In re G.R.

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 4-26-0366
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 260366-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under June 25, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-26-0366 Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re G.R., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA277 v. ) Hope R., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Daniel M. Cordis, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed, finding the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In September 2025, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights

against respondent, Hope R., the mother of G.R. (born in December 2023). In March 2026, the

trial court granted the petition and terminated Hope’s parental rights.

¶3 On appeal, appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing Hope’s appeal presents no potentially meritorious

issues for review. We grant the motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On December 5, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging G.R. was neglected

because her environment was injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). The petition alleged Hope had been found unfit in Peoria County case Nos. 18-JA-345, 18-JA-

346, 19-JA-364, and 21-JA-90, due to, inter alia, ongoing domestic violence and “lack of

parental ability.” Hope surrendered her parental rights in the first three cases, and her parental

rights were terminated in the fourth case. There had been no subsequent finding of fitness, and

Hope had not completed any services that would result in a finding of fitness.

¶6 The petition alleged that, on August 6, 2021, Hope grabbed Alonzo M., G.R.’s

putative father, by his neck and squeezed, and she reported Alonzo choked her and threatened to

kill her. On October 10, 2021, Hope contacted law enforcement to have them remove Alonzo

from her apartment, alleging that Alonzo “threatened to shoot her apartment.” Alonzo

subsequently reported Hope had not been taking her medications for her bipolar diagnosis. Hope

was previously indicated by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for

“Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare by Neglect”

on August 30, 2018, October 31, 2018, October 15, 2019, and March 17, 2021. Hope completed

a parenting capacity assessment in March 2021, after which the examiner expressed concerns

regarding Hope’s parenting capacity and her ability to meet children’s physical and emotional

needs.

¶7 On December 6, 2023, the trial court placed G.R.’s temporary custody with

DCFS. Hope stipulated to the petition’s contents, and the court entered a dispositional order

making G.R. a ward of the court.

¶8 On September 24, 2025, the State petitioned to terminate Hope’s parental rights,

alleging she was an unfit parent because she failed to make reasonable progress toward G.R.’s

return to her care during the nine months from November 26, 2024, through August 26, 2025.

See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024).

-2- ¶9 A. Fitness Hearing

¶ 10 The trial court conducted a fitness hearing on March 9, 2026. Melissa Shaw

testified she was the caseworker assigned to G.R.’s case. Hope was expected to cooperate with

DCFS, maintain stable housing and income, comply with monthly drug drops, and successfully

complete individual counseling, a domestic violence class, and a parenting class. During the

relevant nine-month period, Hope completed just five out of nine scheduled drug drops. One of

those drops tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Hope reported using both marijuana

and ecstasy, despite being pregnant. Shaw encouraged Hope to complete a drug and alcohol

assessment, but she did not do so. Hope refused to discuss her unborn child with Shaw. Hope

also refused to permit Shaw to conduct a home safety check without a court order, and she would

often raise her voice at Shaw, swear at her, and call her names.

¶ 11 Shaw testified that visits between Hope and G.R. went well when they occurred,

but Hope often canceled visits with little advanced notice, or she would fail to call ahead to

confirm visits. Hope missed 13 out of 32 possible visits with G.R. during the nine-month period.

She also failed to attend four of her weekly individual counseling sessions in July and August

2025. Hope indicated she was uncertain who was the father of her unborn child, but she believed

it was De’Juan J. Hope reported De’Juan “was involved in criminal activity,” namely, credit card

fraud. Hope insisted she was not in relationship with him.

¶ 12 Hope maintained stable employment and housing. Prior to the nine-month period,

Hope completed a domestic violence course and two parenting courses. G.R. appeared to be

comfortable with Hope, and she would cry when Hope left the room.

¶ 13 During closing arguments, the guardian ad litem (GAL) argued that during the

final six months of the nine-month period, Hope did not make progress toward G.R.’s return to

-3- her care because she stopped engaging consistently with visits and her individual counseling.

The GAL acknowledged Hope’s pregnancy likely factored into Hope’s decreased engagement,

but he emphasized that a parent’s reasonable progress is judged by an objective standard. The

GAL argued that, at the end of the nine-month period, G.R. was further from returning to Hope’s

custody than she was before it.

¶ 14 On March 23, 2026, the trial court found the State showed, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Hope failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-

month period. The court acknowledged some of Hope’s actions demonstrated progress toward

reunification, including completing a domestic violence class and two parenting classes and

maintaining stable housing and income. However, Hope missed 13 out of 32—more than one-

third—of the possible visits with G.R. during the relevant period. Hope stopped regularly

attending her counseling sessions. Hope missed four out of nine scheduled drug drops, and one

of the drops she completed tested positive for THC. Hope also failed to cooperate with DCFS, as

she refused to permit Shaw to conduct a home-safety check until a court order was entered, and

she failed to maintain regular contact with Shaw. Because G.R. could not be returned to Hope’s

custody in the near future, the court found Hope had failed to make reasonable progress.

¶ 15 B. Best-Interests Hearing

¶ 16 The matter proceeded to a best-interests hearing. Shaw testified G.R. had lived

with her foster family since she was six months old. G.R. lived with the same foster family as her

biological siblings, and her foster parents provided appropriate food, shelter, and clothing. G.R.

had not known any parental figures other than her foster parents. G.R. was “[v]ery bonded” to

her foster parents, and she turned to them for her needs. Shaw described G.R.’s relationship with

her foster parents as “[v]ery loving.” G.R. had five biological siblings, four of whom had been

-4- adopted by her foster parents. The remaining sibling was younger than G.R. and was currently

living with the family as a foster child. G.R.’s foster parents provided consistency and security,

and they wanted to provide G.R. permanency in the form of adoption.

¶ 17 The trial court found the State had met its burden and granted its termination

petition. The court found all the applicable best-interests factors favored terminating Hope’s

parental rights so G.R.’s foster parents could adopt her. The court placed special emphasis on the

fact that G.R. was living with the same foster family as five of her biological siblings. The court

asserted:

“[G.R.] is so young. This is her only placement. She’s living with siblings. She

only knows her foster parents as parental figures, and so the risks that would go

along with being in substitute care are certainly minimal. I think flipping that on

its head, the risks attendant to not being in that foster home would be far more

significant.”

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 In May 2026, Hope’s appointed appellate counsel filed a motion seeking leave to

withdraw as counsel. Hope did not file a response. Counsel asserts no arguably meritorious issue

can be raised on appeal. We agree.

¶ 21 A. Standard of Review

¶ 22 To terminate an individual’s parental rights, the State must first show the parent is

unfit by clear and convincing evidence and then show that terminating their parental rights serves

the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494-95

(2002); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004). “The trial court is given broad discretion and

-5- great deference in matters involving minors.” In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (2001). We

will not reverse an unfitness finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, as

such a determination “involves factual findings and credibility determinations that the trial court

is in the best position to make.” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 48. Likewise, we will

not reverse a best-interests finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re

Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. “A decision is against the manifest weight of the

evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658,

¶ 48.

¶ 23 B. Unfitness Finding

¶ 24 The Adoption Act provides several grounds on which a trial court may find a

parent unfit. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024). Those grounds include a parent’s failure to

“make reasonable progress toward the return of the child *** during any 9-month period

following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(m)(ii) (West 2024).

“[R]easonable progress” means “measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of the

return of the child.” In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 460-61 (1991). We have previously

described “reasonable progress [a]s an objective standard,” measuring whether “the progress

being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently

demonstratable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the

child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88.

¶ 25 There is no issue of arguable merit concerning the trial court’s unfitness finding.

The evidence supports the court’s determination that Hope failed to make reasonable progress

toward G.R.’s return during the nine months from November 26, 2024, through August 26, 2025.

-6- See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). Hope’s recommended services included individual

counseling, cooperating with DCFS, and completing monthly drug drops. During the relevant

nine-month period, Hope attended her counseling sessions with decreasing frequency. She failed

to maintain regular communication with Shaw, and she refused to permit Shaw to conduct a

home-safety check before a court order was entered. She only completed five out of nine

monthly drug drops, and one of those drops tested positive for THC. And she attended fewer

than one-third of her scheduled visits with G.R. during the relevant period. While Hope

maintained stable housing and income, and she completed a domestic violence class and two

parenting classes, Hope did not make sufficient progress such that G.R. could have been returned

to her care in the near future. See F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88. Accordingly, the court’s

unfitness finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d

492, 500 (2011).

¶ 26 C. Best-Interests Determination

¶ 27 Once a trial court finds a parent unfit, it must consider whether terminating their

parental rights serves the child’s best interests. “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest

in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving

home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364 (2004). When considering whether termination of parental

rights serves a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within “the

context of the child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024).

These factors include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,

-7- continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the

child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s

need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of

relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family

and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the

person available to care for the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052,

1072 (2006).

See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024).

¶ 28 There is no issue of arguable merit regarding the trial court’s best-interests

finding. G.R. began living with her foster family when she was six months old. She lived with

five of her biological siblings, four of whom her foster parents had already adopted. G.R.’s foster

parents provided her with appropriate food, shelter, and clothing, and she was bonded to them.

G.R. had a loving relationship with her foster parents, and she looked to them to meet her needs.

G.R.’s foster parents were the only parental figures she had ever known, and they wished to

provide her permanency in the form of adoption. Based on this evidence, the court determined it

was in G.R.’s best interests to terminate Hope’s parental rights. We cannot say “the opposite

conclusion is clearly apparent,” nor can we find the court’s decision to be “unreasonable,

arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 We agree with appointed appellate counsel this appeal presents no issue of

arguable merit. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

-8-