In re Grand Rapids Furniture Agency

209 F. 483
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedNovember 15, 1913
DocketNo. 4,719
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 209 F. 483 (In re Grand Rapids Furniture Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Grand Rapids Furniture Agency, 209 F. 483 (W.D. Wash. 1913).

Opinion

NETERER, District Judge.

On January 29, 1912, the trustee filed a petition seeking to levy an assessment against John C. Smith, W. M. Lucas, and F. E. Dickinson to pay the debts of the bankrupt in an amount not exceeding an alleged liability for the unpaid portion of the capital stock of the bankrupt corporation subscribed by the respective parties, and on March 15, 1912, filed a separate petition to enforce- the alleged stock liability of said parties. It is alleged that Smith, Lucas, and Dickinson on the 25th of April, 1911, made and subscribed articles of incorporation of the bankrupt, which recited that the capital stock should be $100,000, divided into 1,000 shares of $100 each; the respondents being named therein as the first trustees. It is further alleged that on May 9, 1911, the respondents signed a written subscription by which John C. Smith agreed to take 333 shares, W. M. Lucas 334 shares, and F. E. Dickinson 333 shares, but that this subscription had been changed so as to make it appear that Dickinson had subscribed for 900 shares, and Smith and Lucas each for 50 shares; that on the same day said stock was issued and accepted by the respondents in the proportions first above set out; that Smith had paid on his subscription an amount not exceeding $7,333.33, Lucas an amount not exceeding $3,333.34, and Dickinson $2,733.33, and, after an allegation of insufficiency of the assets to pay the claims against the bankrupt, prays for judgment against the respondents in the_ respective amounts of their unpaid stock liability. The petitions were referred to the referee in bankruptcy, John P. Hoyt, as special master, who heard evidence and arguments thereon and on October 3, 1913, reported to the court his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The special master stated: That he found it unnecessary to determine whether the sub-' scription had in fact been altered. That Smith, Lucas, and Dickinson were the sole stockholders, having exclusive control of the stock, and that the stock had not been issued according to the stock subscription now appearing on the books of the company but had been issued as follows: John C.'Smith, 333 shares; W. M. Lucas, 334 shares; F. E. Dickinson, 333 shares. .That, after the issuance of such' capital stock as aforesaid, Smith, Lucas, and Dickinson so conducted themselves as to creditors and parties in interest as to make it appear that they owned the stock in equal proportions, and that said Smith and Lucas were the chief financial backers of said bankrupt. That said Smith is entitled to a credit of $6,100 on his stock liability, and Lucas to a credit of $3,000. The special master concludes that Smith is liable for $33,-[485]*485300, less a credit of $6,100, and Lucas is liable for $33,400, less $3,000. No jurisdiction was acquired over Dickinson.

The testimony of various witnesses was to the effect that statements had been made by Dickinson, in the presence of Lucas and Smith, that about two-thirds of the stock was owned by Lucas and Smith in equal proportions; some of the witnesses stating that Lucas and Smith had nodded their assent to these statements. The witness McKnight, a representative of one of the largest creditors,' who came to Seattle to investigate the financial standing of the company, stated in his deposition that he was told by Smith and Lucas that while the original subscription had been Smith and Lucas each for 50 shares, and'Dickinson 900 shares, yet this had been altered by agreement, and that they were each entitled to one-third of the capital stock which had been issued to them accordingly. Three witnesses, employés of banks, testified as experts that in their opinion the figures in the original subscription showed signs of alteration.

No stock was issued according to the subscription as it now appears. But on May 9, 1911, the date of the subscription, the blanks in certificates Nos. 1, 2, and 3, for 333, 334, and 333 shares, were properly filled to indicate that Smith, Lucas, and Dickinson were the owners of that number of shares respectively. These certificates were not detached from the stubs, and across the face of each is written the word-“canceled.” The stubs in the stock book show that on the same day certificate No. 4, for 166 shares," was issued to Lucas “as trustee for Grand Rapids Furniture Agency,” being transferred by F. E. Dickinson, who held same under certificate No. 3, for 333 shares; that certificate No. 5, for 167 shares, was issued to W. M. Lucas, “as trustee,” 'etc., being transferred by W. M. Lucas, who held same under certificate No. 2, for 334 shares; and that certificate No. 6, for 167 shares, was issued to W. M. Lucas, “as trustee,” etc., being transferred by John C. Smith, who held same under certificate No. 1, for 333 shares. Various certificates were thereafter issued to different parties, being transferred from W. M. Lucas, “as Trustee G. R. F. A.”

On August 24, 1911, certificate No. 12, for 167 shares, was issued to W. M. Lucas “in pool,” being transferred by W. M. Lucas, who held same under certificate No. 2, for 334 shares; certificate Nó. 13, for 166 shares, was issued to John C. Smith “in pool,” being transferred by John C. Smith, who held same under certificate No. 1, for 333 shares; and certificate No. 14, for 167 shares, was issued to F. E. Dickinson “in pool,” -being transferred by F. E. Dickinson, who held same under certificate No. 3, for 333 shares. Thereafter various certificates were issued to the respective parties, being transferred from himself “in pool”; a notation being made upon the stub of the character of payment made therefor.

Lucas testified that the original subscription of the parties was as indicated in the original subscription; that certificates Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were written up by the witness in an effort to get the stock “into a pool,” or into the hands of a trustee; that the subsequent issue of certificates Nos. 12, 13, and 14 “in pool” was with a view of getting that portion of the stock into a pool from-which each of the said parties [486]*486would have the privilege of purchasing one-third, the stock to be issued to him only when paid for; and that the remainder of the stock held under certificates Nos. 4, 5, and 6 by Lucas, “as trustee,” should be regarded as “treasury stock” to be sold to various parties for the benefit of the company. The witness testified that certificates Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were never delivered but remained undetached from the stub in the stock certificate book, which all the while remained in .the possession of the company until delivered to the trustee.

[1] The respondents contend that the trustee cannot recover upon the alleged agreement or subscription, and that “if he depends upon the issuance and acceptance of capital stock, as he has alleged, he certainly must fail because there is no evidence of the issuance of any share of stock without the payment of the full consideration therefor.” The respondents assert that no rights are acquired by reason of a certificate of stock not taken from the stock book or delivered to the purchaser.

Where one having no control over the books of the company is-sought to be held, the rule stated is undoubtedly true. But—

“where a certificate is filled up and signed by the proper officer, though not detached from the stock certificate book, and' though the corporate seal be not affixed, it is sufficient issuance of the certificate to constitute the person to whom it is issued a stockholder, when such person has the custody of the certificate book and the power and right to detach it at any time.” 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 875; Halstead v. Dodge, 51 N. Y. Super.

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209 F. 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-grand-rapids-furniture-agency-wawd-1913.