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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-FS-538
IN RE G.D.L., APPELLANT.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (BKS-117-16)
(Hon. Yvonne M. Williams, Trial Judge)
(Argued September 16, 2019 Decided January 2, 2020)
G.D.L., pro se.
Melissa Colangelo, with whom Abraham Sisson was on the brief, for amicus curiae Children’s Law Center.
Before FISHER, BECKWITH, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant G.D.L. seeks review of an order
denying his request for access to unredacted records relating to his adoption,
including his original birth certificate. We vacate and remand for further
proceedings. 2
I.
The following facts appear to be undisputed. Appellant G.D.L. was born and
adopted in the District of Columbia in the mid-1960s. In 2000, G.D.L.’s biological
mother contacted G.D.L., and the two began to develop a close relationship. G.D.L.
then also got to know his biological mother’s family, including her siblings, G.D.L.’s
cousins, and G.D.L.’s grandparents. Through these relationships G.D.L. learned his
biological father’s identity, and he communicated with at least one member of his
paternal family. In 2011, G.D.L. learned through a paternal uncle that his biological
father did not wish to have contact with G.D.L. G.D.L. respected his biological
father’s wish and has had no contact with his biological father.
G.D.L.’s mother died in 2001, leaving G.D.L. her personal records and
diaries. Those materials were extensive, but few covered G.D.L.’s birth and
subsequent adoption proceedings. In 2016, G.D.L filed a petition requesting a copy
of his original birth certificate on file with the District of Columbia Department of
Health, the Superior Court’s records of his adoption proceedings, and adoption-
related documents in the possession of the child-placement agency. 3
The trial court initially granted G.D.L.’s motion in part. The trial court did
not specifically address either the request for an order directing the Department of
Health to disclose G.D.L.’s original birth certificate or the request for disclosure of
the Superior Court’s adoption records. Rather, the trial court focused exclusively on
records held by the child-placement agency. The trial court appeared to assume,
however, that the child-placement agency would have a copy of the original birth
certificate. Although the trial court focused on records held by the child-placement
agency, it relied on a statute apparently addressing disclosure of court adoption
records. D.C. Code § 16-311 (2019 Supp.) (addressing disclosure of “the petition,
records and papers in adoption proceedings”). See In re D.B., 133 A.3d 561, 562
(D.C. 2016) (noting questions whether § 16-311 applies to adoption records held by
child-placement agencies and whether D.C. Code § 4-1405 (2012 Repl.) applies to
such records). Section 16-311 precludes disclosure in the absence of a finding that
“the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected.” D.C. Code § 16-
311. The trial court concluded, however, that the protections of that provision were
inapplicable to G.D.L. because G.D.L. was no longer a minor. The trial court
therefore viewed itself as free to balance the relevant interests in deciding the motion
for disclosure. In order to “protect [G.D.L.’s] birth father’s privacy as much as
possible,” the trial court directed the child-placement agency to give G.D.L. redacted 4
copies of the original birth certificate and “adoption records,” omitting his biological
father’s name and any “information related to” his biological father.
G.D.L. sought reconsideration, arguing among other things that (1) the trial
court did not address the request for an order directing the Department of Health to
disclose the original birth certificate; (2) the trial court did not address the request
for disclosure of the Superior Court’s adoption records; and (3) with respect to the
agency’s records, the trial court applied the wrong standard and erroneously required
redaction of the agency’s records. The trial court vacated its original order and
issued a new order. The trial court reiterated its understanding that it was required
to “protect the birth father’s right to privacy as much as possible.” The trial court
again did not explicitly address the requests for an order to the Department of Health
directing disclosure of the original birth certificate or for direct disclosure of the
Superior Court’s adoption records. Rather, the trial court appeared to assume that
the agency would have access to the original birth certificate and the Superior
Court’s adoption records, and directed the agency to disclose redacted versions of
those documents, omitting “identifying information related to the birth father.”
Finally, the trial court also directed the agency to disclose its records, similarly
redacted. 5
According to G.D.L., the child-placement agency subsequently provided
G.D.L. with eighty pages of copied documents, all of which were in the agency’s
files. Those documents included a redacted copy of the original birth certificate and
some copies of court records.
II.
G.D.L. challenges (1) the trial court’s failure to directly release to G.D.L.
unredacted Superior Court records relating to the adoption; and (2) the trial court’s
failure to direct the Department of Health to give G.D.L. an unredacted copy of his
original birth certificate. G.D.L. does not raise a claim on appeal with respect to the
redacted agency records, so we do not address that issue. Similarly, although the
pertinent statutes refer to inspection of records, D.C. Code §§ 4-1405(c) (2012
Repl.), 7-231.21(h) (2019 Supp.), 7-210(c) (2018 Supp.) (repealed), 16-311, G.D.L.
requested copies of records. The trial court granted the request for copies in part.
Because no one has raised the issue, we have no occasion to address the possible
distinction between a right to inspect and a right to obtain a copy. Compare, e.g.,
Direct Mail Serv. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 5 N.E.2d 545, 546-47 (Mass. 1937) 6
(“The right to inspect commonly carries with it the right to make copies without
which the right to inspect would be practically valueless.”), with, e.g., Acosta v.
Local Union 26, UNITE HERE, 895 F.3d 141, 143-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (concluding
under particular statutory scheme that right to inspect did not confer right to copy).
Finally, we emphasize that we are addressing only the issue of G.D.L.’s right of
access to the records at issue, which otherwise remain sealed.
A.
We turn first to G.D.L.’s request for access to unredacted Superior Court
records relating to his adoption. We conclude that further proceedings are necessary
with respect to that request.
1. Meaning of “Child” in § 16-311.
As previously noted, § 16-311 governs access to “the petition, records and
papers” in adoption proceedings in Superior Court. Those documents “shall be
sealed” and “may not be inspected . . . except upon order of the court, and only then
when the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or
protected.” D.C. Code § 16-311. Relying on a decision of this court, In re D.E.D., 7
672 A.2d 582, 584 (D.C. 1996), the trial court interpreted the word “child” in § 16-
311 to be limited to those who are minors at the time of the motion for disclosure.
Although the trial court’s reliance on In re D.E.D. for this conclusion was quite
understandable, we conclude that In re D.E.D. is better read more narrowly.
In In re D.E.D., D.E.D., who was an adult at time of the request, sought access
under § 16-311 to the records of her own adoption. 672 A.2d at 583. D.E.D.’s
adoptive mother, biological mother, and putative biological father all consented. Id.
at 583, 584-85. D.E.D.’s adoptive father did not file a formal consent but had not
indicated that he would file an objection. Id. at 583. The trial court denied access,
concluding that D.E.D. had failed to demonstrate a need to review her adoption
records. Id.
This court vacated the trial court’s ruling. 672 A.2d at 585. We pointed out
that § 16-311 did not require a showing of particularized need, but rather only a
finding that the child’s welfare would be promoted or protected. Id. at 584. We
held that where an adult seeks disclosure only to herself and with the consent of all
other affected persons, the purpose of § 16-311 “is fully protected.” Id. We
therefore remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether D.E.D.’s
biological and adoptive parents all consented. Id. at 585. 8
It is true that there is language in In re D.E.D. suggesting more broadly that
the word “child” in § 16-311 is most naturally read as referring to minors, and that
adoptees who are adults fall outside § 16-311’s “welfare” requirement. 672 A.2d at
584 & n.3. In re D.E.D. did not definitively rule, however, that the “welfare”
requirement is categorically inapplicable to an adoptee who is or has become an
adult. Id. at 584-85. So expansive a holding would have surprising consequences:
for example, a third party could seek access to the adoption records of someone who
had become an adult, and the trial court could grant such access even if doing so
would be contrary to the welfare of the adoptee. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the word “child” in § 16-311 extends to adoptees who are or have
become adults.
We decide issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Facebook, Inc. v. Wint,
199 A.3d 625, 628 (D.C. 2019). In interpreting statutory text, “[w]e first look to see
whether the statutory language at issue is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the correct reading
of statutory language, we consider statutory context and structure, evident legislative
purpose, and the potential consequences of adopting a given interpretation. E.g.,
J.P. v. District of Columbia, 189 A.3d 212, 219 (D.C. 2018). 9
Considered in isolation, the word “child” is ambiguous. It can refer to an
individual who is chronologically a minor, but it can also refer to an individual of
any age who stands in a familial relation (biological or legal) to the individual’s
parents. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 290 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “child” as
“1. An unemancipated person under the age of majority . . . . 4. A son or
daughter.”). Put concretely, G.D.L. is chronologically no longer a child, but he is
still the child of his biological and adoptive parents. We therefore must turn to other
considerations to determine the meaning of “child” in § 16-311.
When we look to the use of the word “child” in other D.C. Code provisions
relating to adoption, we do not find clarity. In places “child” is used in an apparently
chronological sense, and in places it is used in an apparently familial sense.
Compare, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-301(a) (2012 Repl.) (referring to adoption of “any
adult or child”), with, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-312 (2012 Repl.) (adoption “establishes
the relationship of natural parent and natural child”). On the other hand, construing
the word “child” in § 16-311 to apply to adoptees of all ages does serve the
“paramount” purpose of the adoption statutes as a whole: the best interests of
adoptees. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995). Specifically, the sealing
of adoption records is primarily intended to protect the privacy interests of adoptees. 10
In re D.E.D., 672 A.2d at 584 (relying on committee report relating to prior statute
governing access to adoption records). Such privacy interests surely persist into
adulthood.
In sum, we hold that the term “child” in § 16-311 extends not only to minors
but also to adoptees who are adults at the time of the request for disclosure. We
interpret In re D.E.D. to stand for the narrower proposition that -- at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances -- the trial court should not deny a request
for disclosure where the request is made by an adult adoptee and all other affected
persons have consented. 672 A.2d at 584.
2. Standard Applicable to Requests Under § 16-311.
G.D.L. and amicus curiae Children’s Law Center (CLC) argue that, in
determining whether to grant a request for disclosure under § 16-311, the trial court
may consider only the adoptee’s welfare, granting such a request if doing so would
be in the adoptee’s interests and denying the request if doing so would not be in the
adoptee’s interests. We disagree, for three reasons. 11
First, by its terms, § 16-311 establishes a prerequisite to disclosure of adoption
records: a trial court may permit disclosure only after finding that doing so would
“promote[] or protect[]” the adoptee’s welfare. Section 16-311 does not say that the
welfare of the adoptee is the only relevant consideration.
Second, we have previously held that § 16-311 gives trial courts discretion as
to whether to permit disclosure of adoption records. In re S.E.D., 324 A.2d 200, 202
(D.C. 1974). We have further indicated that the trial court, in exercising that
discretion, should consider not only the welfare of the adoptee but also the interests
of other affected individuals, including the biological parents. In re C.A.B., 384
A.2d 679, 679-80 (D.C. 1978).
Third, focusing exclusively on the welfare of the adoptee would lead to
unacceptable consequences. For example, such an approach would seemingly
preclude the trial court from redacting adoption records to protect privacy interests
of third parties, no matter how weighty those privacy interests were, as long as
disclosing completely unrelated records would to any degree promote or protect the
adoptee’s interests. 12
In sum, a trial court ruling on a motion for disclosure under § 16-311 must
make a threshold determination that disclosure would promote or protect the
adoptee’s welfare. If the trial court so determines, the trial court has discretion as to
whether to disclose the adoption records in whole or in part. In exercising that
discretion, the trial court must consider the interests of all affected persons, and the
trial court is not limited to considering only the welfare of the adoptee.
Section 16-311 does not provide guidance about how to balance interests in
deciding whether to permit disclosure of court adoption records. Our case law
reflects one important principle, though: the welfare of the adoptee is the
“paramount” purpose of the adoption statutes. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 859. We
view that principle as fully applicable to determinations under § 16-311. Thus, the
most important consideration is whether disclosure would be in the interests of the
adoptee. Moreover, In re D.E.D. indicates that -- at least barring unusual
circumstances -- a trial court will have no reason to doubt that disclosing an adoption
record would be in the interests of an adult who seeks disclosure of his or her own
adoption record. 672 A.2d at 584.
Conversely, the interests of the biological parents, though certainly relevant,
are by no means necessarily dispositive. As G.D.L. points out, biological parents do 13
not even have an initial assurance of privacy under the relevant provisions. See, e.g.,
D.C. Code § 16-314(a) (2019 Supp.) (adoptive parents can choose to leave in place
original unsealed birth certificate naming biological parents). It follows that they
have no absolute right of privacy in connection with a later motion to disclose. More
generally, as previously noted, the adoption statutes generally give greater weight to
the interests of the adoptee than to the interests of biological parents.
3. Application of § 16-311 in This Case.
In light of the foregoing, the case must be remanded for the trial court to
further consider the motion for disclosure under § 16-311. First, the trial court did
not specifically address Superior Court adoption records, instead apparently
assuming without any clear basis that the agency would be in possession of all
relevant court records. On remand, the trial court must issue an order specifically
addressed to Superior Court adoption records.
Second, the trial court did not explicitly address G.D.L.’s interests in
obtaining unredacted records. As we have noted, however, G.D.L.’s interests are
entitled to great weight. 14
Third, the trial court was of the view that it was required to protect the
biological father’s privacy interests to the greatest extent possible. To the contrary,
the biological father’s interests are relevant but may not be treated as necessarily
dispositive. Relatedly, the trial court did not explain how redacting the records to
remove identifying information would actually serve the biological father’s privacy
interests, particularly given that G.D.L. apparently already has information about his
biological father’s identity. In fact, because the biological father did not participate
in this proceeding, the trial court did not know whether the biological father had any
objection to disclosure of the information at issue. On remand, the trial court should
take reasonable steps to provide the biological father with notice and an opportunity
to be heard with respect to the motion for disclosure. Cf. In re D.E.D., 672 A.2d at
585 (remanding for consideration of positions of biological and adoptive parents
with respect to adoptee’s motion for disclosure).
B.
G.D.L. further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
order the Department of Health to give him a copy of his unredacted original birth
certificate. This issue could possibly become academic on remand, if a copy of the
original birth certificate is in the Superior Court file and the trial court ends up 15
determining that it would be appropriate to disclose an unredacted version of the
birth certificate under § 16-311. We address the issue briefly, however, because it
might well arise on remand, depending on whether a copy of the original birth
certificate is in the Superior Court’s adoption file and on how the trial court resolves
the motion for disclosure under § 16-311.
D.C. Code § 16-314(a) provides that, when a child is adopted, the original
birth certificate will be sealed, unless the adoptive parents choose otherwise. The
sealed birth certificate may be opened only by court order or by the Department of
Health for certain administrative purposes. D.C. Code § 16-314(a); see also D.C.
Code § 7-231.21(h) (2019 Supp.) (in case of adoption, sealed original birth
certificate may be disclosed only by court order, for administrative purposes, or
pursuant to regulation). Citing now-repealed provisions from an earlier version of
the Vital Records Act, D.C. Code § 7-231.01 et seq. (2019 Supp.), G.D.L. argues
that he has an absolute right to receive an unredacted copy of the original birth
certificate. We disagree.
An earlier version of the Vital Records Act was in effect when G.D.L.’s
motion was filed in 2016. D.C. Code § 7-201 et seq. (2018 Repl.). We need not
decide whether the old or the new provisions govern the current motion. Under 16
either statutory scheme, no specific criteria are established to govern a trial court’s
decision whether to permit access to an original birth certificate that was sealed in
connection with an adoption. D.C. Code § 7-210(c)(2) (2018 Supp.) (repealed);
D.C. Code § 7-231.21(h) (2019 Supp.). G.D.L. argues that -- under the now-
repealed provisions -- he is entitled to obtain a copy of his original birth certificate
upon a showing that he has “a direct and tangible interest” in his birth certificate. In
support of that argument, G.D.L. relies on D.C. Code § 7-220(a) (2018 Supp.;
repealed). That provision, however, addresses the general authority of the Health
Department to disclose vital records, not the special requirements applicable to
sealed birth certificates.
CLC argues that a trial court deciding whether to grant an adoptee’s motion
for disclosure of an original birth certificate held by the Department of Health should
apply the same standard applicable under D.C. Code § 16-311 to a motion for
disclosure of Superior Court adoption records. We agree. To the extent the trial
court needs to address the issue on remand, the trial court therefore should apply
those standards in deciding whether to provide G.D.L. with access to an unredacted
original birth certificate from the records of the Department of Health. 17
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order denying in part G.D.L.’s
motion for disclosure of unredacted court adoption records and his unredacted
original birth certificate, and we remand the case for further proceedings.
So ordered.