In Re Goldstein
This text of 990 A.2d 404 (In Re Goldstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court, of the State of Delaware, Lee C. GOLDSTEIN, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
*405 Michael S. McGinniss, Esquire, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, DE.
Charles Slanina, Esquire, Finger, Slanina & Liebesman, LLC, Hockessin, DE, for Respondent.
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
*406 BERGER, Justice.
This is an attorney disciplinary proceeding. The Board on Professional Responsibility (Board) concluded that Respondent, Lee C. Goldstein, Esquire, violated the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Responsibility (Rules) in the course of conducting 10 closings for a private money lender. The Board recommended the sanction of a private reprimand. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed objections and recommended the sanction of a public reprimand. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
Facts
Respondent has been a member of the Delaware Bar for more than 30 years, primarily in solo practice. He had significant experience in residential real estate closings involving conventional lenders when, in 2007, he began representing Maven Maven, LLC., a private money lender. Maven made short-term loans, secured by second, third or fourth position mortgages, to individual borrowers who needed immediate cash and could not obtain conventional financing. The loans included high interest rates, high points, fees, and penalties, in violation of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994. In addition, the loan documents failed to provide a "right to rescind" notice required by the Truth in Lending Act.
Respondent used loan documents given to him by Robert Lubach, Maven's principal. Respondent did not review the documents because Lubach told him that they were "tried and true." Respondent conducted 10 closings for Maven in 2007. In each case, Respondent was contacted by Maven a few days before the closing, and in all but one case, Respondent did not know the borrowers. At closing, respondent told the borrowers that he did not represent them. He reviewed the terms of the loan, obtained the necessary signatures, and disbursed the funds. The loans all provided that Respondent's legal fees (ranging from $500-$1,000) would be deducted from the loan proceeds. Respondent did not give the borrowers written notice that he did not represent them and he did not advise them in writing of their right to have counsel of their choosing.
Based on these facts, the Board found that respondent violated Rules 1.1 and 1.4(b) in connection with his representation of Maven. Rule 1.1 requires that a "lawyer shall provide competent representation to the client," and Rule 1.4(b) requires that a "lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Respondent negligently failed to discover or discuss the deficiencies in Maven's loan documents. The Board also considered whether respondent violated any ethical rules in connection with his dealings with the borrowers. The Board concluded that, because respondent did not represent the borrowers, he did not.
Discussion
The standard governing attorney disciplinary matters is well settled. "The Supreme Court reviews the record independently to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's factual findings. We review the Board's conclusions of law de novo, and we consider the Board's recommended sanction helpful, but it is not binding."[1] In this case, the Board's factual findings are not disputed and they are supported by the record. The parties disagree, however, as *407 to the legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts. The Board determined that respondent did not represent the borrowers and, as a result, respondent owed them no ethical duties. Respondent agrees with the Board's analysis. ODC argues that, because the borrowers did not have their own attorneys for these residential real estate closings, respondent owed ethical duties to the borrowers that did not depend on the creation of a traditional attorney-client relationship.
This Court recently considered a similar disciplinary matter involving the same money lender. The attorney, I. Jay Katz, prepared the loan documents for Lubach, the money lender; the loans violated federal law; and the borrowers were in dire financial need.[2] Unlike respondent, Katz purported to represent both the lender and the borrowers. Katz prepared "Statements of Representation and Disclosure" explaining both the borrowers' rights and Katz's possible conflict of interest. But, in some cases, Katz never obtained the borrowers' signatures on the disclosure form, and, in other cases, Katz did not give the form to the borrowers until the closing. The Court concluded that Katz violated ethical duties to Lubach and to the borrowers. Katz was suspended from the practice of law for three months and placed on probation for one year thereafter.
We recognize that, because of certain factual differences, Katz is not controlling. But we find that decision instructive. Rule 1.16 addresses the circumstances under which a lawyer should not represent a client. In brief, "[a] lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion."[3] In Katz, the Court emphasized the legal profession's long history of avoiding conflicts of interest. Delaware's Interpretive Guideline for residential real estate transactions, which is included in the Comment to Rule 1.16, protects buyers and mortgagors by requiring that they be given the opportunity to obtain conflict-free representation:
More than thirty years ago, the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct were amended to include an Interpretive Guideline outlining principles relating to concurrent conflicts in residential real estate transactions. Like the right of rescission, the Interpretive Guideline is a recognition of the importance that society attaches to a person's residence. It also reflects the historic importance that the legal profession places on either conflict-free representation or an informed waiver of a conflict that has been disclosed in writing in a timely manner.
Pursuant to the Interpretive Guideline, a Delaware lawyer's ethical obligation requires timely written disclosure of a concurrent conflict before the representation is commenced.[4]
In Katz, the lender's attorney intended to represent the mortgagors, but they were not told about that purported representation until the day of closing. As a result, the mortgagors had no meaningful opportunity to obtain independent counsel. Here, the mortgagors had even less protection. They were told, at closing, that respondent was not representing them. Thus, not only did they have no advance written notice of their right to independent counsel, they had no counsel at all.
*408 The Interpretive Guideline is about disclosure. It could be read narrowly to apply only when the conflicted lawyer intends to represent the buyer or borrower.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
990 A.2d 404, 2010 WL 891906, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-goldstein-del-2010.