In Re Gole

715 N.E.2d 399, 1999 Ind. LEXIS 722, 1999 WL 685854
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 2, 1999
Docket49S00-9503-DI-326
StatusPublished

This text of 715 N.E.2d 399 (In Re Gole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Gole, 715 N.E.2d 399, 1999 Ind. LEXIS 722, 1999 WL 685854 (Ind. 1999).

Opinion

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

PER CURIAM

Today we suspend the respondent, Richard A. Gole, from the practice of law for making improper sexual comments to, and inquiries of, two female clients.

The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission has charged respondent Gole with two counts of violating Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The respondent and the Commission have submitted a Conditional Agreement for Discipline to resolve these charges. As a result of our approval of that agreement pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 11, the respondent will be suspended from the practice of law and required to continue treatment for the problems which prompted his misconduct. 1

The agreement sets forth the following undisputed facts. With regard to Count I, on October 16,1993, a female client consulted the respondent about extricating herself from a relationship with her boyfriend, with whom she jointly owned property and was jointly obligated on a mortgage. During that meeting, the respondent asked her intimate and inappropriate questions of a sexual nature. For example, he asked the client whether she was involved with another person, whether her boyfriend satisfied her sexually, and whether she liked using sex “toys.” He also volunteered details of his own sexual experiences. The client was offended by the respondent’s comments and never sought his counsel again.

*400 While the charge relating to that misconduct was pending before a hearing officer, the respondent committed the misconduct forming the basis of Count II. A female client consulted the respondent in his office on October 8, 1997, regarding her pending divorce. During their consultation, the respondent made numerous inappropriate, sexually explicit remarks. He inquired, for example, as to the frequency of her sexual experiences and whether she had ever had sexual contact with a woman. He also detailed his own sex life. The next day the client discharged the respondent and successfully sought return of her initial payment of $300.

We find that the respondent, through his inappropriate and offensive comments to and questioning of two clients, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). 2 The clients contacted the respondent in good faith seeking only his advice as to legal issues then confronting them. What they received was uninvited, irrelevant and patently offensive verbal voyeurism.

Our finding of misconduct requires us to determine an appropriate sanction. In assessing a sanction, we examine the nature of the misconduct, the duty violated, the state of mind of the respondent, the actual or potential injury caused by the respondent, the potential risk to the public in allowing the respondent to continue in practice, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity of the profession, and factors in aggravation and mitigation. Matter of Lucas, 672 N.E.2d 934 (Ind.1996).

As the parties suggest, the timing of the respondent’s actions with regard to the second count of misconduct is an aggravating factor. The respondent committed the actions which led to the charging of Count II after a hearing had been conducted on Count I and the matter was pending before the hearing officer. Unfortunately, these incidents are not the respondent’s first experience with discipline for professional misconduct. In 1983 and 1985, the respondent was privately reprimanded for unrelated professional misconduct.

The parties cite as mitigating circumstances the respondent’s admission of his misconduct, the diagnosis of his sexual addiction, and his subsequent treatment for it. He has met regularly during the past year with a twelve-step support group for individuals suffering from sexual addictions or compulsions. The respondent also has voluntarily undergone evaluation by a psychiatrist, who determined that the respondent is likely to avoid repeating this misconduct so long as he continues with a twelve-step style program for addictive behaviors. At the Commission’s request, the respondent also was evaluated by a psychologist, who determined that the respondent’s efforts to address his sexual addiction appeared substantial and sincere. The psychologist assessed the respondent’s danger to clients as minimal.

Given these mitigating factors, the respondent and the Commission suggest a six-month suspension from the practice of law, with the first .thirty days to be an active suspension and the remaining five months to be suspended upon compliance with all terms of a one-year probation. The probationary conditions include continuing treatment for the respondent’s acknowledged sexual addiction. Such an agreement is consistent with others which we have approved in disciplinary matters arising from misconduct attributable to addictive behaviors. See, e.g., Matter of Martenet, 674 N.E.2d 549 (Ind.1996).

While we are mindful that the respondent appears to have made substantial efforts toward overcoming the problems which prompted these most recent incidents of misconduct, such actions do not excuse the misconduct. The respondent used professional consultations to obtain personal sexual gratification. While facing disciplinary charges with regard to the first incident, he engaged in the prohibited misconduct again. His actions demeaned the profession and serve to undercut public confidence in the legal system. For that reason, we believe a period of suspension is appropriate. Moreover, a period of probation during which the respondent *401 must continue treatment and undergo close monitoring also appears merited. We note that the respondent will face much more serious consequences if he engages in any further misconduct of this type.

Accordingly, we approve the conditional agreement tendered by the parties and impose a six-month suspension, beginning October 8, 1999, with the following conditions. The first thirty days of the six-month suspension shall be an active suspension. The final five months of the suspension shall be suspended upon compliance with all of the terms of a one-year probation. Upon successful completion of the conditions of probation, the respondent will be automatically reinstated to the practice of law in this state. The terms of probation are:

1) The respondent shall have a continuing duty through his term of probation to keep the Disciplinary Commission and the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court advised of the current address of both his home and law office.

2) The respondent shall not engage in discussions of sexual matters of any kind with clients who come to him for legal consultation, except to the extent that sexual matters are directly relevant to the legal matter about which the respondent is consulted. The respondent shall not offer, invite or engage in social interactions of any kind with female clients who consult and/or retain him for legal services.

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Related

Matter of Lucas
672 N.E.2d 934 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1996)
Matter of Martenet
674 N.E.2d 549 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
715 N.E.2d 399, 1999 Ind. LEXIS 722, 1999 WL 685854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gole-ind-1999.