In Re Grossman

147 B.R. 903, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1938, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1221, 1992 WL 362074
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 24, 1992
Docket19-05338
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 147 B.R. 903 (In Re Grossman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Grossman, 147 B.R. 903, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1938, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1221, 1992 WL 362074 (Ill. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE JUDGE

JACK B. SCHMETTERER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor Jeffrey Grossman has moved to disqualify this Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and for transfer of this bankruptcy proceeding to another judge. The Motion rests entirely on statements contained in rulings in another judicial proceeding. The United States Trustee has opposed the Motion. Having considered the record and authorities, and submissions and arguments of counsel, the Debtor’s Motion is denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Debtor filed his pending voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 23, 1992. The *904 instant Motion was presented on June 29, 1992. Four years earlier, the Debtor was an investor in, and later manager of, a company that became a debtor in a proceeding pending before this Court, In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 88 B 18708. During the course of the Rusty Jones bankruptcy case, following various hearings, several published decisions were issued in which Debtor was mentioned for his work with Rusty Jones. Debtor now cites portions of those transcripts and written decisions where references were made to his connection with Rusty Jones. Debtor argues that those statements constitute a basis for this Court’s disqualification for asserted appearance of bias in Debtor’s own bankruptcy proceeding, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). He does not assert bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144, nor does he assert grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).

The earlier statements made in rulings on matters in the Rusty Jones case and now relied on by the Debtor are the following:

In a decision reported as In re Rusty Jones, 109 B.R. 838 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989), the attempt of debtor to employ the investors, including Mr. Grossman, was denied. In the opinion of the Court such employment would have circumvented the rule against employing interested professionals involved in administering a debtor’s business or plan. The attorneys for Rusty Jones argued that this was simply a business judgment in the course of managing the estate. The ruling stated:

The foregoing argument implies two assumptions: First, it assumes that the Debtor’s business judgment in seeking to employ the three men is independent of the business judgment of those three men in seeking to be employed. In the light of the conceded facts that make clear that these same three men now control the Debtor through their holding companies, there is a serious question whether the Debtor’s instant decision to hire these men is actually “made in good faith by the debtor-in-possession” so as to constitute a business decision entitled to great weight.
Second, the argument assumes that the work sought to be performed by the three men is nonprofessional and nonadministrative. On this record, that assumption is doubtful....

Rusty Jones, 109 B.R. at 842.

Mr. Grossman also cites In re Rusty Jones, 110 B.R. 362 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990), as another example of this Court’s asserted bias. In that decision, a Chapter 11 reorganization plan proposed by Rusty Jones for confirmation was denied following hearing. The following Findings of Fact were then made:

6. Based on prior proceedings before this Court, the testimony of Wortman [past President of Rusty Jones], and the other facts found herein, it is clear that Debtor’s present officers Grauer and Grossman have at all times during this case controlled Rusty Jones through their holding companies. Further, those persons made several efforts during this bankruptcy to bleed Rusty Jones of its assets so as to benefit one or more non-debtor businesses. Unless prevented, they will continue to do so in the future. They succeeded in doing so only in small ways in the past because of the vigilance of the U.S. Trustee and this Court’s refusal to sanction such efforts when made by motion, and because the former president Wortman sometimes blocked them from doing so when they tried to do so out of court.
7. The persons who were in control of Rusty Jones did not exhibit sufficient concern for the fiduciary obligation that people who control Chapter 11 estates owe to the estate and the estate’s creditors, nor did they take seriously their responsibility to preserve estate assets.
8. Had those “investors” who acquired' control over a $3 million cash pot in return for a $1.00 investment been conscientious, they could have helped preserve this estate and pare down the overhead below current levels. Instead, they repeatedly tried to take untoward advantage of their position. The investors could have helped negotiate a con-firmable plan. Instead, as set forth below, the proposed plan is a palpable over *905 reaching by the controlling investors, and evidence presented was distorted by not requiring Debtor’s valuation expert to take known evidence into account.
9. ... Other parts of that cash drain, however, resulted from the payment to Renaissance that was only partly repaid and from continued excessive overhead for many months longer than necessary.... The new “investors” during this bankruptcy made a number of efforts, some of which were successful, to obtain direct or indirect benefit from the cash assets with which Debtor started this bankruptcy. Most of those efforts were not for good business reasons and were contrary to the interests of the estate and its creditors. Some of these efforts were by motions to the Court before the instant hearing and some were proved by evidence during the hearing. Specifically:
(a) Rusty Jones moved the Court early in the case to authorize it to assume a management contract which had been entered into with Renaissance Capital, Ltd. during the two-week period between Rustco’s “purchase” of Rusty Jones and Rusty Jones’ commencement of this ease. That management contract would have cost Rusty Jones substantial sums, amounting to several hundred thousands of dollars_ The Court believed then and still finds that the contract itself was unwarranted, without substantial benefit to the estate, and unnecessary. On the face of it, this episode raised the question whether the “investors” who purchased control of Debtor for a dollar were overreaching in their effort to get Debtor to fund an expensive “management” contract with their other company (Renaissance) although there was precious little remaining to manage and salaried officers were doing what was required.
(b) Shortly thereafter, Debtor moved the Court for authorization to add the three “investors,” Knopfler, Grauer and Grossman, to Rusty Jones’ payroll.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
147 B.R. 903, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1938, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1221, 1992 WL 362074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-grossman-ilnb-1992.