In Re Golub

80 B.R. 230, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2197, 16 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1016, 1987 WL 4428
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 16, 1987
DocketBankruptcy 87-965-BKC-6P1
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 80 B.R. 230 (In Re Golub) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Golub, 80 B.R. 230, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2197, 16 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1016, 1987 WL 4428 (Fla. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON TRUSTEES OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS

GEORGE L. PROCTOR, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Trustee’s objection to certain exemptions in personal property claimed as exempt by virtue of tenancy by the entireties. Upon consideration of the evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.On February 6, 1981, the Debtor, in contemplation of marriage, entered into an Antenuptial Property Agreement (the “Antenuptial Agreement”) with Linda Go-lub, nee Linda Fatizzi, (“Linda”). At the time of the marriage, Linda had two minor children from a previous marriage, and was nineteen years younger than the debtor. The debtor had no minor children. As a result of these factors, the parties included in the Antenuptial Agreement terms which were favorable to the wife. Specifically, the Debtor was to “transfer” his property to joint ownership. Linda, however, was only obligated to incorporate her possessions with that of the Debtor and no transfer of ownership in the wife’s property is indicated by provisions in the Antenuptial Agreement. Additionally, the Antenuptial Agreement provides that in the event of divorce, Linda would get all of her property back while the Debtor’s property, now held jointly, would be split with Linda. The provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement were not to become binding until the marriage was actually solemnized, which occurred nine months later on November 27, 1981. The uncontroverted evidence propounded at the hearing in this cause is that the Debtor and Linda Fatizzi intended to create tenancies by the entireties in all property owned by the Debtor. Additionally, the evidence showed that at both the time the Agreement was signed and when the marriage later occurred, the financial reverses which led to the filing of the Chapter 7 petition had not yet occurred.

2. After the marriage but prior to the filing of the petition in this cause, the Debt- or and his wife opened a cheeking account at Freedom Savings & Loan Association. The signature card for the account has a statement of permission authorizing either spouse to act for the other in issuing checks or removing funds from the account. Additionally, a box on the signature card was marked expressly designating the account as a tenancy by the entirety.

3. After the marriage and in accordance with the Antenuptial Agreement, the Debt- or caused Squirrel Point, Limited, a general partnership, to assign a 50% interest in a promissory note (“Squirrel Point Assignment”) to “Murray M. Golub and Linda Golub, his wife,” as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

4. On January 18, 1983, in accordance with the Antenuptial Agreement, the Debt- or assigned his interest in the Sunshine Peninsula Profit Sharing Plan (“Profit Sharing Plan”) to himself and his wife. The assignment states that the interest in the Profit Sharing Plan “... shall be property that is owned as joint property with a survivorship interest in the whole by myself, Murray M. Golub and my wife, Linda *232 Golub. The share owned jointly between ourselves shall be undivided and in the event of death each shall own the whole.”

5. The Debtor brought into the marriage various household goods, supplies and furnishings (“household items”). The Antenuptial Agreement and the Debtor’s testimony at the hearing evidenced that the Debtor and his wife intended to create a tenancy by the entireties in the household items and thought a transfer to entireties property had been effectuated. However, no document evidencing such transfer, other than the Antenuptial Agreement, was ever executed.

6. Subsequently, the Debtor experienced severe financial difficulties and on April 21, 1987 filed the petition in this cause. On Schedule B-4 of the Petition, the Debtor claimed the following as exempt property under Florida law:

14 Acorn Circle, Tavares, Art. X Sec. 4 $378,000.00

Florida 32778 Fla. Const.

Wearing apparel and watch Art. X Sec. 4 FI 100.00 Const., Ten. by Entireties

Loan Receivable from Squirrel Point Homeowner's Association Ten. by Entire- 11,394.00

Joint checking account with spouse Ten. by Entire- 700.00

Dawn Developers, Inc. (100 shares) Art. X Sec. 4 -0-Fla. Const.

Sunshine Peninsula Profit Sharing Plan Ten. by Entir., 100,000.00 11 U.S.C. 541

Household goods, supplies & furnishings Ten. by Entir. 5,000.00

7. The Profit Sharing Plan was claimed as exempt by virtue of tenants by the en-tireties and “11 U.S.C. 541”. The Debtor’s reference to 11 U.S.C. § 541 was an apparent inadvertent error and should have been 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B).

8. After the filing of the petition, the Trustee timely objected to the exemptions and alleged that the items claimed by the Debtor as exempt by virtue of tenants by the entireties did not satisfy the requirements for tenants by the entireties. The Trustee also objected to the exemption of the Debtors residence and the exemption of the 100 shares of Dawn Developers, Inc. However, at the hearing on the Trustee’s Objection, the Trustee withdrew his objection as to the residence and the Debtor withdrew his claim of exemption as to the shares of Dawn Developers, Inc.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Upon commencement of a case under Title 11, United States Code, an estate is created which is comprised of all property in which the Debtor has a legal or equitable interest as of that time. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). However, an individual debtor may exempt property from his/her bankruptcy estate by claiming exemptions as authorized by Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code.

2. Section 522 provides that a state may opt out of the federal exemptions and limit a debtor’s rights to only those exemptions provided under its state laws. The State of Florida has exercised this option. Section 222.20, Florida Statutes (1977).

3. A person claiming protection under the laws of Florida is entitled to exempt a homestead residence and $1,000.00 worth of personal property. F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, Section 4 (1972).

4. In addition to the state law exemption provided in Section 522(b)(2)(A), Debtor is also entitled under Section 522(b)(2)(B) to exclude from his bankruptcy estate “... any interest in property in which (he) ... had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety ... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under applicable non-bankruptcy law.” (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2)(B). See also In re Lunger, 14 B.R. 6 (Bkrtcy., M.D.Fla.1981); cf. In re Koehler, 6 B.R. 203 (Bkrtcy, M.D.Fla.1980).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
80 B.R. 230, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2197, 16 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1016, 1987 WL 4428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-golub-flmb-1987.