In re G.C.

2024 IL App (4th) 240421-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 21, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-0421
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240421-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 21, 2024 NO. 4-24-0421 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re G.C, a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 20JA271 v. ) Ashley W., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Timothy J. Cusak, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights, concluding the court’s best interest determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In November 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of

respondent, Ashley W., as to her minor child, G.C. (born in 2020). In February 2024, the trial court

found termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor’s best interest. G.C.’s father is

not a party to this appeal.

¶3 Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court’s best interest determination was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In October 2020, the State filed a petition to adjudicate G.C. neglected under the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)), alleging G.C. was in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). In

particular, the State alleged (1) G.C.’s father pushed respondent against a wall and pulled

respondent’s hair in the presence of G.C.; (2) respondent damaged a vehicle with G.C. inside while

she was under the influence of alcohol or another substance; (3) respondent left G.C. alone in a

hotel room to go drink with strangers and then brought one of the strangers back to the hotel;

(4) respondent had mental health and substance abuse issues; and (5) respondent had a criminal

history. In January 2022, trial court adjudicated G.C. neglected, found respondent unfit, made G.C.

a ward of the court, and placed guardianship and custody with the Illinois Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS).

¶6 In November 2022, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights,

alleging respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)) for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of G.C. to

her care within nine months after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged a nine-month period

of February 2, 2022, to November 2, 2022.

¶7 In July 2023, respondent stipulated to the unfitness allegations of the petition. As a

factual basis, the State provided facts showing respondent (1) was not progressing in counseling;

(2) failed to attend all drug drops; (3) tested positive on multiple occasions for alcohol, marijuana,

and medications not prescribed to her; (4) failed to complete a domestic violence class;

(4) remained in a relationship with her domestic abuser; and (5) failed to complete substance abuse

treatment. The trial court found respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence and that finding

is not at issue on appeal.

¶8 In February 2024, the trial court conducted a best interest hearing. The court

accepted a best interest report prepared by DCFS. The report noted G.C. was placed with foster

-2- parents who were willing and able to adopt her. The foster parents met G.C.’s basic needs of food,

shelter, clothing, and health care. The home was observed to be in good condition, with no safety

hazards or concerns. G.C. was the only child in the home and had her own bedroom. The foster

parents provided an abundance of toys and learning materials. G.C. was in good health. She had

lived with her foster parents for nearly her whole life, viewed them as her “true parents,” and was

bonded with them.

¶9 The report noted G.C. appeared to enjoy visits with respondent and had a bond with

her. Generally, visits went well. However, the report also noted that G.C. had significant anxiety

surrounding visits with respondent. After the visits, G.C. struggled with emotional regulation.

¶ 10 The report further questioned whether respondent could remain in her current home

due to financial concerns, as respondent did not provide pay stubs to verify her income. Ultimately,

the report expressed concern respondent did not consistently apply the skills acquired through

services and noted the disruption a change in care would cause to G.C. Thus, DCFS recommended

it was in the best interest of G.C. to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 11 Howard Krueger, the current caseworker, testified G.C. had been in the same foster

home since 2020. Krueger generally testified consistent with the information provided in the DCFS

report. Krueger further testified G.C. referred to her foster parents as “ ‘mom’ ” and “’ dad’ ” and

referred to respondent as “ ‘Momma Ashley.’ ” Krueger stated G.C. saw both respondent and her

foster mother, Jennifer P., as her mothers. However, he opined G.C. was bonded more to Jennifer.

G.C. also acted out after visits with respondent. Krueger testified respondent missed only a few

visits with G.C. Those were due to transportation issues or illness, and all were rescheduled.

Krueger acknowledged respondent provided comfort to G.C. during her visits by bringing food

-3- and gifts. Krueger also had no concern about G.C.’s safety during the visits. All visits between

respondent and G.C. were supervised.

¶ 12 Krueger also testified about an incident in which respondent gave G.C. a key to her

home and told G.C. she would be coming to live there. The incident was confusing to G.C. and

upset her.

¶ 13 Jennifer testified G.C. had lived with her and her foster father since October 2020.

Jennifer stated she loved G.C. like a daughter and wanted to provide permanency for G.C. through

adoption. Jennifer testified about the incident in which respondent gave G.C. a key, stating it

caused G.C. frustration, confusion, and sadness. In addition to handing G.C. the apartment key,

respondent showed G.C. pictures of what would be G.C.’s bedroom. When G.C. returned home

from the visit, she reacted negatively to the key by “slamming it on the ground and saying ‘no,’ ”

and she fearfully asked Jennifer if she was going to be leaving. Jennifer also testified G.C., in the

past several months, did not want to attend visits with respondent and displayed anxiety and fear

before visits.

¶ 14 Respondent testified and admitted she had experienced housing instability in the

past, including living in five or six places since the opening of the case, “couch surfing,” and

spending time in substance abuse facilities. However, she had been living at the same apartment

since May of the prior year. Respondent stated she had been employed since October and had no

issues making her rent payments. Although respondent had a valid driver’s license, she said she

stopped driving due to physical injuries sustained from an accident in 2018. Respondent used

public transportation and Uber, and generally did not have any impediments to attending visits

with G.C.

-4- ¶ 15 Additionally, respondent testified about her activities with G.C. during visits.

Respondent said she greatly enjoyed her visits with G.C. They painted and played together, and

respondent brought G.C. gifts. She testified she gave G.C the apartment key to show she cared and

that G.C. would always have a place with her. Respondent did not intend to cause any damage.

¶ 16 Respondent also testified she had received treatment throughout the duration of the

case. She attended therapy twice per week and learned how to confront and deal with childhood

trauma, how to change her negative behaviors, and that behavior modification was possible. In

November 2023, respondent completed a parental capacity and bonding evaluation. That report

noted in part that respondent was capable of being an adequate parent.

¶ 17 Respondent testified she was not in a sexual relationship with anyone but was being

courted by a man named John who worked as an executive chef at a restaurant. She stated he did

not have a criminal record. Regarding substance abuse, respondent testified she had a positive test

for “benzos” in April 2023, which she believed was caused by smoking a laced marijuana joint.

She also took Suboxone. Respondent admitted she struggled with substance abuse. She became

dependent on Xanax at an early age and tested positive for other substances as well. She had also

resided in detox facilities in the past. Respondent stated she learned through drug treatment that if

she worked through her issues and took a step back and thought about it logically, she could work

through situations without being dependent on anything or anybody else. She stated she had not

knowingly consumed or ingested any drug other than cannabis since April 20, 2023.

¶ 18 Respondent testified she completed a 12-week domestic-violence program, as well

as individual counseling, following a domestic incident with her ex-husband in February 2023.

She stated she no longer maintained contact with her ex-husband and had become closer with her

family. Her divorce was finalized in January 2024.

-5- ¶ 19 The guardian ad litem (GAL) reported G.C. was “extremely well bonded” to her

foster parents. G.C. was well cared for and comfortable in their care. Listing statutory factors to

be considered by the trial court, the GAL recommended the court terminate respondent’s parental

rights and change the permanency goal to adoption.

¶ 20 The trial court found it was in G.C.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. The court found although respondent’s last positive drug drop had been 10 months ago, that

was 3 years into the case. The court noted an inconsistency related to respondent’s report as to

why she did not drive in light of a previous report that she drove while intoxicated with G.C. in

the vehicle. The court acknowledged respondent had engaged in services but observed she did so

too late, instead of in the first year of the case. Meanwhile, the court noted the foster parents had

cared for G.C. for much of her life. The court noted the State and the GAL had covered the statutory

best interest factors, mentioned several of them, and found “every single one of those factors inures

to the benefit of the [foster parents].” Ultimately, the court found G.C. needed permanency.

Accordingly, the court terminated respondent’s parental rights and changed the permanency goal

to adoption.

¶ 21 This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, respondent challenges only the trial court’s best interest determination,

arguing it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 24 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

2022)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the State

must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as that term is defined in section

-6- 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234,

244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006).

¶ 25 After a trial court finds a parent unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in

the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352,

818 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (2004). “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining

the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T.,

212 Ill. 2d at 364. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence termination of parental

rights is in the minor’s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. In making the best interest

determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile

Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). These factors include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the

child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,

cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love,

security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive

placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community

ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability

and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the

uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care;

and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” In re

Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009) (citing

705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

-7- its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19, 8 N.E.3d 1258. On review, “[w]e

will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the [child’s] best interest unless it was

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961, 835 N.E.2d

908, 914 (2005). “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence

clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that no reasonable person could arrive at the

[trial] court’s finding on the basis of the evidence in the record [citation].” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68, 162 N.E.3d 454.

¶ 26 Here, the evidence demonstrated G.C. had a strong bond with her foster parents.

The foster parents provided for G.C.’s needs, including food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.

G.C had her own room, toys, and learning materials, and she expressed a desire to remain with her

foster parents. The foster parents wanted to provide permanency for G.C. While respondent had

made efforts to correct the circumstances that led to G.C.’s removal, as the trial court noted, she

did so too late. Further, the court observed G.C. needed permanency, and the foster parents, who

had cared for her most of her life, were able to provide that. The court considered the evidence in

relation to the statutory best interest factors and found all of them weighed in favor of terminating

respondent’s parental rights. We cannot conclude the evidence in the record “clearly calls for the

opposite finding” or is such that “no reasonable person” could find as the court found. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. Accordingly, the court’s best

interest determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

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