in Re: General Motors Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 29, 2008
• Docket: 12-07-00387-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                                NO. 12-07-00387-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

§         

IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS

CORPORATION,      §          ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

RELATOR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            General Motors filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s order granting the amended motion to compel filed by the real parties in interest, Monica Albright Smith and Matt Albright, individually and as the representatives of the estate of Tonya Albright, deceased.¹  General Motors contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery that is overbroad and by overruling General Motors’s privilege objections.  We conditionally grant the petition.

Background

            Monica Albright Smith was a passenger in a 1994 Chevrolet S-10 pickup driven by her mother, Tonya Albright, when they were involved in an automobile accident.  After the accident, the pickup caught on fire.  Tonya Albright died from her injuries, and Monica Albright Smith suffered significant injuries, including burns to most of her body.

            Monica Albright Smith and Matt Albright then brought suit against General Motors and the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident.  As it pertains to General Motors, the Albrights’ petition included allegations that General Motors was liable for their injuries because the fuel system in the 1994 Chevrolet S-10 pickup was defective.  The Albrights brought claims against General Motors under theories of strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, negligence, and gross negligence.

            The Albrights then sent written discovery to General Motors consisting of requests for production and interrogatories.  General Motors responded and objected.  Unhappy with the multitude of objections and the lack of complete responses, the Albrights filed a motion to compel.  General Motors supplemented its responses with the production of some of the requested documents.  General Motors then promised to provide additional documents upon the entry of a confidentiality order.  The Albrights amended their motion to compel, and the trial court set the motion for hearing.  On the day of the hearing, General Motors filed its response to the Albrights’ motion to compel.

            After the hearing but before the trial court ruled on the amended motion, General Motors and the Albrights agreed that certain documents would be produced and treated as confidential until and unless the Albrights presented the documents to the trial court for a ruling about whether the documents were in fact confidential.  General Motors then sent several thousand documents to the Albrights.

            The trial court granted the Albrights’ amended motion to compel as it pertained to 43 interrogatories and 85 requests for production.  In its order, the trial court overruled all of General Motors’s objections and ordered General Motors to provide complete responses to the specified interrogatories and requests for production.

            General Motors then filed this petition for writ of mandamus along with a motion for emergency relief.  We stayed the proceedings in the trial court pending our disposition of General Motors’s petition.

Availability of Mandamus

            Mandamus will issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion where there is no adequate remedy by appeal.  In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992).  The trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law.  Id.  Moreover, an appellate remedy may be adequate even though it involves more delay or cost than mandamus.  See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842.  An appeal from a trial court’s discovery order is not adequate if (1) the appellate court would not be able to cure the trial court’s error on appeal; (2) the party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is vitiated or severely compromised; or (3) missing discovery cannot be made a part of the appellate record.  Id. at 843.

Scope of Discovery

            We first consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering General Motors to provide complete responses to the Albrights’ discovery requests.  The purpose of discovery is the administration of justice by allowing the parties to obtain the fullest knowledge of facts prior to trial.  West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978); Hill and Griffith Co. v. Bryant, 139 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, pet. denied).  Discovery rules must be given a broad and liberal treatment.  Hill and Griffith Co., 139 S.W.3d at 695.  A party must be allowed to inquire into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.  Id.  Discovery is permitted of any unprivileged information relevant to the subject of the lawsuit, including inadmissible evidence, so long as the request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a); see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).

            While the scope of discovery is quite broad, it is confined by the subject matter of the case and the reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid resolution of the dispute.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 192 cmt. 1; see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152.  Discovery should be reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to the case.  In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).  Although the parties must be given some latitude in fashioning proper discovery requests, this latitude is not unlimited.  Id.  The trial court should limit discovery when the discovery is 1) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, 2) obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, or 3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4.   Discovery requests that are not reasonably tailored as to time, place, or subject matter are impermissible.  In re Lowe’s Companies, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding).  Further, while a corporate defendant’s “state of mind” about a particular product may be discoverable, attempts to extend that inquiry to every product ever made by that party are likewise impermissible.  In re Graco Children’s Products, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).

            Requests for production are limited to items within the scope of discovery.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 196.1(a).  The rules outline the scope of discovery with regard to documents and tangible things as follows:

A party may obtain discovery of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, location, and contents of documents and tangible things (including papers, books, accounts, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, electronic or videotape recordings, data, and data compilations) that constitute or contain matters relevant to the subject matter of the action.  A person is required to produce a document or tangible thing that is within the person’s possession, custody, or control.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(b).  Generally, interrogatories are limited to matters within the scope of discovery.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 197.1(a) (interrogatories may inquire about any matter within scope of discovery except matters covered by Rule 195 pertaining to testifying expert witnesses).  Contention discovery is permitted.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(j) (“A party may obtain discovery of any other party’s legal contentions and the factual bases for those contentions.”).  But all that is required is a basic statement of those contentions, and not a marshaling of evidence.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 192 cmt. 5.  

            Here, the Albrights failed to reasonably tailor their requests, and, in many circumstances, failed to tailor their requests at all.  A number of the Albrights’ discovery requests seek information on all General Motors vehicles made at any time.  Although most of the Albrights’ discovery requests focus on the S-10, even those discovery requests are not adequately limited in time.  In failing to limit their requests, the Albrights clearly exceeded the scope of discovery, and the trial court should have limited their requests.  Instead of limiting discovery by the subject matter of the case and the reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid in resolution of the dispute, the trial court ordered discovery where there was “no apparent connection between the alleged defect and the discovery ordered.”  See In re Graco, 210 S.W.3d at 601.  Therefore, the trial court’s order constitutes an abuse of discretion.

            Having determined that the trial court’s order allowed overbroad discovery and, thus, was an abuse of discretion, the order must be vacated if there is no adequate remedy on appeal.  In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153.  Where a discovery order compels production of patently irrelevant documents, there is no adequate remedy by appeal because the order imposes a burden far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the party seeking discovery.  Id.  Because the trial court’s order compels the production of patently irrelevant documents, it imposes such a disproportionate burden on General Motors.  Consequently, General Motors has no adequate remedy by appeal.

Conclusion

            Having held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Albrights’ motion to compel and that General Motors has no adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant General Motors’s petition for writ of mandamus. 

            The trial court’s order covers 43 interrogatories and 85 requests for production.  As in American Optical, the parties here presented general arguments regarding the proper scope of discovery, but did not specifically focus on each individual discovery request.  Under these circumstances, rather than “attempt to set the precise bounds of discovery in the first instance, we believe the trial court should have an opportunity to reconsider its ruling in light of our opinion today.”  See In re Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d at 713-14.  Accordingly, we trust that the trial court will promptly vacate its order of September 26, 2007, revisit the Albrights’ amended motion to compel and General Motors’s discovery objections in light of this opinion, and issue a written order setting the precise bounds of discovery.  The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply with this court’s opinion and order within ten days.  The trial court shall furnish this court, within the time for compliance with this court’s opinion and order, a certified copy of its order evidencing such compliance.

            Because we have determined that the trial court’s order compels overbroad discovery and therefore cannot stand, we need not address General Motors’ other claims.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.  Our stay of the trial court proceedings is lifted.

                                                                                                    BRIAN HOYLE   

                                                                                                               Justice

Opinion delivered February 29, 2008.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)

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¹ The respondent is the Honorable Joe Bob Golden, Judge of the 1st Judicial District Court, San Augustine County, Texas.