In Re Greater Miami Trading, Inc.

177 B.R. 1022, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 366, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 203
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedFebruary 20, 1995
Docket18-25811
StatusPublished

This text of 177 B.R. 1022 (In Re Greater Miami Trading, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Greater Miami Trading, Inc., 177 B.R. 1022, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 366, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 203 (Fla. 1995).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING FINAL FEE APPLICATION FOR COUNSEL TO EXAMINER; SUSTAINING OBJECTION OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEE TO APPLICATION AND PROPOSED ORDER AUTHORIZING AND DENYING MOTION TO ACCEPT FEE APPLICATION INSTANTER AND DEFERRING RULING ON T.C.F.C.’S MOTION TO DISGORGE ATTORNEYS’ FEES PAID TO HALL & O’BRIEN, P.A.

A. JAY CRISTOL, Chief Judge.

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on December 15,1994 on the Objection of the United States Trastee to Applications and Proposed Order Authorizing the Retention of Richard O’Brien, III, Esquire and Hall & O’Brien, P.A. and Motion for Reconsideration or Rehearing of Order Requiring Richard O’Brien, III, Esquire to File Fee Application on Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation’s Notice of Joinder and Objection of United States Trustee and on Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation’s Motion to Disgorge Attorneys’ Fees paid to Hall & O’Brien, P.A. and the Joinder of Joel Tabas, as Trustee for Greater Miami Trading and Kaufman & Roberts, Inc. and the Court having heard the argument of counsel on November 15, 1994 and again on December 15, 1994 and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court does hereby adjudge as follows:

A review of the course of the Chapter 11 proceedings is instructive in assessing the entitlement of Hall & O’Brien, P.A. (“Hall & O’Brien”) to an award of attorney’s fees. This case was filed as a Chapter 11 on January 3, 1994. On January 18, 1994, the Debt- or filed an Emergency Motion under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code for the use of Cash Collateral to Make Payments for Expenses to the Debtor. In this Motion, the Debtor represented that it was “developing a plan whereby a new corporation will take over certain of the assets and continue to run the business”. Thereafter, the Debtor filed an Emergency Joint Motion of the Debtor, Greater Miami Trading, Inc., d/b/a Bush & Cohen and AYAC of Florida, Inc. for the Assumption and Assignment of Business Lease of Real Property. Additionally, the Debtor filed an Emergency Joint Motion for the Approval of Sales of Certain Assets of Debtor, Free and Clear of Liens and Encumbrances Saving and Excepting Certain Liens and Encumbrances that the Assets Will be Taken Subject to (the “Emergency Motion”). In the Emergency Motion, the Debtor represented that the Debtor was currently unable to pay its obligations as they matured on a post petition basis and that it had no use of cash collateral other than its gross profits which were insufficient to pay its operating-expenses. The Debtor further represented that without such sale, in all likelihood, the case will be converted to Chapter 7. On January 27, 1994, at the hearing on these joint motions, this court sua sponte converted this case to a case under Chapter 7.

The Order Converting the Case Under Chapter 11 to a Case Under Chapter 7 as of January 27, 1994; Order Granting Trustee Authority to Operate Debtor’s Business for 30 Days; Order requiring Debtor to File Schedules and Statements of Financial Affairs (“Order of Conversion”) specifically note that the Debtor represented to the Court that the Debtor would not be able to *1024 reorganize, that the Debtor seeks to liquidate all payroll and tangible assets, that the Debt- or had not met payroll for over two weeks, and that the Debtor had no unencumbered funds to continue operations. This Court further observed in the Order of Conversion that the “circumstances surrounding the filing of this case as a Chapter 11 are questionable and especially in light of the filing of a Chapter 7 Petition by one of the Debtor’s Shareholders and a Chapter 7 Petition by another company owned by the Debtor’s principal.” The Order of Conversion required the Debtor to file an accounting of all receipts and distributions made within 30 days. It also required the Debtor to file the Schedules and Statement of Affairs and the reports required by F.R.B.P. 1019(1)(A) and F.R.B.P. 1007(c). Within thirty (30) days from the date of the Order of Conversion, the Debtor’s counsel was also required to file an Application for Compensation for Outstanding Fees and Expenses incurred during the Chapter 11 Administration including an application justifying retention of any retainer received which has not been approved by prior award.

The Debtor filed nine separate Motions for Enlargement of Time within which to file the various reports required by the Order of Conversion. However, neither the Debtor nor Hall & O’Brien sought any extension of time within which to file an Application for Professional Fees. A Report in accordance with the Order of Conversion was not filed until August 10, 1994. An Amended Report was filed on or about November 14, 1994. The Schedules and Statement of Affairs were not filed until February 1, 1994.

CHAPTER 11 FEES DISTINGUISHED FROM CHAPTER 7 FEES

There are two operative periods at issue here. Since this case converted within a matter of weeks to a Chapter 7 it is only as to the fees incurred during the Chapter 11 proceeding that are arguably recoverable. It is well settled that only under exceptional circumstances may a Chapter 7 Debtor’s counsel recover fees. Those exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case. Therefore, it is only for the period ending January 27, 1994 that the fees being sought will be considered. The Report filed reflects the Debtor’s counsel received a $4,000.00 retainer and that the amount of time expended in putting together the Schedules and attending to the other various matters exceeded $4,000.00. The Debtor’s counsel then claimed in the Amended Report that an additional amount of $16,760.61 was paid for as a retainer and for additional costs for a total sum of $20,762.61. The Schedules on the other hand reflect a $4,000.00 “nonrefundable” fee and $16,762.61 retainer and costs paid and that the source of compensation was Jose L. Saumat. Hall & O’Brien’s Affidavit of Proposed Attorney for Debtor in Possession (the “Affidavit”) also fails to disclose the fact that Hall & O’Brien received a fee of $20,762.00. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit specifically states that the law firm of Hall & O’Brien was paid a fee of $4,000.00.

Hall & O’Brien did not seek to be employed as counsel to the Debtor until August 10, 1994. This Court denied Hall & O’Brien’s initial application based on its failure to comply with Local Rule 214(A) (doe. 309) Thereafter, Hall & O’Brien filed yet another application that had sought to retain their firm nunc pro tunc to January 3, 1994. Hall & O’Brien has demonstrated no basis for the granting of a nunc pro tunc application in this case. It waited over eight months from the inception of the case to seek retention as counsel, and offered no explanation for the failure in this regard. Surely if Hall & O’Brien had conscientiously observed the requirements of this Court’s orders, it should have been alerted to the lack of an order authorizing its retention within thirty (30) days of the Order of Conversion.

When the United States Trustee’s Objection came before the Court on October 28,1994, Richard O’Brien and the law firm of Hall & O’Brien were once again required to file an application for the period the case was a Chapter 11 case.

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Bluebook (online)
177 B.R. 1022, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 366, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-greater-miami-trading-inc-flsb-1995.