In Re GEICO General Insurance Company
This text of In Re GEICO General Insurance Company (In Re GEICO General Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 In re GEICO General Insurance Company Case No. 19-cv-03768-HSG 8 ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO SEAL 9 Re: Dkt. Nos. 92, 99, 103, 106, 110 10 11 12 Pending before the Court are the parties’ motions to file under seal portions of their class 13 certification briefs and associated exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 92, 99, 103, 106, 110. For the reasons 14 detailed below, the Court DENIES the motions to file under seal. 15 I. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 17 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 18 v.City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the 19 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 20 and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of 21 access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this 22 strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion 23 must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 24 general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in 25 understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations 26 omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 27 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a 1 vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 2 scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. 3 Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records 4 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 5 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 6 Civil Local Rule 79-5 supplements the “compelling reasons” standard. The party seeking 7 to file under seal must submit “a request that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are 8 privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . . The 9 request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material . . . .” Civil L.R. 79- 10 5(b). Courts have found that “confidential business information” in the form of “license 11 agreements, financial terms, details of confidential licensing negotiations, and business strategies” 12 satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard. See In re Qualcomm Litig., No. 3:17-cv-0108-GPC- 13 MDD, 2017 WL 5176922, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (observing that sealing such information 14 “prevent[ed] competitors from gaining insight into the parties’ business model and strategy”); 15 Finisar Corp. v. Nistica, Inc., No. 13-cv-03345-BLF (JSC), 2015 WL 3988132, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 16 June 30, 2015). 17 Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of 18 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only 19 tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This 20 requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information 21 is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th 22 Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 23 examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 24 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 Because the motion for class certification is more than tangentially related to the 27 underlying action, the Court applies the “compelling reasons” standard in evaluating the motions 1 cover sealable material, Defendant has sought to seal an unjustifiably broad swath of basic 2 business practice information.1 For example, Defendant indicates in its Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 3 Motion for Class Certification that for total loss claims it complies with the California Total Loss 4 Regulation, which “provides that GEICO is required to pay all applicable taxes and one-time fees 5 incident to transfer of ownership and the ‘remaining term’ of the totaled vehicle’s annual 6 registration fees.” Dkt. No. 99-4 at 2. But Defendant seeks to seal the portion of a deposition 7 transcript of GEICO witness Phillip Gallimore and a different portion of its opposition that detail 8 this exact practice. See id. at 4; Dkt. No. 99-1 at 2, ¶ 2. Defendant claims that Gallimore’s 9 deposition transcript, attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Kymberly Kochisin in Support of 10 GEICO’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, “contain[s] confidential and 11 proprietary information concerning GEICO’s internal procedures and operations relevant to 12 GEICO’s processing and settlement of auto damage claims in California,” and that “disclosure . . . 13 would cause GEICO harm and leave it at a competitive disadvantage.” Dkt. No. 99-1 at 2, ¶ 2. 14 But the fact that Defendant detailed this practice elsewhere in its opposition brief shows that its 15 request to seal Exhibit A in its entirety is overly broad. And the same is true for several other 16 exhibits. 17 As a second example, Defendant seeks to seal the entirety of Exhibit T to the supplemental 18 declaration of Annick Persinger, a claim document provided by GEICO to Plaintiff Subbaiah. See 19 Dkt. No. 104, ¶ 4. GEICO indicates that Exhibit T is “the type of material used by GEICO in the 20 adjustment of California total loss claims and is part of GEICO’s proprietary claims handling 21 processes and thus reflects GEICO’s business practices with respect to the adjustment and 22 settlement of total loss claims and are generally considered confidential and proprietary by 23 GEICO.” Id. But the substance of the claim letter reflects a business practice that is obviously 24 visible to claimants, as demonstrated by Plaintiff Subbaiah’s allegation in the complaint detailing 25 the reason for GEICO’s settlement of her claim. See Dkt. No. 75, ¶ 19. 26 27 1 As previously noted, the parties’ filed motions to seal portions of their class certification briefs 1 These overly broad requests do not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(b), which requires 2 || that the “request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Defendant 3 makes the blanket assertion that the identified material constitutes confidential and proprietary 4 business information, but as noted, much of the material details basic business practice 5 information. Moreover, many of the requests were not limited to cover portions that refer directly 6 || to the purportedly proprietary information. In filing motions to seal, the burden is on the parties to 7 || justify, in detail, each proposed fact that they want to seal. 8 In light of the deficiencies of the pending motions to seal, the motions are DENIED. The 9 Court DIRECTS the parties to file public versions of all documents within seven days of this 10 || order.
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