In re Frey

9 F. 376, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 10, 1881
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 9 F. 376 (In re Frey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Frey, 9 F. 376, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).

Opinion

Brown, D. J.

The bankrupts composed the firm of Prey Brothers & Co., carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling cigars, tobacco, etc., in the city of New York. They had a store in Yesey street, where they sold their goods, and a manufactory in another part of the city. On April 28, 1876, they made a voluntary assignment of their property to Charles Loeb, a brother-in-law of J. L. Haas, one of the firm, in trust for the equal benefit of their creditors. About June 28, 1876, a petition, by certain of their creditors, was filed against the firm, upon which they were subsequently adjudged bankrupts, and an assignee was subsequently appointed, to whom, after a long-contested suit in equity, resulting in setting aside the prior voluntary assignment, Loeb transferred what then remained in his hands of the bankrupts’ effects. The specifications filed in opposition to the bankrupts’ discharge state 14 grounds of objection, upon which a great mass of testimony has been taken.

The first objection, that the bankrupts failed to transmit a schedule of creditors, and a verified inventory, etc., in the form and manner required by section. 5030, is obviated by their subsequent filing of those schedules, which is certified to by the register.

The second objection, that the assets do not equal 30 per cent.; that no assent of creditors has been obtained; and the fourteenth objection, that the debtors made a voluntary assignment as above stated, — are neither of them valid objections to a discharge in involuntary bankruptcy such as this. Sections 5112a, 5021.

The third objection is that Jacob L. Haas, one of the bankrupts, swore falsely upon his examination, at the instance of the assignee, [377]*377on August 3,1877, concerning the disposition of certain tobacco said to have been consigned to Beadles, Wood & Co., of New Orleans. This examination was three years prior to this proceeding for discharge. The examination was never read over or signed by the bankrupt. The counsel for the creditors, in the course of these proceedings, sought to compel the debtor to sign the old examination for the purpose of using it, as it stood, as evidence upon this proceeding. On examining the former testimony, which was originally taken by a stenographer, the debtor alleged that there were inaccuracies and errors in taking or transcribing it, and refused to sign it. Upon request of the counsel for the opposing creditors the matter was certified to the court, and, upon hearing before Judge Choate, this court, in January, 1881, declined to make any order requiring the debtor to sign the paper presented as his former testimony. This former deposition, not having been read to or signed by the debtor, was manifestly incomplete, and not of itself competent evidence upon this proceeding, in which the rules of evidence are the same as in ordinary trials. In re Van Buren, 2 Fed. Rep. 643, 649. No other evidence than this unsigned and incomplete deposition was offered to sustain the charge of previous false testimony; and, as this deposition was rightly rejected, the third objection is overruled as not sustained by any competent evidence.

The fourth, fifth, ninth, and tenth objections allege a fraudulent concealment, or fraudulent gift or transfer, of property, through shipments of tobacco, in February and March, 1876, to Beadles, Wood & Co., of New Orleans, and Zacharias & Co., of Chicago. The charge of an attempt at concealment or fraud in those shipments seems to have been based upon failure to find any accounts opened with those firms in the ledger or journal. The evidence shows, however, that these shipments were on consignment, and were entered not only on the United States revenue book, kept by the bankrupts, but in special consignment books kept with those firms. The remittances received from each firm, on account of the consigned goods, were duly entered on the cash-book, and the corresponding entries, under the head of “merchandise,” were made in the journal and ledger, as parts of various aggregate entries from the cash-book, as pointed out by Mr. Haas in his testimony. These entries seem to be inconsistent with the theory of either concealment or fraud, nor do I find any sufficient evidence to sustain these charges.

The sixth and seventh objections allege concealment of books and papers, negligence in the custody of them, as well as false and [378]*378fraudulent entries therein, specially with reference to the alleged-shipments of Beadles, Wood & Co., above referred to. But I fail to find any evidence sufficient to sustain either of these charges. Mr. Haas swears to the correctness of the entries; no one contradicts him; and the opposing creditors did not procure the testimony of either Harmon or any member of the firm of Beadles, Wood & Co., by whom they could most easily have proved the falsity of these entries, if fictitious. All the bankrupts’ books and papers legally passed into the custody of their voluntary assignee; some were confessedly lost in subsequent legal proceedings without their fault; and I do not find any evidence, of the firm’s retention of any of them, or of negligence in keeping or turning them over.

The eighth objection charges fraudulent payments, gifts, and transfers, to the amount of $74,000, to Lagowitz & Co. These payments are alleged to have been made by checks, which were not put in evidence, and were proved only by the very imperfect evidence of the stubs of the check-book, which bore on each the word “exchange,” or “exch.” Mr. Haas testified that they were all given in exchange for checks or cash to the same amount received by Lagowitz & Co. A bundle of such checks of Lagowitz & Co. was produced on the hearing and offered for examination. I find many of them noted on the deposit side of the check-book, extending down to near the time of failure. This charge is not, therefore, sustained. Nor do I find any evidence of any fraudulent payment to Loeb & Co., as further charged in this same objection; nor that the claims proved by Lagowitz & Co. and-by L. Haas are either false or fictitious, as charged by the eleventh objection.

The twelfth objection alleges that the bankrupts did not keep proper books of account, but kept them go carelessly and incorrectly, so far as the bulk of their transactions are concerned, that said books are utterly incapable of explaining the manner in which their business was conducted; that there is little connection between the cashbook, check-book, and bills-payable book; that much money was received of which there is to trace, and that the bulk of the payments for bills payable from January 1, 1876, to April, 1876, when they failed, are inexplicable; that no stock-book was kept; that checks were drawn not traceable in the cash-book or elsewhere; that it is impossible to balance the books, or ascertain from them a true statement or record as to what disposition the bankrupts made of their property between January and April, 1876.

The evidence shows that the books were kept by double entry; [379]*379.that an invoice-book, which dispenses with the need of a stock-book, (In re White, 2 N. B. R. 590,) was properly kept, and that all the other usual or necessary books of account were also kept. The objection being, therefore, to the manner in which the books were kept, and to imperfections or omissions therein, general objections like those above stated are not sufficient. The particular irregularities or omissions must be pointed out in the specifications to entitle them to be considered. In re Littlefield, 3 N.B. R. 57; Hammond

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Bluebook (online)
9 F. 376, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-frey-nysd-1881.