[Cite as In re G.D.S., 2025-Ohio-2297.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HENRY COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 7-24-10
G.D.S., OPINION AND JUVENILE TRAFFIC OFFENDER. JUDGMENT ENTRY
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 24 TR 00048
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 30, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Danny A. Hill for Appellant
Melody Wilhelm for Appellee Case No. 7-24-10
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Appellant, G.D.S., appeals the August 21, 2024 judgment entry of the
Henry County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding him to be a
juvenile traffic offender on the basis of G.D.S.’s violation of R.C. 4511.43(A),
failure to yield. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
{¶2} On May 14, 2024, G.D.S., a 16-year-old driver, was cited with a failure-
to-yield offense in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A), a minor misdemeanor if committed
by an adult.
{¶3} The matter was heard by a magistrate on June 25, 2024. Thereafter, on
July 3, 2024, the magistrate issued a decision setting forth his factual findings.
Specifically, the magistrate found that G.D.S. was traveling southbound on County
Road 19 “behind a semi-truck.” (Doc. No. 6). When “the semi-truck came to the
intersection of County Road 19 and US 6,” the semi-truck “stopped at the stop sign,”
and G.D.S. stopped “behind the semi-truck.” (Id.). However, “prior to the semi-
truck clearing the intersection,” G.D.S. “went through the intersection without
allowing the semi-truck to clear the intersection.” (Id.). Based on these factual
findings, the magistrate determined that G.D.S. “stopped at the intersection but did
not yield the right of way to a vehicle in the intersection and as a result violated the
statute [R.C. 4511.43(A)].” (Id.).
-2- Case No. 7-24-10
{¶4} On July 17, 2024, G.D.S. timely filed his objections to the magistrate’s
decision. G.D.S. argued that he proceeded “safely through the intersection behind
the semi” and that “there was no right of way for [G.D.S.] to yield to any other
vehicle.” (Doc. No. 7). Notably, G.D.S. did not file a transcript of the proceedings
before the magistrate for the juvenile court’s review.
{¶5} On August 21, 2024, the juvenile court found G.D.S.’s objections not
well taken and adopted the magistrate’s decision. The juvenile court noted G.D.S.’s
failure to file a transcript within 30 days of filing his objections as required by Juv.R.
40(D)(3)(b)(iii). Without a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate,
the juvenile court determined that it “can only rely on the Magistrate’s Decision as
filed. The Magistrate heard the case and found [G.D.S.] had violated ORC
4511.43(A).” (Id.).
{¶6} On August 23, 2024, G.D.S. filed a motion requesting that a transcript
of the proceedings before the magistrate be prepared and that the juvenile court issue
an order extending the time for filing the transcript. The juvenile court denied
G.D.S.’s request.
{¶7} On September 19, 2024, G.D.S. filed his notice of appeal, raising a
single assignment of error for our review. Included with the record on appeal is a
transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate.
-3- Case No. 7-24-10
Assignment of Error
The Court erred in finding that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A), by failing to yield the right of way, when there was no vehicle to which G.D.S. was required to yield the right of way.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, G.D.S. argues that the juvenile court
erred in determining that he violated R.C. 4511.43(A). Specifically, G.D.S.
contends that R.C. 4511.43(A), when read in conjunction with R.C.
4511.01(UU)(1), does not require a driver to yield to a vehicle in front of the driver
in an intersection. In support of his argument, G.D.S. cites to a transcript that was
not provided to the juvenile court for its review.
Standard of Review
{¶9} When a party has filed timely objections to a magistrate’s finding but
failed to provide a transcript for the trial court’s review, our review is limited to
whether “‘the trial court’s adoption of that finding constituted an abuse of
discretion.’” In re McClure, 1995 WL 423391, *2 (3d Dist. July 19, 1995), quoting
Proctor v. Proctor, 48 Ohio App.3d 55, 60 (3d Dist. 1988). An abuse of discretion
suggests that the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶10} Moreover, even though G.D.S. has provided this court with a
transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate, we are precluded from
considering it since the juvenile court did not have a transcript available for its
review of G.D.S.’s objections. McClure at *2. See also State v. Kepler, 2024-Ohio-
-4- Case No. 7-24-10
2283, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.) (stating that “we are unable to consider the transcript of the
hearing before the magistrate because [appellant] did not file the transcript with the
trial court”).
Analysis
{¶11} In this case, the juvenile court relied on the magistrate’s factual
findings to determine that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A). In relevant part, R.C.
4511.43(A) provides as follows:
[E]very driver of a vehicle . . . approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, . . . then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, R.C. 4511.43(A) requires that a driver must stop at a stop
sign, then—after stopping—must yield the right of way to any vehicle in the
intersection. The term “right-of-way” means “[t]he right of a vehicle . . . to proceed
uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it . . . is moving in
preference to another vehicle . . . approaching from a different direction into its . . .
path.” R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1).
{¶12} On appeal, G.D.S. argues that R.C. 4511.43(A) does not require a
driver to yield the right of way to a vehicle in front of the driver in an intersection.
According to G.D.S., R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1) limits the definition of “right-of-way”
-5- Case No. 7-24-10
to vehicles “approaching from a different direction.” Since the semi-truck was “in
front of G.D.S.’s vehicle” and not approaching from a different direction, G.D.S.
contends that the juvenile court erred in relying on the magistrate’s findings and
determining that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A). (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
{¶13} As previously stated, we are unable to consider the transcript
submitted with the record on appeal because G.D.S. failed to provide a transcript
for the juvenile court’s review. “When the objecting party does not give the trial
court a transcript, the appellate court cannot consider the transcript.” Kepler, 2024-
Ohio-2283, at ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). Therefore, our review in this matter is limited to
determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in applying the law to
the facts. See State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728,
730 (1995).
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[Cite as In re G.D.S., 2025-Ohio-2297.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HENRY COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 7-24-10
G.D.S., OPINION AND JUVENILE TRAFFIC OFFENDER. JUDGMENT ENTRY
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 24 TR 00048
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 30, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Danny A. Hill for Appellant
Melody Wilhelm for Appellee Case No. 7-24-10
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Appellant, G.D.S., appeals the August 21, 2024 judgment entry of the
Henry County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, finding him to be a
juvenile traffic offender on the basis of G.D.S.’s violation of R.C. 4511.43(A),
failure to yield. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
{¶2} On May 14, 2024, G.D.S., a 16-year-old driver, was cited with a failure-
to-yield offense in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A), a minor misdemeanor if committed
by an adult.
{¶3} The matter was heard by a magistrate on June 25, 2024. Thereafter, on
July 3, 2024, the magistrate issued a decision setting forth his factual findings.
Specifically, the magistrate found that G.D.S. was traveling southbound on County
Road 19 “behind a semi-truck.” (Doc. No. 6). When “the semi-truck came to the
intersection of County Road 19 and US 6,” the semi-truck “stopped at the stop sign,”
and G.D.S. stopped “behind the semi-truck.” (Id.). However, “prior to the semi-
truck clearing the intersection,” G.D.S. “went through the intersection without
allowing the semi-truck to clear the intersection.” (Id.). Based on these factual
findings, the magistrate determined that G.D.S. “stopped at the intersection but did
not yield the right of way to a vehicle in the intersection and as a result violated the
statute [R.C. 4511.43(A)].” (Id.).
-2- Case No. 7-24-10
{¶4} On July 17, 2024, G.D.S. timely filed his objections to the magistrate’s
decision. G.D.S. argued that he proceeded “safely through the intersection behind
the semi” and that “there was no right of way for [G.D.S.] to yield to any other
vehicle.” (Doc. No. 7). Notably, G.D.S. did not file a transcript of the proceedings
before the magistrate for the juvenile court’s review.
{¶5} On August 21, 2024, the juvenile court found G.D.S.’s objections not
well taken and adopted the magistrate’s decision. The juvenile court noted G.D.S.’s
failure to file a transcript within 30 days of filing his objections as required by Juv.R.
40(D)(3)(b)(iii). Without a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate,
the juvenile court determined that it “can only rely on the Magistrate’s Decision as
filed. The Magistrate heard the case and found [G.D.S.] had violated ORC
4511.43(A).” (Id.).
{¶6} On August 23, 2024, G.D.S. filed a motion requesting that a transcript
of the proceedings before the magistrate be prepared and that the juvenile court issue
an order extending the time for filing the transcript. The juvenile court denied
G.D.S.’s request.
{¶7} On September 19, 2024, G.D.S. filed his notice of appeal, raising a
single assignment of error for our review. Included with the record on appeal is a
transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate.
-3- Case No. 7-24-10
Assignment of Error
The Court erred in finding that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A), by failing to yield the right of way, when there was no vehicle to which G.D.S. was required to yield the right of way.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, G.D.S. argues that the juvenile court
erred in determining that he violated R.C. 4511.43(A). Specifically, G.D.S.
contends that R.C. 4511.43(A), when read in conjunction with R.C.
4511.01(UU)(1), does not require a driver to yield to a vehicle in front of the driver
in an intersection. In support of his argument, G.D.S. cites to a transcript that was
not provided to the juvenile court for its review.
Standard of Review
{¶9} When a party has filed timely objections to a magistrate’s finding but
failed to provide a transcript for the trial court’s review, our review is limited to
whether “‘the trial court’s adoption of that finding constituted an abuse of
discretion.’” In re McClure, 1995 WL 423391, *2 (3d Dist. July 19, 1995), quoting
Proctor v. Proctor, 48 Ohio App.3d 55, 60 (3d Dist. 1988). An abuse of discretion
suggests that the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶10} Moreover, even though G.D.S. has provided this court with a
transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate, we are precluded from
considering it since the juvenile court did not have a transcript available for its
review of G.D.S.’s objections. McClure at *2. See also State v. Kepler, 2024-Ohio-
-4- Case No. 7-24-10
2283, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.) (stating that “we are unable to consider the transcript of the
hearing before the magistrate because [appellant] did not file the transcript with the
trial court”).
Analysis
{¶11} In this case, the juvenile court relied on the magistrate’s factual
findings to determine that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A). In relevant part, R.C.
4511.43(A) provides as follows:
[E]very driver of a vehicle . . . approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, . . . then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, R.C. 4511.43(A) requires that a driver must stop at a stop
sign, then—after stopping—must yield the right of way to any vehicle in the
intersection. The term “right-of-way” means “[t]he right of a vehicle . . . to proceed
uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it . . . is moving in
preference to another vehicle . . . approaching from a different direction into its . . .
path.” R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1).
{¶12} On appeal, G.D.S. argues that R.C. 4511.43(A) does not require a
driver to yield the right of way to a vehicle in front of the driver in an intersection.
According to G.D.S., R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1) limits the definition of “right-of-way”
-5- Case No. 7-24-10
to vehicles “approaching from a different direction.” Since the semi-truck was “in
front of G.D.S.’s vehicle” and not approaching from a different direction, G.D.S.
contends that the juvenile court erred in relying on the magistrate’s findings and
determining that G.D.S. violated R.C. 4511.43(A). (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
{¶13} As previously stated, we are unable to consider the transcript
submitted with the record on appeal because G.D.S. failed to provide a transcript
for the juvenile court’s review. “When the objecting party does not give the trial
court a transcript, the appellate court cannot consider the transcript.” Kepler, 2024-
Ohio-2283, at ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). Therefore, our review in this matter is limited to
determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in applying the law to
the facts. See State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728,
730 (1995).
{¶14} Here, there is limited information about G.D.S.’s driving and the
surrounding circumstances that is properly before us. Although G.D.S cites to
several facts that he believes the magistrate improperly considered, nearly all of that
information comes from the transcript, which we cannot consider. Kepler at ¶ 11.
{¶15} From the magistrate’s decision we know that (1) G.D.S. was traveling
southbound on County Road 19 behind a semi-truck; (2) the semi-truck “stopped at
the stop sign at [the] intersection” of County Road 19 and US 6, and G.D.S. stopped
behind the semi-truck; and (3) “prior to the semi-truck clearing the intersection,”
G.D.S. “went through the intersection without allowing the semi-truck to clear the
-6- Case No. 7-24-10
intersection.” (Doc. No. 6). Moreover, in the absence of a transcript, the juvenile
court relied on the magistrate’s factual findings and determined that G.D.S. violated
R.C. 4511.43(A).
{¶16} Nonetheless, G.D.S. contends that he only had the duty to yield the
right of way to vehicles approaching from another direction. We do not agree. In
relevant part, R.C. 4511.43(A) mandates that “[a]fter having stopped, the driver
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, under R.C. 4511.43(A), G.D.S. had a duty to yield to the semi-truck in the
intersection because the semi-truck had the right of way to proceed through the
intersection.
{¶17} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by adopting the magistrate’s decision. In ruling on G.D.S.’s
objections, the juvenile court properly relied on the magistrate’s factual findings in
the absence of a transcript for review.
{¶18} G.D.S.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/hls
-7- Case No. 7-24-10
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED: /hls
-8-