In Re Grubbs

325 B.R. 151, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1101, 95 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2160, 2005 WL 1222484
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedApril 29, 2005
Docket04-13719
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 325 B.R. 151 (In Re Grubbs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Grubbs, 325 B.R. 151, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1101, 95 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2160, 2005 WL 1222484 (N.C. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS W. WALDREP, JR., Bankruptcy Judge.

The single issue in this matter is whether an annuity created pursuant to Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 403(b), is exempt from the claims of the Chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”) under the language of the North Carolina exemption statute that protects both “individual retirement plans as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and any plan treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan under the Internal Revenue Code.” N.C. Gen.Stat. lC-1601(a)(9).

The Court held a hearing in this matter on April 21, 2005, in Greensboro, North Carolina, at which time the Court took the matter under advisement. After considering the arguments of the parties, the evidence, and the relevant law, the Court holds that an annuity created pursuant to Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code is exempt under North Carolina law because a Section 403(b) annuity — at least within the meaning of the exemption statute — is treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan under the Internal Revenue Code.

I. BACKGROUND

Teresa Ann Warren Grubbs (the “Debt- or”) obtained an NEA Valuebuilder Annuity from Nationwide Insurance Company in 1997. The parties stipulated that the Debtor’s annuity is established under Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. After contributing a small amount of her paycheck each month from Alamance Burlington School System for seven years, the Debtor accumulated $10,230.56 in her annuity. When the Debtor and her husband filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on December 10, 2004, the Debtor claimed her annuity *153 as an exempt asset. 1 The Trustee seeks to apply the value of the Debtor’s annuity, inter alia, to the $30,022.81 of unsecured debt that the Debtor and her husband listed on Schedule F of their bankruptcy petition.

II. DISCUSSION

The Trustee contends that the Debtor’s annuity is not exempt because a Section 403(b) annuity is not “treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan under the Internal Revenue Code.” In support of this argument, the Trustee states that an “individual retirement plan” as defined by the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(37), 2 specifically does not include Section 403(b) annuities. The Trustee argues that the differences between Section 403(b) annuities and “individual retirement plans” preclude the application of the North Carolina exemption statute to the Debtor’s annuity. The Debtor argues that the similarities between a Section 403(b) annuity and a Section 408(a) individual retirement account (“IRA”)-which is specifically defined in Section 7701(a)(37) of the Internal Revenue Code to be an “individual retirement plan”- — far outweigh any differences and that a 403(b) annuity is sufficiently similar to an IRA as to be an exempt asset under the North Carolina statute.

A. The North Carolina Exemption Statute

North Carolina has opted out of the federal exemption statute. N.C. Gen.Stat. § lC-1601(f) (“The exemptions provided in The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), are not applicable to residents of this State.”). Thus, as a preliminary matter, the Court must ascertain the General Assembly’s meaning when it chose to exempt “individual retirement plans as defined by the Internal Revenue Code and any plan treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan under the Internal Revenue Code” inasmuch as a Section 403(b) annuity is not specifically exempted under the plain language of the statute and an ambiguity exists over whether such annuities are included within the scope of the statute. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(9); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 118 L.Ed.2d 39 (1992)(directing a court to resolve a statutory ambiguity by examining the statutory history); Allen v. Geneva Steel Co. (In re Geneva Steel Co.), 281 F.3d 1173 1178 (10th Cir.2002)(“[A]m-biguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”)(quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 45.02, at 11-12 (6th ed.2000)).

Before the 1995 amendments to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1601, the General Assembly had not included any retirement plans in the list of general exemptions. As part of legislation enacted in 1995, however, the General Assembly chose to allow a debtor to exempt from the claims of creditors “[i]ndividual retirement accounts as described in Section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, individual retirement annuities as described in Section 408(b) of the *154 Internal Revenue Code, and accounts established as part of a trust described in Section 408(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.” § 1C-1601(a)(9) (1996). Notably, retirement trusts created pursuant to Section 408(c) are not specifically included in the Internal Revenue Code’s general definition of an “individual retirement plan.” 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(37). The inclusion of Section 408(c) trusts evidences an intent by the General Assembly not to strictly bind the State law exemption for retirement plans and annuities to the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of an “individual retirement plan.”

Four years later, the General Assembly again amended the exemption statute and chose much broader language, which is the version of the statute applicable to this case. In 1999, not only were individual retirement plans exempted, but “any plan treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan by the Internal Revenue Code” was also exempted from the claims of creditors. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(9) (2000). The alteration of the statutory language evidences an intent by the General Assembly not to limit the exemption solely to retirement plans created pursuant to Section 408(a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code and would seem to encompass trusts created pursuant to Section 408(c), which had previously been specifically exempted, as well as other types of retirement tools recognized by the IRS. Exactly what the General Assembly meant when it required a plan to be treated “in the same manner as an individual retirement plan” before that plan could be declared exempt under North Carolina law was not specifically stated. 3 In any event, the language of the statute plainly does not limit the applicability of the exemption to IRAs.

Exemption statutes are to be interpreted liberally. In re LoCurto, 239 B.R. 314, 318 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1999)(“This court has held many times that North Carolina’s exemption laws are to be liberally construed .... ”).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
325 B.R. 151, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1101, 95 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2160, 2005 WL 1222484, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-grubbs-ncmb-2005.