In Re Glover Const. Co., Inc.

35 B.R. 233, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4964
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedNovember 23, 1983
Docket19-30123
StatusPublished

This text of 35 B.R. 233 (In Re Glover Const. Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Glover Const. Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 233, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4964 (Ky. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MERRITT S. DEITZ, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

On November 10, 1982, Glover Construction Co. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On that day by operation of law a protective statutory cloak was lowered into place which stayed all creditor actions. 1 On September 8, 1983 American States Insurance Co., surety for this debtor on a bonded public works project, filed a motion which in essence sought the removal of the automatic stay. The motion was the subject of extended hearings on short notice on October 7 through 11. This order follows.

None of these events are unusual or unexpected in proceedings in Chapter 11. The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is applicable to reorganization proceedings to give a reorganizing debtor relief from creditor pressure and an opportunity to restructure. It is not uncommon for a creditor, fearing economic depreciation of its collateral beyond salvage value, to request relief from that stay.

What is uncommon about the instant controversy is the nature of the property interest sought to be released from the inhibitory effects of § 362. The unique nature of this claim for relief will become apparent in the course of this opinion.

Section 362(d) was enacted by Congress to remedy the previously inadequate treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. It affords such creditors relief if their interests are detrimentally affected *234 by the stay. The standards for relief are expressly stated, and relief becomes available thirty days from the request, unless the court holds a hearing and intervenes in favor of the debtor. 2

Although the statutory language is unlimited, the legislative history designates the obvious beneficiaries of § 362; the envisioned “protected class” is comprised of creditors with collateral that may be deteriorating in value. 3 American States is not a secured creditor attempting to repossess rapidly depreciating property. Nevertheless, the breadth of statutory language leads us to believe that American States is a proper claimant for relief from § 362.

As we have said, there are certain standards that the movant must meet to escape the automatic stay. Section 362(d)(1), relied upon by American States, demands that there be “cause” to vacate the stay. The moving party must show some interest in property that is jeopardized by continuation of the stay. Certainly, isolation of the interest at stake must precede any consideration of its status during the bankruptcy proceedings. This is especially true when we deal not with the typical secured creditor, but with a contractor’s surety.

American States bypasses this threshold consideration and proceeds immediately to the allegedly endangering factors. Its original motion, arguments during the hearing, and supporting briefs contend that the stay should be lifted because Glover’s unsatisfactory performance precludes timely completion of the contract. The surety’s ultimate complaint is that if Glover is permitted to perform, although at an unsatisfactory rate, its “exposure will increase as the project falls farther behind and the unpaid bills of suppliers and contractors mount.”

On the preliminary question — the nature of the property interest sought to be protected — it is unnecessary for American States to argue. It unquestionably has an equitable interest in the contract progress payments. 4

Somewhat more difficult is an analysis of exactly how the § 362 automatic stay impacts on this property interest, and how its removal would benefit this creditor. We approach the question foreknowing that this equity court must “balance the hurt” between the debtor's right to reorganize and the surety’s rights to realize its bargain and to be exposed only to risks actually anticipated and contracted for. Equity must also take cognizance of the other parties which will be materially affected by our determination — the Army Corps of Engineers, which awaits use of the completed facility, and the many subcontractors and suppliers who are financially dependent on this project.

We weigh the following facts:

1. Glover is the general contractor for a tankwash facility at Ft. Knox. The contract price is $6,279,250, and the revised completion date is October 10, 1983, with an additional eight days that may be justifiable according to Corps of Engineers’ correspondence. Liquidated damages are allowed at $555/day.
2. Pursuant to the two bonds executed with Glover for this project, American States must pay all unsatisfied claimants and complete performance if Glover fails to finish the work.
*235 3. American States has paid $934,229.52 in pre-petition claims.
4. By order of this Court, March 23, 1983, American States was given veto power over disbursement of all construction funds. A specialized trustee was appointed to administer a Glover-American States joint checking account.
5. Because this is a public project, the Corps releases contract funds to Glover based on materials stored on site and actual work in place. These payments facilitate an approximation of the contractor’s rate of performance.
6. No funds were authorized or paid to Glover during the period April-July, 1983.
7. Glover and the Corps reached an impasse regarding a phase of the construction by the end of March, 1983. As of April, 1983 the Corps did not have test results indicating that masonry block work was of acceptable standards. Consequently, no masonry work or work built upon it could qualify for progress payments.
8. No work stop order was issued by the Corps, but correspondence to Glover advised that removal of the masonry might be required. On July 19, this problem was resolved, further tests were waived and the Corps advised that it knew “of no reason that the work should not now proceed on the masonry.”
9. On July 29, payment for work during March was authorized, $19,619. On August 31, payment for work performed April through July was authorized, $72,891. On September 16, payment for work during August was authorized, $66,675. On September 20, payment for work through September 19 was authorized, $61,639.20. On October 11, payment for work from September 20 through October 5 was authorized, $121,479.
10. The following is a time perspective of the Ft. Knox project:
Time Period Payments Received
9/21/81 - 1/8/82 $1,000,000 (16%)
1/8/82 - 4/15/82 $1,000,000 (16%)
4/15/82 - 8/1/82 $1,000,000 (16%)
8/1/82 - 1/1/83 $1,000,000 (16%)

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Bluebook (online)
35 B.R. 233, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4964, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-glover-const-co-inc-kywb-1983.