In re: Gabriel Bravo v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-1657
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 24-1657 _______________________

In re: GABRIEL BRAVO, Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Court No. 2:22-cv-04820 District Judge: The Honorable Kelley B. Hodge __________________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 11, 2025

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 17, 2025)

__________________________

OPINION * __________________________ SMITH, Circuit Judge. I.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Gabriel Bravo appeals the District Court’s order affirming the

Bankruptcy Court’s overruling of his claim objection and denial of his subsequent motion

for reconsideration. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

II.

In January 2006, Gabriel Bravo and his wife obtained a $71,250 loan from Interbay

Funding, LLC, secured by property the Bravos owned in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Interbay assigned the loan to Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC. Bayview filed a Civil Action

in Mortgage Foreclosure in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in June

2015. The Court of Common Pleas issued a consent order granting Bayview a $105,613.62

in rem judgment with interest accruing until the date of a sheriff’s sale. Before a sheriff’s

sale was scheduled, Bayview assigned the mortgage foreclosure to E-Z Cashing, LLC.

The property initially sold at a July 2017 sheriff’s sale, but the Court of Common

Pleas later vacated that sale. In October 2017, before a subsequent sale could occur, Bravo

filed his first Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. So the Court of Common Pleas postponed the sheriff’s

sale. After the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Bravo’s petition, he filed another the next day,

prompting the Court of Common Pleas to again stay the sheriff’s sale. The Bankruptcy

Court dismissed Bravo’s second petition in November 2020.

Three months later, E-Z Cashing filed a Motion to Reassess Damages in the Court

of Common Pleas. The motion alleged that in the four years since the Court issued its

$105,613.62 consent judgment: (a) Bravo incurred $31,252.08 in interest on that amount;

(b) E-Z Cashing itself incurred an additional $19,049.55 in post-judgment costs; and (c) 2 Bravo paid E-Z Cashing $2,880. E-Z Cashing asked the Court of Common Pleas to amend

the judgment to $153,035.25, which represented the amount of the consent judgment, plus

post-judgment interest and costs, less Bravo’s payments.

Bravo responded to E-Z Cashing’s motion by filing an Answer with New Matter. 1

Bravo argued that E-Z Cashing was not entitled to the post-judgment costs it sought. He

also claimed that he had actually paid E-Z Cashing $31,184 since the consent judgment

was entered, significantly more than the $2,880 conceded in E-Z Cashing’s motion. Bravo

requested that the Court of Common Pleas reject E-Z Cashing’s claim for post-judgment

costs, credit his over-$30,000 in payments, and amend the judgment to $105,681.70.

Accepting neither party’s proposed dollar figure, the Court of Common Pleas issued

an order in June 2021 granting E-Z Cashing’s motion and reassessing damages to

$136,865.70. The Court of Common Pleas did not issue an opinion explaining its own

calculation, but the Court did state in its order that it had reached its conclusion “upon

consideration of” E-Z Cashing’s motion and Bravo’s response. DCD 2-1 at 71. The amount

of the reassessed judgment equaled the initial $105,613.62 consent judgment, plus the

$31,252.08 E-Z Cashing asked for as post-judgment interest. The order did not account for

any post-judgment payments made by Bravo to E-Z Cashing—even the $2,880 E-Z

Cashing admitted Bravo paid. Bravo did not move for reconsideration or appeal.

1 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030, “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a). A party may raise “affirmative defenses including . . . payment” in a new matter. Id. 3 Four months later, in October 2021, Bravo filed his third Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

Petition. E-Z Cashing filed a Proof of Claim seeking the amount stated in the Court of

Common Pleas’ June 2021 order reassessing damages (hereinafter the “reassessment

order”), plus interest. Bravo objected. He argued that the reassessment order did not

account for the $31,284 2 he had allegedly paid E-Z Cashing following issuance of the

consent judgment. E-Z Cashing countered that the Court of Common Pleas’ reassessment

order controlled and that the doctrine of res judicata prevented Bravo from relitigating the

issue of post-judgment payments before the Bankruptcy Court.

After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the Bankruptcy Court

overruled Bravo’s objection to E-Z Cashing’s Proof of Claim on res judicata grounds. It

reasoned that E-Z Cashing’s claim was based on the Court of Common Pleas’ reassessment

order and that Bravo raised the issue of crediting post-judgment payments in that

proceeding. The Court explained: “Whether the [Court of Common Pleas] considered and

rejected [Bravo’s] Post-Judgment Payments, or alternatively did not consider them at all

because [Bravo] failed to properly follow Pennsylvania procedure in asserting them, does

not change the fact that they arose from the same claim and cause of action . . . and could

have been litigated in connection therewith.” DCD 2-1 at 364. The Bankruptcy Court thus

held that res judicata barred Bravo from objecting to E-Z Cashing’s claim.

2 Before the Court of Common Pleas, Bravo alleged that he had paid E-Z Cashing a total of $31,184. We agree with the District Court that this “discrepancy of $100.00 is de minimis and is likely the result of scrivener’s error.” App. 10 n.7. 4 Bravo moved for reconsideration. He argued that the Bankruptcy Court erred by

failing to credit a separate $500 payment he had made to E-Z Cashing after filing his third

bankruptcy petition. Bravo also claimed that res judicata could not apply because EZ-

Cashing engaged in fraud by failing to credit Bravo for various payments. The Bankruptcy

Court granted Bravo’s motion as to the $500 payment but denied it in all other respects.

Bravo appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. That Court affirmed, and Bravo timely appealed to this Court.

III. 3

“On an appeal from a bankruptcy case, our review duplicates that of the district

court and view[s] the bankruptcy court decision unfettered by the district court’s

determination[.]” In re Orton, 687 F.3d 612, 614–15 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). In turn, we review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 615.

Bravo contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that res judicata

barred his objection to E-Z Cashing’s Proof of Claim. We disagree.

In determining the preclusive effect of a Pennsylvania judgment, we look to

Pennsylvania law. Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.

2006). Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by a

court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies

on the same cause of action.” Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995)

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. 5 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). The doctrine applies not only to claims

actually litigated in the first proceeding, but also to claims that could have been litigated

“if they were part of the same cause of action.” R/S Fin. Corp. v. Kovalchick, 716 A.2d

1228, 1230 (Pa. 1998).

For res judicata to apply, “Pennsylvania courts require that the two actions share

the following four conditions: (1) the thing sued upon or for; (2) the cause of action; (3)

the persons and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued.”

Turner, 449 F.3d at 548 (citing Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. 1974)).

Here, Bravo contests only the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the two actions shared

conditions one and two. We see no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis.

The “thing” sued upon in the Court of Common Pleas and the Bankruptcy Court

was the same. Both actions were disputes with respect to the amount Bravo owed E-Z

Cashing on the consent judgment stemming from the underlying foreclosure action. See,

e.g., Romah v. Romah, 600 A.2d 978, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). The causes of action were

likewise identical. Before both Courts, Bravo complained of E-Z Cashing’s failure to credit

the same alleged post-judgment payments. See Turner, 449 F.3d at 550 (“[The] present

action and the prior state-court litigation originated from the same cause of action,

inasmuch as they are based on the same allegedly wrongful acts.”). And in both

proceedings, Bravo sought credit for post-judgment payments in an effort to reduce his

obligation to E-Z Cashing. See Kelly v. Kelly, 887 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)

(concluding two causes of action were identical where the appellant “ma[de] the same

demand for recovery” and sought “compensation for the same damages”). Because 6 adjudicating Bravo’s claim objection “would require the parties to ‘rehash’ the facts and

legal arguments raised before the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas[,]” the Bankruptcy Court

properly concluded that the things sued upon and the causes of action in both matters were

identical for res judicata purposes. Turner, 449 F.3d at 550.

Still, Bravo argues that res judicata cannot preclude his claim objection because the

issue of crediting his post-judgment payments was not “actually litigated” in the Court of

Common Pleas. Opening Br. at 19. In his view, because the Court of Common Pleas

neglected to credit even the $2,880 in post-judgment payments E-Z Cashing had conceded,

“it is quite likely” that the Court “believed that its only duty was to determine the gross

amount” of damages, without crediting any payments. Opening Br. at 18.

“An issue is ‘actually litigated’ when it ‘is properly raised, by the pleadings or

otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.’” O’Leary v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments

§ 27 comment d, at 255 (1982)). There can be no question that Bravo raised the issue of

receiving credit for post-judgment payments in his Answer and New Matter before the

Court of Common Pleas. And Bravo points to no Pennsylvania Rule 4 or precedent that

prevents a court from crediting post-judgment payments when reassessing damages

4 Bravo points to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1037 and Philadelphia County Local Rule 1037.2, arguing that because neither Rule contemplates crediting post- judgment payments, the Court of Common Pleas believed it lacked the authority to do so. But those Rules govern the assessment of damages in the first instance before default judgment is entered. They do not apply when a party moves to reassess the amount of previously awarded damages. See EMC Mortg., LLC v. Biddle, 114 A.3d 1057, 1072 n.12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).

7 pursuant to its inherent “equitable power to enforce the underlying judgment and to grant

relief until the judgment is discharged or satisfied.” PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs,

929 A.2d 219, 227 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Although the brevity of the reassessment

order precludes a full understanding of the Court of Common Pleas’ analysis, we are not

persuaded that the Court lacked the authority to determine the issue of crediting post-

judgment payments and therefore did not actually litigate the issue. 5

Moreover, to the extent Bravo believed that the Court of Common Pleas failed to

adequately address the issue of post-judgment payments, he could have litigated that

assertion by seeking reconsideration or appealing the Court’s reassessment order. Biddle,

114 A.3d at 1061. He elected not to. “[I]n the absence of an appeal,” even an “erroneous

adjudication is res judicata[.]” Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 433 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Because

Bravo did not seek further relief, res judicata precludes him from re-litigating in the

Bankruptcy Court the issue of his entitlement to credit for post-judgment payments. See

Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 100 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. 1953) (“[A]ny mistakes in

the original judgment are wrapped up in that judgment and cannot be inquired into

thereafter.”).

5 We have not overlooked the Bankruptcy Court’s observation that “there was compelling evidence” that E-Z Cashing “failed to credit a significant amount of Post-Judgment Payments” Bravo “made when seeking the Damages Reassessment Order.” DCD No. 2-1 at 364 n.7. Nevertheless, that Court determined that “res judicata preclude[d] it” from making a contrary finding. Id. Even assuming the Court of Common Pleas erred by not crediting these payments, “that error, although regrettable, is [nonetheless] res judicata[.]” Tulewicz v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 606 A.2d 427, 433 (Pa. 1992) (Larsen, J., dissenting).

8 Finally, we turn to Bravo’s contention that the Bankruptcy Court erroneously

rejected his argument that res judicata cannot apply because E-Z Cashing engaged in fraud.

Under Pennsylvania law, preclusive effect will not be given to a judgment that “has been

procured by fraud or collusion[.]” Wilkes v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d

366, 387 (Pa. 2006) (citing Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550–51 (1947)). To circumvent

res judicata’s application, the prior judgment must have been procured by extrinsic fraud,

i.e., fraud “collateral to the matter tried by the first court[.]” McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab

Co., 110 A. 366, 368 (Pa. 1920). Bravo, however, never argued that E-Z Cashing engaged

in extrinsic fraud. He claimed only that E-Z Cashing lied about receiving and/or crediting

his post-judgment payments during court proceedings. Such intrinsic fraud is insufficient

to defeat the application of res judicata. 6 See id. (explaining that “a fraud in the matter on

which the decree was rendered” cannot overcome res judicata’s application).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

6 For this reason, and as the Bankruptcy Court concluded, Bravo’s reliance on Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999), is misplaced.