In Re Glasstream Boats. Inc. Tax I.D. No. 58-1471322

110 B.R. 611, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 239, 1990 WL 9774
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJanuary 9, 1990
Docket19-70127
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 110 B.R. 611 (In Re Glasstream Boats. Inc. Tax I.D. No. 58-1471322) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Glasstream Boats. Inc. Tax I.D. No. 58-1471322, 110 B.R. 611, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 239, 1990 WL 9774 (Ga. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN T. LANEY, III, Bankruptcy Judge.

These are Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Motion of the Debtor, Glasstream Boats, Inc. under § 363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code for use of cash collateral belonging to the Creditor, Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc.

Debtor is a boat and trailer manufacturing company with manufacturing facilities in Georgia, Florida, and Arkansas. Creditor is conceded to have a properly perfected security interest in accounts receivable, inventory, work in process, some equipment, and proceeds thereof.

Shortly after this Chapter 11 case was filed, the court held a hearing on Debtor’s Motion for Authority to use Cash Collateral. Debtor and Creditor entered into an agreement as to the use of the cash collateral in question, which was later made an order of the court. This order incorporated certain projections. When these projections were not met by Debtor, the parties entered into a modified arrangement, again with court approval. The Debtor failed to meet sales projections in the modified arrangement and the Creditor terminated its consent in accordance with the terms of the order. In direct violation of the court order, the Debtor refused to remit proceeds from C.O.D. sales of boats which had been the Creditor’s collateral and filed a new motion with this court for authority to use this cash collateral and future cash collateral to be received from C.O.D. sales already made from which the cash was in transit and sales to be made in the future.

After a preliminary hearing, the court permitted some use of the cash collateral pending a final hearing. The court expressed concern over the failure of the Debtor to obey its prior order and over the failure of the Debtor to present satisfactory evidence of the value of the inventory and work in process.

A final hearing was held on January 2, 1990. At that time, evidence showed that the Debtor had again disobeyed an order of the court and had overspent for some categories of expenses. The only explanation was that the Debtor’s president, Mr. A.L. Kirkland, had misunderstood the court’s order.

The court’s order was stated orally in the presence of Mr. Kirkland in such clear terms that it could not have been misunderstood by a person of ordinary intelligence. It was also reduced to writing in a very clear fashion and the Clerk’s Office served a copy on the Debtor. As a result, the Creditor’s collateral was reduced. The court can only conclude that the Debtor knowingly and intentionally violated a court order for the second time.

Nevertheless, the court was and is convinced that the best interests of the Debtor in Possession and this Creditor and the other Creditors is for the Debtor to continue in operation as a manufacturing facility. The Debtor’s counsel has said that a denial of this motion would result in another shut down of the assembly line, which the court doesn’t feel is in the best interest of either party. The court continued the interim cash collateral order for one more week in order to give in depth study to the evidence and the law before announcing a ruling.

Section 363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Debtor in Possession may not use cash collateral unless each entity that has an interest in the cash collateral consents or the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use in accordance with the provisions of § 363 of the Code.

Section 363(c) provides that, at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property proposed to be used, the court *613 shall prohibit or condition such use as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.

Section 363(o)(l) provides that in any-hearing under § 363, the Debtor in Possession has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection. Adequate protection as used in § 363 is defined in § 361 to include the Debtor in Possession’s making a cash payment or periodic cash payments to the secured party to the extent that the use of the property results in in a decrease in the value of the Creditor’s interest in the property; providing an additional or replacement lien to the extent that the use results in a decrease in the value of the Creditor’s interest in the property; or giving such other relief as will result in the realization by the Creditor of the indubitable equivalent of the Creditor’s interest in the property.

So the test is not whether or not it is in the best interest of the Debtor and the secured Creditor, but whether or not the Debtor carries its burden to show that its use of the cash collateral will not reduce the value of the Creditor’s interest in the property without providing adequate protection—the indubitable equivalent of the Creditor’s interest in the property.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 727 F.2d 1017 (1984) stated that “when a creditor opposes a proposed use of cash collateral, the guiding inquiry is whether its security interests are ‘adequately protected’ absent the additional protection that the cash collateral would provide....”

“In determining whether a creditor’s secured interests are so protected, there must be an individual determination of the value of that interest and whether a proposed use of cash collateral threatens that value.” Id. at 1019.

Quoting from Collier on Bankruptcy, the court continued, “Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for.” Id. at 1019-20.

Courts have split over the burden of proof that the Debtor must carry under this section. Some bankruptcy courts have required proof by clear and convincing evidence. In re O.P. Held, Inc., 74 B.R. 777 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1987); In re Leavell, 56 B.R. 11 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1985); In re Sheehan, 38 B.R. 859 (Bankr.D.S.D.1984).

However, this court believes the proper burden is preponderance of the evidence as stated by Judge Ryan in In re McCombs Properties VI, LTD., 88 B.R. 261 (Bankr.C. D.Calif.1988).

In this motion, the Debtor asks for authority to use up to $175,000.00 per week of the Creditor’s cash collateral to carry on its business operation. It asserts that the Creditor is undersecured, but put into evidence projections that purport to show that Creditor’s cash collateral would increase as a result of the continued operation of the Debtor. Essentially, the Debtor proposes to take cash from sales of boats that are pledged to Creditor and use it to stay in operation, including creating new boats, selling them, and also purchasing new raw material inventory which would be subject to a post-petition replacement lien in favor of Creditor.

As “adequate protection" for the use of cash collateral, Debtor proposed:

(1) All sales would be C.O.D. absent further order of the court;

(2) It would collect prepetition accounts receivable and pay over to Creditor sums collected in excess of $592,000.00;

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
110 B.R. 611, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 239, 1990 WL 9774, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-glasstream-boats-inc-tax-id-no-58-1471322-gamb-1990.