In re Grand Jury Proceedings Earnest

90 F.R.D. 698, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJuly 17, 1981
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 90 F.R.D. 698 (In re Grand Jury Proceedings Earnest) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Grand Jury Proceedings Earnest, 90 F.R.D. 698, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293 (M.D. Ga. 1981).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR BAIL PENDING APPEAL

WILBUR D. OWENS, Jr., Chief Judge.

As is shown in more complete, accurate detail by the court’s file and court reporter’s transcript, the subject grand jury witness, pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 6001, et seq., grant of immunity, has been ordered by this court to testify before a grand jury of this court in spite of his privilege against self-incrimination. On Wednesday, July 15, 1981, the witness, upon learning of the 18 U.S.C. § 6001, et seq., order attacked its validity through counsel. An immediate hearing was held, and the order was determined to be validly applied for and issued. The witness reappeared before the grand jury and when asked about a telephone number or conversation read a lawyer-prepared objection by which he refused to answer because the information on which the question was based was the result of an illegal wiretap. The court held an immediate hearing; because of the existence of valid court orders for all electronic surveillance upon which the grand jury’s questions are to be based the objection was found to be without basis. The witness was instructed to appear before the grand jury on Thursday, July 16, 1981, and testify and further advised of the authority of the court to imprison recalcitrant witnesses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826.

On Thursday morning the witness was again called before the grand jury. A transcript1 of his appearance was presented to the court, and a hearing on his continued failure to testify was held.

The witness through counsel contends that he has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when he as an immunized witness is called before the grand jury, and that when he is asked a question by the grand jury, he is entitled to exit the grand jury and consult his counsel as to the manner in which he should answer the question. He says he wants counsel to assist him by refreshing his recollection and thereby avoid the possibility that he will perjure himself. He further says that he wants to testify and that counsel’s assistance is needed to insure that he gives a full, complete answer to the grand jury. This, in his opinion, helps rather than hinders the grand jury process.

After hearing from the witness, his counsel, and government counsel the court ruled that this witness is entitled to the advice of counsel on the question of whether or not he is required to testify under a grant of immunity, but having decided as the result of such advice that he will testify, the witness is not then entitled to exit the grand jury and consult with counsel as to the manner in which he is to answer each question. The grand jury, this court said, is entitled to the testimony of the witness, not that of his lawyer.2

[700]*700The witness was instructed to reappear before the grand jury and to answer every plainly understandable question without exiting to consult his counsel. Asked if he intended to reappear and testify pursuant to these instructions or wished to refuse and be confined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826, the witness elected to refuse and .be confined. He was ordered confined until he chooses to testify or the grand jury term expires.

The witness filed a notice of appeal and moved for bail pending appeal. For the following reasons the appeal in this court’s best judgment is legally frivolous.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the assistance of counsel. Having received that assistance on the question of whether or not he must testify under a grant of immunity, this witness in effect seeks to take counsel into the grand jury with him by going before the grand jury to hear a question, leaving the grand jury to tell the lawyer the question and get his assistance in formulating an answer, and then returning to give the answer he and his lawyer prepared.

A witness has no constitutional or legal right to have counsel with him when he appears before a grand jury. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1778, 48 L.Ed.2d 212, 225 (1976); Matter of Andretta v. United States, 530 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Daniels, 461 F.2d 1076 citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333, 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376, 380 (1957); Perrone v. United States, 416 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1969).

As evidenced by Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in spite of the commonly known suggestions that Rule 6 be amended to permit counsel to appear with a witness before a grand jury, the rule remains unchanged and prohibitive of the appearance of counsel for a witness before the grand jury, either with or without the witness. It seems to be the usual practice, when non-immunized witnesses are involved, to allow such witnesses to consult with their attorneys during the course of the questioning to determine whether or not they should invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, this court is aware of no case which mandates this practice, and in any event this witness was permitted to consult with counsel for that very purpose prior to his being granted immunity. After being immunized, however, that need to consult with counsel on every question asked by the grand jury no longer existed.3

If this same witness were on trial for a crime against the United States, was represented by counsel, and was being cross-examined as a witness by the United States Attorney, neither the Constitution, laws, nor rules would permit him to consult with his lawyer for the purpose of formulating an answer to questions put to him. It is only when the questioning ceases because of a court recess that a defendant has a right to consult with counsel. See, Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592. If the situation were any different, a trial jury — like this grand jury — would hear the testimony of the defendant’s lawyer through the mouth of the defendant instead of the testimony of the defendant. As juries are regularly admonished, “what lawyers say is not evidence.” In this case, what this witness says through his lawyer is not evidence. This grand jury is entitled to the evidence — the testimony of this witness.

No authority for the refusal of this witness to testify having been urged or found by the court, there is no just cause for his [701]

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Bluebook (online)
90 F.R.D. 698, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-grand-jury-proceedings-earnest-gamd-1981.