In re Guardianship of C.D.M.

2020 IL App (5th) 180227-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 19, 2020
• Docket: 5-18-0227
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2020 IL App (5th) 180227-U NOTICE Decision filed 02/19/20. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0227 Supreme Court Rule 23 and changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent the filing of a Petition for by any party except in the Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________

In re GUARDIANSHIP OF C.D.M. ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (Linda Williams, ) Washington County. ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 17-P-21 ) Dwaine McDonald and ) Eric Petersen, ) Honorable ) Daniel J. Emge, Respondents-Appellees). ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Welch and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The statute of limitations set forth in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 applied to a minor who was represented by a guardian ad litem in a case brought under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act where parentage was at issue. The statute of limitations for disestablishment of parentage began to run when the minor, through her guardian ad litem, became aware that her legal father was not her biological father. The parties did not argue that there was any error in the circuit court’s dismissal of the minor’s claim for establishment of parentage and, as such, the circuit court’s dismissal is affirmed.

1 ¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 This case involves the parentage of a minor child, C.D.M. (minor), born July 9,

2010. On the day after the minor’s birth, the Illinois Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) received a hotline call indicating that the minor was believed to be “at

risk” if released to her mother, Adrienne Crabtree (mother). DCFS became involved and

determined that a plan should be instituted to place the minor in protective custody, and

that certain interventions were required for both the mother and the putative father,

Dwaine McDonald.

¶4 On July 12, 2010, mother and McDonald signed a “Voluntary Acknowledgment of

Paternity” (VAP) establishing Crabtree as the mother and McDonald as the father of the

minor. On July 13, 2010, a petition for adjudication of wardship was filed by the State,

alleging it was in the best interests of the minor that she be made a ward of the court. The

petition was filed in Jefferson County, Illinois, case 2010-JA-39 (juvenile case) and

alleged that the minor was neglected pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile

Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2010))). The next day, the circuit court held

a hearing on the petition and mother and McDonald were both present. On July 14, 2010,

the court entered a temporary custody order finding probable cause to believe the minor

was neglected and that it was in the best interests of the minor that she be made a ward of

the court. DCFS was appointed temporary guardian. The court also ordered mother and

McDonald to “submit to DNA testing to determine paternity.”

¶5 The DNA report was returned prior to the adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile case

and was filed on October 25, 2010, showing that McDonald was excluded as the minor’s 2 biological father. On December 20, 2010, the circuit court entered an interim order which

stated: “Custody of minor is placed with father, Dwaine McDonald. Guardianship

remains with DCFS.” The interim order went on to establish visitation with the mother

and maternal grandmother, Linda Williams.

¶6 On September 8, 2011, mother filed a “Petition to Vacate Voluntary

Acknowledgement of Paternity” pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010). Because mother’s petition was filed more

than 60 days after the VAP was signed, mother was required to prove that she signed the

VAP under fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 1 750 ILCS 45/6(d) (West 2010). In

support of her petition, mother alleged that she was under a great deal of stress after the

minor’s birth and was not taking her prescribed medication for diagnosed mental health

issues. She alleged that these facts proved that she did not knowingly or voluntarily

execute the VAP. On November 10, 2011, the Jefferson County court held a hearing on

mother’s petition. Williams was present at the hearing, represented by counsel, and filed

written closing arguments. The minor was 16 months old at the time of the hearing and

was represented by her guardian ad litem (GAL), who participated in the hearing and also

filed a written closing argument asserting that the petition to vacate the VAP should be

denied. On March 2, 2012, the circuit court denied mother’s petition to vacate the VAP,

finding that mother had failed to show by “clear and convincing evidence that she was

1 Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, the presumption of parentage was conclusive if the putative mother and father had signed a VAP, unless the acknowledgment of parentage was rescinded within 60 days after the date set forth in the VAP. 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West 2010). 3 bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract, or in this case, the

signing of a VAP.”

¶7 On May 16, 2011, Williams was granted intervener status in the juvenile case. On

May 10, 2013, an adjudicatory hearing was held and an order was entered by the circuit

court finding that the minor was neglected as defined by section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile

Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2012)), in that the minor was in an

environment that was injurious to her welfare. The docket sheet indicates that McDonald

was present for the adjudicatory hearing, and the adjudicatory order indicates he was

present with his attorney. The order also indicates that Williams was present, with her

attorney. Mother, the minor through her GAL, and DCFS were also represented. A

dispositional hearing was held directly following the adjudicatory hearing. The “agreed

dispositional order” again lists McDonald’s attorney as “attorney for father.” As to

McDonald, the dispositional order found that “[t]he father is fit, able and willing to care

for, protect, train, educate, supervise or discipline the minor and he will not endanger the

health, safety or well-being of the minor. Father has agreed to subsidized guardianship

with maternal grandmother, Linda Williams.” The circuit court granted unsupervised

visitation “for father from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Saturday.”

¶8 On June 19, 2013, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of the minor seeking to appoint

Williams as guardian of the person of the minor in Jefferson County case 2013-P-54

(guardianship case). The petition alleged that McDonald was the father of the minor. On

June 24, 2013, a GAL was appointed to represent the minor. That same day, the circuit

court entered an order appointing Williams as the guardian of the minor and McDonald 4 consented to the entry of this order. The order authorized Williams to have, subject to the

direction of the court, “the care, management, and custody” of the minor. The court also

terminated DCFS’s wardship and guardianship of the minor in the juvenile proceedings,

No. 10-JA-39, and closed the juvenile case. The circuit court entered a visitation schedule

with McDonald by separate order in the guardianship case.

¶9 On November 14, 2016, McDonald filed a petition to modify visitation based on

an interfering work schedule and a claim that Williams had refused to allow visitation

with the minor. Williams filed an answer denying that she had refused visitation to

McDonald. On April 26, 2017, Williams moved to transfer the case to Washington

County, as the minor had relocated there with Williams. By order entered May 11, 2017,

the guardianship case was transferred to Washington County for the convenience of the

parties.

¶ 10 On October 20, 2017, Williams, as guardian of the minor, filed a counterpetition

on the minor’s behalf to declare the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship between

McDonald and the minor and for other relief. Because of the transfer of the guardianship

case to Washington County, the circuit court appointed a new GAL. The court also

appointed counsel for McDonald to represent him on the allegations in the

counterpetition.

¶ 11 Williams filed an amended counterpetition on October 27, 2017, consisting of two

counts. Count I sought to declare the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship

between McDonald and the minor pursuant to section 205(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act

of 2015. 750 ILCS 46/205(a) (West 2016). Count II sought the establishment of 5 parentage between the minor and Eric Petersen. It does not appear from the record that

Petersen was served with the amended counterpetition or given notice of any of the

proceedings, and he did not appear or participate in any hearings held on said

counterpetition. The counterpetition set forth the factual circumstances surrounding the

birth of the minor, the signing of the VAP by mother and McDonald, and the alleged

neglect by mother. The counterpetition further explained how Williams became the

custodian and guardian of the minor. Williams attached the VAP to the counterpetition.

Williams also averred that a DNA test had been performed which indicated that

McDonald should be excluded as the father of the minor child. A copy of the DNA report

was attached to the counterpetition and was dated October 25, 2010.

¶ 12 On November 9, 2017, McDonald filed a motion to dismiss the amended

counterpetition pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

619 (West 2016)). The basis of this motion was that the amended counterpetition was

time-barred because it was not brought within two years after Williams, as guardian of

the minor, knew or should have known that McDonald had been excluded as the father of

the minor through DNA testing. McDonald alleged that Williams knew “as early as

October 25, 2010, when the DNA results were received, or at least as of March 2, 2012,”

when a hearing had been held to determine whether mother had lacked the mental

capacity to sign the VAP. Therefore, pursuant to section 205(b) of the Illinois Parentage

Act of 2015, McDonald asked the court to dismiss the counterpetition, as time-barred.

750 ILCS 46/205(b) (West 2016). On January 11, 2018, mother entered her appearance

and waived notice of any further proceedings. In her entry of appearance, mother 6 indicated that she was agreeable with the entry of a determination that McDonald was not

the father of the minor, as any other finding would require her to have an ongoing

relationship with a man who was not the father of her child.

¶ 13 On March 2, 2018, the parties and their attorneys appeared and argued

McDonald’s motion to dismiss the amended counterpetition. The court took the matter

under advisement. On March 13, 2018, the circuit court entered a written order that

dismissed the amended counterpetition in its entirety, with prejudice. The minor appeals

the circuit court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, and this matter is properly before this

court.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The first issue we must address is the jurisdiction of this court to hear the merits of

this appeal. The Illinois Appellate Court has an independent duty to examine its appellate

jurisdiction even if the parties do not raise the issue. A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v.

MSMC Realty, L.L.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67. In addition, we cannot obtain

jurisdiction over an appeal through consent or waiver of appellate jurisdiction. Gaynor v.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 322 Ill. App. 3d 288, 289 (2001).

¶ 16 The appellant asserts that we have jurisdiction over the order dismissing the

amended counterpetition pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017),

which concerns appeals from final judgments. We disagree.

¶ 17 The proceedings in this case began when McDonald filed a petition to modify

visitation. Williams, on behalf of the minor, filed an amended counterpetition for the

disestablishment of McDonald’s parentage and for other relief, including the 7 establishment of parentage with Petersen. As noted above, the circuit court dismissed the

amended counterpetition with prejudice. Specifically, the circuit court’s order states,

“That the Amended Counter-Petition to Declare the Non-Existence of the Parent Child

Relationship between Dwaine McDonald and [C.D.M.] and for Other Relief filed by

Linda Williams, as guardian of [C.D.M.], is dismissed, with prejudice.” The language of

the order, therefore, dismissed with prejudice the entire amended counterpetition, which

included both counts of the amended counterpetition. This dismissal of the amended

counterpetition was not a final order under Rule 303, because McDonald’s petition to

modify visitation was still pending.

¶ 18 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), an “appeal may be taken from a

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all *** claims only if the trial court has

made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either

enforcement or appeal or both.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8,

2016). Here, the circuit court has not made any Rule 304(a) findings. Therefore, the order

dismissing the amended counterpetition is not appealable under Rule 303 or Rule 304(a).

¶ 19 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), however, categorizes

certain interlocutory orders that are appealable without the special finding required by

Rule 304(a). Relevant to the appeal in the present case, Rule 304(b)(1) allows an appeal

without a special finding from a judgment or order entered in the administration of a

guardianship or similar proceeding which finally determines a right or status of a party.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Here, as we explain below, the circuit court’s

order dismissing the amended counterpetition had the effect of finally determining that 8 McDonald was the legal father of the minor. Accordingly, we conclude that we have

jurisdiction over the order dismissing the amended counterpetition under Rule 304(b)(1).

We now turn to the merits of the order dismissing the amended counterpetition.

¶ 20 A. Count I of the Amended Counterpetition

¶ 21 The next issue we address concerns the circuit court’s dismissal of count I of the

amended counterpetition as being time-barred. The circuit court dismissed the amended

counterpetition with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(4) and (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2-619(a)(4), (9) (West 2016)), a defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a

motion for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the

following grounds: “(4) [t]hat the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment *** [or]

(9) [t]hat the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter

avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.”

¶ 22 Our review of a ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is de novo. In re

Paternity of Rogers, 297 Ill. App. 3d 750, 754 (1998). In considering a section 2-619

motion, we accept all well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from those

facts as true, and consider the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. Id. Our inquiry on

review, absent an issue of material fact, is whether the dismissal was proper as a matter of

law. Id.

¶ 23 In the present case, in order to analyze the circuit court’s dismissal order, we must

first determine what statute of limitations applies to the relief requested in the amended

counterpetition. In count I of the amended counterpetition, Williams, on behalf of the 9 minor, C.D.M., brought a disestablishment claim pursuant to section 205(a) of the Illinois

Parentage Act of 2015. 750 ILCS 46/205(a) (West 2016). Section 205(b) of the Illinois

Parentage Act of 2015 sets out a statute of limitations that applies to causes of action to

declare the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship, including those brought by the

minor. Section 205(b) provides that the cause must be commenced within two years after

the petitioner “knew or should have known of the relevant facts.” Id. § 205(b).

Specifically, that section reads as follows:

“(b) An action to declare the non-existence of the parent-child

relationship brought under subsection (a) of this Section shall be barred if

brought later than 2 years after the petitioner knew or should have known

of the relevant facts. The 2-year period for bringing an action to declare the

non-existence of the parent-child relationship shall not extend beyond the

date on which the child reaches the age of 18 years. ***” Id.

¶ 24 Here, McDonald moved to dismiss the amended counterpetition arguing that it

was time-barred under section 205(b) because the petitioner (the minor) knew, or should

have known, that McDonald was not the biological father of the minor as early as

October 25, 2010, when the DNA results were received, or at least as of March 2, 2012,

when the hearing to determine whether mother had lacked capacity to sign the VAP was

held. The minor was a party to the juvenile case and represented by her GAL during both

events. Considering the specific facts of this case, we agree and hold that count I of the

amended counterpetition is untimely under section 205(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act of

2015. 10 ¶ 25 As we set out in the background section above, on July 12, 2010, mother and

McDonald both signed the VAP, which identified McDonald as the father of the minor.

Pursuant to a court order entered the next day, a DNA test was performed. On October

25, 2010, the report of the DNA test was put before the court. The report revealed that

McDonald was not the biological father of the minor. DCFS was appointed the temporary

guardian of the minor. On December 20, 2010, the court gave McDonald custody of the

minor and established a visitation schedule for mother and Williams.

¶ 26 Under article 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015:

“(a) *** a valid voluntary acknowledgment filed with the

Department of Healthcare and Family Services, as provided by law, is

equivalent to an adjudication of the parentage of a child and confers upon

the acknowledged father all of the rights and duties of a parent.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, parentage

established in accordance with Section 301 of this Act has the full force and

effect of a judgment entered under this Act and serves as a basis for seeking

a child support order without any further proceedings to establish

parentage.” 750 ILCS 46/305(a), (b) (West 2016).

¶ 27 The VAP is conclusive unless rescinded by the earlier of two dates, 60 days after

the date of the acknowledgment of parentage was signed, or the date of an administrative

or judicial proceeding relating to the child in which the signatory is a party, neither of

which was done here. Id. § 307. After the expiration of the two aforementioned

timeframes, section 309 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 specifically states that: “[a] 11 voluntary acknowledgment and any related denial may be challenged only on the basis of

fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact by filing a verified petition under this Section

within 2 years after the effective date of the voluntary acknowledgment or denial, as

provided in Section 304 of this Act.” Id. § 309(a).

¶ 28 On September 8, 2011, mother filed a petition to vacate the VAP, alleging she was

under extreme stress and had not been taking her medications as ordered for mental

health issues. On November 10, 2011, the Jefferson County circuit court held a hearing

on mother’s petition. Notably, Williams and the minor, through her GAL, were present at

and participated in this hearing. The circuit court denied mother’s petition on March 2,

2012.

¶ 29 It is undisputed that between July 12, 2010, the date of executing the VAP, and

October 25, 2010, when the DNA results were put before the court, no one filed on behalf

of the minor to have the existence of the parent-child relationship with McDonald

declared invalid. During this timeframe the minor could not be said to have gained the

requisite knowledge that McDonald was not her biological father. No petition to declare

the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship between the minor and McDonald was

filed, however, until Williams filed the amended counterpetition at issue in this case on

October 27, 2017, seven years later.

¶ 30 On appeal, Williams, as guardian on behalf of the minor, contends that the

statutory time period of two years should not be applied, as the public policy of Illinois

contained within the applicable Parentage Act was to recognize the right of every child to

a legal relationship between her “natural or adoptive parents.” J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 12 182, 198 (2007). Williams contends that if we were to apply the two-year statute to

the minor, this court would be ratifying an untruth, rather than correcting the error

that occurred in the first instance. While we concede the technical truth that

McDonald is not the biological father of the minor, we also acknowledge that the

parent-child relationship is more than simply the result of a DNA test.

¶ 31 Since he signed the VAP, McDonald has taken an active role in the care of the

minor and has continually maintained a parent-child relationship with her. He has

appeared at the proceedings involving the minor and demonstrated a willingness to

continue as her father. Nevertheless, through her present guardian, Williams, the minor

argues that the question presented was whether the knowledge of Williams or the minor’s

GAL should be imputed to the minor child. Williams’ attorney argued that the minor was

not aware of what was going on in the juvenile case and should have the right to contest

her parentage until two years beyond her eighteenth birthday. We disagree.

¶ 32 Generally, it is true that the minor was not a party or in privity with her mother or

McDonald in the signing of the VAP and is therefore not barred from challenging that

judgment. In re M.M., 401 Ill. App. 3d 416, 422 (2010). This is because no child can file

a petition in his own right. Doe v. Montessori School of Lake Forest, 287 Ill. App. 3d

289, 298 (1997). There was no attorney appointed for the minor at the time the VAP was

signed. A minor is legally dependent on her legal representatives to file a claim and is

bound by what that representative does. Flynn v. Flynn, 283 Ill. 206, 219 (1918). Legal

representation of a person invokes status as a party or privy, whether it be counsel for a

parent or counsel for a minor. In re Griesmeyer, 302 Ill. App. 3d 905, 913 (1998). In the 13 present case, the minor’s legal representatives at the time that DNA evidence was

returned were DCFS, as temporary guardian of the minor, and the minor’s GAL.

¶ 33 Because Williams has no independent right at stake and has brought the amended

counterpetition on behalf of the minor, the focus of our inquiry must be on when the

minor knew, or should have known, that McDonald was not her biological father.

Inherent in that question, as the minor was an infant at the time the DNA results were

filed in her juvenile case, is the issue of whether the knowledge of the GAL is imputed to

the minor for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations period.

¶ 34 The minor’s GAL was appointed in the juvenile case at the time of the shelter care

hearing, making her a party in the juvenile case in July 2010. The minor’s GAL was

aware in October 2010 of the DNA results showing that McDonald was not the minor’s

biological father when they were filed in the juvenile case. Further, the minor, through

her GAL, participated in and submitted closing arguments in her mother’s petition to

vacate the VAP, filed on September 8, 2011, after receipt of the DNA results. The minor

was represented by a GAL at the time the juvenile case was dismissed and at the time

when guardianship was granted to Williams in a separately filed guardianship action. The

guardianship case relied on McDonald’s legal status as father and was entered with his

consent. Further, in that action the court established visitation between the minor and

McDonald based upon his legal status as the minor’s father.

¶ 35 Under the facts of this case, we find that the minor failed to file an action to

declare the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship with McDonald within two years

of learning he was not the minor’s biological father, as was required by the Illinois 14 Parentage Act of 2015. 750 ILCS 46/205(b) (West 2016). Unlike a petition to adjudicate

parentage under article 6 of the Parentage Act of 2015 (id. § 602), which broadly

authorizes a variety of individuals to file an action to determine the existence of the father

and child relationship, one of those being the minor’s guardian, subsection 205(b)

explicitly limits its application to actions brought by the minor, the natural mother, or a

man presumed to be the father for reasons related to marriage. Id. § 205(b).

¶ 36 The Juvenile Court Act sets forth the rights of the minor to representation during

juvenile proceedings:

“[T]he minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his parents,

guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent

have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the

proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files

and records and also, although proceedings under this Act are not intended

to be adversary in character, the right to be represented by counsel. ***

No hearing on any petition or motion filed under this Act may be

commenced unless the minor who is the subject of the proceeding is

represented by counsel.” 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2016).

¶ 37 The Juvenile Court Act requires the court to appoint a GAL to represent the minor,

providing that the court shall appoint a GAL upon the filing of the petition that a minor is

abused or neglected. Id. § 2-17(1). The GAL is charged with representing the best

interests of the minor and with presenting recommendations to the court consistent with

that duty. Id. The procedural rights assured to minors “shall be the rights of adults unless 15 specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such minors.” Id.

§ 1-2(3)(a). When read together, the minor’s right to representation is clearly established,

and “the right to representation afforded to minors is almost coextensive to that afforded

to adults.” In re A.W., 248 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976 (1993).

¶ 38 The GAL, acting on behalf of the minor, has standing to bring an action

challenging the paternity of a father who is the father only because he has signed a VAP.

In re M.M., 401 Ill. App. 3d at 422. In Griesmeyer, the First District identified numerous

instances where the proposition was adopted by this court that the appointment of a GAL

confers party status on the GAL, and by extension, the minor. In re Griesmeyer, 302 Ill.

App. 3d at 909-15. The Griesmeyer court noted that legal representation of a person

invokes status as a party or privity. Id. at 913. Under the facts of Griesmeyer, the court

found that: “the minor’s paternity began as a dispute, continued through the legal process

with the minor represented by a guardian ad litem, and ended as an uncontested judicial

finding. Under these circumstances, to exclude the minor as a nonparty or nonprivy of the

dissolution judgment where the minor was represented by a court-appointed guardian

ad litem renders such legal representation a nullity.” Id. at 915.

¶ 39 In the present case, knowledge of the GAL is imputed to the minor, as the minor

was a party in the juvenile case and was bound by the actions of her legal representative.

The minor’s GAL was in possession of sufficient facts to file a petition to declare the

nonexistence of the parent-child relationship between the minor and McDonald in

October 2010, when DNA results were returned to the court. The GAL’s role, when faced

with a presumed father under a VAP and no established biological father, was to decide 16 that the filing of a paternity action was or was not in the best interests of the minor.

Majidi v. Palmer, 175 Ill. App. 3d 679, 685 (1988).

¶ 40 Based on the above, we find that the minor was a party to the underlying actions in

this matter and, through her GAL, has known since October 25, 2010, that McDonald

was not her biological father. The minor’s legal interests were fully represented at all

times through representation by her GAL. The minor’s claim is time-barred.

¶ 41 The circuit court’s order is written in two parts. The first portion of the order

addresses the minor’s own knowledge of the DNA results gained by and through her

GAL in the juvenile case, an issue which is fully addressed above. The second portion

finds, alternatively, that Williams’ knowledge also time-bars the minor’s claim as

brought by Williams. As we agree with the circuit court’s first position, that the minor

herself is time-barred in bringing a petition to declare the nonexistence of the parent-child

relationship, we need not address the alternative, that Williams’ knowledge additionally

time-barred the minor’s claim.

¶ 42 B. Count II of the Amended Counterpetition

¶ 43 As explained above, the circuit court’s order dismissed the amended

counterpetition in its entirety, with prejudice. On appeal, the appellant does not challenge

the circuit court’s dismissal of count II. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s

dismissal of count II with prejudice. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (“[p]oints

not argued are waived”); Turcios v. The DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 43 (“As to

count V of plaintiffs’ complaint *** plaintiffs make no argument that this count may and

17 should proceed independent of the wrongful death count. For this reason, we also affirm

the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of count V.”).

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Washington County

is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.