In re F.W.

2024 Ohio 5431

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 5, 2024
• Docket: 24CA6
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re F.W., 2024-Ohio-5431.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ATHENS COUNTY

IN RE: : : F.W. and K.W., : Case Nos. 24CA6 : Adjudicated Neglected : and Dependent Children. : : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY : :

APPEARANCES:

Richard D. Hixson, Zanesville, Ohio, for Appellant.

Brittany E. Leach, Athens County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, the father of the minor children F.W., age 15, and K.W.,

age 13, appeals the trial court’s judgment that placed his two children in the

permanent custody of Athens County Children Services (“the agency”). In his first

assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court’s finding that the children

cannot be placed with him within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

him is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In his second assignment of

error, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s finding that placing the children in the Athens App. No. 24CA6 2

agency’s permanent custody is in their best interest likewise is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that

the trial court erred by failing to appoint an attorney to represent the children.

Upon review, we do not find any merit to Appellant’s assignments of error.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s three assignments of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

FACTS

{¶2} On June 24, 2021, the agency filed complaints that alleged the

children are neglected and dependent. The complaints alleged the following. On

April 8, 2021, the agency received a report of educational neglect. Beginning in

March 2020, none of the children consistently attended school. During the 2020-

2021 school year, F.W. missed at least 94 school days, and K.W. missed at least 69

days of school. An agency caseworker subsequently spoke with the children’s

mother, and she admitted that the children had not been attending school. The

mother assured the caseworker that the children would attend school, but the

mother failed to fulfill her promise. For these reasons, the agency asked the court

to grant it protective supervision of the children.

{¶3} On September 8, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the children

neglected and dependent. The trial court later entered a dispositional order that

granted the agency protective supervision of the children. Athens App. No. 24CA6 3

{¶4} On May 16, 2022, the trial court granted the agency ex parte

emergency custody of the children and set the matter for a shelter care hearing to

be held on May 17, 2022. The court subsequently continued the ex parte

temporary custody order pending a full hearing.

{¶5} On May 17, 2022, the agency filed a motion to modify the protective

supervision order to a temporary custody order. The agency asserted that the

children’s mother recently tested positive for methamphetamines and suboxone

and that Appellant refused to submit to drug screens. Additionally, the agency had

concerns that “the parents have an alcohol abuse problem. Their home and the

property they live on is littered with beer cans.” The agency further alleged that

(1) the family’s home, “a small camper,” is “in near deplorable conditions,” with

trash inside and outside the home, (2) the home lacks running water and receives

“electricity from the home next door,” (3) Appellant “has an anger management

problem,” and (4) the children have missed a significant number of days of school.

{¶6} On June 28, 2022, the trial court granted the agency temporary

custody of the children.

{¶7} On May 9, 2023, the agency filed a motion to modify the disposition

to permanent custody.1 The agency asserted that the children cannot be placed

with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

1 In February 2023, the children’s mother tragically and unexpectedly passed away. Athens App. No. 24CA6 4

parent and that placing the children in its permanent custody is in their best

interests.

{¶8} On October 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing to consider the

agency’s permanent custody motion. Stephanie Blaine, a kindship program

coordinator, testified that she conducted a home study for a paternal aunt, but the

home did not “meet the minimal safety standards.” She sought other potential

relatives but none was available.

{¶9} Caseworker Katie Schlegel likewise testified that she investigated a

potential placement for the children, but the home study was not approved.

{¶10} Caseworker David Driggs testified that he administered several drug

tests to Appellant and that Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine,

amphetamine, and THC. Driggs did not provide specific dates for these positive

test results, but the trial court admitted into evidence copies of the drug test results.

This evidence indicated that (1) in April 2023, Appellant tested positive for THC,

(2) on January 30, 2023, Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine,

amphetamine, and THC, and (3) in July, September, and October 2022, Appellant

tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Driggs stated that he

attempted to test Appellant after April 2023, but he was unable to connect with

Appellant. Driggs further reported that beginning in July 2023, he did not make

any further attempts to test Appellant due to “safety concerns.” Athens App. No. 24CA6 5

{¶11} Caseworker Rebecca Inboden testified as follows. In April 2021, the

agency entered into a voluntary case plan with the family to help resolve school

truancy issues. The children “had not attended school during the majority of the

2020-2021 school year.” The initial case plan objectives focused around ensuring

that the children were attending school. Inboden was “going to the home on a

regular basis [and] attempting to talk to the parents about the importance of the

children attending school.” She informed the parents that the children needed to

consistently attend school “sooner than later”; otherwise, “there was possibly going

to be some sort of sanctions forthcoming from the court.” The parents never were

able to ensure that the children attended school on a consistent basis.

{¶12} Inboden further testified that the agency had concerns regarding the

family’s housing. In September 2021, the family was living in a two-bedroom

camper. For electricity, the family used electrical cords that connected to the home

next door. Additionally, the camper did not have running water. The agency also

had concerns about a lack of food in the home and potential refrigeration issues.

{¶13} In April 2022, the agency received a referral that the parents “were

abusing substances.” Inboden completed a home visit with the parents and asked

them to submit to drug testing. The mother submitted to a test, and she tested

positive for “illicit substances.” The mother advised Inboden that “she did not

know how those substances would have gotten into her system.” Appellant refused Athens App. No. 24CA6 6

to take a drug test, and he did not explain why he would not submit to a drug test.

Appellant “was very upset with the request” and did not believe that the test was

necessary. Inboden stated that Appellant “was very amplified and kicking,

knocking over objects,” and “at one point[,] he had threatened to kill his sister-in-

law.”

{¶14} In May 2022, the children entered the agency’s temporary custody.

Before their removal, the children had been living in “unstable home conditions.”

The parents appeared to be abusing drugs, the children’s older sister (who was 17

at the time but now is over the age of majority) was several months pregnant and

had not received prenatal care, and the father of this unborn child (with whom the

17-year-old had an ongoing relationship) “was known to be drug involved and

domestically violent.”

{¶15} Once the children entered the agency’s temporary custody, the

agency amended the case plan to include goals related to alcohol and drug

treatment, mental health, and housing. Inboden explained that “the family has a

history of multiple moves and or [sic] their housing not being sanitary, organized,

and potentially being a safety hazard.”

{¶16} The agency also had concerns regarding the 17-year-old child’s

pregnancy. The parents claimed that they did not know that she was pregnant,

even though “it would have been difficult for [the child] to hide a pregnancy of that Athens App. No. 24CA6 7

duration because she was nearly ready to give birth by the time the pregnancy was

discovered.”

{¶17} Inboden explained that Appellant wanted to be present for the birth of

the 17-year-old’s child, but the hospital had restrictions regarding the persons

allowed in the room. Appellant was not allowed to be present and “he had to be

escorted off of the property.”

{¶18} Between July 2022 and July 26, 2023, Appellant tested positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, and suboxone. Inboden referred

Appellant for a substance abuse assessment. Appellant was noncompliant between

July 2022 through May 2023. He since has been “actively participating.”

{¶19} Inboden also testified that she had heard comments suggesting that

Appellant wanted to harm her. In late May 2022, she heard that Appellant had

stated an “intention to place [Inboden] in a wood chipper.” As a result, Inboden

contacted her supervisor and the agency decided that Inboden no longer would be

required to personally visit the family’s home.

{¶20} In the summer of 2023, Inboden received a phone call from a mental

health therapist who “reported having a duty to warn as [Appellant] had presented

for a therapy session and verbalized intention for members of [Inboden’s] family,

or any other Children Services workers[’] family to, ‘come up missing if the

agenc[y’s] motion for permanent custody was granted.’ ” Inboden reported the Athens App. No. 24CA6 8

incident to her supervisor and to law enforcement officials. As a result of

Appellant’s threat, Inboden was advised not to “have any further face-to-face

contact with” Appellant.

{¶21} Inboden stated that the case plan also required Appellant to engage in

mental health services. She explained that Appellant “has a lengthy history of

violent and or [sic] assaultive behavior towards adults that has been adjudicated

through” Athens County Common Pleas Court. Inboden indicated that Appellant

completed a mental health evaluation, but she does not know “what the

recommendations were.” She has been unable to determine whether Appellant “is

emotionally or mentally healthy for parenting” due to “the safety precautions that

have been put in place.”

{¶22} In April 2023, Appellant was living with a paramour in the

paramour’s mother’s house. Inboden explained that the children had difficulty

processing Appellant’s new relationship, given that their mother had passed away

only a few months before Appellant started this new relationship.

{¶23} Inboden was unable to access the paramour’s mother’s home to

determine whether it would be an appropriate home for the children. The agency

nevertheless had received information that “multiple individuals” were “coming

and going from that property, including teenagers living in a shed behind the

house.” Athens App. No. 24CA6 9

{¶24} As of the date of the permanent custody hearing, Inboden did not

know if Appellant had appropriate housing for the children. Moreover, Inboden

did not receive income verification from Appellant. She has “been told that he

receives social security benefits.” Inboden thus does not know if Appellant can

provide for the children’s basic needs.

{¶25} Inboden stated that the two children currently live in the same foster

home, where they have lived since May 2022. She reported that the children “are

thriving.” If the agency is granted permanent custody, Inboden expects that the

children will remain living in this home. The foster parents have indicated that

they would be willing to adopt the children. Inboden explained that K.W. has been

“holding out hope that she is going to go home, and it will be difficult for [her] to

have that dream essentially go away.”

{¶26} Inboden testified that the children have “come a long way since

they’ve arrived in [the foster] home.” She explained: “They have a close bond

with their foster family. They attend school every day. They do not evidence any

unexcused absences. They participate in family activities.”

{¶27} Inboden explained that the agency requested permanent custody of

the children because the agency “has had ongoing involvement with this family for

a number of years, and it tends to always be related to the same issues”: “Housing,

lack of resources, . . . allegations of substance use, or dependence, concerns about Athens App. No. 24CA6 10

the mental health of one or both parents. One of the parents being . . . involved

with the criminal justice system.” Additionally, when the children were in

Appellant’s custody, they were not attending school on a consistent basis and their

“education needs [were] not being met.” Inboden does not believe that Appellant

has made “sufficient progress with regard to the case plan activities and objectives

in order to recommend reunification.” Inboden stated that she knows that

Appellant “loves his children dearly,” but she is “worried for these children’s

safety, and . . . their stability if they were to reunify with” Appellant.

{¶28} Renee McKee, a clinician at Health Recovery Services, testified as

follows. She has been working with Appellant since May 2023. Appellant

currently takes suboxone, and, other than testing positive for marijuana, he has not

had a positive drug test since July 2023. Appellant also completed a mental health

evaluation.

{¶29} On July 14, 2023, Appellant stated that “if his children were taken

that other . . . people’s family members would come up missing.” McKee reported

the statement to authorities. McKee since has seen an improvement in Appellant’s

behavior, and she believes that he will continue to improve.

{¶30} Kelly Morman, the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL), testified that

she would not “recommend permanent custody at this time. The girls are clearly

closely bonded with their extended family.” However, she would not recommend Athens App. No. 24CA6 11

“that the girls be returned to their father at this time.” Instead, she believed that “a

lot of progress” still “needs to be made and a lot of concerns around housing . . .

need to be addressed.” Morman indicated that Appellant has “expressed remorse

for past comments that have been made.” She further suggested that Appellant has

made “earnest progress.” Morman would like to see Appellant continue to have

clean drug screens, continue to engage in treatment, and obtain a stable and safe

home. She recommended that the court give Appellant another three months to

comply with all of the case plan goals.

{¶31} Morman reported that the children “are clearly determined” to remain

with one another, and they “have been consistent in their desire to be reunified.”

In their current placement, the children seem to be “adjusting well” and “attending

school regularly.” They also are engaged in extracurricular activities. Morman

stated that the children “seem to be connected to their foster parents, but [she]

think[s] there is still a remaining kind of distance.” Thus, Morman is uncertain

whether keeping the children in the foster home is “a good long-term solution.”

{¶32} Appellant did not testify, but his counsel asked the court to give

Appellant more time to complete the case plan goals.

{¶33} On March 14, 2024, the trial court granted the agency permanent

custody of the two children. The court first found that placing the children in the

agency’s permanent custody is in their best interests. With respect to the Athens App. No. 24CA6 12

children’s interactions and interrelationships, the court found that (1) the children

and Appellant have a “strong bond”; (2) Appellant regularly visits the children and

the visits “go well”; (3) the children have been in the same foster home since May

2022; (4) before entering the agency’s temporary custody, “the children were

struggling with housing security and their education”; (5) since entering the

agency’s temporary custody, “the children have made tremendous strides as they

have a stable environment that allows them to thrive”; (6) their “school attendance

has significantly improved”; and (7) they “have a solid bond with their foster

caregiver.”

{¶34} The court considered the children’s wishes and found that they would

like to be reunified with Appellant. The court stated that the family “has a very

strong bond and are very close to each other.” The court further noted that the

GAL “advocated that [Appellant] be given more time to complete his case plan

goals for reunification purposes.”

{¶35} The court additionally reviewed the children’s custodial history. The

court found that the case began on June 24, 2021, when the agency requested a

protective supervision order due to concerns about the children’s educational

neglect. Nearly one year later, the court placed the children in the agency’s

temporary custody “due to a multitude of concerns that included the parents’

substance use, continued educational neglect with the children missing school, and Athens App. No. 24CA6 13

housing instability as the family was residing in a camper that was in a deplorable

condition.” The children have been in the agency’s continuous temporary custody

since May 16, 2022.

{¶36} The court further found that the children need a legally secure

permanent placement and that they cannot achieve this type of placement without

granting the agency permanent custody. The court noted that Appellant “has

struggled with case plan requirements” but determined that he has made “some

progress.” The court commended Appellant for “engag[ing] in substance use

treatment,” but found that “housing insecurity still looms as well as [Appellant]’s

ability to provide for the children’s basic needs.” The court declared that “[t]he

children deserve the chance to succeed in life” and that they are “highly unlikely”

to be able to succeed “if permanent custody is not granted to the agency.” The

court stated that awarding the agency permanent custody “will allow the children

to be in a safe and stable environment that will provide them with the necessary

resources to continue their success.”

{¶37} The court also concluded that the children cannot be placed with

Appellant within a reasonable time and should not be placed with Appellant. The

court again noted that the “family is very close and bonded,” but it determined that

this “bond is not enough for permanent custody not to be granted to the agency.”

The court observed that the children entered the agency’s temporary custody as a Athens App. No. 24CA6 14

result of their “parents’ potential substance use, continued educational neglect, and

deplorable housing conditions.” The court recognized that Appellant “has taken

steps to address his substance use and hopes that he continues to do so in the

future.” The court additionally noted that the children and Appellant have “gone

through additional trauma during this case as Mother unexpectedly passed away.”

The court nevertheless did not believe that Appellant has made “the necessary

progression.” The court stated that Appellant has “documented anger issues

toward the agency” and his “alleged threats of bodily harm have affected the

progress in this case and ha[ve] not been properly addressed.” The court further

found that these anger issues have “affected his case plan progress and whether he

can adequately and appropriately parent these children.”

{¶38} The court additionally stated that Appellant has not verified that he

has appropriate housing for the children. The court indicated that part of the

problem with verifying Appellant’s housing stemmed from his “behavior toward

agency staff.” The court found that Appellant “previously could not provide for

the children’s basic needs and that still appears to be the case.” The court stated

that it did “not feel comfortable that [Appellant] has verifiable income to support

himself and his children as well as providing for their basic every day needs.” The

court found that “[t]he family has historically had the same issues that still remain Athens App. No. 24CA6 15

today. They struggle with housing, lack of utilizing resources provided to them,

substance use, and mental health or anger concerns.”

{¶39} The court recognized that Appellant “loves his children and has made

progress with his substance use,” but it stated that other issues remain. The court

found that the children “appear to be thriving in their current environment by

making strides emotionally, mentally, and educationally.” The court indicated that

the children are receiving “the resources and support” that they did not receive

while in their parents’ care. The court stated that if the children were returned to

Appellant’s custody, “they would be highly susceptible to falling back into the

environment that they were previously removed from.”

{¶40} The court thus found that (1) the children cannot be placed with

Appellant within a reasonable time and should not be placed with Appellant and

(2) permanent custody is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, the court

granted the agency’s permanent custody motions. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN FINDING THAT THE MINOR CHILDREN COULD NOT BE PLACED WITH FATHER WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH HIM, AS SUCH A FINDING WAS UNSUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN FINDING THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST Athens App. No. 24CA6 16

INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN, AS SUCH A FINDING WAS UNSUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND FAILED TO PROTECT THE MINOR CHILDREN’S STATUTORY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN FAILING TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN.

First and Second Assignments of Error

{¶41} For ease of discussion, we have combined our review of Appellant’s

first and second assignments of error.

{¶42} In his first two assignments of error, Appellant argues that the trial

court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. More specifically,

appellant asserts that the record fails to contain clear and convincing evidence to

support the trial court’s findings that (1) the children cannot be placed with him

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him and (2) placing the

children in the agency’s permanent custody is in their best interests.

Standard of Review

{¶43} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s permanent

custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

E.g., In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). When an appellate court

reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ ‘‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable Athens App. No. 24CA6 17

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.” ’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20, quoting

Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115 (9th Dist.2001), quoting State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶44} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing

court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings . . . were supported by clear and

convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. In determining whether

a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing

court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55

Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). “Thus, if the children services agency presented

competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could

have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s

decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” R.M., 2013-Ohio-

3588, at ¶ 55 (4th Dist.).

{¶45} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may

reverse the judgment only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the Athens App. No. 24CA6 18

conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at

175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody decision

against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in

which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin at

175; see Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest weight of

the evidence” “denotes a deferential standard of review under which a verdict will

be reversed or disregarded only if another outcome is obviously correct and the

verdict is clearly unsupported by the evidence”).

{¶46} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is

“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’

demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v.

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-

3146, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). As the Ohio Supreme Court long ago explained:

In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through independent investigation can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.

Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13 (1952). Athens App. No. 24CA6 19

Permanent Custody Framework

{¶47} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) specifies that a trial court may grant a children

services agency permanent custody of a child if the court finds, by clear and

convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s best interest would be served by the award

of permanent custody, and (2) any of the following conditions applies:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state. Athens App. No. 24CA6 20

{¶48} In the case at bar, the agency asserted, and the trial court found, that

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies.2 Appellant argues that clear and convincing

evidence does not support the court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) finding that the

children cannot be placed with him within a reasonable time or should not be

placed with him.

{¶49} R.C. 2151.414(E) requires a court that is determining whether a child

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should

not be placed with the parents to consider all relevant evidence. The statute further

specifies that if one or more of the following conditions exist “as to each of the

child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:”

(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent

2 The trial court stated that the children have not been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Neither party disputes this finding on appeal. We note that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states that a “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.” In the case at bar, on September 8, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the children neglected and dependent. On May 17, 2022, the children were removed from the home. The statute instructs that the earlier date, September 8, 2021, controls. Thus, if the statute means what it says, the children are considered to have entered the agency’s “temporary custody” on September 8, 2021, which means that they have been in the agency’s “temporary custody,” for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. But see In re Ar.S., 2019-Ohio-5378, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.) (stating that a period of protective supervision following an adjudication does not count for purposes of calculating the 12-month period). However, because the parties and the trial court proceeded as if R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) governs, we will consider whether clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the children cannot be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him. Athens App. No. 24CA6 21

within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

...

(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child;

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

{¶50} A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of

the R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a

finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time Athens App. No. 24CA6 22

or should not be placed with either parent. See In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 50;

In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 99 (1996); see e.g., In re L.R.B., 2020-Ohio-

6642, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.); In re Hurlow, 1998 WL 655414, *4 (4th Dist. Sept. 21,

1998).

{¶51} In the case before us, competent, clear and convincing evidence

supports the trial court’s finding that the children cannot be placed with Appellant

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him. The evidence indicates

that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), Appellant failed continuously and repeatedly

to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside

their home. One of the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside

their home was the family’s lack of suitable housing. Appellant has not remedied

this condition. At the time of the permanent custody hearing, Appellant was living

with his paramour in the paramour’s mother’s house. The agency received reports

that multiple individuals were “coming and going from” the paramour’s mother’s

house, “including teenagers living in a shed behind the house.”

{¶52} Additionally, due to Appellant’s threats, the agency was unable to

determine whether his paramour’s mother’s home would be an appropriate

placement for the children. Thus, although Appellant faults the agency for failing

to visit this residence, he does not recognize that his threats were the reason why

the agency could not visit the residence. Athens App. No. 24CA6 23

{¶53} The evidence also demonstrates that before Appellant moved in with

his paramour, he had not shown a consistent ability to maintain a safe, stable home

for the children. The agency caseworker described the family’s home at the time

of the children’s removal as “deplorable.”

{¶54} Appellant’s failure to secure adequate housing for the children

supports a finding, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), that he failed continuously and

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be

placed outside their home. See In re An.M., 2022-Ohio-2873, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.)

(upholding trial court’s finding that the mother did not substantially remedy the

conditions that caused the child’s removal when the evidence showed that the

mother did not “obtain safe and stable housing”); In re S.S., 2003-Ohio-319, ¶ 15

(2d Dist.) (upholding trial court’s finding that the father did not substantially

remedy the conditions that caused the child’s removal when the evidence showed

that the father “did not secure permanent housing, but continued to reside in the

homes of various females”); see also In re B.J.L., 2019-Ohio-555, ¶ 76 (4th Dist.)

(upholding permanent custody judgment when the evidence showed that the

“father ha[d] not maintained stable housing for any significant length of time”); In

re K.J., 2008-Ohio-5227, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.) (upholding permanent custody judgment

when the parents had “not obtained independent, stable housing”); In re Barnhart,

2002-Ohio-6024, ¶ 43 (4th Dist.) (“by not acquiring independent housing,” the Athens App. No. 24CA6 24

father showed that he was “unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for”

the child). In re Goff, 2004-Ohio-7235, ¶ 55 (11th Dist.) (upholding permanent

custody judgment when “[t]he record clearly demonstrate[d] that, at no time during

the[] proceedings, ha[d the parent] been able to provide safe and sanitary

housing”). The existence of this one factor alone supports the trial court’s finding

that the children cannot be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time or

should not be placed with him. E.g., C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 50.

{¶55} Appellant nevertheless argues that his clinician and the children’s

GAL “suggested that placement with [him] could realistically happen within the

following six months.” He noted that his clinician stated that Appellant has not

returned a positive drug screen since July 2023. This clinician further testified that

Appellant’s “anger issues had significantly improved” since July 2023. The

clinician also indicated that she expected to see Appellant continuing to improve

his situation.

{¶56} Appellant asserts that the GAL likewise had faith in his ability to

improve his situation. Appellant states that given all of the above, the evidence

fails to clearly and convincingly show that the children cannot be placed with him

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him.

{¶57} We do not agree with Appellant. While the evidence may show that

Appellant has made some progress, the court emphasized his repeated anger issues Athens App. No. 24CA6 25

with the agency caseworkers, which hindered his case plan progress. Furthermore,

part of the reason that the agency could not verify whether Appellant’s current

living situation would be appropriate for the children stemmed from Appellant’s

threats. And even though the agency did not visit this home, the agency received

reports that “multiple individuals” had been observed at the property, including

teenagers who had been living in a shed. This evidence suggests that this home

would not be a safe and stable home environment for the children. Thus, the

record does not contain any evidence that Appellant secured housing that would be

suitable for the children.

{¶58} In sum, we do not believe that the evidence weighs heavily against a

finding that the children cannot be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with him. The trial court’s finding is not, therefore, against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

Best Interest

{¶59} Appellant next argues that the trial court’s best interest finding is

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶60} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a trial court to consider all relevant, as

well as specific, factors to determine whether a child’s best interest will be served

by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The specific factors

include: (1) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, Athens App. No. 24CA6 26

siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person

who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly

by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the

child’s maturity; (3) the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a legally

secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved

without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors

listed under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.

{¶61} Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children

services agency will promote a child’s best interest involves a delicate balancing of

“all relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory

factors.” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513,

¶ 56; accord In re C.G., 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.); In re N.W., 2008-Ohio-

297, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). However, none of the best interest factors requires a court

to give it “greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57. Instead, the

trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest

determination. In re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-

Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child’s best interest is served by

placing the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and

security.” In re C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of

Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991). Athens App. No. 24CA6 27

{¶62} In the case at bar, as we explain below, we do not believe that the trial

court’s best interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The agency presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the

children in its permanent custody would serve the children’s best interest.

Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships

{¶63} By all accounts, the children and Appellant share a strong bond. The

court found that the family is “very close” to each other.

{¶64} The evidence shows that the foster family has provided the children

with a suitable home. Since being placed in this home, the children consistently

have attended school and have engaged in extracurricular activities. Even if the

foster home is not the children’s desired placement, the foster family appears to be

having a positive effect on the children’s lives.

{¶65} We also recognize that “family unity and blood relationship may be

‘important factors’ to consider, but neither is controlling.” B.J.L., 2019-Ohio-555,

at ¶ 68 (4th Dist.), citing In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1703, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.). Indeed,

“neglected and dependent children are entitled to stable, secure, nurturing and

permanent homes in the near term . . . and their best interest is the pivotal factor in

permanency case.” In re T.S., 2009-Ohio-5496, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). Thus, while

biological relationships may be important considerations, they are not controlling

when ascertaining a child’s best interest. In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1706, ¶ 163 (8th Athens App. No. 24CA6 28

Dist.); accord In re J.F., 2018-Ohio-96, ¶ 65 (8th Dist.) (stating that the “existence

of a positive relationship,” by itself, is not determinative of the child’s best

interest); In re S.S.-1, 2018-Ohio-1349, ¶ 76 (4th Dist.).

Children’s Wishes

{¶66} The children would like to be reunified with Appellant. The GAL did

not recommend that the court reunify the children with Appellant, but she did

suggest that the court give Appellant more time to demonstrate that he could

provide the children with an adequate home. See C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 55

(R.C. 2151.414 “unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering the

child’s wishes directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem”); In re

S.M., 2014-Ohio-2961, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.) (recognizing that R.C. 2151.414 permits

juvenile courts to consider a child’s wishes as child directly expresses or through

the GAL).

Custodial History

{¶67} The children lived with both parents until their May 2022 removal.

Before their removal, the agency had protective supervision of the children for

around eight months. When the agency filed its May 2023 permanent custody

motions, the agency had been involved with the family for approximately two

years. Athens App. No. 24CA6 29

Legally Secure Permanent Placement

{¶68} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the term ‘legally

secure permanent placement,’ this court and others have generally interpreted the

phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be

met.” In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.), citing In re Dyal, 2001 WL

925423, *9 (4th Dist. Aug. 9, 2001) (implying that “legally secure permanent

placement” means a “stable, safe, and nurturing environment”); see also In re

K.M., 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) (observing that legally secure permanent

placement requires more than stable home and income but also requires

environment that will provide for child’s needs); In re J.H., 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95

(11th Dist.) (stating that mother unable to provide legally secure permanent

placement when she lacked physical and emotional stability and that father unable

to do so when he lacked grasp of parenting concepts); In re J.W., 2007-Ohio-2007,

¶ 34 (10th Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (stating that a legally secure permanent

placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”); Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to mean, in part, “not exposed to

danger; safe; so strong, stable or firm as to insure safety”); id. (defining

“permanent” to mean, in part, “[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same state, status,

place, or the like without fundamental or marked change, not subject to fluctuation,

or alteration, fixed or intended to be fixed; lasting; abiding; stable; not temporary Athens App. No. 24CA6 30

or transient”). Thus, “[a] legally secure permanent placement is more than a house

with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a

child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for

the child’s needs.” M.B. at ¶ 56.

{¶69} Here, the record indicates that the children need a legally secure

permanent placement and that they cannot achieve this type of placement without

granting the agency temporary custody. As the trial court found, Appellant has a

history of being unable to maintain a safe, stable, and sanitary environment for the

children. At the time of the permanent custody hearing, he was living with his

paramour in the paramour’s mother’s house. The agency had received reports of

multiple people living on the property. Additionally, partly due to Appellant’s

threats to agency caseworkers, the agency was unable to visit this home.

Furthermore, Appellant had not taken other steps to ensure that he would be able to

provide the children with a legally secure permanent placement.

{¶70} Appellant nevertheless asserts that the agency could have sought two

six-month temporary custody extensions and that the children, therefore, did not

need a legally secure permanent placement.

{¶71} We observe that R.C. 2151.415(A)(6) allows an agency to request an

extension of temporary custody, unless “a motion for permanent custody described Athens App. No. 24CA6 31

in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code is required to be

made.” R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) provides as follows:

Except as provided in division (D)(3) of this section, if a child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the agency with custody shall file a motion requesting permanent custody of the child. . . . The motion shall be filed in the court that issued the current order of temporary custody. For the purposes of this division, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.

{¶72} If a child is “considered to have entered the temporary custody of an

agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to [R.C.] 2151.28

. . . or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home,” id., then

the children in the case at bar statutorily have been in the agency’s “temporary

custody” for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The court

adjudicated the children neglected and dependent on September 8, 2021. On May

17, 2022, the children were removed from the home. Sixty days after their

removal would have been in July 2022. The statute instructs that the earlier date,

September 8, 2021, controls. Thus, unless an exception applied,3 R.C.

3 R.C. 2151.413(D)(3) lists exceptions to the requirement that an agency file a permanent custody motion and states as follows:

An agency shall not file a motion for permanent custody under division (D)(1) or (2) of this section if any of the following apply: Athens App. No. 24CA6 32

2151.415(D)(1) seemingly required the agency to seek permanent custody of the

children in September 2022.

{¶73} Moreover, R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) states as follows:

No court shall grant an agency more than two extensions of temporary custody pursuant to division (D) of this section and the court shall not order an existing temporary custody order to continue beyond two years after the date on which the complaint was filed or the child was first placed into shelter care, whichever date is earlier, regardless of whether any extensions have been previously ordered pursuant to division (D) of this section.

{¶74} In the case at bar, on June 24, 2021, the agency filed the neglect and

dependency complaints. This date is earlier than May 16, 2022, the date on which

the children were placed into shelter care. Thus, according to R.C.

2151.415(D)(4), the trial court could not have entered an order that continued the

children in the agency’s temporary custody beyond June 24, 2023. Consequently,

we disagree with Appellant’s argument that the trial court could have granted the

(a) The agency documents in the case plan or permanency plan a compelling reason that permanent custody is not in the best interest of the child.

(b) If reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s home are required under section 2151.419 of the Revised Code, the agency has not provided the services required by the case plan to the parents of the child or the child to ensure the safe return of the child to the child's home.

(c) The agency has been granted permanent custody of the child.

(d) The child has been returned home pursuant to court order in accordance with division (A)(3) of section 2151.419 of the Revised Code. Athens App. No. 24CA6 33

agency two six-month temporary custody extensions and that the children,

therefore, did not need a legally secure permanent placement.

{¶75} We also recognize that the evidence indicates that in July 2023,

Appellant was starting to make strides to improve his life and well-being and

began to engage in some of the case plan activities. As we have observed several

times in the past, however, a parent’s case plan compliance may be a relevant, but

not necessarily a conclusive, factor when a court considers a permanent custody

motion. In re E.R., 2023-Ohio-1468, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.); In re B.P., 2021-Ohio-3148,

¶ 57 (4th Dist.); In re T.J., 2016-Ohio-163, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.), citing In re R.L., 2014-

Ohio-3117, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.) (“although case plan compliance may be relevant to a

trial court’s best interest determination, it is not dispositive of it”); In re S.C.,

2015-Ohio-2280, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (“Compliance with a case plan is not, in and of

itself, dispositive of the issue of reunification”); accord In re K.M., 2019-Ohio-

4252, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.), citing In re W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.)

(“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is not necessarily dispositive on the

issue of reunification and does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a

children’s services agency”); In re N.L., 2015-Ohio-4165, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.)

(“substantial compliance with a case plan, in and of itself, does not establish that a

grant of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous”). “Indeed, because the trial

court’s primary focus in a permanent custody proceeding is the child’s best Athens App. No. 24CA6 34

interest, ‘it is entirely possible that a parent could complete all of his/her case plan

goals and the trial court still appropriately terminate his/her parental rights.’ ”

W.C.J. at ¶ 46, quoting In re Gomer, 2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.); accord In re

K.J., 2008-Ohio-5227, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.) (“when considering a R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the focus is upon the child’s best

interests, not upon the parent’s compliance with the case plan”). Thus, a parent’s

case plan compliance will not preclude a trial court from awarding permanent

custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the child’s best interest.

Id. Accordingly, even though Appellant has made some improvements in his life,

those improvements do not override the children’s best interest.

{¶76} While we do not doubt that Appellant loves his children and

desperately wants to reunite with them, his actions regrettably do not show that he

will provide the children with the legally secure permanent placement that their

best interests demand.

{¶77} This court has recognized that a parent’s past history is one of the best

predictors of future behavior. In re West, 2005-Ohio-2977, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), citing

In re A.S., 2004-Ohio-6323, 2004 WL 2698408, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.) (“Past history is

often the best predictor of future conduct. While surely people can change, the

facts do not indicate that [the biological parents] have the motivation or ability to

follow through and do what is necessary to regain custody of their child.”); In re Athens App. No. 24CA6 35

Vaughn, 2000 WL 33226177, *7 (4th Dist. Dec. 6, 2000) (“To further the interests

of the children, the court must consider any evidence available to it, including a

parent's pattern of conduct. Some of the most reliable evidence for the court to

consider is the past history of the children and the parents.”); see also In re Brown,

60 Ohio App.3d 136, 139 (1st Dist.1989) (stating that the mother’s “past parenting

history and her ability to comply with prior reunification plans regarding her other

children were relevant considerations in the juvenile court's dispositional

determination” to award a children services agency permanent custody).

{¶78} Here, Appellant’s past behavior unfortunately documents that he

failed to maintain any stable, consistent, and sanitary environment suitable for the

children. While he claims that his paramour’s mother’s house is a suitable

residence, the agency was unable to visit the residence. Furthermore, given that

Appellant does not own the residence, the likely permanency of this residence is

unknown.

{¶79} Given the children’s progress and stabilization while in the agency’s

temporary custody, the trial court could have quite reasonably decided not to

experiment with their welfare by continuing them in custodial limbo to give

Appellant more time to demonstrate that he could provide the children with a

legally secure permanent placement. We repeatedly have recognized that trial

courts need not experiment with a child’s welfare: Athens App. No. 24CA6 36

“[A] child should not have to endure the inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to give the * * * [parent] an opportunity to prove her suitability. To anticipate the future, however, is at most, a difficult basis for a judicial determination. The child’s present condition and environment is the subject for decision not the expected or anticipated behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the * * * [parent]. * * * The law does not require the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.”

W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841, at ¶ 48 (4th Dist.), quoting In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d

123, 126 (5th Dist.1987).

{¶80} In the case before us, the trial court determined that the children were

thriving in the foster home, and it did not have any obligation to experiment with

their welfare by providing Appellant additional time to establish a legally secure

permanent placement, especially given Appellant’s history of failing to maintain an

adequate home for the children. The children need “stability and security . . . to

become productive and well-adjusted members of the adult community.”

Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d at 324. Their best interests thus will be “served by

placing them in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.”

C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing Ridenour. Consequently, the

evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the children need a legally secure

permanent placement and that they cannot achieve this type of placement without

granting the agency permanent custody. Athens App. No. 24CA6 37

Conclusion

{¶81} Based upon all of the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the

evidence weighs heavily against the trial court’s judgment granting the agency

permanent custody of the children. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing

reasons, we overrule Appellant’s first and second assignments of error.

Third Assignment of Error

{¶82} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court

erred by failing to appoint an attorney to represent the children.

{¶83} We initially observe that Appellant did not request the trial court to

appoint independent counsel for the children. Therefore, Appellant failed to

preserve the issue for purposes of appeal. B.J.L., 2019-Ohio-555, at ¶ 41 (4th

Dist.), citing In re C.B., 2011-Ohio-2899, ¶ 18. We nevertheless may review this

assignment of error for plain error. See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources,

Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 2015-Ohio-3731, ¶ 27 (stating that reviewing court has

discretion to consider forfeited constitutional challenges). As we explain below,

we do not believe that the trial court committed an error, plain or otherwise, by

failing to appoint—or by failing to inquire whether to appoint—independent

counsel for the children.

{¶84} “[A] child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to Athens App. No. 24CA6 38

terminate parental rights is a party to that proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to

independent counsel in certain circumstances.” In re Williams, 2004-Ohio-1500,

syllabus, citing R.C. 2151.352, Juv.R. 4(A), and Juv.R. 2(Y). Williams does not

mandate that a child always have independent counsel in a juvenile court

proceeding to terminate parental rights. Instead, a child is entitled to independent

counsel in a parental-rights termination proceeding only when “certain

circumstances” exist. Id.

{¶85} The Williams court did not explicitly explain the “certain

circumstances” that would warrant the appointment of independent counsel.

Instead, the court offered the following guidance for juvenile courts to follow when

ascertaining if “certain circumstances” exist: “courts should make a determination,

on a case-by-case basis, whether the child actually needs independent counsel,

taking into account the maturity of the child and the possibility of the guardian ad

litem being appointed to represent the child.” Id. at ¶ 17. Furthermore, a juvenile

court must appoint independent counsel for a child “when a guardian ad litem who

is also appointed as the juvenile’s attorney recommends a disposition that conflicts

with the juvenile's wishes.” Id. at ¶ 18.

{¶86} Consequently, a trial court ordinarily should appoint independent

counsel for a child “ ‘when the child has consistently and repeatedly expressed a

strong desire that differs and is otherwise inconsistent with the guardian ad litem’s Athens App. No. 24CA6 39

recommendations.’ ” In re V.L., 2016-Ohio-4898, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.), quoting In re

B.K., 2011-Ohio-4470, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.); accord In re Hilyard, 2006-Ohio-1965,

¶ 36 (4th Dist.).

{¶87} Here, the children’s desires and the GAL’s recommendations were

consistent. The children wished to be reunified with Appellant, and the GAL

recommended that the trial court give Appellant more time to work toward

reunification. Thus, we do not believe that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

appoint counsel to represent the children.

{¶88} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule

Appellant’s third assignment of error.

{¶89} Having overruled all of Appellant’s assignments of error, the

decision of the trial court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Athens App. No. 24CA6 40

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that costs be assessed to Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

_____________________________ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.