Filed 6/25/26 In re G.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E087518 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DLIN2400150) v. OPINION G.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Emily A. Benjamini,
Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and
Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Defendant and appellant G.C., who was born in August 2007 and who has been
charged with several criminal offenses committed in August 2024, appeals the granting of
the People’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 petition transferring him from the
juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.1 We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In August 2024, G.C. (then age 17) was at home and had several visitors,
including 17-year-old A.U. and 18-year-old Fabian. G.C., A.U., and Fabian came up with
a plan to rob a drug dealer (the victim). To that end, Fabian created a fake Instagram
account to arrange to buy marijuana vape pens from the victim. G.C. and A.U. were
present when Fabian asked to borrow a car from another person who was visiting G.C.,
telling the car’s owner that he was going to get food and pick up a couple of vape pens,
adding that he was “ ‘gonna jack that fool.’ ”
Later that night, A.U. and Fabio—each armed with a firearm—set out for the
victim’s home. Fabian drove the car while G.C. and A.U. hid in the back seat so the
victim would not be alarmed to see how many people were in the car. When they arrived,
Fabian messaged the victim. Fabian started shooting at the victim when he came out of
the house, then G.C. and A.U. got out of the car and G.C. joined in the shooting.2 When
the victim fell to the ground, Fabian, A.U., and G.C. stood over the victim and continued
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
2 A.U. tried to participate in the shooting but his gun malfunctioned.
2 shooting. Then they took the victim’s vape pens and drove off. They abandoned the car
and Fabian gave the car keys to G.C. The victim died.
Fabian said the victim did not brandish, point, or shoot a firearm.
G.C. was arrested two months later and the People filed a petition in the juvenile
court alleging he came within section 602 because he had committed several criminal
offenses (the section 602 petition).3 G.C. was detained. The People also filed a section
707 motion to transfer G.C. to a court of criminal jurisdiction and the juvenile court
granted their request for a psychological evaluation of G.C. to be performed by Dr. Gene
Berg with the proviso that the doctor was not to address the “underlying incident” with
G.C. Dr. Berg’s evaluation resulted in a recommendation that G.C. continue to receive
services in the juvenile court system.
Ana Gutierrez a Riverside County probation officer with three years’ experience as
a juvenile investigator prepared a probation report for G.C.’s section 707 hearing. Office
Gutierrez set forth information obtained from police reports filed in connection with
G.C.’s offense (which included the statements of witnesses Fabian, A.U., and G.C.); Dr.
Berg’s evaluation; G.C.’s school records; whether G.C. had any gang affiliations; G.C.’s
medical, substance abuse, and mental health history; his adjustment to juvenile hall;
3 The charged offenses are all violations of the Penal Code. They are murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with the special circumstances of killing the victim while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and by intentionally discharging a firearm (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)), count 1; robbery (§ 211), count 2; and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29610, count 3); and, an enhancement allegation as to the murder and robbery count that the minor personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused the death of another person (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1197.7, subd. (c)(8)).
3 interviews with G.C. and his mother; and the availability of youth rehabilitation programs
for G.C. Officer Gutierrez recommended transfer of G.C. to criminal court.
After hearing the section 707 transfer petition in October 2025, on December 3,
2025, the court issued a written order in December transferring G.C.’s case to criminal
court. It dismissed without prejudice the section 602 petition and ordered that G.C. (then
18 years old) continue to be housed in juvenile hall and to appear in criminal court that
afternoon for arraignment. G.C. appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, G.C. argues the juvenile court’s decision to transfer him to a court of
criminal jurisdiction is not supported by sufficient substantial evidence.
A. The Statutory Backdrop and Standard of Review
Section 707 provides in relevant part that, when a section 602 petition alleges a
minor who is 16 years old or older committed a felony such as murder or robbery, the
People may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal
jurisdiction (often referred to as adult court). (§ 707, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1) & (3).) Upon
receipt of the motion, the juvenile court is required to order a probation officer to submit
a report on the minor’s behavioral patterns and social history. (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)
To prevail on a section 707 motion, the People must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); In re Miguel R. (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 152, 156 (Miguel R.).) In making the amenability determination, the
4 juvenile court is required to consider specific criteria set forth in subdivision (a)(3)(A)-
(E) of section 707 (variously referred to herein as the section 707 criteria or factors), to
wit, (i) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (ii) whether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (iii)
the minor’s previous delinquent history; (iv) the success of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor; and, (v) the circumstances and gravity of the
offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. The statute also
provides a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to consideration of each of the section
707 criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
The minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is the central and dispositive question in
a section 707 proceeding and the juvenile court’s analysis of the section 707 criteria must
be focused through the lens of that issue (In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 161-
162), but the statute does not require that any of the section 707 criteria are to be
accorded more weight than the other (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156, 166).
We review a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to transfer a minor to criminal
court for an abuse of discretion. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Because
abuse of discretion is not a unified standard and calls for varying degrees of deference
according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling being reviewed, “ ‘[t]he trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and
capricious.’ ’’ (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 812.)
5 Here, the juvenile court’s findings as to each of section 707 criteria are findings of
fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
Its ultimate finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation under its jurisdiction
is required to be made by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, we review that
finding by examining the record to determine whether, as a whole it contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high
probability demanded by the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Ibid.)
B. The Juvenile Court’s Section 707 Criteria Findings in This Case
Here, the juvenile court’s written opinion sets forth in detail the evidence it
considered in connection with each of the section 707 criteria. It found the People had
not met its burden of establishing that G.C. could not be rehabilitated before the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)), he had no
previous history of delinquency (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)), and there had been no
previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate him (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)).
The juvenile court did find, however, that the People had met their burden in
establishing (i) that G.C. evidenced criminal sophistication and (ii) the circumstances and
gravity of the allegations against G.C. supported his transfer to the criminal (adult) court.
(§ 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)(i) & (a)(3)(E)(i), respectively.) The minor claims the court’s
findings as to those two factors are not supported by substantial evidence.
6 (a) The Finding That the Minor Exhibited a Sufficient Degree of Criminal
Sophistication to Support a Transfer to Adult Court
When making a finding as to the degree to which a minor exhibited criminal
sophistication, the juvenile court must give weight to any relevant fact, including the
minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, as well as their physical, mental, and
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to
appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community
environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child
welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor criminal sophistication. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Here, ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that G.C. demonstrated
a sufficient degree of criminal sophistication to support a transfer to criminal court.
(i) The Criminal Offense
The court found that 17-year-old G.C. had not acted in a sudden or impulsive way
but rather in a planned and violent manner evidencing criminal sophistication when he
killed and robbed the victim. In support of that conclusion, it noted that G.C., Fabian,
and A.U. made plans to undertake that crime. After they identified their intended victim,
Fabian set up a fake Instagram account so they could communicate with the victim and
arrange to purchase marijuana vape pens from him. Each of them armed themselves with
7 loaded firearms and drove to the victim’s home together in a car they had borrowed with
the intention of robbing the victim of the vape pens and killing him. G.C. and A.U. hid in
the back seat so the victim could not see how many people were in the car when Fabian
drove up to the victim’s home and, when they lured the victim out of his house, they
ambushed him. After they shot the victim numerous times, they took the marijuana vape
pens (worth $20) and left the scene.
(ii) G.C.’s Actions Before and After His Arrest
Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that G.C.’s conduct before
and after his arrest for the murder and robbery demonstrated criminal sophistication.
A few days after the murder, G.C. was drinking with Fabian and another friend.
Fabian and G.C. asked the friend if he knew what had happened recently and Fabian then
pulled out a “Glock” firearm and said it was the one he used to kill the victim. G.C., in
what the juvenile court described as an exhibition of a chilling lack of remorse, said,
“ ‘We were trying to get him for a 10 piece and he pulled out a gun, so we shot him.
Fuck him.’ ”
Two months after the murder G.C. was taken into custody and placed in the back
seat of a police car where one of the law enforcement officers placed a body-worn camera
that recorded a telephone call G.C. made to a family member while waiting in the car.
G.C. asked the family member to telephone an unidentified man and put the call on the
speaker. G.C. told the man the name of the person he believed had snitched on him and
asked the man to “do me a favor and pop him for me.”
8 In addition to the showing of a lack of remorse and making threats, the juvenile
court found G.C.’s conduct to be dishonest and manipulative. It noted that he had told
both Dr. Berg and Officer Gutierrez that he did not use drugs or alcohol, which was not
true. A friend said he went with G.C. and Fabian to G.C.’s house and consumed alcohol,
and it was on that occasion when G.C. made the statement about shooting the victim and
“[f]uck him.” Too, in March 2025, staff at the juvenile hall overheard G.C. tell his father
that the medication he had been prescribed was not working because of frequent drug use
and that G.C. was going to tell a person named Andres “ ‘to bring [G.C.] one, to put it in
his jacket when he visits [G.C.], … [w]e can get snacks, he can put it in the chocolate so
[G.C.] can be high.’ ’’
(iii) G.C.’s Personal Attributes and Circumstances
Dr. Berg found, and the juvenile court noted, that G.C.’s intellectual functioning
was average, his general judgment and decisionmaking were adequate, and there was no
evidence he suffered from any major mental health disorder. G.C. was raised in a stable
household consisting of his parents and two younger siblings, he had received support
from his family throughout his life and did not report any childhood trauma. The only
mental health difficulties G.C. reported were anxiety and depression related to being
separated from this family since his arrest and detention.
Dr. Berg found no evidence that G.C. was suffering from any mental, physical, or
emotional health issues at the time the offense was committed that may have influenced
his actions. The doctor concluded that G.C. is not criminally sophisticated but with the
9 caveat that no information was made available to him relating to G.C.’s behavior during
the offenses.
Dr. Berg did not question G.C. about the robbery and murder (there was a court
order prohibiting that inquiry), he did not review any of the materials related to that event
or address G.C.’s actions taken after the event occurred. Because Dr. Berg was “missing
a great deal of information” the juvenile court “heavily discount[ed]” his opinion
regarding G.C.’s criminal sophistication.
G.C. argues the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he acted with
criminal sophistication for several reasons: (i) the juvenile court improperly relied solely
on the second-hand account of indicted co-participant Fabian to establish the facts of the
offense; (ii) Fabian, who was the only adult of the three participants, was the sole
organizer of the incident; (iii) there is conflicting evidence with respect to whether the
killing was premeditated and whether G.C.’s fired his gun defensively; (iv) none of
G.C.’s conduct suggested that he was a sophisticated criminal; and, (v) the juvenile court
“punished G.C. for having no mental health conditions and being of normal intelligence.”
We are not persuaded.
G.C. complains the only basis for concluding he was involved in the planning to
rob and kill the victim was the “self-serving” statements of Fabian, the indicted adult who
he posits was the unambiguous leader and sole organizer of the plan. G.C. argues the
court should have disregarded Fabian’s version of events in favor of evidence suggesting
G.C. did not know there was a plan to murder the victim and that he only started shooting
10 because the victim pulled out a gun first. His claim fails because the existence of
contrary evidence does not establish that juvenile court’s findings were not supported by
substantial evidence (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 169.)
G.C. also posits that his conduct was not that of a sophisticated criminal but rather
that of a hapless follower desperate for attention who was going along with an adult
leader. The record supports the trial court’s findings that G.C. was not pressured but
instead willingly participated in the planning, killing, and robbing of the victim. The
participants and their friends were gathered at G.C.’s home before and after the offenses
took place. There is very little difference between the participants’ ages and no one who
was present during the planning stage suggested that G.C. was not on board or had any
reservations about executing the plan, and certainly G.C.’s telephone call made while
waiting in a police car for the purpose of trying to arrange revenge against a snitch
supports the finding that G.C. was a willing participant, not a hapless follower.
G.C. posits that his making that call in the police car “in front of a police officer
who was filming” is evidence that he was not a criminal sophisticate but was simply an
example of “puffed-up bravado” by an immature teenager trying to act tough. He is
mistaken. That call was not made in front of a police officer but rather was captured on a
bodycam left in the police car by an officer. It is reasonable to infer the officer placed the
bodycam in the car surreptitiously and G.C. was not aware of it. (Miguel, supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 169 [reviewing courts draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
court’s findings, not against them].)
11 Contrary to G.C.’s contention, the court’s finding that he had normal intelligence
and no mental health conditions is not tantamount to a punishment for having those
attributes. Rather, it is simply a finding on a section 707 factor that requires the court to
consider whether G.C. suffered from cognitive or mental health problems that might have
impacted his decision to participate in the killing and robbery of the victim. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii).)
In connection with his punishment claim, G.C. asserts that, when the juvenile
court found that he is criminally sophisticated, it improperly relied on the circumstances
of the offense while ignoring all the science surrounding children’s brain development
and their inability to make sophisticated choices.
G.C.’s claim that it is improper to consider the circumstances of the offense is
based on (i) the fact it is not listed in subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii) of section 707 as a factor to
be considered and, (ii) every transfer motion involves a serious felony and a vast majority
of those cases involve planning, use of a firearm, and postoffense statement and,
therefore, consideration of those facts amounts to a “per se finding of sophistication.”
We disagree.
That “circumstances of the offense” is not specifically listed as a factor does not
mean it was improper for the juvenile court to consider them. Subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii)
of section 707 authorizes the juvenile court to “give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to” those listed in the subdivision. Moreover, consideration of
a minor’s impetuosity and appreciation of risks and consequences of criminal behavior
12 (which are specifically mentioned in the subdivision) may well be informed by the
minor’s planning, firearm use, and statements made after committing the offense as we
have seen in this case.
With respect to the assertion that the juvenile court “ignored all the science”
concerning children’s brain development, we note at the outset that G.C. did not present
any materials or argument on the subject at the transfer hearing. Moreover, it appears to
us that, on their face, the section 707 criteria are designed to, among other things, suss out
a minor’s ability to distinguish bad choices from good ones and to weigh consequences of
their actions.
(b) The Finding That the Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense Alleged in the
Petition Supports a Transfer to Adult Court
When evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
section 602 petition to have been committed by the minor, the juvenile court must give
weight to any relevant factor including, but not limited to, the actual behavior and mental
state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm the
person actually caused, and their mental and emotional development. (§707, subd.
(a)(3)(E)(ii).) The court shall also consider evidence offered that indicates that the
minor’s victim had trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(iii).)
The juvenile court found that the circumstances and gravity of G.C.’s offenses
support his transfer to adult court. In arriving at that conclusion, the court fully
13 incorporated the facts it relied on in support of the finding made as to G.C.’s criminal
sophistication, discussed ante. It found G.C. planned and took steps to rob the victim and
he, with co-participant Fabian, shot the victim multiple times and ultimately killed him.
With respect to G.C.’s behavior and degree of involvement, the court found his
level of planning and participation was significant. All three participants were close in
age to one another, G.C. and A.U. were with Fabian when he set up the Instagram
account, borrowed the car, and told the car’s owner there was a plan to rob the victim,
and G.C. was there when the car’s owner said it was not a good idea to commit a crime in
a borrowed car. And, G.C. aided in the ambush of the victim by hiding in the back seat of
the car and he participated in shooting the victim, who died from the injuries he
sustained.
The court did not find any mitigating circumstances in G.C.’s background
information. As noted, ante, G.C. was raised in a stable household with his parents and
siblings, he did not report having suffered any childhood trauma, he had average
intellectual functioning, adequate capacity to make judgments and decisions, and there
was no evidence of his having a major mental health disorder.
G.C. claims consideration of the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
in the petition is the least important section 707 criterion because the issue at the transfer
hearing is not whether the minor committed the act but whether that person is amenable
to the care, treatment and training available through juvenile court facilities.
14 It is well settled that the section 707 criteria to determine whether a minor should
be transferred to the criminal court are based on the premise that the minor did in fact
commit the offense. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682.)
And, as we explained ante, the juvenile court is required to consider all five of the section
707 criteria in making its determination, although the statute does not dictate that one
criterion be given greater weight or less weight than any other. (Miguel R., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Accordingly, contrary to G.C.’s suggestion, his degree of
involvement in the crime and the harm he caused are proper considerations, and the
weight to be accorded those factors is up to the juvenile court’s discretion.
G.C. makes the same insufficiency of the evidence claim as to this section 707
criteria as he did with respect to the criminal sophistication factor, that is, Fabian’s
descriptions of G.C.’s participation in planning and executing the offense are inherently
unreliable. We find that argument unavailing for the reasons given in our discussion of
the sophistication factor, ante.
C. The Finding That the Minor Is Not Amenable to Rehabilitation
The juvenile court’s lengthy detailed written opinion establishes that it considered
and weighed all the section 707 factors. Although it found three factors supported the
conclusion that transferring G.C. to the criminal court was not appropriate (notably
G.C.’s near exemplary conduct in juvenile hall), it found G.C. is ultimately not amenable
to treatment while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction based upon his high level of
criminal sophistication and the severity of his offenses, as well as his lack of candor with
15 Dr. Berg and Officer Gutierrez, which the juvenile court found to be an affirmative
barrier to treatment and rehabilitation in the juvenile court system.
In support of its finding that the People had met its burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence that G.C. is not suitable for, and cannot be rehabilitated within, the
juvenile court system, the court explained:
“When the court examines the evidence of planning, and [G.C.’s] significant role
in the violent offense, his use and discharge of a firearm (that was repeatedly discharged)
at a drug dealer over vape pens, when [G.C.] was suffering from no diagnosed mental or
physical condition at the time of the offense, with no inducement by others to participate
in the offense, and the court views his post offense conduct in the recorded threat of a
potential witness against him, the court considers [G.C.] not amenable to treatment in the
juvenile court jurisdiction and considers [G.C.’s] violent conduct is likely to recur as
demonstrated by his conduct and action after the homicide.”
The juvenile court added that it “strongly concurs with the Probation Officer’s
analysis that despite being raised in a positive family environment with no apparent
psychological impairments, [G.C.’s] statements to the witnesses in this matter indicated a
blatant lack of empathy or accountability and strongly indicate a resistance to
rehabilitation. His actions were carefully planned, callous, and deliberate, and his post-
offense conduct reflected continued (threats) and criminal sophistication incompatible
with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.”
16 G.C. argues that the juvenile court did not give sufficient weight to his progress
and positive response to the structure and intervention provided in the juvenile hall and
posits that he is “a perfect candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. ” That
argument is essentially a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court, which is beyond our authority. (In re G.L. (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order granting the section 707 order transferring G.C. to the
jurisdiction of the criminal court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J. CODRINGTON J.