In Re Gabrielle Sowell v. the State of Texas
This text of In Re Gabrielle Sowell v. the State of Texas (In Re Gabrielle Sowell v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued August 21, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00502-CV ——————————— IN RE GABRIELLE SOWELL, Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus proceeding, relator Gabrielle Sowell asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion by granting a new trial after its plenary power expired.
Because we agree, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.1
1 The underlying case is Linda Rose Camacho v. Gabrielle Sowell, cause number 24- CV-0166, pending in the 405th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, the Honorable Jared Robinson presiding. Background
The underlying case involves a dispute over real property. On January 31,
2024, Linda Rose Camacho sued Sowell for trespass to try title and, alternatively, to
quiet title. Sowell filed special exceptions to Camacho’s petition. The trial court
granted the special exceptions and ordered Camacho to replead within ten days.
On January 15, 2025, Sowell moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that
Camacho failed to comply with the trial court’s order requiring her to replead. The
next day, January 16, 2025, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the suit
“in its entirety with prejudice to [Camacho’s] rights to refile same.”
On February 7, 2025, Camacho filed a motion for new trial. She argued that
she did not have the opportunity to respond to the dismissal motion because it was
granted one day after it was filed. Five days later, Camacho filed a first amended
motion for new trial expanding her argument. The trial court did not rule on either
the original or the first amended motion for new trial.
Camacho filed a second amended motion for new trial on March 11, 2025.
The trial court granted the second amended motion on May 6, 2025.
Void Order
In her sole issue, Sowell argues that the May 6 order granting Camacho’s
second amended motion for new trial is void because the trial court lacked plenary
2 power to grant it. She asks that we grant mandamus relief and order the trial court to
vacate the order. We requested a response from Camacho, but no response was filed.
A. Standard of Review
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that
(1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an adequate
remedy by appeal. In re Kappmeyer, 668 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2023). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it signs an order after its plenary power expires. See In re
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). An order
granting a new trial signed after the trial court’s plenary power has expired is void.
See In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2008). A relator
challenging a void order need not show that she lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.
Sw. Bell. Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.
B. Applicable Law
A motion for new trial “shall be filed prior to or within thirty days after the
judgment or other order complained of is signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a). An
amended motion for new trial “may be filed without leave of court before any
preceding motion for new trial filed by the movant is overruled and within thirty
days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed.” Id. R. 329b(b). A
motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if it “is not determined by
written order signed within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed.” Id. R.
3 329b(c). A trial court retains plenary power for thirty days after a motion for new
trial is overruled “either by a written and signed order or by operation of law.” Id.
R. 329b(e).
C. Analysis
Here, the trial court signed its judgment—the order dismissing Sowell’s suit—
on January 16, 2025. Camacho’s first amended motion for new trial was timely filed
within thirty days of that date, but her second amended motion was untimely. See id.
R. 329b(a), (b). The first amended motion was overruled by operation of law on
April 1, 2025, seventy-five days after the judgment was signed. See id. R. 329b(c).
The trial court retained plenary power over the suit for another thirty days, until May
1, 2025. See id. R. 329b(e). Because the trial court granted the second amended
motion for new trial on May 6—five days after the court lost plenary power—the
May 6 order is void. See id.; Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 72.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it signed the May
6 order. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605. Because the May 6 order is void,
Sowell need not show that she lacks an adequate appellate remedy. See id. We hold
that Sowell is entitled to mandamus relief. See id.; In re Patchen, No. 01-16-00947-
CV, 2017 WL 976077, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 14, 2017, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting mandamus relief because trial court signed order
granting new trial after its plenary power expired).
4 Conclusion
We conditionally grant Sowell’s mandamus petition and order the trial court
to vacate its May 6, 2025 order granting the second amended motion for new trial.
A writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.
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