In re Guaranty Trust Co.

15 Misc. 2d 23, 181 N.Y.S.2d 929, 1958 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2277
New York Supreme Court·Decided November 28, 1958·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Jacob Markowitz, J.

This is a motion to confirm the second supplemental report of a Referee appointed by the court. In May, 1958, after the Referee had filed his original report, a remission to the Referee was directed for the purpose of considering various problems involved in the negotiation of a sale, by the trustee herein, of the securities of Universal Oil Products Company, including ‘ the methods, mechanics and procedures to be followed by the trustee ”, “ the partial or total [25]*25sale of the securities”, “ the question of the fixation of a minimum upset price ”, and provision for stock incentives for Universal’s employees

The second supplemental report of the Referee is based upon the evidence submitted at a hearing before him and upon the advice of the First Boston Corporation, heretofore appointed by the court as an expert, to advise both the Referee and the court. The report, among others, recommends (1) that all of the stock of Universal be sold under a contract of sale to be negotiated, subject to the court’s approval, with an investment banking house or syndicate of investment banking houses initially selected by the trustee from among the leading national investment banking houses capable of organizing and managing a group of underwriters to handle the transaction, the selection to be likewise subject to the court’s approval; (2) that there be no fixation of an upset price beneath which the securities are not to be sold; (3) that no contract of sale be approved by the court unless it incorporates a suitable stock incentive plan for key managerial and technical personnel of Universal.

The First Boston Corporation in its opinion stated: the sale of Universal Oil Products Company, in accordance with the terms of the Court’s orders, can best be effected on a negotiated basis through one or another of the leading national investment banking houses capable of organizing and managing a group of underwriters to handle the transaction.”

The opinion further states: (a) The requirements of the Court’s orders are for the widest public distribution among bonafide investors, effected through a nation-wide group of underwriters and dealers. This, as we understand it, is paramount in connection with the proposed sale, the purpose being to prevent the acquisition of control by one or another of the large oil companies to the deteriment of the so-called independent smaller companies. The only practical way of accomplishing the Court’s purpose is, in our opinion, through the selection of a capable and thoroughly responsible underwriting manager or managers committed to this purpose, and with every step in the design of the security or securities to be sold, the selection of participants in the group, and the setting of underwriting and selling terms and restrictions, to be undertaken with this requirement in mind. We consider that the moral commitment of a responsible and capable underwriter is as important as the contractual requirement for such distribution. ’ ’

The evidence before the Referee and the complete written opinion of the First Boston Corporation, annexed to his report, [26]*26amply support his conclusion that the sale of Universal’s stock should be effected through the negotiated sale recommended by him, rather than through competitive bidding. Although, in an ordinary case, there is much to be said for preferring competitive bidding to a negotiated sale, the unusual circumstances involved in a sale of Universal’s securities are such as to compel the conclusion that the purposes to be achieved can best be accomplished through a negotiated sale approved by the court, after a hearing before the Referee. No useful purpose would be served by detailing here the reasons why a negotiated sale of Universal’s securities is to be favored as the best means of securing the maximum price obtainable upon the terms and conditions imposed in the prior order of this court. The reasons are sufficiently set forth in the evidence summarized in the Referee’s report, in the Referee’s “findings of fact”, and in the written advice furnished to the Referee by the First Boston Corporation.

All of the parties to the proceeding who have an interest in the charitable trust- have given their views in favor of a negotiated sale.

Under the circumstances, the method of a private negotiated sale is fully consistent with the trust agreement and with the exercise of sound discretion of the court.

The Referee’s recommendation that no upset price be fixed is likewise well supported by the evidence before him, which is adverted to in his report.

The recommendation that there be a “ suitable stock incentive plan ” is supported by testimony of the chairman of the trustee’s board of directors that such a plan is desirable to reward outstanding men in the organization and furnish an incentive for further efforts in the future. The management of Universal has submitted a draft of such a plan to the trustee and it is contemplated that a plan will be submitted to the Referee for his approval.

The importance of the inclusion of an adequate stock incentive plan in the contract of sale cannot be over-emphasized. One of the reasons for the court’s conditional approval of the sale of the Universal stock was the “drag upon Universal’s continued ability to meet competition, while its stock remains in the hands of the trustee ” because of “ the difficulty of establishing stock option and stock bonus plans in order to give the outstanding members of its organization the incentive necessary to obtain their best efforts.” The plan to be adopted should not limit its incentive provisions to the top echelon of Universal’s management but should extend its benefits to the [27]*27classes of employees whose activities play an important part in the success of Universal’s operations. The chairman of the trustee’s board of directors testified before the Referee that a very substantial portion of the value of Universal’s stock consists of the “brains of the organization ”.

The recommendation that the sale be of all Universal stock, and not a partial sale, is also warranted by the testimony before the Referee subject, however, to the allocation to emloyees of Universal.

A hearing is to be held by the Referee for the purposes of considering and making recommendations within the framework of the proceedings heretofore had and subject to court approval with respect to:

(i) whether the selection by the trustee of the investment bankers (whose names shall be set forth in the notice) as managers of an underwriting group shall be approved or whether the trustees should negotiate with other competent investment bankers who may appear and give evidence in the hearing before the Referee;

(ii) whether the terms and conditions of the contract of sale of shares of Universal Oil Products Company and the underwriting agreements (draft copies of which shall be made available for inspection at the offices of the Referee and counsel for the trustee) should be approved, subject to final approval with respect to price and related matters;

(iii) whether the terms and conditions of the Employees’ Stock Incentive Plan, including the classes of employees to be covered thereby and other pertinent matters related thereto, shall be approved; and

(iv) such other matters related to the sale of Universal Oil Products Company as may properly come before the Referee.

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In re Guaranty Trust Co., 15 Misc. 2d 23, 181 N.Y.S.2d 929, 1958 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2277 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1958).

15 Misc. 2d 23 (In re Guaranty Trust Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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