NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 210054-U
Order filed May 27, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re G.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Will County, Illinois. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-21-0054 ) Circuit No. 18-JA-108 v. ) ) David C., ) The Honorable ) Paula A. Gomora, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and O’Brien concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing supervisor of minor’s caseworkers to testify about minor’s case and father’s progress; and (2) trial court order finding father unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where he failed to complete any services and did not consistently visit or communicate with minor or her caseworkers.
¶2 Respondent David C. is the father of G.C. In June 2018, the State filed a petition, alleging
G.C. was neglected in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. After an adjudicatory
hearing, the trial court ruled that G.C. was neglected. Following a dispositional hearing, respondent was found unfit. From February 2019 to February 2020, the trial court entered three orders finding
respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the goal of G.C. returning home. On
February 7, 2020, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights. At the
termination hearing, the trial court heard testimony from respondent, one of G.C.’s caseworkers
and the supervisor of G.C.’s other caseworkers. Following the hearing, the trial court found
respondent unfit and terminated his parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) the trial
court erred in allowing the caseworkers’ supervisor to testify, and (2) the court’s unfitness finding
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 15, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging G.C., age two, was a neglected minor
in that her environment was injurious to her welfare after she was observed with drug
paraphernalia, her mother admitted to continued marijuana use and her mother failed to comply
with services. A shelter care hearing was held on July 11, 2018. Respondent was in Cook County
Jail and did not attend. Following the hearing, the court entered an order stating there was probable
cause to believe G.C. was neglected based on an injurious environment. G.C. was placed in the
temporary custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and the
court appointed Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) to represent G.C.’s best interests.
¶5 On July 23, 2018, a re-shelter hearing was held. Respondent was transported from Cook
County Jail to attend. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that G.C. was neglected based on an
injurious environment. The parties also stipulated that there was an immediate and urgent need for
G.C. to be placed in shelter care because her “mother is in need of substance abuse treatment and
is not compliant with intact services” and respondent “is in Cook County custody and has not filed
for minor’s custody.”
2 ¶6 On October 30, 2018, an adjudicatory hearing was held. Respondent was no longer in jail
but did not attend the hearing. Following the hearing, the court entered an order finding G.C.
neglected in that her environment was injurious to her welfare because of “a history of domestic
violence in [her] home.” On November 26, 2018, a dispositional hearing was held. Respondent
did not appear. The trial court found respondent unfit because he failed to complete an integrated
assessment or engage in any services.
¶7 On February 4, 2019, respondent attended a permanency review hearing and agreed to
complete an integrated assessment. The trial court told respondent that he would be advised what
services to complete after the integrated assessment and told him: “[Y]ou are to engage in those
services.” The court cautioned respondent that his parental rights could be terminated if he did not
make “positive progress towards the goal of return home.” The trial court advised respondent: “[I]f
you have any difficulty getting into services, getting in contact with someone, that is what your
lawyer is for.”
¶8 On August 15, 2019, another permanency review hearing was held. Respondent did not
attend. G.C.’s caseworker, Salvador Arias, filed a permanency hearing report with the court, which
stated respondent completed his integrated assessment on February 24, 2019. After that,
respondent began visiting G.C. but stopped attending visits shortly thereafter and stopped
communicating with Arias. As of July 9, 2019, respondent’s whereabouts were unknown.
¶9 A permanency review hearing was held on February 4, 2020. Respondent did not attend.
According to a report filed by CASA, respondent stopped attending visits with G.C. and became
unreachable through CASA or G.C.’s caseworker. G.C.’s caseworker, Gabriela Alvarado, filed a
report stating respondent had not contacted her for six months. A diligent search conducted on
3 December 17, 2019, did not reveal respondent’s whereabouts. The report was signed by Alvarado
and her supervisor, AnnMarie Coglianese.
¶ 10 On February 7, 2020, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The
motion alleged that respondent was unfit in that he: (1) failed to maintain a degree of interest,
concern and responsibility as to G.C.’s welfare; (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for removal of G.C. from March 2019 to December 2019; and (3)
failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of G.C. from March 2019 to December 2019.
¶ 11 On March 10, 2020, respondent’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, asserting that
respondent “failed to contact counsel or make any effort to apprise himself of the status of this
case.” According to counsel, respondent had not communicated with him or attended court in over
a year. The trial court granted the motion.
¶ 12 A family service plan completed by Alvarado and approved by Coglianese on July 1, 2020,
stated that respondent had not contacted Alvarado, and his whereabouts were unknown. A diligent
search for respondent was conducted on February 25, 2020, but respondent was not located.
¶ 13 The final permanency review hearing was held on August 17, 2020. Respondent was not
present. At that time, a court report was filed by G.C.’s new caseworker, Laura Ingalls. It stated
that respondent last saw G.C. on April 28, 2019. The report was signed by Ingalls and Coglianese.
¶ 14 On January 21, 2021, a termination hearing was held. At the hearing, the State introduced
into evidence four exhibits: the trial court’s permanency review orders entered on February 4,
2019, August 15, 2019, February 4, 2020, and August 17, 2020, in which the court ruled
respondent had not made reasonable efforts toward the goal of G.C. returning home.
¶ 15 Salvador Arias testified that he was G.C.’s caseworker at Guardian Angel Community
Services (Guardian Angel) from October 2018 to approximately July 2019. During that time,
4 respondent completed an integrated assessment. Based on the results of the assessment, respondent
was supposed to complete the following services: (1) perform a substance abuse assessment and
follow any recommendations from the service provider, (2) obtain and maintain employment and
appropriate housing, (3) attend parenting classes, (4) participate in parent coaching, (5) attend
individual therapy, and (6) visit G.C. While Arias was G.C.’s caseworker, respondent did not
complete any of his required services. Arias did not provide respondent with a written service plan
because Arias lost contact with respondent shortly after he completed the integrated assessment.
¶ 16 Arias had no contact with respondent from October 2018 until February 4, 2019, when he
appeared in court. After that, Arias saw respondent for his integrated assessment and “one or two
parent/child visits.” Respondent participated in weekly visits with G.C. for approximately two
months but stopped when scheduling issues arose. By April 2019, respondent stopped
communicating with Arias. Arias made attempts to locate respondent but was unsuccessful.
Respondent did not visit G.C. after the summer of 2019.
¶ 17 On direct examination, AnnMarie Coglianese, a foster care supervisor for Guardian Angel,
testified that G.C. has received foster care services from Guardian Angel since 2018. Coglianese
testified she is familiar with G.C.’s case because she has been the supervisor on the case since July
2019, when Gabriella Alvarado replaced Arias as G.C.’s caseworker. According to Coglianese,
respondent completed the integrated assessment in February 2019, and attended four visits with
G.C. from February to April 2019. Respondent completed no required services. Since April 2019,
respondent had no visits with G.C. and had no contact with anyone at Guardian Angel. Respondent
was informed of future court dates and administrative case reviews but failed to attend them.
Coglianese had no knowledge of respondent having any communication with G.C. after April
2019. She was not aware of respondent sending G.C. any cards or letters.
5 ¶ 18 On cross examination, Coglianese agreed she obtained information about G.C.’s case from
reviewing the case file completed by G.C.’s caseworkers. Coglianese was not G.C.’s caseworker
and had no personal contact with respondent.
¶ 19 On redirect examination, Coglianese testified that she had monthly meetings with G.C.’s
caseworkers to discuss the details of the case. Alvarado, who no longer works for Guardian Angel,
was G.C.’s caseworker from July 2019 to May 2020. Laura Ingalls became G.C.’s caseworker
after that and was still her caseworker at the time of the termination hearing. Ingalls was not present
at the termination hearing because she was ill. When the State asked Coglianese if respondent
contacted the agency after April 2019, respondent’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The trial
court partially sustained and partially overruled the objection, ruling that Coglianese could testify
about Alvarado’s contact with respondent because Alvarado no longer worked at Guardian Angel.
Coglianese testified, without objection, that respondent failed to complete any services.
¶ 20 At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was incarcerated in Cook County and
had been since May 18, 2020. He testified he had not been contacted by any of G.C.’s caseworkers
during his incarceration. He denied ever been told that he was required to complete services and
denied being referred to any agencies for services. He testified that he began visiting G.C. every
other week in late 2018 or early 2019. He testified that he met with Arias three or four times. He
said he saw Alvarado a couple times when he visited G.C., but she never informed him he needed
to complete services.
¶ 21 Respondent testified that he visited G.C. without Guardian Angel’s knowledge in 2019
when G.C. was placed with an acquaintance of his. At the time of the hearing, respondent had not
had any contact with G.C. or visited her in over a year. Respondent said he tried to contact
Guardian Angel in January and February 2020 but was given no information about G.C.’s
6 whereabouts. Respondent never filed a petition seeking custody of G.C. Respondent agreed that
he was appointed an attorney in July 2018, but said he “lost touch” with him and lost his phone
number. Respondent agreed he could have looked up the attorney’s phone number.
¶ 22 Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding respondent an unfit parent
because he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to G.C.’s
welfare.
¶ 23 ANALYSIS
¶ 24 I.
¶ 25 Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Coglianese to testify because
she relied on reports contained in Guardian Angel’s case file, which were neither admitted into
evidence nor written by her.
¶ 26 The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a
reviewing court will not disturb evidentiary determinations absent a clear abuse of discretion. In
re A.S., 2014 IL App (3d) 140060, ¶ 28.
At a termination hearing, a witness cannot testify about events recorded in the case file
about which she has no personal knowledge. See In re M.H., 2020 IL App (3d) 190731, ¶ 20; In
re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237 (1999). However, when a witness has direct knowledge of the
information contained in the case file because of her involvement in the case, she can provide
testimony about the contents of the case file, including a parent’s progress or lack thereof. In re
Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 64.
¶ 27 An objection to evidence must be timely made when the evidence is first introduced. See
Hunter v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 200 Ill. App. 3d 458, 472 (1990). A
party must make a proper and timely objection to preserve an argument that the court erred in
7 admitting evidence. In re Estate of Doyle, 362 Ill. App. 3d 293, 303 (2005). When evidence is
admitted without a timely objection, the parties forfeit on appeal any argument regarding the
admission of the evidence. See People v. Lefler, 294 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309 (1998) (citing People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988)).
¶ 28 Because termination of parental rights affects a fundamental liberty interest, a court may
consider whether a forfeited issue constituted plain error. In re L.B., 2015 IL App (3d) 150023, ¶
11. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) provides that “[p]lain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court.” The plain-error doctrine is a limited and narrow exception to the forfeiture rule. People
v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider an
unpreserved error where either (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely
balanced that such error threatens to tip the scales of justice against the accused, regardless of the
seriousness of the error or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and the error is so serious that it
affects the fairness of the trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565 (2007).
¶ 29 Before we determine whether plain error occurred, however, we must first determine
whether any error occurred at all. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). This requires a
substantive review of the issues raised on appeal. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (2009). If
clear or obvious error did not occur, no plain-error analysis is necessary. People v. Wright, 2017
IL 119561, ¶ 87; Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 124-25.
¶ 30 In this case, respondent forfeited review of the admissibility of Coglianese’s testimony by
failing to timely object to it. Respondent first objected to the Coglianese’s testimony after the State
questioned Coglianese on direct examination and respondent further questioned her on cross
8 examination. It was not until well into the State’s redirect examination that respondent first
objected to Coglianese’s testimony. The question respondent objected to on redirect examination
– respondent’s contact with Guardian Angel after April 2019 – had already been asked by the State
and answered by Coglianese on direct examination. Because respondent did not object to the
State’s question on direct examination when it was first asked, respondent’s objection was
untimely. See Hunter, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 472. Respondent cannot now argue on appeal that
Coglianese’s testimony was inadmissible. See Doyle, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 303; Lefler, 294 Ill. App.
3d at 309.
¶ 31 Forfeiture aside, Coglianese’s testimony was properly admitted. Coglianese testified that
she obtained information from reviewing G.C.’s case file, which was prepared by G.C.’s
caseworkers. However, Coglianese also testified that she was the supervisor assigned to G.C.’s
case from July 2019 to the time of the termination hearing. During that time, Alvarado and Ingalls
were G.C.’s caseworkers. As the caseworkers’ supervisor, Coglianese discussed G.C.’s case,
including respondent’s progress, regularly with Alvarado and Ingalls. Both Coglianese and the
caseworkers signed the reports documenting respondent’s actions and inactions that were provided
to the court prior to the permanency review hearings. Because Coglianese’s knowledge of G.C.’s
case and respondent’s progress did not come solely from reading reports written by others, it was
proper for Coglianese to testify about events that transpired during the time she was supervisor of
G.C.’s caseworkers. See In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 64.
¶ 32 Respondent contends that our decision in In re M.H., 2020 IL App (3d) 190731, requires a
different result. We disagree.
¶ 33 In M.H., we ruled that the minor’s caseworker, who took over the minor’s case in February
2019, could not testify about incidents that occurred prior to February 2019 because the
9 caseworker’s knowledge was solely “based on her reading of the case file.” 2020 IL App (3d)
190731, ¶ 20. Because the caseworker “had secondhand knowledge, at best, of the events” that
occurred before she was the minor’s caseworker, we found it was error for the court to allow the
caseworker to testify about those events. Id.
¶ 34 Here, unlike the caseworker in M.H., Coglianese had direct knowledge of G.C.’s case and
respondent’s progress from July 2019 to the time of the termination hearing based on her regular
conversations with Alvarado and Ingalls, not just reports written by them. Coglianese testified only
about events that occurred once she became involved in the case as a supervisor. She did not
provide any testimony about what transpired before that time. Thus, M.H. is distinguishable and
not controlling.
¶ 35 Because we find no error in the admission of Coglianese’s testimony, there can be no plain
error. See Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 87; Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 124-25.
¶ 36 II.
¶ 37 Next, respondent contends that the trial court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest
weight of the evidence because he visited G.C. and completed his integrated assessment. He claims
he did not complete any services because he was never advised he had to do so or provided with a
service plan.
¶ 38 A parent may be found unfit under the following grounds: failing to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare; failing to make reasonable
efforts to correct the conditions warranting the child’s removal; and failing to make reasonable
progress toward the return home of the child. 750 ILCS 50/1D(b), (m)(i), (m)(ii) (West 2018).
When the State alleges more than one ground of unfitness, a finding that the State has proved any
allegation is sufficient to sustain an unfitness finding. In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (2001). It is
10 the State’s burden to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re B'yata I.,
2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 29. An unfitness finding is entitled to great deference and will only
be reversed on appeal if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d at
9. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident. In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 124 (2002).
¶ 39 Under the first unfitness ground, a parent may be unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the child. 750 ILCS 50/1D(b) (West
2018). Any one of the three elements may form a basis for unfitness. B'yata I., 2014 IL App (2d)
130558-B, ¶ 31. To determine unfitness under this ground, the court looks at the efforts by the
parent to visit and maintain contact with the child. Id. Other factors include whether the parent
inquired about the child’s welfare or whether he or she completed the service plans. Id. The court
focuses on the efforts of the parent, not whether he or she succeeded, examining “the parent’s
conduct concerning the child in the context of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred.”
Id. Circumstances may include difficulty in obtaining transportation, poverty, conduct by others
that hindered visitation, and the need to resolve the parent’s own life issues. Id.
¶ 40 A parent who is incarcerated can show interest, concern and responsibility by visiting the
child while out on bond and requesting visitation with the child while incarcerated. See In re A.F.,
2012 IL App (2d) 111079, ¶ 42; In re Konstantinos H., 387 Ill. App. 3d 192, 205-06 (2008). Where
visitation is impracticable, a parent may express concern through phone calls, letters or gifts.
Konstantinos H., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 204. The parent’s interest, concern or responsibility must be
objectively reasonable. B'yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31.
¶ 41 “Noncompliance with an imposed service plan and infrequent or irregular visitation with
the child may be sufficient to warrant a finding of unfitness under section [1(D)](b).” Konstantinos
11 H., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 204 (citing In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004)). A parent’s
failure to remain in contact with his or her child’s caseworkers demonstrates a lack of interest,
concern and responsibility as to the child’s welfare. See In re C.D., 2020 IL App (3d) 190176,
¶¶ 34, 36.
¶ 42 In this case, G.C. came into DCFS custody in July 2018. Respondent was incarcerated at
the time but was present for the re-shelter hearing. Respondent was no longer incarcerated at the
time of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings in October and November 2018, but he failed
to attend either hearing. When respondent appeared in court for the February 4, 2019 permanency
review hearing, the trial court advised respondent that he would have to complete services. Shortly
after that, respondent completed an integrated assessment and visited G.C. a few times but stopped
visiting G.C. and communicating with G.C.’s caseworkers by April 2019. While respondent
testified that he visited G.C. after that without Guardian Angel’s knowledge, he admitted he
stopped visiting G.C. by the end of 2019. Respondent failed to attend scheduled court hearings in
August 2019, February 2020 and August 2020. In March 2020, respondent’s attorney filed a
motion to withdraw because respondent had not communicated with him or appeared in court in
over a year. In May 2020, respondent was arrested and placed in custody in Cook County.
Respondent was transported from Cook County Jail to attend the termination hearing in January
2021.
¶ 43 From the time G.C. was placed into DCFS custody until the termination hearing, a period
of over two-and-a-half years, respondent repeatedly failed to appear in court, visited G.C. only a
few times over a few months, stopped communicating with his attorney, and made no attempt to
communicate with G.C.’s caseworkers for nearly two years. At the time of the termination hearing,
respondent admitted he had not visited G.C. or attempted to contact her in over a year. Nor did
12 respondent send G.C. any cards, gifts, or letters. Respondent pointed out that he had been
incarcerated for several months prior to the termination hearing; however, respondent’s
incarceration did not prevent him from expressing interest or concern in G.C. by contacting her by
phone or requesting visitation with her. See In re A.F., 2012 IL App (2d) 111079, ¶ 42;
Konstantinos H., 387 Ill. App. 3d at 205-06; In re M.M., 261 Ill. App. 3d 71, 74 (1994).
¶ 44 Moreover, respondent failed to complete any services. While respondent claims he was
never advised he had to complete services, the record shows otherwise. At the only permanency
review hearing respondent attended, in February 2019, the court informed respondent that after he
completed his integrated assessment, he would have a number of services to complete. The court
instructed respondent: “[Y]ou are to engage in those services.” The court advised respondent to
contact his attorney if he had any problems initiating or completing services.
¶ 45 Respondent also contends he was never given a list of services to complete. While this is
true, respondent has only himself to blame. Shortly after he completed his integrated assessment,
respondent stopped communicating with G.C.’s caseworker and could not be located for nearly
two years. Respondent’s failure to remain in communication with G.C.’s caseworkers and advise
them of his whereabouts made it impossible for them to provide him with pertinent information,
including the service plan.
¶ 46 Respondent’s failure to attend court hearings, failure to maintain regular visitation and
contact with G.C. and her caseworkers, and failure to complete any services demonstrates that he
has not maintained a reasonable degree of concern, interest or responsibility in the welfare of G.C.
Therefore, the trial court's finding that respondent was unfit pursuant to section (1)(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
13 ¶ 48 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 49 Affirmed.