In re Greenstreet

80 F.2d 63, 23 C.C.P.A. 786, 1935 CCPA LEXIS 304
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 2, 1935
DocketNo. 3603
StatusPublished

This text of 80 F.2d 63 (In re Greenstreet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Greenstreet, 80 F.2d 63, 23 C.C.P.A. 786, 1935 CCPA LEXIS 304 (ccpa 1935).

Opinion

Garrett, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant’s application filed in the United States Patent Office bears the title “For Treatment of Carbonaceous Material.”

As finally acted upon the application carried fifteen claims, numbered 32 to 46, inclusive, No. 46 being for the product produced and all others being method claims.

The examiner rejected all the claims, citing seven patents as references. The Board of Appeals reversed the examiner as to claims numbered, respectively, 38, 39 and 42, but affirmed as to all others. From so much of the board’s decision as affirmed the rejection of the examiner, appeal was taken to this court.

[787]*787For illustrative purposes we quote appealed claims 32 and 46:

32. Tlie production of liquid hydrocarbon distillates comprising distilling at relatively low temperatures a mixture of about equal parts by weight of finely divided solid carboneaceous material containing volatile hydrocarbons and a mineral oil having a wide distilling range of temperatures approximating to that of the volatiles in the carbonaceous material under the conditions of the process with an end point of about 380’° O. to 400° O.
46. Liquid hydrocarbon products derived from distillation of finely divided coal with at least an equal ■ quantity of mineral oil of wide distilling range having an end point of about 400° O., characterised by being suitable for cracking and free or substantially free from tar acids and other products of ordinary low or high temperature coal carbonisation.

The decision of the board having eliminated one of the references cited by the examiner only six remain in the case as it comes before us:

These are:

Trent, 1,512,427, Oct. 21, 1924;
Blythe, 1,512,577. Oct. 21, 1924;
Forwood, 1,523,942, Jan. 20, 1925;
Trent, 1,641,305, Sept. 6, 1927;
Melamid, 1,723,431, Aug. 6, 1929;
Dubbs, 1,868,732, July 26, 1932.

Of these references the patent to Trent, No. 1,641,305, was regarded by the board as anticipatory “in equivalent steps” of all the method features of appellant’s claims. The product claim (No. 46, supra), was rejected upon the patent to Dubbs which accorded with the holding of the examiner.

Broadly, appellant’s purpose is to produce hydrocarbon materials, in liquid form, susceptible of use in making liquid fuel, gasoline and like products, primarily from bituminous coal; more particularly from “the volatile condensible distillate consisting of pitches, tars, tar acids, light and heavy oils plus gases” that result from the destructive clistilliation of such coal in the production of coke by a distilling process. These pitches, tars, etc., are referred to, at times, in the brief for appellant as “resins.” In carrying out his process, use is made of mineral oils in a manner hereinafter more particularly described.

It may here be said parenthetically that appellant does not limit himself to the use of comminuted coals in his process, but recites that other carbonaceous materials, naming many, may be used. Also Iris specification recites that suitable animal or vegetable oils may be used “instead of or in admixture with mineral oils.”

This, however, is not claimed to have any bearing upon the patent-ability of appellant’s process claims, and as to the product claim only [788]*788coal and mineral oil are prescribed as tlie raw materials to be distilled.

Tlie brief for appellant explains that the destructive distillation of coal results in two general products, namely, coke and the volatile condensible distillate composed of the “resins,” and the application is primarily concerned with the utilization of such “volatile conden-sible distillate” for the making- of a product of the kind above defined.

To do this and to secure a “commercially profitable, operation,” it is said, in effect, that it is requisite to recover the resins without burning- and destroying them by destructive distillation or by any plan of procedure that would burn or destroy them.

The brief then states:

In order to meet all of tlie above conditions tlie inventor, wlio is a noted authority in this field,- after months of experimenting and at great expense, found that a mineral oil liming a wide MstilUnff range should be mixed with coal so as to dissolve the resins that also lime a wide, distilling range, and! the inventor also found that a sufficient percentage ini volume of the solvent oil should be used which would not only be capable of fully dissolving all the resins, but which would be in such volume as to carry over mechanically resins dissolved in the oil on distillation. The volatile distillate secured from such mixture when condensed'could then be converted into a gasoline of high grade by any well known cracking process. (Italics quoted).

It is thus to be seen that appellant emphasizes the wide distilling ■ range of the oil which he uses. This limitation is present in each of the claims. There is another limitation which appellant also emphasizes, namely, the use of a mixture of about equal parts by weight of coal and oil. This limitation likewise is found in all the claims.

A careful study of the brief filed on behalf of appellant in connection with the oral argument made before us leads to the conclusion that, notwithstanding appellant has assigned numerous and, in some respect, complicated reasons of appeal, his reliance here is upon the alleged error respecting the two foregoing limitations. The decisions of the tribunals of the Patent Office are quite definite in pointing out features present in the different references which were regarded as anticipatory of other limitations in the claims, and we do not find where appellant seriously challenges those particular findings.

Our attention, therefore, will be confined in the main to consideration of the two limitations emphasized as above set forth.

Another parenthetical statement seems necessary, in the interest of clarity, in view of the state of the record before us. The “Statement” of the examiner, following the appeal to the board, contains the following:

[789]*789Claims 32 to 45 have been further rejected as drawn to new matter, in that the expression, such as occurs in claim 32, line 5, “boiling point of about 200° C.” has not been found in the original specification.

Examination of the claims as they now read discloses that no one of them contains any reference to a “boiling point of about 200° C.” Therefore, while the record as brought to us is silent upon the subject, the natural inference is that the quoted phrase was eliminated by amendment, probably before the final decision by the examiner, or certainly before the decision by the board in which no reference was made to it. We shall proceed upon that theory.

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80 F.2d 63, 23 C.C.P.A. 786, 1935 CCPA LEXIS 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-greenstreet-ccpa-1935.