.50(A)(1). And their “ultimate concern is the welfare of the ward.” In

re Spangler at ¶ 54. Therefore, courts have interpreted the best interests of the ward

as a basis for the removal of a guardian that is authorized by the catchall provision of

R.C. 2109.24. Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶17} Here, Ms. Payne maintains that the magistrate erred by not using the

best interests standard in evaluating the removal of the guardian. But “in an appeal

from a ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision, an appellate court reviews the

trial court’s judgment, not the magistrate’s decision.” Frey v. Amazon Home

Warranty LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 23AP-114, 2023-Ohio-3899, ¶ 8, citing Vice v.

Sexton, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3371, 2011-Ohio-1647, ¶ 24.

{¶18} Turning to the probate court’s decision, while it adopted the

magistrate’s factual findings and legal conclusions, based on the evidence presented

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at the hearing, it also separately concluded “that none of the criteria for removal of a

guardian set forth in R.C. 2109.24 had been met and the Court cannot find that it is in

the ward’s best interests to remove the guardian.” While it would facilitate our review

if the probate court explained its reasoning for its best interests finding, nonetheless,

the court established that it considered Ms. Hyde’s best interests in its decision to

maintain APSI as her guardian.

{¶19} And further, the record supports this best interests conclusion. Because

of Ms. Hyde’s significant mental health needs and cognitive delays, she is not capable

of independently carrying out the activities of daily life and requires 24-hour care.

Nevertheless, Ms. Payne questioned the delay in moving her daughter to a less

restrictive setting. But the record explains the basis for the delay. Her daughter’s care

team determined that a less restrictive setting with apartment-style living, 24-hour

staffing, and remote monitoring would be most appropriate for her needs and further

her development. Members of her care team emphasized the importance of finding

the right placement to ensure that she did not experience any developmental setbacks

following her transition. Testimony at the hearing established that locating this type

of placement proved extremely challenging, and after much effort, her care team

finally found an appropriate placement.

{¶20} The magistrate determined (and the court adopted the finding) “that

APSI has done a good job of making decisions regarding the care of Ariana Hyde,

sometimes under difficult circumstances” and that “APSI and SODC have a good plan

to transition Ariana to a less restrictive environment which will be in line with her

future needs.” The testimony presented at the hearing demonstrated that APSI has

been involved and has been actively working toward the goal of identifying a less

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restrictive placement that will meet her complex needs. Additionally, while certain

testimony established that Ms. Payne is a good advocate for her daughter, we see no

indication that APSI took any measures to interfere with her advocacy. Therefore, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Payne’s motion to remove

APSI as guardian.

{¶21} Thus, we overrule her first assignment of error.

III.

{¶22} Turning to Ms. Payne’s second assignment of error, she challenges the

court’s determination that the guardian satisfied industry standard guidelines,

alleging that the guardian failed to exercise due diligence and make decisions for her

daughter in pursuit of her least restrictive alternative.

{¶23} As an initial matter, it is important to note that APSI serves as the

guardian in this case. Ms. Payne’s brief references actions of APSI’s assigned

representative—Mr. Potter—and argues that “he” failed to meet industry standards.

But ultimately, APSI, not Mr. Potter, was appointed as Ms. Hyde’s guardian.

Therefore, we evaluate Ms. Payne’s arguments with respect to APSI’s role as guardian.

{¶24} Ms. Payne seemingly equates “industry standard guidelines” to the

provision on guardianship found in the Ohio Rules of Superintendence for the Courts.

See Sup.R. 66. But these rules “are administrative directives only and do not function

as, or have the force of, law in the same manner as rules of practice and procedure.”

In re Guardianship of Bernie, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-01-005, 2019-Ohio-334,

¶ 27, citing Pettit v. Pettit, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-08-018, 2012-Ohio-1801.

Consequently, they “do not provide a ground for reversal.” Id. at ¶ 28.

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{¶25} And regardless, the record does not support Ms. Payne’s arguments

that APSI violated these rules. Ms. Payne asserts that APSI failed to meet the following

responsibilities of a guardian to their ward:

(B) Exercising due diligence

A guardian shall exercise due diligence in making decisions that are in

the best interest of a ward, including but not limited to communicating

with the ward and being fully informed about the implications of the

decisions.

(C) Least restrictive alternative

Unless otherwise approved by the probate division of a court of common

pleas, a guardian shall make a choice or decision for a ward that best

meets the needs of the ward while imposing the least limitations on the

ward’s rights, freedom, or ability to control the ward’s environment. To

determine the least restrictive alternative, a guardian may seek and

consider an independent assessment of the ward’s functional ability,

health status, and care needs.

Sup.R. 66.09(B) and (C).

{¶26} We first consider APSI’s performance with respect to Sup.R. 66.09(B).

All three SODC employees who Ms. Payne called as witnesses expressed that they did

not have any concerns with APSI’s performance as guardian. And further, Ms. Esz

indicated that APSI supported moving Ms. Hyde to a less restrictive setting and that

she had observed APSI acting in her best interests. And the 2021 guardian’s report

discussed at the hearing demonstrated that Mr. Potter had five visits with Ms. Hyde

during that year. Ms. Gaible (an APSI supervisor) clarified that these visits do not

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encompass all of the interactions between Ms. Hyde and Mr. Potter but rather are

limited to visits that meet specific criteria: the visits must be face-to-face and discuss

her wants, needs, placement, services, and any necessary changes.

{¶27} Turning to Sup.R. 66.09(C), the record provides ample evidence

demonstrating APSI’s efforts (along with the rest of Ms. Hyde’s support team) to

transition her to a less restrictive placement. Ms. Hyde was placed in SODC on a court-

ordered, involuntary basis. While the process to transition her placement took

substantial time, and Ms. Hyde expressed her dissatisfaction with her placement at

SODC, her care team made significant efforts to secure her an appropriate placement

that could sufficiently meet her complex needs. They wanted to be certain that her

placement would be stable and sustainable to ensure she would not have to return to

SODC and have her progress disrupted. The process also required a placement

provider to accept Ms. Hyde as a client (which was out of the control of APSI). And

ultimately, shortly after the hearing, in April 2023, Ms. Hyde was transitioned from

SODC to a less restrictive, apartment-style placement that her care team felt could

provide her with sufficient support.

{¶28} In light of the record and the applicable law, we overrule Ms. Payne’s

second assignment of error.

* * *

{¶29} Considering the foregoing analysis, we overrule both of Ms. Payne’s

assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

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Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.